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This thesis attempts to explain Italian intervention 
in World War I as essentially a product of various 
domestic economic and political issues. It begins with a 
discussion of the growing economic difficulties in the 
years before 1914, problems which lead to greater organis­
ation amongst both employers and labour and the collapse 
of Giovanni Giolitti's former political dominance. The 
emergence of Italian imperial aspirations in North and 
East Africa, the Balkans and Asia Minor is then followed. 
This is seen as a further symptom of Italy's economic 
malaise, and as the ground for cooperation between agrarian 
and industrial interests. Italy's demands in 1915 are linked 
to this imperialist programme developed over the previous 
decade. Salandra's decision to pull Italy out of the Triple 
Alliance and join the Entente powers is also caused in part 
by the constant clash of economic interests between Italy 
and the Central Powers in both the Balkans and Asia Minor: 
above all in their diametrically opposed railway plans 
which are of such great importance to both Rome and Berlin.
Further pressure for intervention comes through 
the economic crisis of neutrality, bringing with it the 
threat of a repetition of the insurrection in June 1914, 
Neutrality also demonstrates Italy's dependence on Britain 
for vital raw materials and security on the seas, and 
brings a growing demand for intervention from industri­
alists. This demand also springs from a desire for 
lucrative state contracts, and a mounting distrust of the 
Banca Commerciale -which is attacked as a vehicle of 
German domination over economic and political life in 
Italy.
Salandra is shown to use the campaign against 
this bank to strengthen his position in the political
3struggle against Giolitti: while intervention in the war 
also serves as a means to set Italian politics on a new 
course. The final chapter discusses the appearance and 
significance of the nationalist movement; in particular, 
its influence throughout the Italian press and on members 
of 3alandra!s Cabinet. The similar short-term goals of 
the government and the nationalists leads to much tacit 
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The Decline of G-iolittian Italy
Interest in the closing decades of liberal Italy, or 
what has come to be known as ^'eta giolittiana*, has 
developed rapidly in the last twenty years, with a flood of 
research on many aspects of the period. Much of this work is 
clearly written with an eye to contemporary polemic, aiming 
to demonstrate or refute the incipient authoritarianism 
within liberal democratic institutions, with fascism in the 
nineteen-twenties marking either a confirmation of what was 
already implicit in Giolitti*s benign dictatorship -Salvem- 
ini's famous thesis that fLa differenza fra Mussolini e 
Giolitti era in quantita e non in qualita. Giolitti fu per 
Mussolini quel che Giovanni il battezzatore fu per Gristo: 
gli preparb la strada’1 is an example of this approach- or 
alternatively suggesting that it is merely a parenthesis in 
modern Italian history, with the essentially democratic nature 
of the unitary state reaffirmed in 1945* An event as impor­
tant as intervention in World War I is obviously a prime 
target for such treatment. In the nineteen-fifties and sixties 
more conservative historians such as G. De Biase and G.
Gifuni insisted on Salandra's decision to intervene in the 
war as a product of his desire to win the irredentist lands 
in a national war against Austria-Hungary, a desire shared 
by the majority of Italians and threatened only by Giolitti*s 
unpatriotic intrigues; while A. Caracciolo located the drive 
for intervention in the potential economic gains from war 
production for the industrial bourgeoisie, with the role of 
the government as the servant of this class taken as axiom-
p
atic- despite the presence of a leading southern landowner
1 G. Salvemini, II ministro della malavita e altri scritti 
sull*eta giolittiana, ed. G. Apih (Milan 1962), p. 555
2 See C. De Biase, La rivelazione di Giolitti del dicembre 
1914- (Modena 19b0); G. Gifuni, * Tre memorabile giornata* ,
II Risorgimento, X (1958), pp. 79-90; A. Caracciolo,
1L*intervento italiano in guerra e la crisi politica italiana 
del 1914-15’, Societa, X (1954), pp. 809-26 and 986-1012
7as prime minister and the continuing importance of agric­
ulture in the economic and political life of Italy*
In 1966 Brunello Yigezzi published the first volume 
of L!Italia di fronte alia prima guerra mondiale, an immen­
sely long and detailed study of the first months of Italian 
neutrality. In this work Vigezzi lays great emphasis on 
the ambiguities and uncertainties of Italy's domestic polit­
ical climate (giving in the process a clear explanation of 
some of the diplomatic implications of the struggle between 
Giolitti and Salandra), and is at pains to reject any 
schematic interpretation of the period. He is equally firm 
in rejecting the influence of economic imperatives on 
Italian diplomacy -rather,
si pub vedere come la politica estera italiana soffra 
del difetto opposto, e come sia povera, oscillante, 
incerta anche perchb non ha grandi e precisi 
"interessi economici" da tutelare e da promuovere... 
La pressioni "dirette" delle forze economiche, in 
realta, si riducono entro limiti circoscritti e 
non ledono, in alcun modo, 1'indipendenza del 
governo nelle scelte decisive.3
For Vigezzi, then, 'il dato fondamentale che emerge non pub 
essere cancellato; e il relativo, preoccupante distacco fra 
la vita politica e la vita economica opera e continuera ad 
operare.' Yet, as he goes on immediately to add, 'tutto cib 
e ben lungo dall*esaurire la discussione!’^  An understanding 
of the decision to intervene in May 1915 is in fact possible 
only through an examination of the ten months of neutrality 
made with regard to important trends in preceding years in 
both economic and political spheres. Issues such as the 
mounting hostility toward the personality and policies of 
Giovanni Giolitti among important elements of Italian 
society, leading to his replacement by Antonio Salandra as 
head of a faction which, while still liberal in name, was in 
practice strongly conservative and authoritarian; the sense 
of crisis amongst much of Italy's ruling elites at the down­
turn of the economy after 1911, and the related upsurge of 
socialist and anarchist forces which in June 1914 proved 
themselves temporarily able to destroy with ease the
3 B. Vigezzi, L'Italia*..(Milan 1966), vol. 1, p. L
4 ibid., p. LI
8constituted power in large areas of Italy; the emergence of 
an indigenous Italian imperialism in the decade before inter­
vention, which in the last decade has been widely discussed 
in Italian historiography; and the eagerness of industrial­
ists and landowners to win independence from G-erman finance, 
believed with some justice to exercise control over many 
important sectors of the economy via the Banca Commerciale 
Italiana, and also to head off the increasingly threatening 
attack on the whole system of protective tariffs. All these 
questions would have a vital influence on Salandra's decis­
ion for intervention with the entente powers.
Throughout this study the emphasis will be on the 
factors which drew the government into committing Italy to 
the war. Clearly this decision was in no sense inevitable, 
and the limited attention paid to the influences and indiv­
iduals working for continued neutrality is not meant to 
suggest that they were a negligible force. Rather, it is 
hoped through concentrating on the domestic pressures for 
war to show why even Giolitti's immense prestige, supported 
until only days before intervention by a majority of deputies, 
proved unable to block the drive for war. In this perspec­
tive war can be seen as a great opportunity to sweep away 
the supposedly socialistic G-iolitti, and establish Italian 
politics firmly on a new course, both internally and in 
a more expansionist foreign policy. The onslaught on pre­
war Italy, and in particular on Giolitti, was at its most 
vehement in Idea Nazionale and other nationalist or nation­
alist-influenced journals, and a study of the nationalist 
movement sheds much light on the domestic pressures for war 
in 1915* Whatever its origins, the Associazione Nazionalista 
Italiana (A.N.I.) operated by the eve of war as the mouth­
piece of frustrated industrialists, the earlier ideological 
sympathy for the Central Powers rapidly evaporating in the 
face of Austro-G-erman economic endeavours in the Balkans 
and Asia Minor, areas believed to be the preserve of Italian 
enterprise.
Nor were such domestic benefits merely the by-product 
of a decision made primarily on diplomatic grounds. Documents 
of the period will repeatedly reveal politicians, journalists
9and industrialists all discussing intervention purely in 
terms of the possible repercussions on domestic politics. 
Salandra and Sonnino rejected the substantial Austrian 
concessions in the expectation that a fairly short, succe­
ssful war would bolster Italian institutions, and above all 
give a new lease of life to the monarchy. Extraneous factors 
such as the apparently imminent allied breakthrough in 
the Dardanelles influenced the government’s timing, but 
underlying all was the opportunistic impulse to war. The 
Italian government's discussions with Austria had for months 
been only a delaying tactic while the serious negotiations 
went on in London. Writing in his diary during this period, 
Minister of Colonies Ferdinando Martini referred to d’Azeg- 
lio’s opinion that the strongest impulse in every Italian 
is toward civil war, and noted himself, 'Se non ci sarci. la 
guerra esterna ci sar& la guerra civile.1'* The origins of 
such pessimism and the sense of latent crisis which would 
encourage Salandra to gamble on internal renewal through 
military success can be found in the problems of earlier 
years, in political difficulties rooted above all in Italy’s 
economic malaise.
Italy’s industrial take-off dates from around 1898, 
following a prolonged slump over the previous decade. Expan­
sion continued at a rapid pace until the major crisis of 
1907; a census of 1910 charted the rise of industrial 
concerns from 9,000 in 1861 to 117,000 in 1903 and then a 
further doubling before the war. The creation of ’mixed banks' 
on the German model was of crucial importance in channelling 
credit into industry, making available the savings of many 
thousands of small investors. Banking corporations more 
than doubled their capital in the forty years before 1914, 
a measure of their increasing power and influence in the
5 P. Martini, Diario. 1914-1918, ed. G. De Rosa (Milan 
1966), pp. 315 (28 Jan. 1915) and 415 (12 May 1915)
10
economy.^ Yet as expansion turned dramatically into slump 
in 1907, many industrialists came increasingly to mistrust 
the banks and searched for alternative means of raising 
capital, so ending their almost total dependence on a 
handful of banks for this task. This was only one factor 
in the fundamental restructuring of the major Italian firms 
which occurred in the years after 1907. Piercer internatio­
nal competition and German dumping on a large scale drove 
Italian industry toward organisation by trust (a process 
which will also be shown to answer to difficulties caused 
by the limited domestic market) as the only means to 
compete in the world markets, while the switch of much 
capital into safer areas such as the public debt after 1907
exarcebates the problems of capital formation in a rather
7
small home economy. Indeed an important repercussion of 
the 1907 crisis was to pull still tighter the links between 
the banks and many industrial sectors -Doria has followed 
this process in Liguria, where the flight of capital from 
industry in the wake of this crisis led to its replacement 
by banking capital from Lombardy, Piedmont and from Prance, 
which established a powerful presence in almost all impor­
tant industries. The Banca Gommerciale and the Credito 
Italiano, the two most important mixed banks in the penin­
sula, were especially active, gaining control or a strong 
influence in chemicals, textiles, building and especially 
the heavy engineering industry. It is of interest in this 
respect that the demand for action against the Banca 
Oommerciale (demands which will be discussed in detail 
later) came most strongly from this region.
The protracted economic depression which sets in
6 On Italian industrialisation, see P. Bonelli, Osservazioni 
e dati sul finanziamento dell1industria italiana all’inizio 
del sec. XX (Turin 19b8); A. Gonfalonieri, Banca e indust­
ria in Italia, 1894-1906, vols. 2-3 (Milan 1974-76); E. 
Corbino, Annali dell*economia italiana (Citta di Castello 
1931), vols. 4-3; and J. S. Cohen, ’Financing Industrial­
isation in Italy, 1894-19141, J.E.H., XXVII (1967), PP. 
363-82
7 On the events of this year, see P. Bonelli, La crisi del 
1907. Una tappa dello sviluppo industriale in Italia 
(Turin 1971)
8 G. Doria, Investimenti e sviluppo economico a Genova alia 
vigilia della prima guerra mondiale, vol. 2 1883-1914 
(Milan 1973), pp. 321-38. For figures, see p. 337nl3 and 
nl4 and p. 338nl6
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from 1911, culminating in a further crisis two years later, 
provides the key to future political developments in the 
period before intervention. Riccardo Bachi wrote in the 
volume of his authoritative annual economic surveys for 1913 
that
la situazione ha preso piu decisamente l'aspetto di 
crisi...per molti rami di attivitk industriale... 
si presenta decisa la sovra produzione: cosi si 
vanno moltiplicando le intese, gli accordi, i 
consorzi per sistematiche riduzione di attivita 
e per il sostegno dei prezzi.9
Bachi pointed in particular to the ’ormai annosa astensione
del privato risparmio dagli investimenti industriali.'
These aspects of Italy's economic difficulties were also
stressed by Gino Borgatta in an important article in the
Rivista delle Societa Commerciali (the official journal
of Italian industry and commerce) of October 1913. Borgatta
warned that
l’economia italiana deve attendersi piu un peggior- 
amento che un miglioramento dei grandi mercati 
europei con i quali e in rapporto commerciale e 
finanziario: e piu probabile ancora deve attend­
ersi il permanere se non 11accentuarsi dell’alto 
saggio degli sconti e degli interessi e delle 
difficolta di avere capitali disponibili per 
propri bisogni normali o nuovi.ll
The conjunction of an international monetary and financial
squeeze with Italy’s own continuing credit problems proved
disastrous for an industrial sector still relatively weak
and vulnerable to any international fluctuations. Borgatta
underlined the role of organisation by cartels within each
industry in the attempt to escape from these problems:
Leila organizzazione tecnico-finanziaria di parecchi 
dei nostri gruppi industriali si e in questi 
ultimi anni accentuato un fenomeno che nelle dich- 
iarazioni di coloro che lo attuano avrebbe dovuto 
e dovrebbe avere una influenza decisiva a superare 
e neutralizzare le condizioni di crisi delle Indus­
trie: il tentativo e 1 1esperimento di accordi e 
sindacati industriali in proporzioni sempre maggiori 
. ..Gia 1’anno scorso rilevavamo come ai compiuti 
accordi nelle industrie zuccheriere, siderurgiche, 
zolfo, vetrerie, superfosfati, fiammiferi, distill- 
azione, si andassero aggiungendo tentativi sempre
9 R. Bachi, L1Italia economica nell'anno 1913 (Cittk di 
Gastello 1914), pp.X-XII
10 ibid., p.X
11 G. Borgatta, 'La depressione industriale ed il mercato 
finanziario in Italia', Rivista delle Societa Commerciali,
III (1913), p.184
12
piu vasti di accordi nelle industrie della birra, 
juta, lino, concierie, cotoniere, seriche. Anche 
nel 1912 i tentativi sono continuati: si e compi- 
uta la preparazione di un grande ente regolatore, 
l'Istituto cotoniere, si segnalano accordi per fini 
parziali nell'industria della canapa, della carta 
etc. Parecchi di questi experimenti sono un visi- 
bile prodotto, almeno in parte, dello stato di 
depressione industriale: gli accordi nelle industrie 
dello zolf0, birra, distillazione, cotoniere etc., 
corrispondono visibilmente ad una situazione indus­
triale in cui alia larghezza ed all'aumento degli 
impianti, dei prodotti, degli stocks, non si contra- 
ppone un aumento, o un sufficiente aumento, delle 
domande e del consumo specie nazionale.12
The Italian economist also pointed out the basic flaw in
this response of the peninsula's industry, arguing that
l'estendersi del fenomeno non piu non preoccupare, 
anche dal lato della produzione, ma da quelle del 
consumo e dei capitali disponibili, in minor misura 
ed a saggi piu alti: ora, il rimedio trovato solo in 
rialzi di prezzi e maggiori difficolta di consumo, 
pub certo temporaneamente giovare a qualche gruppo 
produttore, ma non tocca le radici del male che 
sono in parte appunto nelle condizioni delle domande 
e del consumo, anzi lo aggrava, nel suo aspetto 
generale, col rincrudimento dei prezzi.13
Pepe's recent study follows Borgatta on this point,
relating the crisis of 1913 to the shortage of investment
capital which had characterised the Italian economy since
industrialisation. This latest slump demonstrated
quella piu profonda e drammatica contraddizione 
dello sviluppo industriale italiano che...concern- 
eva 1'impossibilita del capitalismo nazionale di 
finanziare una industrializzazione monopo.listica 
altamente concentrata. Non era possibile in Italia 
garantire al tempo stesso 1'accumulazione allargata, 
il reinvestimento industriale e il saggio dei prof- 
itti, quindi una riproduzione adeguata dell'intero 
meccanismo.14
Hence the move to organisation by trusts offered no solut­
ion to the economic problems faced by Italy before 1914.
In 1911 a bank consortium headed by the state Banca d'ltalia, 
had to open a credit of ninety-six million lire for the 
iron cartel, whose condition -in the opinion of the bank's
12 ibid., p.186
13 Ibid.
14 A.Pepe, Lotta di classe e crisi industriale in Italia: La 
svolta del 1913 (Milan 1978), p.26. See Chapter I for a 
discussion of the progress of Italian capitalism before 
1914
13
Director, Bonaldo Stringher- 'davano argomento a qualche
preoccupazione, segnatamente a cagione della mancanza
di indirizzo e di disciplina nella produzione.1 The
government’s action was necessary, as
un arresto nello svolgimento, anzi nella vita 
stessa di un’industria cospicua e tanto preminente, 
avrebbe avuto gravi conseguenze per i capitali, 
per il lavoro e per l’assetto organico dell’Italia 
industriale, in un momento di depressione se non di 
vera crisi.15
As well as revealing the extent of the economic down­
turn in 1911, Stringher's remarks (and the rapid support 
forthcoming from the state) suggest the essentially artif­
icial nature of the iron and steel industry, which had in 
fact been created by government fiat in the previous century 
ahd was always completely dependent on state contracts for 
its survival, a fact of great significance during the months 
of neutrality in 1914-15* In January 1913 La Metallurgia 
italiana admitted that, 'L'attivitk del mercato Siderurgico 
Nazionale nell'anno decorso non fu certamente quello che 
era lecito attendere dalle brillanti notizie che sempre
informavano i resoconti dei mercati esteri.'1  ^The journal’s
%
open hostility to Germany -fE un vero abuso del "dumping-
system" di cui lo "Stahl Verband" fa sfoggio verso 1’Italia,
alio scopo di annientare la nostra industria siderurgica*-
and its avowal that the only firms prospering were those
fulfilling ’importanti ordinazioni dei Ministeri della
17Guerra e della Marina’ both foreshadow the pressure for 
intervention which would come strongly from this sector once 
war broke out in Europe. In the following month the journal 
published a letter from the Associazione fra gli industriali 
metallurgici italiani to Pietro Bertolini at the newly-formed 
Ministry of Colonies, expressing
15 Banca d*Italia, Relazione del direttore generale del 30 
marzo 1912 (Rome 1912), p. 24. At a meeting between Stri- 
ngher and various figures in the financial and industrial 
world held in April 1911? Arturo Luzzatto, a leading 
industrialist, admitted that 'in seguito ai costosi impianti 
fatti di quasi tutte le societa siderurgiche, & nata la 
preoccupazione di una eventuale sovraproduzione.’ Cited in 
Doria, op. cit., p. 358. On the problems in the industry
in 1911? see also the official monograph, A. Frumento, 
Imprese lombarde nella storia della siderurgia italiana: 
il contributo dei Falck (Milan 1952), pp. 216-17
16 La Metallurgia italiana, V (1913), p. 78
17 ibid.
14
la speranza che V.E. voglia riconoscere la opport­
unity di una diretta collaborazione delle Rappres- 
entanze della industria nazionale, e cio& delle 
Camere di Commercio e delle Associazioni Industriali, 
all’esame delle questioni d*indole economica, inter- 
essanti la madre Patria, che codesto Onor. Ministero 
sara chiamato a risolvere.18
With the declaration of war fresh problems arose of raw
material shortages, export bans and closed markets. Yet
these were extra handicaps imposed on an industry already
facing an insoluble problem of overproduction, a problem
which not even the war in Libya had been sufficient to
solve. Such a position was clearly untenable in the long
term, and created strong pressures for the opening up of
new markets overseas and for a radical change in Italy’s
tariff structure.
The parlous condition of heavy industry was matched
by several other important sectors. The problems of the
textile industry, for example, continued despite the move
to cartelised production in many of its individual branches.
In February 1910 the Associazione cotoniera italiana had been
forced to form a Unione filatori per 1*applicazione dello
short-time; this organisation, representing over seventy
firms employing approximately 70,000 workers, had enforced
over four and a half million days unemployment through short-
19time between March 1910 and January 1911. Cotton production
fell by between twenty-five and thirty-five per cent between 
201910 and 1911, leading to a major restructuring of the
entire industry in 1912. Yet over-production continued, to
be solved once again only by military demand. Indeed it seems
beyond doubt that the Italian economy had entered into a
serious depression in 1913, with inevitable effects on
the level of unemployment, as Bachi again makes clear:
Le condizioni dell1occupazione continuano sfavorev- 
oli nell1industria edilizia in parecchi grandi 
centri e si ripercuotono anche sul mercato del 
lavoro di varie altre industrie connesse. II mercato 
si presenta poco buono per vari rami delle industrie 
tessile...Un peggioramento sensibile si h
18 ibid., p. 101
19 See M. Degl*Innocenti, II socialismo italiano e la guerra 
di Libia (Rome 1976), p. 81
20 Rivista delle Societa Commerciali, IV (1914), p. 197
15
constato, in confronto con gli anni precedenti, 
nelle industrie metallurgiche e meccaniche...La 
situazione del mercato del lavoro si presenta 
ancora poco buona per le industrie vetrarie, per 
l1oreficeraia e, in parte, per quella dei cementi 
e della ceramica.21
In October 1912 prefects throughout Italy had been instru-
22cted to report on the level of unemployment in their region,
while the soaring figures for both strikes (which in the
industrial sector reached a record of some four million
days lost in 1913, higher even than the figures for 1907)
and emigration reveal the problems faced by workers. Nor
was the slump confined to industry. Inquiries made by Feder-
terra at the beginning of 1913 discovered an unemployment
level of almost fifty per cent amongst casual labourers
23in forty-two communes in the province of Bologna. One
year later unemployment amongst agricultural workers stood
at fifty per cent in the province of Piacenza, fifty-eight
per cent at Bologna, from fifty to eighty per cent at Reggio
Emilia and seventy per cent at Ferrara.^
The socialist party blamed excessive spending on
armaments for the crisis, proposing this motion during a
parliamentary debate on the problem in March 1913:
La Camera, convinta che la crisi economica, che 
affligge il paese, e il cui indice piu grave e dolo- 
roso & la disoccupazione operaia, h precisamente il 
portato della politica di eccessivi dispendi militari 
e di prowedimenti finanziari, che hanno una concorr- 
enza disastrosa nel credito interno alle imprese 
private agricole, industriali e commerciali;
invita il G-overno a contenere la spese militari 
e ad iniziare una piu larga ed organica politica 
di lavori pubblici e di sollievo delle oppresse 
forze della economia nazionale, in guisa di promuo- 
vere energieamente lo sviluppo della produzione e il 
rifiorire della prosperita economica nazionale.25
The same demands were made in a motion passed by the organ­
ising committee of a 30,000 strong demonstration against
21 R. Bachi, op. cit., pp. 178-9
22 A.C.S., Min. Int., Dir. gen. Pub. Sic., Ufficio Riservato
(1911-1915), b. 39A, f. 88
23 M. Degl'Innocenti, op. cit., p. 88
24 R. Bachi, op. cit., p. 178
25 See fLa Libia contro l'ltalia?', Critica Sociale, XXIII, 
1-16 March 1913, pp. 185-6
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unemployment held in Milan in April 1915, which affirmed
their intention
a intervenire con tutti i mezzi, anche i piii 
energici, qualora le auto^ita locali persistessero 
nella politica passiva e inconcludente in rispetto 
al grave e doloroso problema della disoccupazione; 
e il governo continuasse a rovesciare nella voragine 
degli armamenti le risorse della nazione, diment- 
icando di soddisfare gli impellenti hisogni della 
classe lavoratrice.2b
Such attacks on armaments expenditure were only part of a
wider campaign against both the cartelisation of industry and
Italy’s tariff structure, a campaign which had spread rapidly
in 1913 and 1914-. On the eve of the war, agrarian and
industrial interests faced a sustained attack on the very
rationale of protective tariffs. The tone was set by the
claim of Oritica Sociale that
L1Italia 6 in uno stato di crisi permanente, tanto 
permanente da dovere ritenere il disagio come il suo 
stato normale. Sono dovuti in grande parte al protez- 
ionismo, fenomeni che hanno conturbato e conturbano 
da anni la vita del paese, come l1emigrazione, la 
questione meridionale, la crisi edilizia, il caro- 
viveri...tutta la molteplice tragedia della vita 
nazionale trova il suo motivo d'essere piu visibile, 
se non unico, nel sistema protezionista.27
However the campaign won support well beyond socialist
circles. Luigi Einaudi had attacked the iniquities of
protection for many years; in both the Corriere della Sera
and La Riforma Sociale he stressed the links between tariffs
and the move toward cartels, urging that 1 la protezione
ha mancato al suo fine e che e dovere strettissimo del
governo di intervenire, ribassando i dazi doganali, per
ripristinare quella concorrenza che gli industriali protetti
28si ostinano a volere sopprimere.' Einaudi also blamed 
protection for the chronic over-production of so many 
sectors, as is clear in this attack on the sugar trust in 
May 1914:
Troppi altri esempi si conoscono di industrie a
2b Cited in Degl1Innocenti, op. cit. , p. 95
27 A. Lanzillo, ’II movimento anti-protezionista in Italia 
e il suo valore politico', Critica Sociale, XXIV, 1-15 
Dec. 1914, p. 365
28 'Dazi doganali e sindacati fra industriali', now in L. 
Einaudi, Cronache economiche e politiche di un trentennio 
(1893-1925), vol. Ill, 1910-1914 (Turin 19b3)« p p . 643- 
75 at 660. March 1914
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cui la protezione inizialmente giovo, ma che 
furono tratte a rovina per la sovraproduzione 
provocata dall'eccessiva durata del dazio protett- 
ore, perche non si debba augurare, nell'interesse 
permanente della industria nazionale dello zucchero, 
che la protezione abbia a cessare prima che essa 
diventi troppo dannosa.29
A conference of the Lega Antiprotezionista Italiana
(a pressure group formed back in 1904 but which became
especially active between 1912 and 1914) gathered in Milan
in May 1914 to organise a still greater campaign against
cartels and tariffs: as Gritica Sociale commented, 'Contro
la siderurgia va quindi constituendosi un complesso di
interessi antagonistici, decisi ad andare fino alle ultime
30conseguenze della loro azione.' Among the speakers at this 
conference were Einaudi, Gaetano Salvemini and Professor 
Gino Borgatta, who described the tariff on grain as ' il 
principale puntello che compensa e trattiene i gruppi 
agrarii dalla lotta contro i ben maggiori dazi industriali.'^1 
Borgatta suggested that once this tariff was removed land­
owners would react against the high industrial tariffs. The 
conference also heard attacks on the nationalist party as 
the servant of the armaments industry, and on the cost to 
the country of favouritism shown to cartels in such areas 
as armaments and provisioning of the railways. Even Bonaldo 
Stringher feared that 'un giorno, non lontano, col rincar- 
imento della vita...possa risuonare alta e vibrate un'altra 
domanda: quella di una efficace e piu penetrante protezione
a vantaggio della grande massa consumatrice delle derrate 
32agrarie.' The tariff agreements with Germany and Austria- 
Hungary were due to expire in 1917, and it was within the 
context of a strong impulse for major revisions of the entire 
tariff structure that war offered great attractions, above 
all as a powerful justification for the retention of tariffs 
on major industries of strategic value.
29 'L'industria zuccheriera e il regime della protezione', 
Corriere della Sera, 26 May 1914, in ibid., pp.716-21
at 717
30 A. Lanzillo, 'II movimento...', p.364
31 See Secolo, 22 May 1914
32 Cited in R. Romeo, Breve storia della grande industria 
in Italia (Rome 1967), p.115
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At the same time employers faced an increasingly 
combative labour movement. Not only did the figure for days
lost through strikes in industry stand 600,000 days higher
33in 1913 than in 1907, but the nature of union activity had
also changed. To cite Bachi once more,
il movimento operaio ha assunto nel 1913 un cara- 
terre nettamente diverso da quello dell1anno pre- 
cedente: accanto al gran numero di piccoli scioperi 
per questioni disciplinari o per opposizione a 
diminuzione di mercede diretta o indiretta -indizio 
di mercato del lavoro sfavorevole- si presenta una 
discreta serie di grandi battaglie, spesso seguite 
da scioperi di solidarieta, indici che manifestano 
la particolare situazione delle organizzazioni 
operaie nel momento attuale e la tensione di rapp- 
orti fra la leghe di diversa tendenza e fra leghe 
operaie e padronali.34
On his return to Italy in August 1913, the anarchist Malat-
esta wrote in Volonta, the anarchist weekly of Valona, of
his impression 'che un grande risveglio sta avvenendo nelle
masse popolari...Mi e parso che il proletariato d'Italia
35e in marcia verso la rivoluzione.' Even before the dram­
atic events of 'Red Week' in June 1914 brought into question 
the very survival of the existing state structures, indus­
trial and agricultural struggles in the preceding years 
had instilled a deep alarm among employers. Reflecting in 
the nineteen-thirties on the disputes between 1911 and 
1914, Corbino admitted that 'nessuno avrebbe potuto dire 
che cosa a lungo andare sarebbe rimasto all’impiedi della 
vecchia impalcatura liberale, se la guerra non fosse venuta 
a sconvolgere il mondo in maniera tanto inattesa quando 
profonda. '3 fei<s eight month dispute at Massafiscaglia, and 
the strike at Molinella in 1914 which led to repeated 
battles between peasants and the public forces, were only 
the most notorious among thousands of separate disputes.
However as both Bachi and Corbino accepted, the 
deterioration in labour relations was fostered by a
33 For the figures, see E. Corbino, Annali..., vol.V, p.466
34 Bachi, op. cit., p.180
35 Cited in L. Lotti, La settimana rossa (Florence 1965),
p.8
36 Corbino, op. cit. , p.455
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matching assertiveness on the part of employers. It has
been suggested that the major problem for employers in
this period was the chronic shortage of capital -as an
article in the Rivista delle Societa Gommerciali pointed
out in January 1914,
mai come nel 1913 alia ansiosa ricerca di capitali 
corrispose tanta malavoglia da parte degli invest- 
itori e tanta scarsita di denaro. Anche nei princ- 
ipali mercati internazionali gli insuccessi nelle 
emissioni segnano un record: gli assuntori sono 
carichi di titoli che non riescono a collocare 
e nondimeno la richiesta continua.37
The attempt to claw back earlier concessions on both wages
and working conditions was a natural response to these
difficulties, with employers’ efforts to impose ’Taylorist’
working practices in many factories in 1912-13 encount-
• z  Q
ering strong opposition. Yet if the biennio 1912-13 marked
the high point of the pre-war struggle between capital and
labour, the beginnings of the political mobilisation among
employers dates back to 1906, with the foundation of the
Lega Industriale in Turin. A group headed by Giovanni Agnelli,
Luigi Bonnefon Craponne and other leading figures in the
industrial world had dissolved the old Societa Promotrice
dell’industria Nazionale, and founded the league as a
nucleus for new employers’ mobilisation in pursuit of
new goals. Henceforth industrialists would act in defence
of political or class interests rather than sectional
economic demands. Corbino again helps put this development
in a broader context:
L’infrazione al sistema liberista che si era compiuta 
con i dazi portava fatalmente all’altra da compiere 
in materia di contrattazione con i lavoratori, 
perchk la misura della protezione non avrebbe 
piu potuto essere goduta se non nel caso in cui 
le modificazioni ai patti di lavoro fossero state 
concordate fra tutti gli industriali di ogni gruppo.
E quindi dallo strappo iniziale derivava non solo 
la necessita del riconoscimento delle organizzazioni 
operaie ma anche quella dell’organizzazione in 
fronte unico di tutti gli industriali per far si 
che 1*aumento dei costi non fosse neutralizzato 
dalla concorrenza interna entro i limiti dei dazi, e 
dalla concorrenza esterna oltre quei limiti. E i 
fatti si svolsero proprio in questo senso a partire
37 G. Jarach, ’Le Societa ordinarie per azioni durante 
l'anno 1913’, Riv. delle Soc. Comm., IV (1914), p. 33
38 See Pepe, op. cit., pp. 40-44 for the introduction of 
Taylorism, and chapters 2-5 for the industrial struggle 
of 1912-13
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dal momento in cui (Craponne) si fece iniziatore 
della Bega industriale di Torino che contrappose, 
prima in Italia, la schiera unita degli indust­
riali a quella degli operai.39
By the following year over two hundred and fifty 
firms had joined, with representatives from chemicals, 
textiles, electrics and indeed almost every branch of 
industry in Piedmont. This body was followed in March 
1908 by the Federazione industriale piemontese (also pres­
ided over by Bonnefon Craponne), which in turn linked up 
with the Consorzio meccanici e metallurgici in Milan (the 
latter representing fifteen of Piedmont’s largest companies), 
ahd reached agreement on the exclusion of striking workers.
Two years later came the Confederazione italiana dell* 
industria (Confindustria), which within a few months would 
represent nearly two thousand concerns.^ All these organis­
ations shared a belief in the basic autonomy of the factory, 
opposing any governmental interference in the agreement 
of wages and conditions with their employees. Industrialists 
were also hostile to the limited social legislation enacted, 
believing that the state should pay for the remedial 
measures which it introduced. The trend toward political 
mobilisation in industry is once again matched in agriculture, 
with the formation of the Confederazione Nazionale Agraria 
in 1910. The common interests of the two groups found 
expression in the first international congress of agricultural 
and industrial employers' associations, held in Turin in 
1911. This meeting worked for a common front with their 
foreign counterparts -groups attended from Germany, France, 
Austria and England- on issues such as labour unrest 
and social legislation. Industrialists also continued 
to organise within their individual sectors. In the auto­
mobile industry, for example, Giovanni Agnelli (head of 
Fiat) had promoted the Consorzio delle fabbriche di auto 
mobili in 1911, and proceeded to offer his employees 
higher wages and a reduction in hours in return for large
39 E. Corbino, op. cit. , pp. 461-2
40 On these developments, see P. Spriano, Socialismo e classe 
operaia a Torino dal 1892 al 1913 (Turin 1958), pp. 171- 
229; and V. Castronovo, Giovanni Agnelli (Turin 1971),
pp. 51-3
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limitations on the right to strike, a tactic which led to 
long and bitter strikes in both 1911 and 1912. Such atte­
mpts to by-pass the unions were pursued in several other 
industries: in 1911 employers in the glass industry had 
forced a five month lock-out after refusing to honour 
previous contracts. Iron workers in Piombino and Elba 
were also defeated in an attempt to enforce new work disc­
ipline -as Bonnefon Craponne explained to the general 
assembly of Confindustria in February 1912, 1All*Elba e 
a Piombino vi era la necessita di organizzare il lavoro,
togliendo abusi inveterati, intromissioni estranee, impos-
41izioni soverchie, rilassatezze esagerate.' In agriculture, 
the Agraria had shown their lack of confidence in govern­
ment policy as early as 1908 by breaking agreements and 
using squadre di azioni against peasant leagues in Parma.
The hardening attitude among employers was clearly 
in part a function of economic recession, but it also formed 
part of a more general desire for political influence, 
and of a mounting alarm and suspicion over the direction 
of Italian politics: a concern which came increasingly to 
crystallise into hostility toward Prime Minister Giovanni 
Giolitti. Restlessness at Giolitti’s attitude, and in part­
icular his willingness to cooperate with the socialist party, 
had been one of the factors in the formation of the Lega 
industriale. As one industrialist explained, 'La prima 
idea (for the league) sorse durante lo scorso sciopero 
generate (that of May 1906 in Turin), quando gli industriali 
si videro assaltare le officine e gli operai desiderosi di
42lavorare, mentre le autorita governative restavano inerti.' 
Since the parliamentary forces showed scant sympathy for 
the problems and requirements of Italian industry, emplo­
yers would have to organise in defence of their interests.
The contempt felt for Giolitti’s regime is clear in an 
article of the Bollettino della Lega Industriale in 1911?
41 Bollettino della Lega Industriale, VI (1912), 2, p. 18
42 Cited in Spriano, op. cit. , p.l91n53
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which suggested that a knowledge of the professional
composition of parliamentary deputies ’metterebhe in luce
la separazione larga e profonda fra il Paese che produce
e paga e la frazione che lo governa, reclutata per la
massima parte fra curiali, professori e pubblici funzio- 
43nari.' A similar desire to shape political events can
also be followed in the diaries of Ettore Conti, a leading
figure in the electrical industry. Conti had noted in
January 1908, ’Di politica mi occupo pochissimo; non ci
sono portato ed anche penso che troppa gente se ne inter-
essa, piu o meno utilmente': yet five years later he had
completely reversed his position, now arguing that ’Noi
borghese, e parlo principalmente dei produttori, abbiamo
forse il difetto di mantenerci troppo estranei alia vita
politica. Penso che fatalmente dovremo organizzarci come
44classe produttrice.1
Dissatisfaction in the industrial world reached
a peak during the automobile strike in Turin in 1913.
Many employers, and not only those directly involved, had
been outraged by G-iolitti's apparent sympathy for the
workers* case. The prime minister believed Bonnefon
Craponne was pressing employers to take a tough line during
the strike: not content just to force his resignation
as head of the employer's association, G-iolitti had even
threatened him with deportation. The outcome of this dispute
has been described by Castronovo as '1*ultimo successo
giolittiano a Torino’: it was however something of a Pyrrhic
victory, since as he continues,
Da quel momento la direzione della politica econ- 
omico-sociale si sarebbe spostata dagli ambienti 
piu avanzati della borghesia intellettuale e 
amministrativa, alleata dad primi anni del secolo 
con le frazioni piu intraprendenti del ceto indust­
riale, a nuovi, piu chiusi, gruppi di potere, depositari 
di specifici interessi economic! e di categoria o di 
istanze di assestamento autoritario del sistema.45
43 'Brevi considerazioni sull’azione economica e finanziaria 
del nostro Parlamento', Bollettino della Lega Indust­
riale , V (1911), 6, p. 87
44 E. Conti, Dal taccuino di un borghese (Milan 1946), pp.
65 and 91-2. See however Cafagna's suggestion that Conti
in fact wrote his ’diary' in 1946, L. Cafagna (ed.), II
nord nella storia dell’Italia. Antologia politica dell* 
Italia industriale (Bari 19b2), p. 534
45 V. Castronovo, op. cit. , p. 68
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Giolitti’s warning (via the prefect of Turin) that the 
safety of the employers in the automobile industry and 
of their factories could not be guaranteed if the lock­
out led to violence forced the industrialists to compro­
mise with Fiom; this intervention by the prime minister, 
together with the attacks in the ’Giolittian' Tribuna on 
Bonnefon Craponne as a provocative foreigner, led Gino 
Olivetti, secretary of Confindustria, to warn that
Non creda il governo che perche oggi gli indust­
riali hanno dovuto inchinarsi alia sua imposiz- 
ione, non si ricordino indelebimente dell’affronto 
subito.46
Bonnefon Craponne himself had speculated as early as 1909
on the need for ’un partito degli industriali', since the
industrial class
non puo per ora aspettare dallo Stato il mezzo 
per la prevenzione o la definizione delle controv- 
ersie che agitano il campo della produzione a 
cui possano dar luogo i loro rapporti colla 
classe operaia. Questo l'ha compreso perfettam- 
ente, e si b preparata il mezzo per rendere piu^7 
favorevole a se la soluzione di tanti problemi.
This was not rhetoric, but the adumbration of a programme 
which would be carried through during the period of neut­
rality. Control of almost all Italy’s leading newspapers 
and close cooperation with the nationalist movement 
(including generous financial support) is used to oppose 
Giolitti's policies and to demand Italian intervention 
in the war, vital as a means to destroy Giolitti's sway 
over political life and provide an escape from Germany's 
putative sway over economic life. In the months before 
May 1915 an attempt is made (with considerable success) 
to establish a link between the two, depicting Italy's 
economic subjection to Berlin as a state of affairs conn­
ived at by Giolitti, who is said to have acted as a German 
representative in Rome.
Clearly the economic and political outlook of pre­
war Italy gave employers little reason for optimism or
46 Cited in M. Abrate, La lotta sindacale nella industri- 
alizzazione in Italia, 1906-26 (Turin 1967), p.101
47 FEDERAZIONE INDUSTRIALI PIEMONTESI (Lega Industriale 
di Torino), II movimento sindacale nell’ora presente in 
Italia (Relazione del Presidente all'Assemblea generale 
del 23 aprile 1909) (Turin 1909),p.8
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confidence in their future development, and this even before 
the calamitous events of June 1914. As the economy spir­
alled downward, so the unions and socialist party became 
increasingly intransigent in their demands. G-iolitti's 
granting of universal suffrage in 1913 offered the prosp­
ect of an enormous influx of socialist deputies into 
the chamber, further increasing misgivings over the prime 
minister’s objectives -misgivings which could hardly have 
been reduced by his explanation that 'la riforma elett- 
orale segnera da sola l'inizio di un nuovo periodo di 
attivita legislativa...Date alle nostre istituzioni la piu 
larga e la piu solida delle basi, sara piu facile affron-
tare le grandi riforme che sono nelle aspirazioni del
48paese. ' In fact G-iolitti had by this date been alienating 
important groups within Italian society for many years: 
since it will be suggested that this fact is of central 
importance in the political background to intervention, it 
is necessary to examine G-iolitti's policies and try to under­
stand why they aroused so much hostility.
C. Seton-Watson has recently argued that despite 
the enormous growth of interest in pre-World War I Italy, 
only two of the ten aspects of G-iolitti's career which 
Luigi Salvatorelli believed in 1950 were in need 'da chi- 
arire definitivamente, e talora anzi da impostare in termini
precisi' have subsequently been examined in satisfactory
49detail. Certainly the Piedmontese statesman has been 
subject to an extraordinary variety of interpretations over 
the decades, yet the tendency in the last two decades has 
clearly been to present him as a progressive and democra­
tic figure in aim and outlook, if not always in electoral 
and parliamentary practice. In taking this approach, post­
war historians have perhaps been encouraged into greater 
tolerance of the limitations of Giolitti’s policies - as 
has been suggested by C. Seton-Watso^- by the continuing 
failure to tackle fundamental reforms in Italy. G-. Carocci's
48 G-. Giolitti, Discorsi extraparlamentari (Turin 1952) , 
p.271. 7 Oct. 1911
49 G. Seton-Watson, ’Giolitti e il giolittismo', H.A., f 
2103, March 1976,pp.324-32 at 327
50 ibid., p.331
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study gave the framework for a more sympathetic interpre­
tation of his policies and achievments. Garocci analysed 
Giolitti's system as one based on tacit cooperation 
between both government and socialists, and workers and 
industrialists, and traced the collapse of both accords 
to the stress of economic recession'!' Even Gaetano Salve- 
mini, in his time a passionate opponent of G-iolitti, would 
later admit to having stressed only the negative aspects
of his activities, the rigging of elections and massive
52use of government influence. However the image of Giovanni 
Giolitti as an extremely prosaic, unimaginative and 
corrupt figure was strong towards the end of his long 
ministry. This mood of disillusion is evident in these 
remarks of Arturo Labriola to the chamber in December 
1913:
II giolittismo diviene una superfluity. Esiste 
un’Italia cattolica, esiste un'Italia socialista, 
esiste un'Italia imperialista: non esiste un'
Italia giolittiana. L'Italia giolittiana e una 
mediocre combinazione parlamentare, nata fra i 
corridoi e l1aula, buona soltanto ad impedire, 
incapace di creare. Questa Italia deve sparire.
Evident too in Salvemini's preference for a clearly cons­
ervative ministry such as that of Salandra rather than a 
continuation of giolittismo:
Da questi contrasti che si avvicinano uscira alia 
fine la prevalenza di un partito conservatore. Hon 
ce ne spaventiamo. Anzi la desideriamo, perche 
siamo sicuri che essa non sara mai dannosa al paese 
come e stato il giolittismo, e constringera i 
partiti democratici a uno sforzo definitivo di 
epurazione e di riorganizzazione. 54
Such a negative appraisal also came later from Antonio
Gramsci, who wrote in the Prison notebooks that 'Giolitti
non creo nulla: egli "capi" che occorreva concedere a
tempo per evitare guai peggiori e per controllare lo
51 G. Garocci, Giolitti e l'eta giolittiana: dall'inizio
del secolo alia prima guerra mondiale (Turin 1961), Ghs.1-2
52 See his introduction to A. ¥/. Salomone, Italy in the 
Giolittian Era: Italian democracy in the making. 1900 
-14 (Philadelphia 1945)
53 A.P., Legis.XXIV, tornata del 9 die. 1913* p.270
54 G. Salvemini, ’II ministero conservatore', L'Unita, March 
1914. Cited in B. Vigezzi, 'II suffragio universale e
la crisi del'liberalismo' in Italia (dicembre 1913- 
aprile 1914’, K.R.S., XLVIII (1964), pp.529-78 at 577.
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55sviluppo politico del paese e ci riusci.' Yet it is poss­
ible to see in this policy of concessions in order to 
forestall greater demands a remarkable understanding of 
the political implications of Italy's industrialisation, 
and as the only possible way for liberal Italy to stave 
off fundamental change. This view was openly canvassed by 
Giolitti in a speech in parliament of February 1901:
Hoi siamo all'inizio di un nuovo periodo storico, 
ognuno che non sia cieco lo vede. Nuove correnti 
popolari entrano nella nostra vita politica, nuovi 
problemi ogni giorno si affacciano, nuove forze 
sorgono con le quali qualsiasi Governo deve fare 
i conti...Gli amici delle istituzioni hanno un 
dovere soprattutto, quello di persuadere queste 
classi, e di persuaderle con i fatti, che dalle 
istituzioni attuali esse possono sperare assai 
piu che dai sogni dell'avvenire; che ogni legit- 
timo loro interesse trova efficace tutelare negli 
attuali ordinamenti politici e sociali.
Dipende principalmente da noi, dall’atteg- 
giamento dei partiti costituzionali nei rapporti 
con le classi popolari, che l'avvento di queste 
classi sia una nuova forza conservatrice, un nuovo 
elemento di prosperita e di grandezza o sia invece 
un turbine che travolga la fortuna della Patria!56
Giolitti viewed the rise of an industrial working-class with
equanimity, since, 'Soltanto le nazioni ai cui progresso con-
corrono attivamente le masse popolari...sono economicamente
potenti...1'ascensione del quarto stato e del resto il
portato di leggi storiche ed economiche alle quali nessuna
57forza umana pub resistere.' He sensed the need to broaden 
the appeal of the ruling factions and so widen the basis of 
support for the monarchy. Sonnino's 'Torniamo alio Statuto' 
and Pelloux's authoritarian programme were 'condannato all*
Gobetti remarks on Salvemini's twenty year crusade against 
Giolitti, 'il quale come uomo di governo aveva le sue ste- 
sse idee, i suoi metodi, i suoi pregiudizi, ma li prese- 
ntava col cinismo del domatore invece che coll'entusiasmo 
dell'apostolo', La Rivoluzione liberale. Saggio sulla 
lotta politica in Italia (Turin 1964), p.88
55 A. Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere, ed. V. Gerratana 
(Turin 1972), p.997
56 Cited in L. Cafagna, op. cit., pp.380-81
57 G. Giolitti, op. cit., p.2^3
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insuccesso perche in contrasto con le tendenze sempre 
piu democratiche dei tempi’ and ’avrebbe avuto il solo
C O
effetto di peggiorare le stesse istituzioni.’
Reflecting in 1911, Giolitti reaffirmed that after
the events of 1898 'il solo modo per mantenere l’ordine
in Italia, fosse un ampia liberta...il risultato ha dimos-
trato che il sistema mio, apparentemente semi-rivoluzio-
59nario, era il solo veramente conservatore.’ His opposition
to any state of siege during the great crisis in Sicily
at the end of the century was rooted in the belief,
explained to the Senate back in 1892, that
i veri conservatori siano quelli che dalle idee 
e dai concetti socialisti traggono cio che e 
possibile attuare senza cagionare alcun disordine, 
perchfe solo in questo modo si possono isolare, 
si possono mettere all’infuori della corrente ^
sana del paese tutte le idee e i concetti esagerati.
This approach won the backing of figures such as Alfredo
Frassati, editor of La Stampa, who believed Giolitti aimed
’a conseguire un rinnovamento del costume politico-sociale,
a richiamare, con piu ampi diritti di liberta, piu vasti
strati di cittadini nell’orbita della vita e degli inter-
essi pubblici.’ Antonino di San Giuliano, Italy's great
foreign minister between 1910 and 1914, had also echoed
many of Giolitti's ideas in the eighteen-nineties. Although
later to immerse himself in foreign policy, the origins of
his sympathy for Giolitti's aims are clear in his admission
of 1895 that
L'Italia non e una nazione abbastanza democratica, 
oserei quasi dire che non lo e punto, in tutto 
cio che ha carattere economico e sociale. In 
questo campo nulla di veramente democratico,di 
veramente serio ed efficace, si e fatto finora 
a favore delle classi lavoratrici.62
58 G. Giolitti, Memorie della mia vita (Milan 1967 ), 
pp.110 and 112
59 hiscorsi parlamentari (Rome 1953-6), vol.Ill, p.1370
60 Cited in G. Manacorda, 'II primo ministero Giolitti',
Studi Storici, II (1962), pp.77-120 at 86
61 A. Frassati, Giolitti (Florence 1959), p.8
62 Cited in P. Cataluccio, ’Antonino di San Giuliano e 
la crisi economico-sociale nell'Italia di fine secolo 
XIX', Critica Storica, XIII (1974), pp.461-80 at 477
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Sari Giuliano also shared Giolitti’s awareness of the need 
to absorb rather than suppress the nascent socialist move­
ment, writing that
In Italia, tranne alcune provincie la questione 
sociale e ancora assai meno minacciosa che in 
altri paesi, i quali sono pervenuti ad uno stadio 
piu avanzato di progresso industriale; ma non 
bisogna illudersi; il presente di quei paesi e la 
immagine del nostro avvenire, e dallo studio delle 
loro odierne condizione e delle fasi per cui esso 
sono passati, noi dobbiamo trarre ammaestramenti 
fecondi per giudicare in che cosa dobbiamo imi- 
tare, in che cosa dobbiamo per convegno fuggire 
il loro esempio. Diciamo il vero senza falso 
ritegno, solo la piu superficiale ignoranza puo 
credere che nel socialismo moderno tutto sia 
errore: esso contiene, senza dubbio, grandissimi 
errori, ma, massime nella parte critica, contiene 
anche incontestabili verita.63
The disturbances in San Giuliano's native Sicily were the
product of immense economic hardship,
e rivelerebbe grande poverta d'intelletto chi 
credesse di ridurle ad un problema di polizia. 
Bisogna raggruppare, con equi provvedimenti, e 
con oculata politica, i migliori elementi, ed 
indurli ad organizzarsi e fare argine al movimento 
di protesta e quasi di ribellione, nel quale si 
estrinseca il generale malcontento, che trae la 
sua origine dal dissesto economico.64
The two men would however differ in their assess­
ment of imperialism; while San Giuliano enthusiastically 
espoused Italian participation in this movement as a means 
of solving her social and economic problems, Giolitti 
-as will be seen- was dubious of the whole business, an 
attitude which put him irreparably at odds with the preva­
iling mood of Italy's ruling elites in the decade before 
1914. Many others in Italy's ruling circles had not even 
gone so far as her foreign minister in accepting the pre­
suppositions of Giolitti's approach, and their numbers grew 
as the country's economic problems mounted. Prom the pers­




fierce international competition, his argument that a truly
conservative policy should aim to put 'alio stesso livello
di fronte alia legge tanto il capitalista quanto il lav-
oratore; ognuno dei due deve avere la sua rappresentanza
65legittima riconosciuta dallo Stato' did not seem beyond
%
dispute. Giolitti's claim in the same speech that, 'E un 
errore, un vero pregiudizia credere che il basso salario 
giovi il progresso dell'industria'began to lose its plaus­
ibility as industrial decollo turned into prolonged stag­
nation. By 1911 La Provincia, a liberal journal of Pesaro, 
could instead argue -in an article entitled 'Che cos'&
il socialismo?1 - that 'si potrebbe dire che il socialismo
67£ oggi nh pih n& meno che il signor Giolitti.' It had
indeed become clear that while Giolitti might be eager to
promote industrialisation, this would not occur entirely
on the employers' terms -as is shown in this message of
1906 to all government officials:
io in special modo ricordo a tutti i funzionari 
dello Stato che in questo periodo di profonda 
trasformazione sociale 1'opera del governo deve 
ispirarsi ad un tempo alia piu assoluta neut­
rality nelle lotte fra capitale e lavoro e alia 
piu affettuosa cura delle legittime aspirazioni 
delle classi lavoratrici.68
Neppi Modona has shown that Giolitti's administrations
were in general tolerant toward industrial strikes over
wages and to all action controlled by reformist socialists,
while reacting far more harshly to the activities of the
peasant leagues (especially in the south) and to strikes
69within the public services. Giolitti later wrote in his 
memoirs of the employers' own interest in compromising 
with their work-force, since 'l'avvenire della nostra 
civilty e la prosperity e grandezza del nostro paese 
dipendevano direttamento...dal miglioramento morale e 
materiale, costante e pacifico delle piu numerose classi
65 Discorsi pari., pp. 627-8
66 ibid, p. 628
67 Cited in G. Corradini, Liberali e cattolici nelle
Marche, 1900-1915 (Urbino 1970), p. 173
68 G. Giolitti, Quarant1anni di politica italiana dalle 
carte di Giovanni Giolitti, vol. 2 (Milan 1962), no. 669
69 G. Neppi Modona, Sciopero, potere politico e magistra-
ture, 1870-1922 (Bari 19b9)
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Yet as early as 1904 the Milan paper La Persev- 
erenza called on employers to organise themselves in 
defence of their rights, while the Gorriere della Sera 
-which under the editorship of Luigi Albertini became 
Italy's most influential newspaper- also opposed G-iolitti 
strongly. Nor were these disagreements confined to labour 
relations. Nationalisation of the railways and the tele­
phone system brought fresh protests, while in 1909 the 
prime minister had clashed with the Navigazione Generate 
shipping company (and therefore by proxy with the power­
ful Banca Oommerciale, who controlled the company and in
the opinion of at least one minister was trying to engin-
71eer Giolitti's fall from power ), following its rejection 
of the government's terms for a maritime service to the 
Italian islands. Opposition to the prime minister came to 
a head in 1911, with the debate on a government bill for 
a state monopoly of life insurance. The immense controv­
ersy over this measure can be seen as a watershed in 
Giolitti's political fortunes and for the progressive 
liberalism which he represented. It marks the emergence 
of a solid bloc of groups opposed both to the bill, and 
to the general trend of Italian politics embodied even 
more ominously in the impending introduction of universal 
suffrage, and of Salandra as a credible alternative leader. 
Giolitti's vision of a neutral state adjudicating on the 
conflicts of sectional interests became increasingly 
unreal in a time of extreme social tension. Industrialists 
organised to defend their interests; while the socialist 
party, which at the turn of the century had welcomed 
Giolitti's accession to powe?^and whose cooperation over 
the next decade had been a vital prop for his political 
survival, now began to move away from this reformism and 
became increasingly critical of his government.
70 G. Giolitti, Memorie, pp.161-2
71 Bertolini to Giolitti, Quarant'anni, vol.2, no.694,
31 June 1909
72 See, for example, Claudio Treves in Gritica Sociale,
IX (1899), pp.182-4
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The prime minister's defence of the life insurance
bill suggests that he felt his position under some threat
as early as 1911:
se non si vuole che questi grandi sindacati diven- 
tino un mezzo di influenza politica, h necessario 
che lo Stato abbia nelle sue mani dei grandi 
istituti finanziari, che lo pongano in piena 
liberth di fronte a tutte le classi. Lo Stato, 
anche in materia economica, deve dirigere, non 
essere diretto.73
Salandra replied that the bill was in no sense liberal:
but, as G-iolitti pointed out,
siamo tutti liberali, ma c'& un modo diverso di 
intendere la liberta. L'onorevole Salandra non 
credeva di offendere il principio di libertk, 
quando appoggiava le leggi proposte dal secondo 
Ministero Pelloux...il fare l'interesse generale 
dello Stato e piu liberale che f^re quello di 
pochi capitalisti. 74
Opposition to the government came also from Luigi Einaudi
in the Corriere della Sera, who described the measure as
another example 'della sapienta tattica adottata dalla
moderna tirannia, la burocrazia governativa, per crescere
le sue schiere gia fin troppo folte e diminuire il numero
degli uomini liberi che vivono indipendenti dal banchetto 
75governativo.' Employers' opposition came in general from 
the same groups which would soon be helping to finance Idea 
Hazionale, the nationalist journal, including represent­
atives of the iron, chemical, textile and sugar-refining 
industries, in addition to the insurance companies directly 
involved -the latter agreed to cooperate against Mitti's 
bill, and if necessary to spend millions of lire to defeat
73 G. Giolitti, Discorsi Pari., vol.Ill, p.1434
74 ibid., pp.1430-31
75 L. Einaudi, Gronache..., vol.Ill, p.275. Einaudi cont­
inued a virulent campaign against the bill ('Vi sono ore 
in cui il disgusto assale';'Hon e un disegno di legge,
h una polemica giornalistica, scritta nella forma appar- 
ente di articoli di legge', ibid., pp.245 and 262) 
throughout the spring of 1911:see ibid., pp.231-307.
On the Corriere della Sera's 'polemica politica aspra, 
qualche volta addirittura feroce, see A. Scialoja, 
'L'Istituto Hazionale delle Assicurazioni ed il prog- 
etto giolittiano di un monopolio di Stato delle assic­
urazioni sulla vita', Quaderni Storici, XVIII (1971) 
pp.971-1027 at 988-9. The other chief opponent in the 
press was the Giornale d'Italia, owned in part by Italy's 
leading insurance company, ibid., pp.979-80
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all deputies who supported the idea of a state monopoly. 
Comitati di agitazione contro il monopolio appeared in 
Italy’s major cities, while' journals linked to industry 
-above all the Rivista delle Societa Commerciali, the mouth­
piece of a new pressure group formed in 1910, the Assoc­
iation of Italian Corporate Companies- weighed^#. against 
G-iolitti. In the chamber Silvio Crespi expressed the fears
of industry that once the state accepted the principle of
77nationalisation, no industry could feel secure. A group 
of deputies met in Rome in June 1911 to plan their oppos­
ition to the bill, and to discuss the possible formation
V ft
of a new political party.
Clearly the prime minister's once dominant posit­
ion was being assailed by influential critics, whose diss­
atisfaction grew with the social and industrial unrest 
of 1912-13. The widespread demand for a reassertion of 
the authority of the state (though not in the sense this 
had been practiced by Giolitti) and for a greater assert­
ion of Italy's demands in and beyond Europe, found their 
amplest parliamentary expression in the rise of Antonio 
Salandra, who had supplanted Sidney Sonnino as the leading 
figure on the right of the liberal party. Salandra's 
enhanced authority came largely from his sustained attack 
on the life insurance bill, which he castigated as 'un 
provvedimento di politica economica, la cui piu chiara 
caratteristica e la ingiustificata negazione dei principii
fondamentali del liberalismo e la franca accettazione
79dei postulati del socialismo.' G-iolitti had made
una schietta e aperta professione di un indirizzo 
politico fondato sul concorso dell'Estrema Sin­
istra. ..Di tale indirizzo politico il monopolio 
di Stato delle assicurazioni e un segno ed un 
pegno; e come tale i socialisti si accalorarano 
a sostenerlo...Eessuno ha affermato che col lvlonop- 
olio s'inizii la confisca della propriety privata 
e s'inauguri, in Italia, il regime del comunismo.
76 See G-. G-iolitti, Quarant' anni, vol.2, nos.45? 46 and 48
77 Atti pari., C.D. Discussione. hegis.XXIII, 24 June 1911? 
pp.ibl95-98, and Feb.27 1912, pp.12197-12308
78 Scialoja, op. cit., p.994; for industrial opposition 
to the bill, see ibid., pp.993-^ 7
79 A. Salandra, La politica nazionale e il partito liber­
al e (Milan 1912), p.XY
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Ma d'altra parte non si puo negare che il Monop­
olio sia un atto di politica socialista.80
Salandra believed the introduction of universal suffrage,
following closely on this bill, would open 'un periodo
critico nel partito liberale', but felt sure that 'dalla
crisi imminente la borghesia liberale potra trarre la spinta
81a una trionfale riscossa.' These controversies were how­
ever damaging Italy's social stability at a time when the 
utmost unity was needed to assert her rights abroad. For 
Salandra's concept of liberalism laid great emphasis on 
the need for a strong state , an approach well-suited to 
the contemporary climate in Europe. He urged that 'nell' 
orbita dello Stato, devono prevalere le idealita della 
patria e il sentimento della nazione. A chiunque riconosca
questa supremazia...il liberalismo italiano deve essere ape-
82rto.' Salandra had been pursuing such themes for several 
years, adumbrating a potent demand for domestic unity as a 
precondition for expansion and increased influence abroad..
He proposed on the occasion of Austria's annexation of Bosnia 
that
sorge evidente dalle dolorose recenti esperienze 
il primo e massivo compito della nuova legislatura 
...il rinvigorimento dello Stato in tutte le sue 
multiformi attivita...Proclamiamo la necessita e 
intraprendiamo 1'effettuazione di una politica 
nazionale, che tenda con opere vigorose e costanti 
a rialzare, all'interno e all'estero, l'efficacia 
e il prestigio dello Stato italiano.83
Naturally enough, the field of foreign policy showed 
most dramatically the radically different assumptions and 
priorities of G-iolitti and Salandra. Giolitti took little 
interest in the development of foreign policy, once recei­
ving a book on foreign relations from Salvatore Barzilai 
inscribed, 'Un credente a un miscredente^f His scepticism 
of the growing demand for Italy to follow the other European 





84 Cited in E. Ragionieri, Italia giudicata, 1861-1943 (Bari 
1969), p.380
34
of 1904, in which the question of colonies is typically
discussed as a likely impediment to domestic reforms rather
than as the key to all progress:
Le colonie che abbiamo dobbiamo conservarle, ma non 
credo che il paese approverebbe una politica di 
larghe spese e tantomeno un avviamento verso una 
politica imperialista...hoi riteniamo in questo 
momento che 1*Italia debba la sue risorse princi­
pal! adoperare all'interno e che all’estero si qc 
debbano conservare come una riserva per l’avvenire.
Nor did his declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire seven
years later announce his conversion to imperialism: rather,
in his famous speech at Turin in the opening weeks of the
war in North Africa, Giolitti concentrated carefully on
the domestic problems Italy still had to solve regardless
of the outcome of this struggle, and as always eschewed 
86all rhetoric. He explicitly denied in his memoirs any 
intention of solving political unpopularity through this war, 
which ’sarebbero state contrarie alia avversione che io ha 
sempre avuta, di cercare diversi all'estero per i conflitti
O  rj
della politica interna.' Giolitti seems instead to have 
reluctantly accepted the need for a limited war in order to 
remove from political life an issue which threatened if 
unresolved to interfere with the enactment of universal 
suffrage and other reforms. His approach to foreign policy - 
including the question of intervention in 1914-15- is cond­
itioned by a belief that those who had followed the ’heroic 
generation’ in Italy had the task of political consolidat­
ion, a task for which peace was a prerequisite; since, ’Noi 
siamo in periodo di formazione; abbiamo grandi problemi 
da risolvere, che attengono strettamente alia vita economica, 
sociale e politica del paese...e tutto questo b impossibile 
se non si fa una politica di pace.
Even Giolitti’s support for the Triple Alliance 
rested at least in part on the impossibility of pursuing any 
reformist policy outside its protection; military
85 Cited in P. Grassi, Le origini dell’imperialismo italiano: 
il ”caso somalo"(1896-1915) (Lecce 1980), p.176
86 G. Giolitti, Hiscorsi parr., vol.4, pi 1710. 7 Oct.1911
87 G. Giolitti, l.lemorie, pp.213-4
88 Discorsi pari., vol.3, p.1130. 4 Dec. 1908
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expenditure would "be infinitely higher were Italy to leave 
the Triplice, and could only be financed by the drastic
89curtailment of public works and assistance to the south.
San Giuliano’s repeated requests for the activities of the 
Banco di Roma in the Ottoman Empire to receive financial 
backing from the government were rejected by the prime min­
ister, on grounds which make evident his complete rejection 
of the supposed economic need for Italian expansion:
Comprendo che pub giovare ai nostri rapporti avven- 
ire con la Turchia la conclusione di quel prestito; 
ma in questo momento non b molto consigliabile 
togliere dei capitali dal mercato italiano. hoi 
abbiamo molte spese da fare come governo e le 
industrie hanno pure grande scarsita di capitali. 
D'altra parte tale scarsita esiste in tutti i 
paesi di Europa tranne forse la sola Francia e 
importa molto evitare la necessita di dover rico- 
rrere all'estero sotto qualsiasi form...Aggiunci 
che ogni esportazione di capitali inasprisce i 
cambi gia elevati in modo pericoloso.90
With his resignation in March 1914, Giolitti aimed
only at a further tactical retirement until more propitious
times; but in the event he granted the conservative and
nationalist right the opportunity to set Italian politics
on a fresh course. Salandra's demand for a 'forte politica 
91nazionale', for territorial expansion as a right and of 
necessity, was echoed by much of the press and the nation­
alist movement. Central to this alternative programme was 
a faith in imperialism as the only solution to Italy's 
economic difficulties. The Libyan war had been hailed as 
the first step in the nation's redemption, both through its 
putative economic benefits and for the new climate it 
helped foster in domestic politics -sweeping away, in the 
opinion of the nationalist Francesco Coppola, 'il pavido 
e cinico individualismo borghese e la idiota menzogna
q p
democratica.' Despite its successful outcome, the war did 
much to undermine the prime minister's position, a fact
89 See F. J. Coppa, Planning, Protectionism and Politics in 
Liberal Italy: Economics and politics in the Giolittian 
age (Washington, D.C. 1971), pp;146-7
90 G. Giolitti, Quarant'anni, vol.3, no.89, 13 Jan. 1913
91 A. Salandra, op. cit. , p.14
92 Idea Hazionale, 19 Oct. 1911
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which will influence much thinking in 1915*
The months of neutrality provided fertile ground 
for Salandra to strengthen his political authority, but the 
extraordinarily rapid collapse of G-iolitti’s dominance sugg­
ests a basic weakness in his system. Oritica Sociale pred­
icted in February 1914 that ’il giolittismo muore; muore
di quello che doveva essere il suo duplice solenne trionfo:
93la guerra di Libia e il suffragio universale.'Yet even 
this journal, though it had been increasingly critical of 
the prime minister in the months before his resignation, 
seemed to take alarm at the forces which had replaced him, 
urging in June 1914 the need, 'Imporre al Governo ed alia 
borghesia di Italia di rifare la strada battuta, ritornare 
sulla via maestra, indicata dal suffragio universale,
94sulla via della liberta assoluta e delle riforme radicali.'
The tenuous nature of Giolittifs control is suggested in
a report from Sir James Rennell Rodd, British ambassador in
Rome, on the occasion of his resignation:
Signor Giolitti's position in Italian political 
life has been a very remarkable one...he has won 
a position which, until quite recently, amounted to 
a practical dictatorship, by transcendant ability, 
by convincing eloquence, or by qualities of chara­
cter commanding general respect...his power has 
been secured by his adroitness in playing on the 
weaknesses and infirmities of others. His so- 
called faithful adherents are for the most part 
bound by ties of favours received or indiscretions 
detected and overlooked.95
Several Italian historians have recently re-emphasised the
clientalist nature of Giolitti's politics, which failed
ever to gain a footing in Italian culture. Lanaro argues
that no Giolittian culture was ever created despite his
long period of power, and as a result, 'Alla fine risulta
lui, Giolitti, la vera "parentesi" della storia d'Italia;
96non il fascismo.' Gentile also catalogues Giolitti's
93 Gritica Sociale. XXIV (1914), 16-28 Feb., p.49. See also 
ibid., 16-31 March, p.82, 'La guerra ha gia distrutto il 
ministero Giolitti; la guerra deve distruggere il 
giolittismo.'
94 ibid., II Vice, 'Cause ed effetti', 16-30 June, pp.177-9 
at 179
95 P.R.O., F.O. 371/2004, desp.93» Rodd to Grey, 16 March 1914
96 S. Lanaro, Hazione e lavoro. Saggio sulla cultura borghese 
in Italia, 1870-1925 (Venice 1979). p.16
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failings -the clientalism, his attempt to depoliticise 
public life, his neglect of the south in favour of a priv­
ileged northern elite, and his pessimistic assessment of
97Italy's democratic potential. He insists on the progre­
ssive nature of much opposition to the prime minister, 
the expression of new groups created by industrialisation 
who saw G-iolitti's parliament as a prime example of the 
institutional blocks to their progress.
Yet the key to G-iolitti's fall from power lies not 
in the disillusion of those who hoped for a more healthy 
and genuine democracy following his departure, but in the 
alliance between industrial and agrarian interests which 
worked in these years for Giolitti's departure,and for the 
reorientation of Italian politics around a new axis of 
national unity and colonial expansion as a means to end 
the nation's social and economic weakness. Giolitti based 
his desire for neutrality in 1914-15 on fears for the 
Italian state's ability to withstand a long war; but the 
forces supporting Salandra believed intervention to be 
vital to the survival of the monarchy, and for breaking- 
out of the circle of economic depression and social unrest.
97 E. Gentile, L'Italia giolittiana (Bari 1977), pp.54-9
38
2
The Hoots of Italian imperialism
The process by which tensions and conflicts within 
Italian society constantly spill over into the development 
and pursuit of foreign policy can be seen at work most 
obviously in the events of 1914-15• Yet it is important 
that the revelations brought by the outbreak of war in 
Europe -both of Italy’s economic dependencies, and of her 
own remarkable territorial and economic ambitions- be seen 
as a climacteric, in which an effort is made to resolve 
domestic difficulties stretching back over many years. 
Intervention serves not simply as a ploy by Salandra to 
ease out G-iolitti or as a means to end the economic crisis 
of neutrality (although these will be seen to be important 
considerations): rather, Italy's war-aims, as expressed 
in the Treaty of London, marked a further stage in the 
elaboration of an Italian imperialism which, while it 
may have appeared a peripheral and dangerous phenomenon 
to the other European powers, expressed real and lasting 
interests of the groups comprising the Italian ruling 
class. Reflecting many years later on the Treaty of London, 
Francesco Nitti was able to explain it only as 1 il piu 
insano patto che abbia mal concluso e che solo un vano e 
intrepido e orgoglioso ministro come Sonnino poteva 
concepire.’^  Yet clearly such a step cannot be explained 
in terms of the personality of Italy's foreign minister 
alone. Nor, given the enormity of Italy's demands, can the 
treaty be assimilated by those who see Salandra's entry 
into the war as grounded purely in his desire to gain 
control of the irredentist lands. However the decision to 
intervene makes sense entirely as an attempt to seize on
1 F. Nitti, Rivelazioni; dramatis personae, vol.VI of 
Scritti polltici (Bari 1963), p.54
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favourable diplomatic circumstances and win for Italy 
imperialist goals which had become increasingly central 
to foreign policy over the previous decade. An examin­
ation of Italian expansion in these years, and especially 
after the crisis of 1907, will suggest that the Consulta 
was ever more responsive to the requirements of industrial 
and agrarian interests. Italian imperialism, far from 
being an artificial growth which San Giuliano struggled 
to nurture in the face of almost total indifference from 
economic lobbies (as one recent study would have it), was 
in fact believed by such interests, as well as government 
and bureaucracy alike, to be indispensable to the future 
stability and development of the Italian economy. Domes­
tic economic requirements will set the course of foreign 
policy, whether toward the Balkans, Asia Minor or Morth 
Africa. Well before World War I, diplomats in the Gonsulta 
and in embassies and consulates abroad had been deeply 
imbued with the goals of industry and agriculture, which 
came to be accepted simply as ’national1 goals.
Yet this had not always been the case. Aquarone 
has noted how, from around the turn of the century, dissat­
isfaction is voiced repeatedly in both the general press 
and in various periodicals dealing with colonial issues 
-L1Italia Coloniale, for example, whose very appearance in 
1900 is evidence of the growing interest in Italy's imper­
ial future- with the inadequacies of the country’s dipl­
omatic and consular service in the support of her industrial
3
and commercial expansion. These remarks, from G-iornale 
d'Italia of 20 December 1901, suggest the mood, while the 
equation of a controlled and directed emigration with 
increasing exports foreshadows later attempts to solve int­
ernal problems through political and economic expansion:
2 R. J. B. Bosworth, 'The Albanian forests of Signor Giacomo 
Vismara: a case study of Italian economic imperialism 
during the Foreign Ministry of Antonino Di San Giuliano', 
Historical Journal, XVIII (1975), pp.571-86 
5 A. Aquarone, 'Politica estera e organizzazione del cons- 
enso nell'eta giolittiana; il Gongresso dell'Asmara e la 
fondazione dell'Istituto Coloniale Italiano', Storia Cont- 
emporanea, VIII (1977), 1-3, pp.57-119, 291-334 and 549-70 
at 61-2
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B questo aumento di benessere in una nazione di 
angusto territorio e con popolazione crescente, 
e indissolubilmente legato alia possibility di 
trovare, oltre l'Alpi e il mare, sbocchi abbond- 
anti e sicuri ai propri prodotti, e terre, dove i 
nostri emigranti possano conservare, nella lingua, 
nella cultura, nei sentimenti, nelle abitudini, 
l'impronta italiana. Se questa non si conserva, 
i nostri emigranti cessano di essere clienti per 
le nostre esportazioni industriali e agricole, 
e diventano per l1Italia cagione, non di forza 
politica, ma di debolezza, contribuendo a rinfor- 
zare l'importanza relativa nel mondo di altre 
nazionalita...La necessita, adunque, per 1'Italia 
di territori coloniali propri, s'impone, ed &
per essa condizione essenziale di sviluppo, di
pace interna, d1indipendenza, di vita.4
The government was not slow to react to demands for radical 
reform of the diplomatic services, and for greater efforts 
to win popular support for Italian expansion. This is 
made clear in Aquarone's article, valuable for its conce­
ntration on the means by which the imperialist idea (dealt 
with elsewhere by Are and Giusti on a more theoretical 
level ) was propagated and won acceptance in the early 
years of the century. Organisations such as the Societa 
d1esplorazione geografiche e commerciale were ideally 
suited for this task -as its president suggested in 1902,
the government subsidy which this body received helped to
maintain
fra noi e il Governo quel contatto, che e una 
delle principali ragioni d'essere delle Associaz- 
ioni come la nostra, perche le rende elemento 
preparatore delle aspirazioni coloniali nazionali 
e strumento d'azione il giorno in cui e necess- 
ario il farlo, senza direttamente compromettere 
la resp#sibility dello Stato. i con questo sistema 
che si e proceduto alia maggior parte della 
espansione coloniale mondiale...6
Giolitti's inability to stem the demands for action 
in Libya in 1911 can only be understood in the context of 
an almost total acceptance of the need for new colonial
4 Cited in ibid. , p.66n
5 G. Are and L. Giusti, 'La scoperta dell'imperialismo 
nella cultura italiana del primo novocento', N.H.S., 
LVIII(1974), pp.549-89 and LIX (1975), pp.100-68
6 Cited in Aquarone, p.75n33
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gains among Italy's ruling groups in the previous years.
With the appearance of II Regno in 1903, the demand for
Italy to partake in the dynamic new process of imperialism
and so prove herself as a great power found fresh support.
Enrico Corradini suggested in its pages that
Vi e bene un'altra forma di espansione per 1'Italia, 
forma, del resto, che oggi e il fatto piu colo- 
ssale e generale del mondo, ed anche per questo 
sarebbe danno per 1'Italia non avviarcisi; 1' 
espansione coloniale. E qui, se non sbaglio, 
incomincia a sentirsi il bisogno...di un po1 
di militarismo.7
Here Corradini was simply voicing (if in typically trenc­
hant style) one possible solution to a problem preoccup­
ying many in Italy in these years -despite her rapid indus­
trialisation, how could such a relatively backward and 
unstable state hope to prosper in a Europe busy throwing 
up tariff barriers around her national boundaries, and 
sharing out all the world markets beyond them? Italian 
nationalism as a movement will be discussed in detail 
later, but in relation to imperialism one can suggest that 
their increasing influence sprang from a cogent analysis 
of the problems facing Italy early in the twentieth- 
century, an analysis which has been claimed to be more
logical and realistic than the positions of either the free-
8traders or the socialists.
Since Italy had only begun to industrialise at a 
moment when the major European economies were reaching 
toward a stage of cartelisation and frenetic expansion, she 
faced a choice of either accepting a basically colonial 
fate, or moving rapidly to a monopolistic level of develop­
ment in order to compete to some extent with the other 
European powers, at least in peripheral markets. So occurs 
the rapid transition from initial industrialisation to the 
development of cartels in almost every major industry.
Within the remarkably short period of some fifteen to
7 II Regno, I (1903), p.3
8 Are and Giusti, op. cit. , pp.148-9
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twenty years, Italy is transformed from an agricultural 
economy to one sharing many of the features described by 
Hilferding in Finance Capital. Hilferding argued that the 
conjunction of a protective tariff policy with the finan­
cing of industry by the banks necessarily produced, in 
conditions of rapid industrial growth, tendencies toward 
cartelisation: these in turn create new groups with a 
stake in protective tariffs which then struggle to make 
the tariff a permanent institution -precisely what can 
be seen developing in Italy in these years. His general 
explanation of imperialism also seems to have great rele­
vance in any attempt to understand Italian foreign policy 
before 1915* Hilferding describes an agreement between 
landed proprietors and cartelised heavy industry, based 
on the protective tariff assuring healthy profits to agric­
ulture, a common hostility to the labour movement, and new 
mutual economic interests (such as the development of agric­
ultural machinery) allied to such traditional common interests 
as those between landed proprietors and mining. Through 
this alliance finance capital wins domination of the state, 
and support from the class which occupies most of the 
highest offices in the bureaucracy and army for a policy 
of imperialist expansion. Imperialism in turn implies a 
strengthening of the state power, an expansion of the 
armed forces and bureaucracy in general, and so helps rein­
force this community of interests between the two groups.^
In his recent study of the Po Delta between 1896 
and 1914, Anthony Cardoza has described the emergence of 
just such an alliance between industrial and agrarian 
interests, their similar narrow domestic market leading to 
a shared vulnerability to world economic conditions and 
labour unrest at home. Coupled with this was a growing 
technical cooperation -intimate links developed between 
rural agricultural consortia and chemical and machine 
concerns, while specialised growers' syndicates established




ties with the agricultural processing and refining sectors. 
This cooperation was encouraged by the state: with property 
taxes falling continuously from the eighteen-eighties until 
1910, capital was freed for improvements, while a large 
proportion of the Ministry of Agriculture’s budget (which 
had tripled in these years) was used to encourage technical 
innovation. The strength of the peasant leagues in the area 
led many landowners to switch from human labour to mechan­
isation and greater use of chemical fertilisers. There was 
also cooperation amongst the growers and processors of 
industrial crops, such as hemp and sugar-beet (both organ­
ised in cartels) to defeat their workers’ demands. In the 
sugar-beet industry, an agreement was reached in the spring 
of 1909 between the Agrarian Federation of Bologna (the 
growers' syndicate) and the Imione Zuccheri in the refining 
sector on resistance to labour demands, and the creation 
of a mutual insurance fund to support employers in the event 
of further strikes. Later in the year, agrarian and indust­
rial interests in this sector succeeded in overturning a 
government decision to reduce the tariff on sugar.^ ^Cardoza 
discusses the development of agrarian consortia on first 
a local and then a national level, and concludes that by 
1914 they 'had become the most important agent in accel­
erating the interpenetration of commercial agriculture, 
rural banks and industry... it had a key role in a more 
general process which witnessed the gradual subordination
of agricultural enterprise to the interests of finance and
12industrial capital.'
Any attempt to follow the development of Italy's 
foreign policy in the years leading to intervention has to 
bear in mind the alliances and conflicts which are taking 
shape in domestic politics. Only in this manner can one 
understand how Italian diplomacy, despite the preponder­
ance of diplomats with traditional landed backgrounds and
11 See A. L. Cardoza, 'Agrarians and Industrialists: the 
Evolution of an Alliance in the Po Delta, 1896-1914', in 




the reservations of politicians as incomparably powerful
as Giolitti, came increasingly to foster the requirements
of industrial sectors. It also counters Brunello Vigezzi's
argument that any attempt to locate Italian intervention
in World War I in the pressures of economic groups founders
on the supposed lack of enthusiasm for war shown by agrarians
13in what was still in part an agricultural economy. In fact, 
while heavy industry was undoubtedly the prime mover in 
Italian expansion and her intervention in 1915, agrarians 
will be seen to have had their own interests across the 
Adriatic and the Mediterranean. In 1914-15, with the depar­
ture of Giolitti and the emergence of Salandra to guide Italy 
into war, the policies of the government were an accurate 
expression of the goals of the country's governing alliance. 
Before examining in detail how this alliance won the state 
for expansion, it is worth citing the views of Arturo Labr- 
iola on the nature of the state and of imperialism on the 
eve of the first world war:
Diventato sempre piu un organo economico, lo Stato 
pone in servizio la sua forza militare dei finix 
di espansione del commercio del proprio paese. E 
quello che si e convenuto chiamare 1'imperialismo.
In questa fase del proprio sviluppo la sfaldatura 
tradizionale fra lo Stato e gl'interessi privati 
non esiste piu. Quando lo Stato entra nel convin- 
cimento della necessita di sottoporre una determinata 
zona coloniale alia propria influenza, esso si 
serve dei privati capitalisti per aprire la strada 
e porre le prime ipoteche. La cosidetta penetrazione 
pacifica non h che la maschera sotto la quale lo 
Stato inizia la propria azione conquistatrice. Appar- 
entemente e lo Stato che serve al commercio, in 
realta e il commercio che serve alio Stato, salve 
poi lo Stato a rendersi docile strumento delle sue 
esigenze espansionistiche...Fra il banchiere, il 
giornalista, l'uomo politico e il commerciante si 
formano rapporti di una natura speciale, per cui 
l'uomo politico, servendo se stesso, pub illudersi 
di servire il proprio paese, e 1'industriale, 
pagando una taglia all'uomo politico e al pubblicista, 
puo trovare che il conto non solo torna. ma e diven- 
uto piu vantaggioso.14
13 B. Vigezzi, 'L'imperialismo e il suo ruolo nella storia 
italiana del primo '900', Storia Gontemporanea, XI (1980), 
pp.29-56 at 36
14 Roma of Naples, 26 March 1914. Italics, in original.
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Labriola's general argument can also be read as an extrem­
ely accurate assessment of the nature of the Italian state 
in 1914, and any attempt to explain intervention in May 
1915 in terms of domestic pressures on foreign policy needs 
to show how this had come about: how by 1912 LfEsplorazione 
Gommerciale, the journal of the Societa Italiana di esplor- 
azioni geografiche e commerciali, felt able to assert so 
confidently that
Uno Stato non si guidica piu oggidi . soltanto dalle 
poderose armate che possiede, ma, specialmente, 
dallo svolgimento del suo commercio di esportazione;
1*espansione commerciale equivale, in questi tempi, 
ad una penetrazione pacifica ed i suoi risultati 
sono tanto vantaggiosi quanto quelli che si otten- 
gono dal dominio di una regione per mezzo delle 
armi.
L1espansione commerciale h la vera conquista 
moderna, la quale rispettando usi, costumi, religione, 
ideali ecc. , solo tende ad imporre la dominazione 
economica. Alla dominazione politica viene sostituito 
il possesso del mercato e questa imponente manifest-
azione della forza del commercio produce in pochi 
anni la trasformazione di un popolo.15
The appearance of such arguments -though clearly they were 
an aspiration rather than the reality for a state as econom­
ically weak as Italy- in the journal of a society closely 
linked to the Gonsulta, and drawing its members exclusively 
from influential figures in parliament and the bureaucracy, 
is a measure of the new mood and new priorities in Italian 
foreign policy. Two months later, L'Esplorazione Gommerciale 
made an even more open demand for state support to economic 
expansion:
il nostro Paesi non deve limitare la sua piu ricca 
esportazione alia mano d’opera; all'esportazione di 
questa merce, tanto preziosa, deve aggiungere il 
capitale: l'una e l’altro insieme potrebbero dare 
all'Italia fuori dei confini quell'impulso che si 
conviene ad una grande potenza. Ed ecco delinearsi 
qui un nuovo programma, un programma protettivo che 
lo Stato dovrebbe svolgere in favore di quei capitali 
che tentano le vie straniere. Gome lo Stato sussidia 
i patronati della nostra immigrazione nei paesi 
europei e transoceanici...cosl essa intervenga a 
proteggere le industrie italiane fuori del paese, 
anche sussidiando queste industrie, garantendo loro
15 E. Bravo, 'G-li organismi, le Istituzioni commerciali e
lo sviluppo dell’Esportazione1, L ’Esplorazione Commerciale, 
XXVII (1912), pp.561-73 at 361
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il maggiore aiuto.16
The demand for a more expansionist policy had bloss­
omed from the early years of the century -as these remarks 
(again from L'Esplorazione Commerciale, this time in 1905) 
suggest:
Da qualche tempo assistiamo ad un innegabile e 
confortante risveglio di attivita e di interess- 
amento alle nostre questioni coloniali tanto nelle 
sfere di governo, quanto nella pubblica opinione 
e nel ceto stesso degli affari, cosl ombroso e 
scettico, quando non del tutto ostile solo poco 
tempo addietro, per tutto cio che sapeva di 
colonie e soprattutto di africano.17
Certainly it would seem that the northern industrialists,
who had indeed been distinctly lukewarm towards Crispi's
policies, and had seen their worst fears confirmed by the
disaster at Adowa in 1896 and the further fiasco in China
four years later, were now reconsidering their position.
In 1906 II Sole, the leading economic and financial journal
in northern Italy, called for Italian participation in
Europe's imperial expansion, and made clear the economic
impulse behind this demand:
La nostra situazione in Africa, oggi, h favorevole 
ad un'abile e saggia politica di penetrazione 
agricola e commerciale, perchfe ci troviamo nell1 
Eritrea e in Somalia nella stessa direttiva dei 
grandi interessi politico-economici dell'Inghil- 
terra, tendenti a congiungersi in un gran solco che 
va dalle foci del Hilo al Capo di Buona Speranza, 
dall'Oceano Indiano ai grandi laghi equatoriali... 
Poiche si sa ormai da tutti, che cio che sospinge 
le maggiori nazioni europee a grande politica colon- 
izzatrice in Africa, non e gia una vana ambizione 
di impero su regioni sterminate e popolazioni barbare, 
ma il bisogno impellente di creare ed assicurarsi i 
centri di produzione delle materie prime aliment- 
atrici delle loro industrie e i mercati di consumo 
alia superproduzione delle industrie medesime.
Senza dire, come sarebbe il caso dell'Italia, ed 
un poco della Germania, dell'avviamento in quelle 
Colonie, sotto il Governo e le leggi della madre 
patria, di una parte di quell'emigrazione, che ora 
va a perdere la propria nazionalita nelle due 
Americhe.18
16 N. Romani, 'Per l'espansione economica dell'Italia', 
L'E.C., XXYII (1912), pp.436-8 at 436-7
17 E. Pini, 'Interessi coloniali', L'E.C., XX (1905), p.113
18 'Risveglio coloniale', II Sole, 26 Aug. 1906. Cited in 
Aquarone, art. cit. , p.302
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A further article in II Messaggero in the same year made 
very similar points, stressing the need for economic expan­
sion and for control over new industrial and commercial 
outlets. It was not so much capital which lacked in Italy, 
but rather the necessary spirit of initiative; the newly- 
founded Istituto Coloniale Italiano needed ’oltre gli uom- 
ini di scienza e i politici, anche gli uomini d’affari, glf 
industriali, i capitalist!, quelli tra i coloni che hanno
raggiunto posizioni moralmente e finanziariamente eminenti...
19Se no., si corre rischio di creare una nuova accademia. '
This piece is also interesting for its urging of a turn
away from the economically developed countries ’ ai mercati,
fino ad allora trascurato a torto, dei paesi nuovi, ben piu
promettenti', where Italy can acquire the raw materials at
present imported at high prices, and where there will be
great opportunities for Italian entrepreneurs in developing
20such areas as ports, railways and banking. As will be 
shown, this would be precisely Italy’s course over the next 
decade. Before tracing the government’s response to these 
demands, it is perhaps worth citing one further article from 
1906, which again underscores the primary importance of 
economic requirements in the widespread sympathy for imper­
ialism. Writing in Rivista Coloniale, Enrico Catellani 
predicted that
I grandi Stati europei od americani che non vollero 
o non hanno potuto sviluppare una politica imper- 
ialista, prenderanno nella nuova societa mondiale 
il posto delle potenze di secondo ordine del passato 
equilibrio europeo...In tale plurality d'imperi­
alism! coesistenti e concorrenti sta il primo 
carattere peculiare del fenomeno imperialista 
moderno.
Un altro carattere peculiare degli imperi­
alism! contemporanei, e il prevalervi dell'elemento 
economico, e piu particolarmente di quella frazione 
dell’elemento economico che si riferisce al commer­
cio internazionale. II motivo imperiale dominante 
non e piu soltanto il desiderio di conquista, o il 
bisogno di sedi per la popolazione esuberante, ma 
il dominio dei mercati e la formazione di grandi
19 Cited in ibid. , pp.296-7
20 ibid.
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e complessi organismi politici che bastino econom- 
icamente a se stessi...la produzione intensiva e 
l'attivo commercio di prodotti tropicali esige 
non solo il governo politico, ma anche la discip 
lina economica di quei territori...E poichfe il 
fine di tali espansioni di dominio h particolar- 
mente economico, la subordinazione di quei popoli 
prende piu di frequente la forma di un protettorato 
che basta per regolarne e coordinarne la vita economica 
con quella dell'impero cui sono soggetti.21
To what extent were such assumptions shared in the
Consulta in this period? As early as December 1903 Foreign
Minister Tommaso Tittoni, later to be mercilessly attacked
by the nationalists for his allegedly weak defence of Italian
interests, declared in the chamber that 1evidentemente l1
elemento economico tende sempre piu ad acquistare maggiore
22importanza nei rapporti internazionali', and promised to 
reform the consular service in response to this. Two years 
later Antonino Di San Giuliano, soon to stand as an unriv­
alled authority on foreign and colonial policy both within 
Italy and in the eyes of foreign governments, called for 
a capitalistic development of controlled colonies, together 
with peaceful penetration in Libya and a policy of assisted
emigration as ' un poderoso coefficiente di una magnifica
23e piu grande Italia fuori d’Italia.’ The reorganisation
of the Consulta in 1910, in which San Giuliano created a 
Direzione Generate to deal with 'questioni di indole comm­
erciale e doganale e tutto quanto ha relazione con l1
espansione economica che ha ormai preso una parte cosi
24preponderante nella vita degli stati moderni’, gave admin­
istrative expression to the foreign minister's approach. As 
he told the chamber in December of that year,
lo conosco pienamente che tutta la politica estera 
degli stati moderni deve informarsi alia cura 
degli interessi economici e che dell'importanza 
di questi problemi si penetri la coscienza di
21 'Gli imperialismi d'oggi e l'equilibrio politico del 
domani', Rivista Coloniale, I (1906), pp. 329-54 at 333
22 A.P. C.D., Legis. XXII, tornata del 16 die. 1903
23 A. Di San Giuliano, 'L*emigrazione italiana negli Stati 
Uniti d'America’, N.A. , f. 805, July 1905, pp. 88-104 at 
93
24 A.S.M.A.E., A.G., b. 2, f. 11. Circolare ministeriale no. 
17
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tutti coloro, che diplomatici o consoli, rappresen- 
tano il nostro paese all'estero.'25
Both Tittoni and San Giuliano, and their officials 
in the Consulta who thought along similar lines, are however 
merely representative of a general acceptance of imperialist 
panacea amongst Italy’s ruling circles. It is important 
to emphasise that these policies were in no sense imposed 
on largely indifferent industrialists and landowners hy 
a handful of southern politicians or members of the bureau­
cracy intent merely on bolstering Italy's position in 
terms of European diplomacy. Indeed this article from the 
authoritative journal L'Economista suggests that the process 
was if anything the reverse:
S'incomincia a capire, da un numero sempre maggiore 
di persone, che i possedimenti coloniali sono, 
come il podere domestico, capacissimi di dare buoni 
frutti, raccolti copiosi, ma a patto di seminarvi 
qualche cosa. Sul modo di dar valore a questi 
possedimenti spesseggiano, molto piu che in 
passato, le ricerche e i suggerimenti degli stud- 
iosi, degli specialisti, dei volonterosi, degli 
uomini pratici. Degli scritti intesi a farne parte 
al pubblico, son pieni ormai i periodici nazionali, 
giornali o riviste. E un buon segno: le idee 
devono agitarsi con larghezza, le cose da principio 
note a pochi devono essere fatte conoscere. Ex 
anche lo Stato comincia a fare la parte sua. E 
1'ultimo a muoversi, e sta bene che sia cosi, perchk 
piuttosto che farsi promotore di tutto, e utile 
che secondi a suo tempo le tendenze giustificate 
e i movimenti sani dei cittadini. Ma insomma si 
muove.26
This was written shortly before Italy’s descent on the coasts 
of Libya demonstrated the government’s willingness to play 
its part, but in fact referred to Italian involvement in 
another part of Africa -the lands of Somalia, stretching 
some twelve hundred miles from British East Africa to the 
easternmost tip of the continent. Her presence in these 
regions in the years before 1914 is a relatively little 
known example of Italian imperialism, but one which clearly 
demonstrates the Consulta's role in opening up new areas
25 A.P. C.D.. Legis.XXIII, tornata del 2 dicembre 1910
26 Cited- in Aquarone, art. cit. , p.554
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for the struggling economy. Government interest in the 
economic penetration of Ethiopia had led to the signing of 
a commercial treaty between Ferdinando Martini (a passionate 
advocate of Italy's colonial future, prominent in such influ­
ential lobbies as the Istituto Coloniale Italiano and the 
Geographical Society, then governor of Eritrea and later
Minister of Colonies) and Emperor Menelik in Addis Ababa in 
27July 1906. It is undoubtedly true, as R. Bosworth argues, 
that the economic interests of Italian commerce and indu­
stry were less central in policy toward Ethiopia, which
also aimed at obtaining influence in a zone of the country
28as a means to link Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. Yet the 
Consulta's endeavours in the entire region offers an example 
of the tendency of economic and strategic imperialism to 
advance side by side, with the original economic claims 
being defended by political agreements beyond the immediate 
region.
The interests involved in Somalia were primarily 
those of the textile industry, whose increasingly parlous 
condition has been described. As international competition 
became ever fiercer, Italian textile firms were anxious to 
find new sources of raw materials and so reduce their 
dependence on foreign markets. Grassi's recent study has 
shown how responsive San Giuliano and Martini proved to be 
to the needs of this industry, in particular to the encour­
agement of a new form of 1capitalist-agriculture’ based on
29industrial monocultures. San Giuliano had proposed a 
motion at a colonial conference held in Asmara in 1905 that 
to encourage the development of the colonies it was necess­
ary 'farsi principalmente assegnamento sopra grandi e medie
intraprese... agricole provviste di capitali necessari ed
30incorragiate con provvedimenti d'urgenza.' However it is
27 On the possibilities in this agreement for the Italian 
economy, see A.C.S., Carte Martini, b.5 f. 17. Report of 
Martini, 27 July 1906
28 R. Bosworth, Italy, the Least of the Great Powers: Italian 
foreign policy before"the First World War (Camb. Univ. 
Press 1979), pp.330-1
29 F. Grassi, op. cit.
30 Cited in ibid., p.384
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the programme laid out toward Somalia by Giacomo De Martino,
diplomat and then parliamentarian of immense authority,
that best demonstrates the economic imperative behind
Italian policy. His conviction that
l'espansione coloniale, o che sia diretta merce 
le occupazioni o che sia in^iretta, in seguito 
all*avviamento verso determinate contrade dell’ 
esuberante produzione, non e un argomento astratto 
...essa e, invece, risultante, da una parte, di 
una conoscenza esatta non solo delle condizioni 
generali della produzione, ma altresi di ogni 
singola industria o coltura nei rapporti con 
1'estero.31
made De Martino play a central part in the creation of the
Istituto Coloniale, and a natural choice as first president
of that body. His southern agrarian background did not
blind him to the needs of industry and commerce, nor to the
role of imperialism in answering to these needs. De Martino
argued at the first Congresso degli italiani all’estero in
1908 that '1'Italia si avvicina a quel periodo fecondo
nella vita dei popoli, nei quali la ricchezza accumulata
dal lavoro industriale nazionale, cerca di espandersi fuori
32dai confini politici dello Stato.' In such circumstances 
the task of the state was to win control of those colonies 
needed ’per mettere in valore le forze agricole e commer­
cial! latenti, per incoraggiare ed assistere, tutelare il
naturale sviluppo del lavoro e i tentativi coraggiosi del 
33capitale.’ These views are of great relevance to a discu­
ssion of the imperialist assumptions within the Consulta, 
coming as they do from a diplomat who in 1914 would hold 
the highest post in that office, and as Secretary General 
of the ministry work in close collaboration with San Giul­
iano .
Both men agreed on the need to develop Somalia and 
Eritrea through large scale capital intensive agriculture 
rather than by peasant holdings: but this only as a begin­
ning, since
Hon basta riconoscere che le terre di alcune regioni
31 ibid., p.417
32 G. De Martino, Discorso inaugurale al Congresso degli 
italiani all’estero (Rome 1908), p.13
33 ibid.
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promettono larghe messi a speciali colture: che la 
nostra zona di influenza oltre il Mareb, come in 
quelle dell'alta valle del Giuba e dello Scebeli, 
commerci promettenti si schiudono alia nostra 
attivita.. • occorre che si ponga mano alia co-stru- 
zione di ferrovie, di porti, opere idrauliche; 
occorre che Society con capitali adeguati si costit- 
uiscano per la messa in valore agricola delle 
terre...Segni precursori assai promettenti sono le 
iniziative gia sorte da gruppi di nostri privati 
cittadini per la coltura principalmente del cotone 
nella Goscia, lungo le sponde meridionali del 
Giuba.34
Yet despite the introduction of a direct shipping line to
Somalia in 1908, commercial groups were still unhappy with
the prospects for cultivation and trade in this rather
distant Italian colony. The textile lobby was particularly
critical of tariffs levied by the government on cotton
produced in Somalia; as one senator complained,
nella vicina colonia inglese non vi sono dazi e 
nella vicina colonia germanica si e stabilito un 
premio di esportazione per il cotone prodottovi 
da ogni agricolture tedesco. Come volete che si 
sviluppi una colonia, quando prima di tutti lavora 
il fisco in modo assolutamente indecoroso?35
The second Congresso degli italiani all'estero heard an
attack on the international textile cartels, which were
held responsible for the national industry's problems, and
on the need to remedy this through cultivation of cotton
in politically secured colonies. These demands were not
confined to figures within the textile industry, but rather
formed part of a more widespread concern over future access
to raw materials which developed apace with the mounting
crisis in Italian industry. As will be seen, the government
was anything but insensible to the benefits of autonomous
sources of raw materials, as extolled repeatedly at this
congress (especially by the many nationalist speakers,
whose influence on the proceedings marked their arrival as a
major political force in Italy), and in the various trade
journals. The desire for economic autarchy had been behind
the difficult and costly development of the metallurgical
34 ibid., p.16
35 A.P. Senato del Regno, 14 Pec. 1910. Senator Vigoni, a 
former mayor of Milan linked to Lombard cotton interests
53
and hydro-electric industries in previous decades, and 
would have an important part in the diplomatic volte-face 
of 1915.
In the case of the cotton industry, government
concern and support can be seen in the extremely swift
response by the Consulta to the strong lobbying for more
favourable conditions in Somalia. De Martino advised his
foreign minister to accept their demands, in order 'non
causare una disillusione alle speranze di produttori e
commercianti italiani che da lungo tempo sollecitano, come
condizione necessaria alia esplicazione dei loro traffici
colla Somalia, 11applicazione di un trattamento di favore
agli scambi fra 1'Italia e la colonia.' The requested tariff
adjustment was enacted in August 1911, together with the
introduction of preferential rates for the textile industry
on shipping routes between Italy and Somalia. The rationale
offered by San Giuliano for these concessions was 'l'impor-
tanza che le misure predette avrebbero per l'industria
cotoniera italiana che verrebbe a mettersi in grado di
sostenere con vantaggio la concorrenza dei mercati esteri
37di produzione specie nelle nostre colonie.1 Such consid­
erations had been at the heart of the policy pursued by 
San Giuliano and De Martino, leading Grassi to conclude 
that
sulla 'quarta sponda' e all'Equatore si determini 
una confluenza oggettiva tra l'industria tessile 
lombarda e la cerealicoltura meridionale nei 
contesto di -un tipico raggiustamento del rapporto 
profitto-rendita le cui radici stavano nella sovra- 
produzione...Cib spiega come vasti settori della 
rendita agraria si facciano in quegli anni pattro- 
cinatori di una svolta imperialistica.38
With the advent of San Giuliano and the downturn
in the hitherto booming economy (overproduction in the
textile industry had led to dumping as early as 1906-07),
the value of inserting areas left unclaimed by the other
36 Grassi, op. cit., p.510
37 ibid., p.511
38 P. Grassi, 'L'industria tessile e 1'imperialismo italiano 
a Somalia (1896-1911)’.Storia Oontemporanea, IV (1973), 
pp.713-38 at 738
54
European powers into the national market came increasingly 
to he recognised. Compared to later ambitions in the Balkans 
or Asia Minor, Italy's efforts to join belatedly in the 
scramble for Africa were hardly of central importance to 
the solution of her economic problems. Nor had the exploit­
ation of Somalia been entirely successful, at least in terms 
of a tied market for Italian exports, as Minister of Colonies
Martini confessed to the Senate in March 1915:
*
E doloroso...pensare che lo zucchero, che si importa 
nella colonia della Somalia, per una somma di 
oltre lire 600,000, e lo stesso avviene nell'
Eritrea, non e importato dall1Italia; cosi non 
sono importate dall'Italia le farine, il riso, il 
sale, i tessuti di seta. Ora, un'opera lenta, ma 
paziente e illuminate, giungera sicuramente a 
questo risultato, di migliorare questi scambi e di 
far gradire nella colonia il prodotto italiano a 
preferenza di quello straniero.39
Martini's announcement of a tenfold increase in Italian
exports to Somalia in the period between 1908-09 to 1912-13
could not remove the impression that this part of Africa had
become something of a sideshow , especially as the total
value of exports stood at the latter date at rather less
than two and a half million lire. However there were still
optimists prepared to argue for the great potential of Italy's
zone in East Africa: an article in L'Esplorazione Commer-
ciale in the autumn of 1910 suggested that
La ferrovia dara pure un nuovo impulso alia vita 
economica e, con l'estendersi della rete e con 
1'inaugurazione di piu comode e rapide comunicaz- 
ioni marittime con 1'Italia e con gli altri porti 
del Mar Rosso, Massaua e 1'Asmara sono destinate a 
diventare i due importanti empori commerciali 
del Mar Rosso.40
Though by 1915 the Italian government is primarily looking 
across the Adriatic for an economic lifeline, yet the case 
of Somalia is useful as an example of the extending links 
between industry and agriculture, and of the strong symp­
athy and responsiveness to their demands among those 
responsible for foreign policy.
39 A.P., Camera dei Senatori, Disc., Legis. XXIV, t. del 
29 marzo 1915» p.1691
40 'Lo sviluppo d'Asmara', L'E.C. , XXV (1910), p.379. For an 
equally hopeful assessment published by this journal just
a few months before Italian intervention, see A. Mallarini,
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An understanding of the economic drives behind 
foreign policy also helps explain the extensive territorial 
claims in East Africa (and indeed throughout the continent) 
made by Italy in the course of negotiations for her inter­
vention in 1914-15. The vagueness of these claims, as finally 
agreed in article thirteen of the Treaty of London signed 
with the entente powers, and her subsequent failure after 
the war to win the support of these powers for her demands, 
has led to a general neglect or underestimation of that 
part of the interventionist package worked out in London 
on the future partition of Africa. Yet from 1915 the Italian 
Colonial Office, and in particular its Lirettore degli 
Affari politici, G-iacomo Agnesa, had been reconsidering 
policy in East Africa, in the light of the general instab­
ility following the death of Emperor Menelik in that year. 
Agnesa, whose demand for the integration of Somalia into the 
national economy dated back many years^ had a series of 
talks with British ambassador Rodd. However it was the 
outbreak of war which served to crystallise thinking within 
the Ministry of Colonies, resulting in the autumn of 1914 
in the detailing of an extraordinary shopping-list of 
Italian demands. These were laid out in a series of eight 
memoranda prepared for Martini, outlining the concessions 
Italy would expect in return for intervention with the 
entente. They included the cession by Britain of Kismayu, 
a claim at the centre of earlier talks between Rodd and 
Agnesa and by which Italy hoped to win control of the mouth 
of the Juba river and hence of the entire trade of southern 
Ethiopia; the establishment of a corridor between Eritrea 
and Somaliland; the cession of Kassala in the Sudan and of 
the French Somaliland to Italy; an Anglo-Italian agreement 
on the future both of Arabia and the Portugese territories; 
and a guarantee of the Italian position in Ethiopia. The 
memoranda on a possible agreement over Arabia and the Port­
ugese territories both insisted on Italian commercial and
’L'avvenire politico ed economico dell'Italia in Etiopia', 
XXIX (1914), pp.300-05 
41 See his report to Tittoni in June 1908 praising the
quality of cotton produced there, and the possibilities 
for further development of the area, in Grassi, Le 
origini..., p.386
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economic interests having complete freedom of access; while
the last and most detailed memorandum on Ethiopia was
hased entirely on an earlier report of August 1913 hy
Agnesa on Italy's position in the event of a partition of 
42Ethiopia.
Given such a programme was developing at the heart 
of the Ministry of Colonies, it seems clear that on the eve 
of the first world war Italy looked to a remarkable exten­
sion of her economic and political presence on the African 
continent. In the most important instance, that of her 
aspirations in East Africa, these were goals of many years 
standing and not inspired simply by the favourable diplom­
atic situation in 1914-15. It is difficult then to accept 
Toscano's contention that these eight memoranda were not 
of great importance in Sonnino's negotiations with the 
entente.^He cites in support of this argument the refer­
ence in only one article of the Treaty of London to the 
future partition of Africa. Yet while the insubstantial 
terms of article thirteen -that
Lei caso in cui la Francia e la Gran Bretagna 
avessero accresciuto i loro domini coloniali 
in Africa a spese della Germania, queste due 
Potenze riconoscevano in linea di principio che 
1’Italia avrebbo potuto richiedere qualche equo 
compenso, specialmente nei regolamento in suo 
favore delle questioni concernenti le frontiere 
delle colonie italiane dell'Eritrea, della Somalia 
e della Libia, e delle colonie vicine della 
Francia e dell Gran Bretagna
-reflects the inevitable compromises made between the 
various parties' rather different interests in Africa, 
and foreshadows Italy's later failure to make progress with 
her demands, the article hardly amounts to a disavowal of 
expansionism by the government in Rome. Since Italian 
intervention presumed a swift military defeat of the Cent­
ral Powers, any Italian government might have hoped in 
the event of such a defeat of their former allies to gain
42 See R. Hess, 'Italy and Africa; colonial ambitions in 
the First World War', Journal of African History, IV 
(1963), pp.105-26, espec. pp.105-08; and M. Toscano, 
Pagine di storia diplomatica contemporanea (Milan 
1963), vol. 1, pp.208-12
43 M. Toscano, op. cit., p.212
57
rather substantial compensation in her carefully specified 
areas of interest. Nor does Toscano account for the reaffir­
mation of very similar demands following Italy’s declaration 
of war on G-ermany in August 1916.
In fact the proposals sent by Minister of Colonies 
Gaspare Colosimo to Sidney Sonnino in November 1916 marked 
a further stage in the elaboration of an economic imperialism 
which had by then been developing steadily over the previous 
decade. Italy’s need for colonies had won complete accep­
tance amongst her ruling groups, so that a body such as the 
Istituto Coloniale serves as little more than an adjunct 
to the Consulta, rather than an extraneous lobby: in receipt 
of government funds, with a membership comprised almost 
exclusively of Italy's political, bureaucratic and military 
elites, the institute aimed to win domestic backing for a 
policy already firmly established in governing circles. The 
following motion, approved at a meeting of its central 
committee on 28 September 1914, thus gives some indication 
of the perception among Italy's rulers of the opportunities 
for expansion offered by war -especially since it was passed 
just as Martini received the colonial programme from his 
officials which would answer all the institute’s demands:
Considerando che per ci6 dalla guerra attuale uscira 
una situazione affatto nuova, nella quale 1'Italia 
potrA doversi avvicinare ad aggruppamenti di potenze 
del tutto o in parte diversi dagli attuali, e che 
pertanto e necessario trarre occasione dalle intese 
che saranno per prendersi nell'attuale contingenza, 
per sgombrare il terreno da tutte quelle questioni 
che, particolarmente in fatto di colonie, potranno 
altrimenti creare nuove spinose divergenze tra 
1’Italia e le potenze cui essa vorra avvicinarsi; 
che inoltre la guerra muterA radicalmente l'equi- 
librio delle potenze non soltanto in Europa ma 
anche nelle altre parti del mondo, per cui diventa 
supremo dovere dell’Italia provvedere che nei 
nuovo assetto degli imperi coloniali essa abbia un 
posto adeguato alia sua qualita di grande potenza 
marittima; considerando che tra gli altri problemi 
coloniali da risolvere 1'Italia aspira in Libia ad 
una razionale e conveniente definizione dei confini 
e della concreta tutela delle vie e del commercio 
con l'interno dell'Africa ...nell'Africa Orientale 
al completo disinteressamento politico ed economico 
della Francia e della Gran Bretagna nell'Etiopia e
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ad un approdo marittimo per la Somalia proporzionato 
all*importanza della Colonia...
Delibera:
di far voti al Governo del Re, affinchk, 
nella valutazione della situazione, e nei corso 
delle trattative colle altre potenze, tenga presente 
i problemi coloniali che incombono sull'Italia e si 
sforzi di raggiungerne la soluzione.44
As this motion suggests, Italy's other major interest 
in Africa was a settlement of her position in Libya. The 
three years following her sudden attack across the Medit­
erranean had witnessed an embarrassing failure of both mili­
tary and political authorities to subdue the region. Indeed 
Italian control became even more tenuous after a succession 
of local risings in the winter of 1914, leaving Salandra's 
government to bargain for her supposedly valuable military 
intervention in Europe against a background of 50,000 
Italian troops in Libya being driven back steadily to the 
coast. A good deal of attention has been given both to 
the diplomatic aspects of Italy's original decision to move
against the Ottoman Empire, and to the financial groups
45which pressed Giolitti's government to act. The putative 
domination of the Banca Commerciale Italiana over Italian 
political life would be a crucial issue on the eve of inter­
vention in 1915, but it seems clear that in 1911 it was one 
of the Comit's rivals, the Banco di Roma, which enrolled 
the state's military strength in defence of extensive
44 Rivista Coloniale, X (1915), p. 248. See also in this 
journal E. Gorbino, 'Le Probabili conseguenze della Guerra 
Europea sull’attivita coloniale nell'Avvenire', in ibid., 
pp. 509-19; and E. Cerulli, 'Italia e Inghilterra nell1 
alleanza ed i Loro interessi coloniali', XII (1917)> PP* 
393-400. These remarks from a work published in 1917 would 
suggest that Italy's reasons for participation in the war 
were not seen in some quarters as solely, or even prima­
rily, to do with adjustments to her border with Austria- 
Hungary: 'La soluzione del nostro problema coloniale,
del nostro avvenire coloniale, da cui, in massima parte, 
dipendono la nostra futura prosperita economica ed il 
nostro prestigio politico, deve essere ricercata, in 
questa guerra e solo in questa guerra puo essere e deve 
essere raggiunta a nostro vantaggio.' S. Acquaviva, L1Avv- 
enire coloniale d'Italia e la guerra (Rome 1917), p. 51
45 See P. Malgeri, La guerra libica (19~11-1912) (Rome 1970);
R. Mori, 'La penetrazione pacifica italiana in Libia dal 
1907 al 1911 e il Banco di Roma', Rivista di Studi Politici 
Internazionali, XXIV (1957), pp. 107-18; A. D’Alessandro, 
'11 Banco di Roma e la guerra di Libia', Storia e Politica, 
VII (1968), pp. 491-509
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investments in the region. Mori and Malgeri argue that the 
Banco di Roma became involved in Libya purely at the behest 
of the Italian government; their operations were often unec­
onomic and served only to further Italy's political and 
strategic interests in the area. Mori cites a despatch of 
April 1911 from San Giuliano to his ambassador in Constant­
inople which accepted that 'tutta l'azione nostra in quelle 
region! deve necessariamente incardinarsi nei detto Istituto 
(the Banco di Roma), giacchb da nessun altro (n6 enti ne 
privati) abbiam potuto ottenere il minimo accordo.’^  The 
bank itself was in no doubt that it deserved well of the gove­
rnment. A meeting of shareholders in March 1915 pressed for 
'il rimborso e risarcimento dei danni e delle spese sostenute 
per l'attivitk del Banco in Oriente e in Libia’ while 
in September the same demands for compensation were repeated 
in a note sent from the bank's representative to the 
Consulta, the Ministry of Colonies and the Treasury. Part 
of this message places the government's interest in Libya 
in a somewhat different context:
II governo italiano fin dal 1905 solennemente 
dichiarava che, interessando all'Italia occupare 
economicamente il paese della Libia e non volendo 
ne dovendo per ora occuparlo militarmente, occorreva 
fare una "politica di penetrazione" con mezzi 
economici e con potenti iniziative.48
As in East Africa, economic penetration into the
Ottoman territories begins around 1907, with the opening
in Tripoli of a branch of the Banco di Roma, soon to be
followed by branches in a dozen other towns. Ernesto
Pacelli's bank promoted schemes in both agriculture and
industry, including a farming venture at Benghasi covering
thousands of acres and involving fifteen thousand cattle, as
well as extractive plants for olive oil, phosphates and
sulphur. Shipping lines were introduced along the coast and
to Alexandria, each with an annual government subsidy of
200,000 lire. The government also backed two new shipping
46 Cited in Mori, art. cit* , p. 114
47 Cited in D'Alessandro, art. cit., p. 495 n8
48 Malgeri, op. cit. , p. 18
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routes from Italy (starting at Genoa and Palermo) to the
North African coast. Exports from Tripolitania to Italy
rose from 254,000 lire in 1895 to 3,200,000 lire in 1910,
while Italian exports to the region climbed from 762 ,000
lire to 4,400,000 lire over the same period. Gino Borgatta
argued in La Riforma Sociale that, !I)inanzi a queste cifre
non possiamo che augurare che dopo la sanguinosa fatica delle
armi, gli anni venturi di pace operosa sappiano portarle
a punti piu alti, indici della vittoriosa espansione econ-
49omica della patria.' Some impression of the economic 
importance attached to Libya within governing circles also 
comes in a message from De Martino, ambassador at Constant­
inople, warning San Giuliano of the dangers posed by the 
growing activities of other European powers:
1. Quelle iniziative industriali, e le altre consi- 
mili, indubbiamente favorite dalle autorita locali, 
costituiscono un danno evidente alia nostra posiz- 
ione politica ed economica in Tripolitania e 
potranno, col tempo, creare una condizione di cose 
assai contraria alle nostre aspirazioni dell' 
avvenire.
2. Non abbiamo nessun modo di impedire a sudditi 
esteri di fare i loro affari in Tripolitania.
3. Non abbiamo nessun modo di impedire ai turchi di 
favorire le iniziative straniere a danno delle 
italiane. II governo esercita cosl un suo sacro- 
santo diritto di difesa contro la penetrazione 
italiana dalla quale solamente ha da temere.
De Martino’s fourth and final point demanded military action
to defend Italy's, economic stake in the area -'Quanto pih
si tardera l'unica e logica soluzione della questione trip-
50olina, tanto piu difficile diverra la soluzione medesima.'
Italy's military efforts in Libya were clearly
rather more than the war for a desert decried by one British 
51observer. More too than an isolated colonial flutter endo­
rsed by Prime Minister Giolitti to win some easy acclaim 
at home. Indeed Giolitti (as has been suggested) was far from
sanguine over this war, despite his later dubious claims to
52have entered office determined to resolve the issue. His
49 G. Borgatta, 'Produzione e commercio in Tripolitania', La 
Riforma Sociale. XXIII (1912), pp. 106-23 at 122
50 Cited in Mori, art. cit. , p. lib
51 P. McCullagh, Italy's War for a Desert: being some exper­
iences of a war correspondent with the Italians in Tripoli 
(London 1912)
52 G. Giolitti, Memorie..., p. 213
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description of 'una fatality storica1 which drove Italy 
into North Africa perhaps betrays his own bewilderment at
the forces acting beneath Italian society and against
Giolitti's pragmatic approach -concerned with steadily 
improving the land and peoples the country already possessed, 
rather than aspiring continually to enlarge them. These 
cautious and prescient remarks of Giolitti, written in 
April 1911 just a few months before he succumbed to domes­
tic pressures and declared war on the Ottoman Empire, are
themselves the best refutation of his image of Italy's action
as a form of diplomatic tidying-up:
I nazionalisti s'immaginano che la Tripolitania h 
il territorio di un povero merlo negro che uno 
Stato europeo pub detronizzare quando vuole. Ma 
la Tripolitania h una provincia dell'Impero otto- 
mano e l'Impero ottomano e una grande potenza 
europea. L'integrita di cib che resta dell'Impero 
ottomano & uno dei principi su cui si fondano 1' 
equilibrio e la pace dell'Europa. Per impossessarmi 
della Tripolitania dovrei muover guerra all'Impero 
ottomano e per fare la guerra a una grande potenza 
europea dovrei avere, se non una ragione, almeno un 
pretesto. Non posso giustificare la guerra all'Impero 
ottomano dichiarando all'Europa che il partito nazion- 
alista vuole la Tripolitania. E poi...1'integrita dell' 
Impero ottomano e una condizione dell'equilibrio 
e della pace dell'Europa. E forse nell’interesse 
dell'Italia mandare in frantumi una delle pietre 
angolari del vecchio edificio? e, se dopo che noi 
avremo attaccato la Turchia, i Balcani si muovono? 
e se una guerra balcanica provoca un urto fra i 
due gruppi di potenza e una guerra europea? Forse 
che noi possiamo addossarci la responsibility di 
dare fuoco alia polvere?53
This remarkable estimate of the likely consenquences of
Italy's action also suggests the prime minister's growing
lack of sympathy with the spirit of the times, and the
goals of most of his colleagues. The divergence between
Giolitti and, for example, his foreign minister, was already
implicit in his rather untimely disregard for foreign policy
per se, but became more marked as Italy's economic and
demographic problems forges support for the colonial
solution, so that San Giuliano would soon be demanding the
economic penetration of the Ottoman Empire almost
53 Malgeri, op. cit., pp. 98-9
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54regardless of the consenquences.
In the case of Libya, it seems reasonable to
conclude that the hope of placing surplus capital and
labour was an important factor in Italian policy; in the
opinion of De Martino, writing in 1907 as president of the
Istituto Coloniale, 'Questo paese felice, a sole trentasei
ore da Siracusa, e dunque adatto quanto la Tunisia, e forse
meglio di essa, alio sfruttamento industriale per opera
di capitalisti e al colonizzamento agricolo per opera dei
55nostri contadinil The acquisition of a new colony in 
lorth Africa had as an especial attraction its potential 
use as a dumping-ground for Italy's surplus peasant popul­
ation. By channelling large numbers of peasants into cont­
rolled colonies, Italy's agricultural population could be 
transformed from a source of international discredit and 
domestic unrest to an integral part of the Consulta's 
new assertive foreign policy. The issue of emigration is 
indeed one of the major examples of the interrelationship 
between Italy's domestic problems and her desire for new 
areas of influence in the years up to 1915 and beyond, and 
played a part too in the decision for intervention.
The weakness of the Italian economy is perhaps 
nowhere so starkly revealed as in the endless stream of 
landless labourers forced to emigrate in search of work.
The permanent imbalance between her potential workforce 
and the work available had led to massive emigration even 
in the years of industrial decollo -almost six million
54 See A.C.S., C.S.G., b.5. Memorandum of early 1914. This 
interpretation of Giolitti's position is not shared by 
Grassi, 'Imperialismo ed emigrazione nella diplomazia 
giolittiana', now in P. Grassi, Gramsci e la "critica" 
della diplomazia "tradizionale" (Lecce I960). However 
the bulk of this article concentrates on Tittoni's 
role as a precursor of San Giuliano's more assertive 
approach.
55 Aquarone, art. cit., p.319- In October 1911 De Martino 
saluted the foreign minister's action: 'Sai quanto ha 
avuto a cuore, amato e studiato questione Tripolitania. 
Dall'opera tua e dall'inaspettata opportunity del momento 
ho fede verra per 1'Italia e la sua diplomazia la 
solenne rivendicazione di tanti errori e di tante 
illusioni.' Malgeri, op. cit. , p.42n
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Italians left the peninsula between 1901 and 1913. Nearly
thirty-four in every 1,000 inhabitants of the Abruzzi
departed in 1910, around thirty in every 1,000 in Calabria,
Basilicata and the Veneto, and over twenty in the Campagna 
56and Sicily. The nationalist movement made much political 
capital from the disastrous repercussions for the economy 
of this exodus. Yet in fact the economic results were far 
from uniformly harmful; one can argue indeed that success­
ive Italian governments could not have financed the enormous 
quantities of imported agricultural and industrial machinery 
needed for industrialisation without the constant flow of 
emigrant's remittances -to a total of 6,212 million lire 
between 1901 and 1913. This sum went a good way to make
up for the trade deficit of over 10,200 million lire incu-
57rred in these years. The high level of remittances had 
also been a vital protection for Italy during the inter-
C Q
national liquidity crisis of 1907* There were too obvious
social benefits from the steady departure of those the
state could not offer work. As Scalabrini commented in
parliament in 1887, emigration offered
una valvola di sicurezza data da Dio a questa 
travagliata society...una forza conservatrice assai 
piu potente di tutti i compressori morali e mater- 
iali escogitati e messi in opera dai legislatori 
per tutelare l'ordine politico e per garantire la 
vita e la roba dei cittadini.59
By the opening years of the following century the 
Italian government moved beyond mere acceptance of such 
advantages toward an attempt to assimilate emigration - 
which for San Giuliano was 'un problema permanente -uno 
dei piu grande, dei piu alti problemi dell'Italia moderna’- 
into its expansionist drive. The foreign minister's 
interest in this question was of many years standing, but
56 E. Sori, L 'emigrazione italiana dall'Unita alia seconda 
guerra mondiale (Bologna 1979), P>25
57 E. Corbino, op. cit. , vol. V, pp.215-6
58 P. Bonelli, ha crisi... , p.51
59 Cited in L. Ganapini, II nazionalismo cattolico: i catt- 
olici e la politica estera in Italia dal 1871 al 1914 
(Bari 1970), p.58
60 A.I. Senato del Regno, t. del 1 luglio 1905, p.2175
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came to centre on the question of winning new outlets for
Italy. Certainly his important article in Nuova Antologia
in 1905 made this connection:
Che importe ai nostri politicanti, se tutti questi 
forti lavoratori, che potrebbero costituire un pode- 
roso coefficiente di una magnifica e piu grande 
Italia fuori d'Italia, vanno perduti per questa,
che dovrebbe essere le grande e luminosa ideality
della generazione presente, e servono solo come 
materia prima e grezza ai progressi ed ai trionfi 
altrui?61
This view was echoed in the same month by the journal itself:
Cessato il pregiudizio che l1emigrazione debba 
considerarsi come un male per un paese come il 
nostro, dove la natalita h sovrabbondante, e dove 
i rimasti...bastano ancora, sempre, ampiamente, alio 
sviluppo dell’agricoltura e delle industrie, l'ideale 
sarebbe che la maggior parte della emigrazione 
potesse venire diretta in paesi che fossero e 
potessero divenire politicamente italiani.62
With San Giuliano's appointment to the Consulta in
1910, such ideas became an intrinsic part of Italian foreign
policy. The new emphasis was evident in the foreign minister's
circular to all ambassadors and consuls on 31 December 1911,
in which he instructed them that
Occorre che il concetto in cui & stato tenuto l'elem- 
ento italiano in troppi altri paesi si trasformi a 
seconda del vero, come si va trasformando il concetto 
in cui era tenuta 1*Italia, grazie alia nuova prova 
che essa sta dando della sua doppia vitality mater- 
iale e morale. L1emigrazione italiana non e gia 
da oggi conseguenza inevitabile di poverta interna,
& volontaria esportazione di forza a beneficio 
dell'estero; consentirle o interdirla non solo 
secondo le garanzie che nei suo benessere ci vengono 
fornite, ma conforme al contegno tenuto dagli altri 
Stati verso lo Stato nostro, h dunque nei nostro 
potere, come h nei nostro diritto.63
San Giuliano had written this in response to a dispute
61 A. Di San Giuliano, art. cit., pp. 92-3
62 'Politica estera ed emigrazione', ibid., pp. 153-60 at
157
b3 La Libia negli atti del Parlamento e nei provvedimenti 
del governo (Milan 1912), vol. 2, p. 401. Cataluccio 
believes emigration may even have been the issue which
led San Giuliano to concentrate on foreign affairs, art.
cit. , p. 479. He describes how in the eighteen-nineties 
Italy's future foreign minister had witnessed the great 
peasant protests led by Giuseppe De Felice Giuffrida in 
Catania, ibid., p. 464
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between the Italian and Argentinian governments, but the 
more general implications of this new tone were not lost 
on observers. The nationalist Gorradini saluted the sentim­
ents in this circular, which
debbono, agli occhi d'ogni italiano che abbia cosc- 
ienza. nazionale, essere idealmente scritte in lettere 
d'oro. Debbono essere preposte come epigrafe al 
capitalo che sepera i due periodi storici della 
nuova Italia...hoi cominciamo a considerare l1emig­
razione come un'arma nella lotta delle nazioni. Cio 
che era nei mondo la nostra catena al piede, l 1 g. 
emigrazione, e oggi la nostra arme in mano nostra.
An article early in 1912 in Gritica Sociale agreed, concl­
uding that '1’emigrazione, che, prima del 1901, fu adoperato
a scopo di politica interna, ora...cominciare ad essere usata
65quale strumento di politica estera imperialista.1 Corra-
dini's joy at the attitude of San Giuliano comes as no
suprise, but these comments in Avanti! on the second Congresso
degli Italiani all’estero reveal how widespread the idea of
an inherent link between emigration and imperialism had
become by around 1911:
II Congresso, senza dirlo espressamente, ha fatto 
toccare con mano ai piu increduli che la posizione 
economica e per riflesso politica e morale dell’
Italia nei mondo e intimamente collegata colie sorti 
materiale e morali, politiche ed economiche, dell’ 
emigrazione; ora che in questa e la base dell'unica 
forma di imperialismo, cui possa nelle condizioni 
attuali aspirare 1'Italia contemporanea, non d'un 
imperialismo politico-territoriale, che per ragion 
di contrasto ci esporrebbe al ridicolo, ma di quel 
tanto d’imperialismo economico che pur senza giurisd- 
izione sovrana e sistemi doganali preferenziali ci 
h consentito, offerto anzi, dalla fecondita ed 
attivita del popolo nostro.66
64 Cited in P. Augen, 'La velleita nazionalista e la politica 
d'emigrazione’, Gritica Sociale, XXII (1912), 1-16 Feb., 
p.35. See also A. Terzolo, ’L'Italia all'Estero: Le realta 
dell'oggi e le aspirazioni del domani', L'Esp. Comm., XXIX 
(1914), pp.171-6; L’espansione, per l'esuberante vitalita 
nostra, si rende inevitabile...(and) sempre deve mirare ad 
un fine supremo: al rafforzamento degli elementi della 
nostra stirpe nei mondo, di fronte agli imperialismi di 
altre razze', p.175
65 P. Augen, art. cit., p.35
66 'II Secondo Congresso degli Italiani all'estero. Uno 
sguardo generale ai suoi risultati', Avanti!, 23 June 1911
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In the event, liberal Italy attempted both forms
of imperialism before 1914, and an important criterion in
the choice between them would be the area's potential for
receiving Italian settlers. Martini's speech at this congress
demonstrates the importance of emigration in her foreign
policy, in addition to giving an unusually frank explanation
of Italy's interests in East Africa:
Sarebbe inutile esaminare e discutere ampiamente 
a proposito delle nostre Colonie di dominio diretto 
l'antica questione concernente i due opposti 
sistemi di ordinamento coloniale, di assimilazione, 
cioe, e di autonomia. Un tale esame si dimostrerebbe 
opportuno soltanto se 1'Eritrea e il Benadir fossero 
o potessero sperare di diventare quandochesia 
colonie di popolamento. Ma esse non saranno mai se 
non colonie di sfruttamento.67
The prospects for such settlements were far happier in Tripol­
itania and Cyrenaica, regions under tenuous Ottoman control 
which were depicted in the most glowing terms by a succession 
of Italian visitors. It was above all nationalist correspon­
dents who eulogised Libya as a future paradise for Italian 
settlers; but even Ernesto Nathan, head of the radical- 
masonic bloc governing Rome and a close confidant of Giolitti, 
could as early as 1904 give this positive appraisal:
E nell'Africa settentrionale v'e una plaga ove 
lungamente sovraneggiava 1'influenza italiana, ov'e 
lecito sperare, per le vie pacifiche dei traffici e 
delle industrie, possa di nuovo prendere il sopra- 
vvento: delle ragioni politiche per colinizzare la 
Tripolitania e la Cirenaica sarebbe inutile disco- 
rrere; non cosi le ragioni economiche che consigliano 
d'imprimere un indirizzo logico e continuo a quella 
corrente di siciliani che traversano il braccio di 
mare per cercare migliore ventura sulla prospiciente 
riva.68
67 Cited in Aquarone, art. cit., p.206n. Not everyone shared 
this cool assessment of the prospects for emigration to her 
colony on the Indian Ocean. One deputy argued in 1905 > 
'Bisogna augurarsi che il popolo italiano non rappresenti 
piu con 1'emigrazione in estranee terre lo strumento cieco 
della ricchezza altrui; auguro al mio Paese che nella 
colonia italiana del Benadir, senza piu sacrifici di vite 
umane e senza eccessivo onere per il tesoro dello Stato... 
possa molto presto svllupparsi quella civilta che e il 
segno di tutte le Nazioni.' Masciantonio, cited in Grassi, 
Gramsci..., p.91
68 E. Nathan, 'Di un disegno di colonizzamento', N.A., f 775,
1 April 1904, pp.537-41 at 540. Nathan believed colonies 
should be founded throughout South America, Texas, Eritrea 
and even the Congo to receive the 'massa di energie che
67
Even G-iolitti would in 1915 pander to such sentiments, just­
ifying the Libyan war through the absolute 'necessita d1
espansione per un paese come il nostro la cui popolazione
69cresce m  modo meraviglioso.’ "
Here then were the twin attractions of Libya; as a
boon for both entrepreneur and peasant, capital and labour
alike. As an article published in L1Esplorazione Commerciale
on the occasion of Italy's assault on the region argued,
Le nostre condizioni economiche, accentuate dal 
sorprendente aumento della popolazione, dal confor- 
tante sviluppo delle industrie, che dobbiamo augur- 
arci ancor maggiore, e la nostra sempre crescente 
emigrazione, rendevano urgente l'acquisto di una 
zona vasta e vicina sulla quale le energie italiane 
potessero, nelle loro varie e molteplici manifestaz- 
ioni, liberamente svolgersi a beneficio della 
nazione, sotto la diretta tutela della bandiera 
nostra, senza essere esposte alle vessazioni, ai 
soprusi, alle persecuzioni di altri G-overni.70
The absurdity of this situation, in which Italy exported both 
her manpower and the capital which could provide it with work, 
was of course rooted in the failure to come to grips with 
the desperate backwardness of the Mezzogiorno. Indeed, indust­
rialisation had increased the disparities between north and 
south, and all San Giuliano's talk of a voluntary export of 
manpower ill-concealed the fact that Italy's emigratoty 
imperialism was a signal of economic and political failures. 
The sceptical remarks of one catholic journal in September 
1911 made just this point:
Che ha 1'Italia questa forza economica? Ha essa una 
esuberanza di vita industriale da sentire il bisogno
si lasciano andare ciecamente a disperdersi o lasciarsi 
assorbire all'estero senza un pensiero, senza un tentativo 
per incanalarle, dirigerle in guisa che la loro potenza 
fecondatrice possa piu utilmente svilupparsi e retrocedersi 
...a beneficio della madre patria. ' *, ibid., p.558
69 Relazione al Re, 29 Sep. 1915, in G. Giolitti, Liscorsi 
pari., vol. 5, p.1716. This is one of the very few refer­
ences ever made by Giolitti to the question of emigration. 
One would not know from his memoirs that this was perhaps 
the most remarked feature of his years as prime minister 
before World War I.
70 P.. Vigoni, 'Tripoli nostra!', L'Esp. Comm., XXYI (1911), 
pp.561-2 at 561
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estremo di uscire dai suoi confini?...Che bisogna 
c'e di andare a fare una penetrazione a Tripoli; 
non sarebbe meglio farla in Sardegna o in Calabria, 
senza uscir d’Italia?71
The problems posed for Italian industry by the limited 
markets of southern Italy were compounded by the high agric­
ultural tariffs, which further weakened domestic demand and 
encouraged producers to look abroad for their markets. Italy’s 
tariff structure faced sustained criticism in the period 
immediately before 1914, an attack often centred on this 
relationship between a severely limited domestic market and 
the svolta imperialistica under San Giuliano. Libya is impor­
tant as a further example of this trend in Italian foreign 
policy, which sought here in her fourth shore and then in 
other areas (some of them at first sight even less propit­
ious) a solution to her social and economic tensions, and 
which led eventually to intervention in 1915.
Libya also has further relevance to a study of the 
politics of intervention. The value of the war of 1911-12 
to the nationalists -who could claim with some justice to 
have helped force Giolitti’s hand- has often been noted.
Yet this is only one aspect of a political realignment trigg­
ered off by the war, which resulted in an enhanced respect 
for the authority of the state and a general ralliement 
against those seen to threaten that authority. If in 1915 
Italian intervention is so persistently canvassed as a solut­
ion to all domestic political difficulties, this is due at 
least in part to the experience of 1911. Giuseppe Prezzolini 
believed the benefits from the Libyan war 'consistono tutti
nei sentimento popolare di unita nazionale e di calma di
72fronte alia lotta.' It had above all paved the way for a 
reconciliation between Catholicism and the secular state, a 
process already signalled by catholic involvement in the 
elections of 1904, as well as the government’s use of the 
Banco di Roma. In 1911 many chaplains would leave with the 
Italian army, while the troops were blessed in services 
across Italy. The tone of many catholic journals on the 
announcement of war, determined to be outdone by none in
71 ’A Tripoli a tutti i costi*, L ’Unita Gattolica, 13 Sep.
1911
72 G. Prezzolini, ’La Pace’, La Voce, IV (1912), now in A.
Romano (ed.), La cultura italiana del *900 attraverso le
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their patriotic enthusiasm, is in total contrast to their
reaction to Italy's previous African campaign fifteen years
earlier. Then L'Unita Cattolica had attacked 'una guerra di
disastri, di disinganni amarissimi, di lutti atroci, una
guerra funestissima che ha tutte le semb'ianze di un flag-
ello onde la divina G-iustizia colpisca chi ha i conti aperti
con lei'; and taken comfort in the unanimity among catholics
'nei combattere e nei condannare le impress, fino dal primo
giorno dello sbarco a Massua. Non ci lasciamo illudere da
nessun miraggio, ne di gloria militare, ne di propaganda
73della civilt&, ne di speculazioni semitico-agricole.'
Yet in 1911 -as '1'Italia prende veramente da oggi
soltanto nella propria coscienza e nella altrui...il suo
74posto di grande potenza mediterranea'- Catholicism and 
patriotism would no longer be at odds in the peninsula: past 
differences are forgotten in the common need to defend 
common values of order and hierarchy. The move to Libya 
was seen widely in catholic circles as a new holy war against 
Islam (the three hundred and fortieth anniversary of the 
Battle of Lepanto fell suitably in October 1911 and was 
commemorated throughout Italy), promising an end to internal 
divisions in the unity of church and empire. At the begin­
ning of 1912, Filippo Sassoli de'Bianchi, president of the 
Lega Cattolica Hugellana, urged the importance that
il nome di Roma e d'Italia vadano per il mondo 
indissolubilmente uniti al nome di Cristo e della 
cristianita...ai forti campioni della nostra arm- 
ata e del nostro esercito, che con tanto valore 
piantano il vessillo nazionale sul lido tripoli- 
tano, (he sent) il saluto ed il plauso nostro, 
nella speranza che questa nuova ardita posizione 
internazionale presa dalls patria sia auspice di 
una indipendenza piu vera la quale permetta alfine 
di raggiungere quella pacificazione religiosa che 
sta al sommo di tutti i nostri voti.75
The movement toward acceptance of the liberal state, which
riviste (Turin 1960^), vol. 3 'La Voce ? 1908-14 , p.479
73 Cited in P. L. Ballini, II movimento cattolico a Firenze 
(1900-1919) (Rome 1969), p.241
74 'Rassegna politica', Rassegna Nazionale, XXXIII (1911), 
pp.569-75 at 570
75 Cited in Ballini, op. cit., pp.246-7
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in the next few years would make a section of catholic opin­
ion responsive to nationalist propaganda and then add a good 
deal of ambivalence to their neutralism in 1914-15, can be 
followed most clearly during the Libyan war in the barrage 
of criticism aimed at the socialist party by catholic 
journals. Indeed one such journal, La Settimana Sociale, all­
uded to the domestic implications of these events, writing 
in March 1912, 'Pareva...che la guerra dovesse aprirci le 
porte della vita nazionale, e che 1’attegiamento dei social - 
isti...ci avrebbe fatto prendere il posto finora occupato
da essi nei cuore del popolo, dei governanti, della monar- 
76chia.1 Rassegna Nazionale attacked anti-war demonstrations
organised by those 'contro la guerra, contro la religione':
E la fermezza del Governo incontrera 1’approvazione 
di tutta la cittadinanza che ha gia dimostrato di 
essere stanca di queste continue sopraffazioni di 
una minoranza infima, ma clamorosa e prepotente, 
ed ha provato anche in questa occasione di essere 
disposta a dare all’autorith tutto il proprio 
appoggio, non solo morale, ma altresi materiale, 
prestandole man forte contro gli atti di fellonia 
che vengono compiendo i teppisti del socialismo 
contro la Patria. I quali...sono rimasti, essi 
italiani, gli unichi alleati della Turchia nei 
conflitto fra questa e 1!Italia.77
Past disagreements should be forgotten, since 'l'unith d’
Italia & veramente compiuta, dal momento che Vescovi e
Gardinali benedicono alle armi nostre, e chiamano il popolo
fedele nelle chiese a pregare il Dio degli eserciti perche
VRci accordi la vittoria.' The review also admonished Giolitti
for his attempt to placate the socialists -’Veda l’on
Giolitti quali patrioti sono costoro che, mentre i nostri
soldati si battono contro il nemico osano ancora qua e la
qualche dimostrazione di protesta in cui giungono...a
gridare viva la Turchia!’: this was in contrast ’al partito
conservatore liberale, che da oggi splendida prova di
patriottismo e di lealismo costituzionale con lo stringersi
79attorno al Governo, rappresentante della Uazione.' War
76 La Settimana Sociale, 9 March 1912
77 'Rassegna politica', Rass. Laz., XXXIII (1911), p.428
78 'Impressioni d'un italiano in Turchia durante la guerra', 
ibid., pp.429-34 at 432
79 'Rassegna politica', ibid. , p.157
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came as a blessing, 'percne ci na ridato la coscienza di
noi stessi, perche ci na fatto rialzare la fronte davanti
a noi e gli altri, perchk ci na rivelato tutto il valore,
tutto la preparazione, tutta la potenza del nostro esercito
di terra e di mare1, bringing a fcorruscante rinascita di
80orgoglio nazionale.' In order to avoid a return to the
previous apathy and decline,
conviene che la Camera...comprenda ci6 che aspetta, 
cio che si chiaramente ha detto di volere il paese;
un governo forte e dignitoso di fronte ai nemici
interni ed esterni...(with) larghezza di intendimenti 
e la fine di certe colpevoli tolleranze, delle 
improntitudini anticlericali, delle blandizie verso 
quelle minoranze egoistiche le quali...potevano 
essere ritenute forti solo perch6 taceva la grande 
voce del paese che ora si potente ha tuonato.81
La Civilta Cattolica also pointed to the domestic benefits
of a national war, which 'ha fatto cessare ogni guerra, o
quasi, di partiti contro il governo. Questa h stato il primo
effetto generale della suddetta guerra; un altro e stato
il gran colpo che hanno avuto i socialist!, messisi in
82disparte dalla nazione.1
This domestic aspect of Italy's war in Nortn Africa, 
wnicn foresnadows tne anti-socialist tone of so much war 
agitation in 1914-15, is itself in part a product of a more 
fundamental change in the relationship between secular and 
clerical groups, following the gradual insertion of catholic 
financial institutions into the nerve-centres of the 
Italian economy -a development crucial in Salandra's rise 
to power and the emergence of a political terrain on which 
his national policy could operate. The research of M. G.
Rossi has shown the growing importance of catholic banks 
in the channelling of small savings into commercial and 
industrial investments, a trend in which the year 1907 
once again stands out as the vital need of industrialists 
for new liquidity forces them toward the many catholic banks
Q-Z
and savings-houses, Rossi follows the integration of
80 'Rassegna politica', ibid., p. 315
81 'Felice risveglio (a proposito della guerra italo-turca)’, 
ibid., p. 464
82 Cited in L. Ganapini, op. cit., p. 212
83 See M. G. Rossi, 'Movimento cattolico e capitale finanz- 
iario: appunti sulla genesi del blocco clerico-moderato' , 
Studi Storici, XIII (1972), pp. 249-88, espec. 258-82
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catholic and secular capitalist interests through the fina­
ncing of electrical, engineering and textile concerns, in 
addition to subventions to shipping companies; and in the
84collaboration of many savings-banks, especially in Lombardy. 
The fusion of previously separate centres of finance was 
visible above all in the Societa Generate immobiliare di 
lavori di utilita pubblica ed agricola: this had as its 
president Mario Besso of the Banca Commerciale and as vice- 
president Romolo Tittoni of the Banca di Roma (brother of 
Italy’s foreign minister and a leading figure in the economic 
and financial dealings of clerical groups), and had links
o c
with companies in shipping, building and other sectors.
The crucial role of the Banco di Roma in promoting 
Italy's economic penetration of Libya takes on an extra 
dimension in this context, given its position at the summit 
of the catholic financial structure. The rapid expansion 
of this bank -from capital of ten million lire in 1902 to 
100 millions in 1910 and then 200 million lire only two 
years later- enabled it to finance many important areas of 
the economy. The Societh elettrica coloniale italiana, the 
Societa italiana per imprese fondiarie and Compagnia di 
Antivari were among the firms benefiting from its credit 
facilities, along with many smaller companies in Lombardy 
and in the real-estate sector, with which clerical finance 
was traditionally linked. The same trend can be followed 
through individual catholic financiers; through, for example, 
the holdings of P. Benucci, president of the catholic press 
trust on its creation in 1907, and involved in firms in the 
chemical, electrical, sugar, shipping, jute and real-estate 
sectors. The new centrality of Pacelli's bank can again be 
seen in its role in Bonaldo Stringher's operation of 1911 to 
avert the disastrous collapse of the iron cartel; this was
See by the same author, 'II movimento cattolico nelle camp- 
agne fino al primo dopoguerra', Gritica Marxista, VIII (1970), 
pp.286-304; 'G-uerra di Libia e imperialismo italiano', Studi 
Storici, XII (1971), pp.381-5; Le origine del partito 
cattolico. Movimento cattolico e lotta di classe nell*
Italia liberate (Rome 1977)
84 Rossi, 'Movimento,..', pp.272-4
85 Rossi, Le origini..., pp.297-302. See also G. Barone, 
'Struttura, congiuntura e lotta politica nell'eta 
giolittiana', in AAVV iotere e Societa in Sicilia nella
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the domestic counterpart to its activities in Libya, and
of equally crucial value to the state. At the same time
the Banca di Roma gained control of other clerical banks,
placing representatives on their boards and furthering the
concentration of catholic finance -in Rossi’s words,
le rete bancaria cattolica veniva a funzionare come 
un complesso di filiali del Banco di Roma e degli 
altri maggiori istituti, rastrellando il piccolo e 
medio risparmio, direttamente o attraverso le casse 
rurali ad essa collegata, e convogliando l’afflusso 
di denaro inutilizzato verso gli impieghi produt- 
tivi.86
Demands in the catholic trust press for decisive 
action in Libya -its leading paper, Corriere d*Italia, sent 
a correspondent to l.orth Africa in February 1911 (i.e. 
before even the foundation of the nationalist journal, L1Idea 
Lazionale), and carried his demand in the following month 
that Italy had ’imporre colla forza...alia Turchia, il 
libero e rispettoso svolgimento di qualsiasi nostra attiv-
O  rj
ita' - have been ascribed to the direct influence of the
Banco di Roma, on whom the trust was financially dependent.
However they can be explained in more general terms as an
expression of the new links between clerical interests and
the state, ties which will be strengthened in the years
before Sarajevo. By 1914 the Banco di Roma is financing
initiatives in the Levant and East Africa, and is also a
88growing presence in the armaments industry. It was active 
too in the interventionist campaign against the Banca Comm- 
erciale, and favoured the banking-industrial bloc formed 
around the new Banca Italiana di Sconto on the eve of inter­
vention; the roots of its attitude during neutrality lie 
-as with so much else in the politics of intervention- in 
the ramifications of Italy’s truncated industrial take-off 
in these earlier years, when clerical finance assumed a
crisi dello stato liberale (Catania 1977), p.24 for the 
important role of catholic banks in Sicily.
86 ’Movimento...’, p.275. On Benucci, see ibid., p.277n
87 E. Vassallo, Corriere d'Italia, 14 March 1911
88 Rossi, Le origini..., pp.317-8
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new importance for the state.
Clerical sympathy for Italy’s colonial expansion is
also suggested by an article in Rassegna ilazionale demanding
the foundation of a colonial bank; writing in 1910, A.
Giovanni Mallarini argued that
Ad’un era di prosperity grande s'incamminano dunque i 
nostri commerci col Levante; ed & consolante ricon- 
oscere che il R. Governo ora apprezza ed appoggia le 
iniziative italiane laggiu. Ma sempre piu palese si 
fa intanto sentire la mancanza di un poderoso Ente 
finanziario apposito, che dia slancio, efficacia 
ed unita di indirizzo e praticity di azione all* 
espansione economica italiana nel Mediterraneo. 
Qualcosa giy fece, e con lode, il Banco di Roma; ma 
urge provvedere al riguardo di questa necessity , 
nazionale merce l'accordo di tutte le sane energie.89
Eritrea and Somalia gave Italy access to 'grandi corsi d’
acqua navigabili, queste meravigliose vie naturali per ragg-
iungere l’altipiano etiopico, servirebbero nei commerci.
Insomma sarebbe un’era di fecondo, sano, lucroso lavorio pr-
oduttore di ricchezze grandi che si inizierebbe1; but only
with a bank which ’sia italiano non solo di nome, onde i
90frutti restino in Italia e non emigrino all'estero.' The
urgent need is to gain access to the small savers who invest
in the national debt or in bonds -since
ora tutto prova giunto il momento storico acconcio 
a che in Italia sorga poderosa, forte subito di 
varie diecine di milioni, una Banca Coloniale 
Italiana, che faciliti il commercio, le industrie 
italiane all'estero, sia centro di depositi di 
fondi per nostri emigranti, provveda alia valori- 
zzazione e sfruttamento delle nostre Colonie dirette, 
e di ogni sua fede, o filiale anche piccola, faccia 
un centro di diffusione o difesa dell'italianita 
nel campo morale, di diffusione dei nostri commerci, 
dei nostri traffici marittimi, di sfogo ai prodotti 
delle nostre industrie nel campo materiale. Oggidi 
piu che mai per 1'espansione economica italiana 
occorrono: unita di direzione, prontezza ed acutezza 
di azione, forza di capitali. Jj'unione delle energie 
da la forza, da il successo...E ormai tempo che 
cessino le gretezze di vedute, che cada il concetto 
d'un Italia fossilizzata entro i suoi ristretti 
confini politici, e per alcuni poi ridotta entro 
la cerchia del proprio partito; la Patria deve fare
89 ’Per una Banca Coloniale Italiana', Rassegna lazionale, 
XXXII (1910), pp.50-70 at 54-55
90 ibid., p.57
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91via nova, non schiava d'alcuno.
These ideas had an immediate impact amongst industrialists,
as Mallarini was pleased to demonstrate in a second article
92published in January 1911. The II Congresso degli '.esport-
atori italiani in Oriente, meeting in Milan in November 1910,
unanimously passed a resolution reaffirming that
lfinfluenza nazionale all'estero non pub estendersi 
senza 1'istituzione di una grande Banca Coloniale, 
da incarico al Comitato presso l'Istituto Coloniale 
per 11effettuazione dei voti dei Congressi, di 
occuparsi, con la maggiore possibile sollecitudine, 
per la formazione della Banca stessa col consorzio 
dei principali Istituti di Credito Nazionali, col 
concorso degl'industriali italiani e coll'appoggio 
del Governo.93
The report of the Milan paper Perseveranza on this congress
concluded that, 'La direttiva per 1'espansione commerciale
italiana h stata chiaramente tracciata', and agreed on the
need for a new national bank, 'che faciliterb enormemente
la intensificazione di interessi nel Levante e nell'Estremo 
'» Q  A
Onente. These demands would be renewed over the next few 
years, as Italy's credit weakness hampered efforts to 
expand at home and abroad, and climaxed with the successful 
struggle for a new 'Italian' bank in 1914.
The measure of support for Italy's expansion exten­
ded even to a part of the socialist party around Bissolati, 
which accepted colonialism as a necessary stage of capitalist 
development. The party responded to the outbreak of war in 
1911 in such a confused and divided fashion that Giolitti 
felt able to cable the king on 25 September, 'Movimento 
socialista non credo abbia importanza. Parecchi socialisti 
sono favorevoli all' imprese. '^This was especially true of 
southern and Sicilian deputies such as De Felice and Podreca. 
I)e Felice had even travelled to Libya on the heels of 
Italy's invading forces, reporting in October on the new nope 
offered to the south by the war:
91 ibid., pp.62-3 and 67
92 'A proposito d'una Banca Coloniale Italians', Hass, baz., 
XXXIII (1911), pp.447-60. See pp.447-9 for the widespread 
interest in his initial article.
93 '11° Congresso degli esportatori italiani in Oriente', 
n'Esp. Comm., XXV (1910), pp.321-30 at 328
94 A. Mallarini, 'A proposito...', p.447
95 G. Giolitti, Quarant' anni, vol.Ill, no. 54
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Con 1'occupazione italiana della Tripolitania il 
corso sociale si modifica anch'esso, si trasforma, 
si evolve, assume un'altra configurazione etnica 
ed una nuova funzione economica: la Sicilia e il 
Mezzogiorno non restano piu al di la dei limiti 
delle funzioni vitali della nostra vita sociale, 
diventano alia loro volta un ponte di passaggio 
fra i commerci piu sviluppati del nostro Bel Paese 
e quelli che stanno per sviluppare in un territorio 
che h quattro volto piu vasto e ricco di quello 
italiano.96
Podreca too announced that he was 'favorevole in massima
all'occupazione europea (of Africa) per ragioni di progresso,
di civilta, di umanita e dello stesso interesse del prolet-
97ariato indigeno', though he claimed to have doubts over the
wisdom of occupying Libya. Turati seemed anxious to accept
Giolitti!s explanation of !una fatalita storica' which had
driven him to act, in the hope that things would soon settle
down and the prime minister could resume his reformist 
98course. Libya showed the potency of a national war in anne­
xing even socialists into a bloc backing government policies 
of expansion, an aspect of the events of 1911-12 not lost 
on either Salandra or the nationalists. This war also had 
an important part in the meeting between the nationalist 
movement and revolutionary syndicalism. Writing in the 
first issue of La Lupa in August 1910, Corradini stressed
the two group's common hostility to parliamentary democracy,
99socialism and pacifism. 7 Here again, links which are first 
sketched in the campaign for war against the Turks will then 
come to fruition in the struggle for intervention in the 
European war.
The diplomatic and military chain between Italy's 
colonial venture in Libya and the war of 1914- has often 
been noted: yet the domestic continuity within Italy from 
1911 to 1914-15 is no less real. Not least in the cavalier 
treatment of parliament. In 1911 war began without any 
parliamentary sanction, and the chamber only resumed sitting
96 Gorriere di Catania, 27 Oct. 1911. Cited in Malgeri, op. 
cit. , p. 65
97 Cited in M. Degl'Innocenti, op. cit. , p. 47. See this for 
a discussion of the socialist party's response to war in 
1911
98 Cited in ibid. , p. lOn
99 Now in P. M. Arcari, Le elaborazioni della dottrina polit- 
ica nazionale fra 1*Unita e l'intervento (1870-1914) 
(Florence 1934-9), vol. II, pp. 667-84
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after five months of fighting; while large stretches of the 
ten months of neutrality in 1914-15 (and indeed of the 
first year of the war) would pass with the chamber in recess. 
In a more general sense, the need for new territories in 
which to place surplus capital and labour and so win 'per 
un lungo giro di decenni, l'avvenire economico e politico e 
la tranquility sociale della nazione' as one paper had it, 
is the driving force behind Italian foreign policy throughout 
this period. Control of Libya and infiltration into Ottoman 
markets might also give a much needed boost to the southern 
economy: the latest series of riots in protest at condi­
tions in the Mezzogiorno occurred around the town of Verb- 
icaro in August and September 1911. The Libyan war shows 
both agrarian and industrial sectors pinning their hopes on 
the exploitation of such underdeveloped areas as a means 
to economic salvation,offering possible mineral wealth 
and agricultural production, as well as an outlet for 
surplus population. Finally, Libya is relevant as an important 
stage in the involvement of catholic forces in economic 
and political life, so making available a pool of support 
for anti-socialist and expansionist policies. Despite the 
Gentiloni pact of 1913 , it was not Giolitti who could hope 
to gain from this development. Rather, war revealed and 
reinforced tendencies in Italian society which gained 
strength and steadily undermined Giolitti1s position -a 
tendency sensed by La Voce as early as 1911:
Troppi sintomi, troppi fenomeni di carattere dubbio 
si manifestavano qua e iy, soprattutto nel giornal- 
ismo...perche fosse possibile di respingere ad 
occhi chiusi il sospetto che alcuni gruppi di 
conservatori tentassero di derivare dalla recente 
fase della politica estera contraccolpi di politica 
interna.102
100 Momento, 2 Aug. 1911
101 See M. Malatesta, II Resto del Oarlino: potere politico 
ed economico a Bologna dal 1885 al 1922 (Milan 1978), pp. 
274-5 for an analysis in these terms of this paper's 
campaign in the first months of 1911 for political 
control of Libya.
102 'La Vcce' , 'Giolitti', now in A. Romano (ed.), op. cit. , 
pp. 376-8 at 376
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Italy and the Balkans
This discussion of Italian imperialism has so far 
been limited to events in Africa. Yet well before 1914 the 
Consulta was also striving to assert Italian influence in 
the lands across the Adriatic. It is here that Italian for­
eign policy, compelled by the requirements of her industrial 
sector to stake out extensive claims throughout the region, 
came to clash repeatedly with the interests of both Germany 
and Austria-Hungary. While the German government could live 
with an alliance partner whose commitment to the Triplice 
often seemed less than total, and Rome could accept the 
Habsburg government discriminating against Italians in 
the irredenta, the collision of economic interests in the 
Balkans and Asia Minor was already sapping the Triple All­
iance even before it was finally destroyed by European war. 
Austro-Italian relations had been troubled regularly by 
outbursts of Italian irredentism, but these came to be over­
shadowed by competition for markets in the Balkans and 
the Levant, Italy’s desire for control of Trieste as the 
key to trade with the east, a fierce naval race and confl­
icting railway projects in the Balkans and beyond into Asia 
Minor. This last problem was perhaps the least soluble, 
with Italy’s projected line from the Danube to the Adriatic 
alarming both the Central Powers, with its implicit chall­
enge to the famous Berlin-Baghdad route on which so many 
interests rested in Berlin. The importance of this question 
in Italy’s diplomatic realignment is suggested in an impor­
tant memorandum sent by De Martino, secretary-general of 
the foreign ministry, to San Giuliano early in September 
1914, in which he argued:
1'azione austriaca contro la Serbia toccava manif-
estamente interessi italiani di natura politica ed
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economica, e cib tanto nell'ipotesi di acquisti 
territorial! dell'Austria-Ungheria quanto nell' 
ipotesi di nessun acquisto territoriale. Questo 
punto b stato ampiamente dimostrato nella corris- 
pondenza ufficiale. Mi limiterb, per memoria, ad 
accennare agli opposti interessi italiani ed 
austriaci in ordine alle ferrovie balcaniche ed 
alia lunga e tenace opera italiana per la ferrovia 
Danubio-Adriatico, la quale per noi ha vitale 
importanza economica e politica.1
To understand why this question had become so central to 
Italian foreign policy, and why the government in Home had 
embarked on such a costly naval race in the Adriatic, it is 
necessary to examine the traditional dependence of Italian 
industry on the state.
It has been suggested that the characteristic 
features of industrialisation -the predominance of heavy 
industry, the large number of cartels and active support 
from the state- are a product largely of her late arrival 
as a nation-state in Europe, and the need for rapid devel­
opment which flowed from this. However the reliance of ind­
ustry on the state can be traced back to the early decades 
of the unified state, with railway construction, military
contracts and a tariff barrier acting as a substitute for
2
the conquest of foreign markets. Increasingly fierce comp­
etition in world markets, together with a general move to 
protective barriers, then reinforces this proneness to feed 
off state contracts. One can indeed see in the introduction 
of protection in Italy, in the form initially of a moderate 
tariff in 1878 and then the far higher tariffs of 1887, a 
decision central to Italy's future economic and political
development, marking a rejection of the earlier generation's
3
more optimistic free-trade policies. Links between the state 
and industry now multiplied rapidly, strengthened especially 
by the need for a measure of self-sufficiency in military 
provisions. This led to a government sponsored expansion
1 Documenti Liplomatici Italiani. Series 5, vol. 1, 4 Sep. 
1914, pp.328-332 at 331
2 See A. Oaracciolo, 'Intorno ai legami del capitale priv- 
ato con lo stato nei primi decenni dell'unita italiana », 
R.S.R. , XLIV (1957), pp.327-32
3 See R. Romeo, op. cit. , Chapter four; and R. Prodi, 'II 
protezionismo nella politica e nell'industria italiana 
dalla unificazione al 1887', R.R.S., XLIX (1965), pp. 
597-626 and L (1966), pp.42-86
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of the metallurgical industry in the eighteen-eighties, 
coinciding above all with Admiral Benedetto Brin's period 
as Minister of Marine from 1884 to 1891. As military spen­
ding rose and the government fed contracts to national 
industry, so a whole network of shipyards and factories 
blossomed whose very existence depended on the continuing 
requirements of the state. By far the greatest activity 
occurred along the coast between La Spezia and Genoa, where 
many small and medium sized factories appeared dependent 
in turn on the major contractors, and also in the vicinity 
of Naples. Firms such as Ansaldo, Odero, Orlando, the 
Stabilmento dei Fratelli Be Luca at Naples, the shipyards 
of Castellammare di Stabia and of Taranto -all were from
their inception locked into the fulfilment of state comm- 
4issions.
The feasibility of gaining entirely autonomous 
sources of supply for naval construction had been the subject 
of a parliamentary commission -a commission created on 
the naval ministry's suggestion and chaired by Admiral Brin. 
Its report (published in 1885) claimed that Italian firms 
were able to offer to 'nostri cantieri una certa quantity 
sufficiente di acciaio per l’andamento ordinario delle 
costruzioni delle navi di guerra senza essere soggetti alle 
case inglesi e francesi'; but the report also stressed that 
Italian producers were 'ancora un po'indietro e che manca 
il grande stabilmento siderurgico completo capace di prov- 
vedere senza restrizioni a tutto quanto serv(iva) per la 
R. Marina.' Here is the origin of the notorious iron and 
steel works at Terni, which was developed at the behest of 
Brin and other figures in the naval establishment. Much 
of the initial capital came from the Italian government, 
and complaints at the enormous corruption which resulted 
from this symbiotic relationship soon began to surface,
4 See L. De Rosa, 'Difesa militare e sviluppo economico in 
Italia (1861-1914)', Rassegna Economica del Banco di 
Napoli, XXXIII (1969), pp.309-16
5 Relazione della Commissione per le industrie meccaniche 
e nsvali (Rome 1885), PP»37 and 44
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and finally became so persistent that the government had 
to set up a. further commission of inquiry. The report of 
this inquiry gave little comfort to either Terni or the 
ministry. Until a government decision of 1903 to put out 
tenders abroad for the first time forced the company to 
lower its prices, Terni had been receiving a string of highly 
profitable commissions -one deputy calculated it had made a 
profit of two hundred per cent on state orders.^ Such incid­
ents were inevitable in the development of an industry which 
even in the early years of industrialisation regularly 
produced more than Italian manufacturers required: the state 
had to step in and play the fostering role quite beyond 
domestic industry if it wished to have a national iron and 
steel industry. The same argument applies to the mines on 
the island of Elba, which were in fact developed in response 
to the birth of Terni. Indeed as early as 1881 Salvatore 
Orlando, director of the Orlando shipyards at Livorno, had 
outlined plans for an autarchic Italian merchant marine, 
with its own shipyards supplied by domestic industry. Orla­
ndo believed Italy would thus save millions of lire at present 
going abroad, provide greater employment and so help check
7
the spread of social unrest and subversion. Here then, in 
the eighteen-eighties, is emerging the government desire 
for autarchy and the resulting mutual dependency of state 
and heavy industry which in the later period of European 
imperialism will make the Gonsulta. so responsive to the 
needs of heavy industry.
Orlando's remarks also point to another advantage 
of a strong navy for the Italian ruling class -its poten­
tial appeal to the public as a focus of national pride. An 
anonymous editorial in the journal of the Lega Lavale in 
1900 argued that Italy had much to learn from Germany on 
this point:
In Inghilterra, in Francia, in Germania, negli
6 R. A. Webster, Industrial imperialism in Italy 1908-1915 
(Berkely 1975), p.56
7 R. A. Webster, 'Autarky, expansion and the underlying 
continuity of the Italian state', I.Q., VIII (1964), 
pp.3-18 at 6-7
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Stati Uniti, perfino in Giappone un'idea, nuova 
per alcuni, rinnovata per altri, eccita gli entus- 
iasmi e preoccupa le menti; l'idea navale...Laneiate 
questa idea in un paese come il nostro, fate che lo 
Stato si metta decisamente alia testa del movim- 
ento navale, lo ecciti, lo stimoli, lo appoggi, lo 
protegga, e voi avrete rovinato il socialismo cosi 
come lo sta rovinando in Germania l'imperatore 
Guglielmo, opponendo idea ad idea, propaganda a 
propaganda, miraggio di agiatezza e di prosperity, 
a mezzo dell’espansione e della potenza, al miraggio 
d'una ipotetica divisione della ricchezza.8
The Lega Navale would never gain the mass appeal of its
counterparts in Britain and Germany; but then in the opinion
of the league's secretary-general, Gastano Limo, this was
not its task:
sono le classi dirigenti che noi vogliamo conquist- 
are con 1!opera nostra. Quando la conquista dei 
cuori e delle menti sia compiuta, ad essi, piu che 
a noi, spetta il compito di agire sulla classe 
popolare e guidarle al nuovo indirizzo politico- 
navale che la Lega vorrebbe imprimere alle energie 
del Paese.9
Limo, author in 1899 of a highly successful 'war scare' book, 
'La Guerra del 190...', could report in the following year 
of the Lega Navale's influence in the Ministry of Marine, in 
banking and industrial circles, the merchant marine and 
both chambers of parliament. The extraordinary sums devoted 
to naval building over the next fifteen years indeed shows 
the complete acceptance of Italy's need for a great navy 
amongst her ruling class; an acceptance which helped produce 
the naval race with Austria-Hungary, and was then strength­
ened by the value of this competition (and other events such 
as the naval descent on the coasts of North Africa and the 
Dodecanese) as a force for social integration within Italy. 
Her claim to rank as a great power in Europe was vital to 
the stability of Italian institutions -above all to the mon­
archy- and her growing naval power in the Mediterranean 
helped give this claim some reality. It was also undeniable 
that Italy could not hope to compete with the other European
8 'L'idea navale nei rapporti con la politica dei socialisti 
e dei conservatori', La Lega Navale, III (1900), p. 250
9 'L'Assemblea Generale della "Lega Navale Italiana"’, ibid., 
pp. 188-9
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powers without a good measure of industrial and military 
strength and self-sufficiency: a point made by Salvatore 
Orlando in 1906, when he invited his fellow deputies to look 
back
a quel periodo quando si era costretti a servirsi 
in Prancia e in Inghilterra ogni qualvolta per un 
impianto occorreva un metro quadrato di metallo, 
quando bisognava richiedere all'estero i macchin- 
ari, le armature, e tutti gli altri materiali, e 
soprattutto mandare centinaia di milioni in quei 
paesi.10
The arguments for a national metallurgical industry to supply
an expanding navy as an expression of Italian strength and
independence, are all pulled together in this final quotation
from ha Lega Lavale:
La nave che esce per la prima volta da un cantiere 
rappresenta quanto di meglio sappia fare l'industria 
nel paese che l'ha costruita...Ha dato piu fama all' 
industria italiana la costruzione di corazzate 
come la Sicilia e la Sardegna che non ne darebbero 
dieci esposizioni. E gli effetti finanziari di 
questa fama non sono arrivati lenti. Per la prima 
volta noi Italiani, che fino a dieci anni fa siamo 
stati tributari all'estero per le industrie metal- 
lurgiche, abbiamo venduto per un'ottantina di milioni 
di navi da guerra alia Spagna, al Portogallo, al 
Marocco, all'Argentina; e abbiamo costruito in 
casa tutto il materiale nuovo, occorrente alia marina 
di commercio. Quando si pensi che centomila etto- 
litri di vino rappresentano meno di due milioni, se 
venduti all'estero...vien voglia di chiedere perche 
tutta 1'Italia non si sia vivamente interessata 
alle sorti di una industria che pub dare un'esport- 
azione di centinaia di milioni.11
Government contracts obviously formed an important 
market for every nation's heavy industry: but the extreme 
dependence shown in Italy made this sector prone to continual 
over-production and crisis, obliging the government to come 
to its aid (as in 1911) and to assist in the desperate search 
for new markets. This problem will also influence the Italian 
government's calculations in 1914-15, when the economic 
crisis of neutrality built up a strong pressure for military 
contracts and then for intervention in heavy industry.
10 Cited in R. Vivarelli (ed.), La cultura italiana tra '800 
e '900 e le origini del nazionalismo (Florence 1981).
p.257
11 Argus (Limo), 'La missione della marina da guerra', I 
(1898), pp.26-7
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Military spending made up sixteen per cent of the state
budget in 1906-07, a figure which then rose to twenty-three
per cent in 1910-11 and then to thirty-four per cent in 1912
-13 -by which time it v/as running ahead of even the sums
spent for the initial programme of the eighteen-eighties.
Payments by the Direzione Generate of the railways and the
defence ministries totalled 2,236,690,000 lire for all mate-
12rials between 1905 and 1912. The leap in state contracts 
to the metallurgical and mechanical (metalmeccanica) industry 
during the Libyan war is apparent in these figures:
15
Year Railway Navy Army
1905-6 93,355,018 50,072,657 53,763,628
1908-9 141,190,675 73,254,749 63,403,362
1912-13 145,195,369 158,274,605 118,926,546
The experience of this war could serve only to reinforce 
the already deeply-ingrained reflex of clientship to the 
state. So the nature of the relationship between the state 
and heavy industry has always to be recalled in seeking 
to follow Italian foreign policy; the demands of La Metall- 
urgia italiana and other trade journals are not those of an 
extraneous pressure group, but of a sector sponsored by the 
rulers of liberal Italy as a means of bolstering the count­
ry’s position in Europe and beyond, and of their own position 
within Italy.
Thus, for example, the interest shown so persistently 
by the Consulta in the ’Trans-Balkan’ railway, projected 
to run through Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro and to term­
inate at Antivari, has much to do with the promise of large
commissions for Italy's heavy industry, as well as the
14certain boost to both Venice and Bari. Profits from the 
network of railways laid down soon after unification had 
gone almost entirely to foreign contractors, but (as the 
figures just cited show) by the early twentieth-century
12 La Metallurgia italiana, V (1913), p»174
13 G-. Scagnetti, La siderurgia in Italia (Rome 1923), p.200
14 See R. Webster, L’imperialismo industriale italiano 
1908-1915: studio sul prefascismo (Turin 1974), PpV 
392-95
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heavy industry found another valuable market in the rail­
ways. Papa has shown that Giolittifs nationalisation of 
the railways in 1905 came after pressure from the sectors 
involved in supplying the railways, anxious at the growing 
chaos in the privately-owned system and aware of the advan­
tage of an assured and profitable customer. At the same 
time Tedesco, Giolitti’s finance minister, pledged that 
foreign participation in provisioning to the railways would
initially be reduced from one-quarter to one-sixth and then
15completely excluded. Nationalisation came as the prelude 
to a decade of rapid expansion and electrification. Govern­
ment interest in railway concessions beyond Italy was not 
limited to the Balkans; as will be seen, the desire for 
a concession in Asia Minor led to long and difficult negot­
iations with Britain in 1913-14. In Libya the Banco di 
Roma numbered railway construction among its projects, 
while in 1914 the Ministry of Colonies was pressing for
16control of the uncompleted railway line to Addis Ababa.
In July 1914 Riccardo Bollati, Italian ambassador
in Berlin, sent his famous note to Foreign Minister San
Giuliano concluding gloomily that
in realta non v'e forse una sole questione nella 
quale gl’interessi dell'Italia non siano...in 
contraddizione con quelli dell'Austria...in cui 
la politica di ciascuno dei due governi non sia 
intesa a sorvegliare gelosamente e molto spesso 
a combattere quella dell'altro...non sia ispirata 
dalla convizione che ci6 che reca giovamento all’ 
uno debba necessariamente recare danno all'altro 
dovrei purtroppo ammettere che non vedo alcun 
mezzo di rimediarvi efficacemente e in modo
duraturo.17
The conflict between Italy and her alliance partners, and 
Austria in particular, had indeed been evident for some 
time. Giovanni Amendola, writing in the Resto del Carlino 
in 1913, had no doubt of their incompatible interests -'la 
possibility del buon accordo fra 1'Austria Ungheria e
15 A. Papa, Classe politica e intervento pubblico nell* 
eta giolittiana: la nazionalizzazione delle ferrovie 
(Naples 1973), pp.115-17
16 See R. Hess, art. cit. , p.107
17 Avarna Di Gualtieri, C., 'II carteggio Avarna-Bollati, 
luglio 1914-maggio 1915’, R.S.I., LXI (1949), pp.248 - 
274, 385-405 and 531-564, and LXII (1950), pp.64-87 
and 375-394 at 250-1
86
1’Italia e strettamente legata...al fallimento delle mire
espansionistiche del gabinetto di Vienna nell1Adriatico 
18e nei Balcani.' Yet if the existence of an Austro-Italian 
clash is generally agreed, the reasons for that conflict in 
the east are still very much debated. Vigezzi has argued 
for the minor importance of economic rivalries in the diver­
gence between Vienna and Rome, producing statistics which
show the small percentage of Italian trade in the Balkans 
19before 1914. Against this, however, and against those
who see economic issues as purely subservient to Italy’s
strategic interests in the region, with no integral impor-
20tance or influence of their own, one can instead argue 
for the primary role of such interests -heavy industry 
in the Balkans and a combination of both industrial and 
agrarian groups elsewhere across the Adriatic. In so arguing, 
it will be far easier to follow and understand the new 
priorities in Italian foreign policy in the years leading 
to intervention.
One can above all grasp in contemporary documents 
and journals a widespread conviction that the limitations 
of Italy's home market could be overcome by a great econ­
omic drive to the east, where hitherto untapped markets 
were in easy reach of Italian traders and investors. Such 
a conviction had been behind the assembling of a series 
of conferences for Italian exporters to eastern markets.
At the second of these annual meetings, held in Venice in 
November 1910, governmental interest and support was shown 
in the presence of Primo Levi, Direttore dell'Ufficio Ciommer- 
ciale in the foreign ministry, together with representatives
from the ministries of finance, post, marine and agricul-
21ture, industry and commerce. The congress, whose demand 
for the formation of a colonial bank has been described,
18 Cited in G-. Carocci, Giovanni Amendola nella crisi dello 
Stato italiano, 1911-25, pp.34-5
19 B. Vigezzi, Da Giolitti a Salandra (Florence 1969 )> p.19
20 See, for example, R. Bosworth, op. cit. , pp.236-45
21 'II congresso...', u’Esp. Comm., XXV (1910)? p.321
87
passed a further resolution proposed by the nationalist
economist, Filippo Garli, recognising
1'opportunity che, ad intensificare le nostre 
esportazionif indipendentemente dagli ausili che 
pub dare il Governo e dai mezzi che sono a sua 
disposizione, intervenga 1'organizzazione collettiva 
degli interessati, diretta soprattutto nell'intento 
di creare dei "gruppi d1espansione", vale a dire 
degli aggruppamenti di produttori, specializzati 
secondo i singoli mercati;
che nell'avviare tale organizzazione si 
tenga particolarmente di mira, per lo specialissimo 
interesse e per le opportunity che presenta, l'Ori- 
ente Europeo, dove troverebbero attualmente note- 
voli possibility di collocamento i manufatti 
tecnici.22
As a first step, the congress also agreed on plans for a 
journey through the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire of a 
large group of Italian industrialists and merchants. Yet 
despite the agreement amongst industrialists on the need 
to organise themselves for expansion into these markets, 
such successes as there were before World War I would in 
fact occur through the mediation of the state. The objec­
tives of government policy in the east can be glimpsed in 
the company report of the Banca Commerciale Italiana for 
1913 : in discussing the activities of the Societa Commer­
ciale d'Qriente, a firm financed by the bank and which 
operated in effect as an adjunct of the Italian govern­
ment, the report argued that this company
assure sa collaboration aux aspirations du Pays 
vers une plus vaste expansion economique en Orient 
...cette Society s'est montree un instrument d' 
etudes de preparation d'affaires et un organe de 
penetration commerciale et industrielle qui... 
pourra certainement rendre d'utiles services a 
I'economie rationale...C'est ygalement en consid- 
yrant la necessity pour l'ltalie de se cryer d' 
autres debouchys et de rendre plus intenses ses 
rapports a,vec les rygions de 1'Orient les plus 
voisines, lesquelles renaissent y un vie nouvelle, 
que nous avons...cru devoir faire participer 1' 
element national aux initiatives destines a 
susciter de nouvelles energies dans les rygions 
deprimees par les evenements recents et eveiller 
la vie yconomique dans les pays de nouvelle creat­
ion...La ou ces initiatives seront secondyes par 
une coopyration intime de nos commergants et 
industriels, convaincus que seule une action
22 ibid., p.358
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commune peut avoir raison de la concurrence et 
des habitudes des marches etrangers auxquels ils 
peuvent aspirer, ces memes initiatives procureront 
a notre trafic de nouveaux champs d*actions, prapres 
k compenser les defaillances dventuelles des marches 
intdrieurs et a permettre en meme temps k nos indu­
stries de prendre le rang qui leur revient dans les 
competitions internationales.23
The links between government policy and economic aspirations, 
and specifically between the Gonsulta and the Banca Comm- 
erciale Italiana, are also made plain by San G-iuliano, in 
a note of June 1914 informing Salandra of the fears of the 
Italian ambassador in Constantinople that the branch of 
the Banco di Roma in the Turkish capital was about to close; 
the foreign minister urged ’la necessita pratica di poter 
contare, in ogni caso, sopra un Istituto di credito il 
quale sia disposto a prestare una attiva collaborazione al 
programma di espansione economica che il B. Governo pros­
egue in Asia Minore.1 Events during the Libyan war had 
undermined the government's relationship with the Banco 
di Roma ’propria in momento in cui piu sarebbe stato oppor- 
tuno che si andassero svolgendo e intensificando’, forcing 
the Gonsulta to turn to Otto Joel's Banca Commerciale -'e 
ci ha secondato in tutti i modi' in Albania, over the 
Balkan railway schemes and in Asia Minor. San Giuliano 
accepted that 'senza di essa noi non avremmo quasi potuto 
svolgere la nostra politica estera, la politice estera ess- 
endo oggi anzi tutto una politica di affari.' Yet the gover­
nment cannot rely on Joel's bank alone, since it has many
other commitments and 'ne conviene dal lato politico al
24regio Governo dipendere da quell'Istituto soltanto.' The 
prime minister would indeed soon rebuild the government's 
bridges with the Banco di Roma, a further token of the 
vital role of these institutions in a period when -as San 
Giuliano accepted- diplomatic and economic goals had become 
inseparable.
Trade with the Balkan states had developed rapidly 
from around the turn of the century, though from a rather
23 Banca Commerciale Italiana, Rapport du Gonseil d'Admin­
istration (Milan 1914), pp.16>-17
24 A.C.S., C.S., b.8 f.63, San Giuliano to Salandra, 11 
June 1914
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low initial figure. While in 1900 Austrian exports to Alb­
ania stood four times higher in value than Italian exports, 
within seven years the situation had been reversed: Italy's 
goods now predominated in the country, having risen over 
the period from 817,000 lire to 7,314,000 lire. Her exports 
to Romania had risen over the same period from 6,214,000 to
23,448,000 lire; and in Serbia from 103,000 to 2,667,000 lire
25-an increase also greatly ahead of Prance and Germany.
However Austria-Hungary was undoubtedly Italy's main rival,
aiming at the same markets and with many similar products,
especially in a range of textiles. An article had appeared
in Corriere della Sera as early as 1901 depicting Austria
as the barrier to Italy’s way to the east, with Germany
giving full backing to Vienna in all its attempts to hinder
Italian expansion. Beyond the possibilities of trade which
the region promised, there were also prospects for settling
surplus labour in the region. Minister of Colonies Martini
noted in his diary in September 1914 his conviction -based
on a report of the Italian representative at Durazzo- that
L'hinterland di Valona...e territorio ricchissimo. 
Terreni di grande fertility abbandonati perche 
mancano le braccia...200,000 italiani potrebbero 
trovarvi col lavoro la sussistenza. V'fe accertato 
il giacimento di carbone, di petrolio, di rame.27
Yet by far the most important cause of deterior­
ating Austro-Italian relations is the competition between 
the two state's heavy industry to gain control of the devel­
opment of railways, ports and roads in an area believed to 
be on the eve of great economic expansion. Here again a 
newspaper article gives a foretaste of the conflicts ahead. 
Writing in ua Tribuns in 1891, Alfredo Cottrau, a leading 
employer in the engineering industry, argued that the 
only prospect for long-term stability and expansion in 
this sector lay in the enlargement of foreign outlets:
Senza una esportazione su larga base qualsiasi
2
25 A. Vivante, Irredentismo Adriatico (Florence 1945),
p. 16
26 A. Tamborra, 'The Rise of Italian industry and the Bal­
kans (1900-1914)', J.E.E.H., 3 (1974), pp.87-120 at 
95-6
27 F. Martini, op. cit., p.90. Entry of 11 Sep.
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industria finira per intischire e per quanto sia 
doloroso a dirlo per un vecchio industrials come 
me, il dilemma per i costruttori meccanici e ora 
in Italia o la decimazione su larghissima scala 
dei piu deboli fra loro -struggle for life- o l1 
adozione per parte del Governo, in via prowisoria 
di premi per l1esportazione.28
This was the method Germany had used to inundate Italy with
her products, and the method Italy must now use herself
!a salvare, se non tutti, almeno una parte dei principali
nostri costruttori meccanici.1 Cottrau!s article won support
elsewhere in the press serving northern Italy (in the
Gazzetta piemontese, for example, and again in the Corriere
della Sera), while in the same month II Mattino urged
Italian heavy industry to profit from the demand in Rumania
for a large expansion of railway locomotives and rolling-
stock. It also led to Cottrau's reception by the king, at
which they discussed ways of creating new outlets for
Italian commerce and industry, and so alleviating the 
29current crisis.
If such crises were a perennial problem in the 
Italian economy, so too the tendency to pass the blame for 
this state of affairs onto other nation’s dishonest trade 
practices remains a constant last resort for Italian ind­
ustry. Twenty years after Cottrau's demand for protection 
from Germany's industrial might and government support 
for Italian exporters, the secretary of the Associazioni 
fra Industriali metallurgici rose to make very similar 
demands at the 11° Gongresso degli esportatori italiani in 
Oriente, urging the need for
un'organizzazione "intiera" delle forze industriali. 
Questa non pub consistere, nel momento attuale, 
altro che nella costituzione anche in Italia di 
Sindacati industriali che applichino il dumping 
system...la forma di organizzazione che assicura 
ai maggiori Stati industriali il successo sul mer- 
cato mondiale. Le industrie nazionali che hanno 
raggiunto o sorpassato il limite di saturazione del 
mercato interno, e che pertanto dovrebbero ridurre 
(come si verifica ora per il cotone, per la seta, 
ecc.) la loro produzione, trovano per questa via 
nuovo sfogo ai loro prodotti, e possono riprendere
28 Cited in L. De Rosa, Iniziative e capitale straniero nell' 
industria metalmeccanica del Mezzogiorno 1840-1904 (Naples
1968), pp. 285-6
29 ibid., pp. 287-8
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appieno la loro attivit& ed anche svolgerla ulter- 
iormente, come accade appunto per il ferro in 
Germania. Del resto, non si pub -in questioni di 
politica commerciale- chiuderci nell'angusta cerchia 
dei postulati teorici. Nel commercio internazionale 
& una lotta continua e accanita; come nella vera 
guerra, & necessario a chi vuol vincere di usare 
-se non vi sono armi migliori- almeno le stesse armi 
dell'avversario.
Le nazioni concorrenti usano il dumping system; 
anche l1Italia deve valersene, se non vuole socc- 
omhere alia concorrenza straniera; insormontahile 
con ogni altro spediente.30
Gottrau had claimed to be opposed to protection in principle,
and it was indeed Italy’s tariff structure which helped to
impoverish the domestic market and drove her industrialists
towards the Balkan and Turkish markets. This link between
protection and imperialism formed a major part of the Lega
Antiprotezionista* s case against tariffs, a case which had
by 1914 won widespread support. An article in Gritica Sociale
recognised that:
\
E un gran merito della Lega Antiprotezionista testb 
sorta in Italia si 6 di avere dimostrato che...sarebbe 
possibile in cinque o sei anni, abolendo i dazi sul 
ferro e sugli zuccheri e riducendo a livello pura- 
mente fiscale quello sul grano, sgravare i consum- 
atori di quasi 400 milioni all’anno (e vi sono certo 
altri dazi non meno gravosi, come quelli sui cotoni 
esteri), e cib non diminuendo ma accrescendo di cent­
inaia di migliaia le braccia impiegata in lavori 
produttivi in Italia...con la abolizione di tali 
tariffe, accrescendo la capacity di consumo del 
paese, noi avremo anche aperto in esso sbocchi ed 
impieghi a capitali, che ora premono sul Governo per 
impieghi all’estero protetti da esercito e flotta e 
diplomazia.31
Nothing serves better to illustrate the thesis of 
advocates of free-trade that Italy’s foreign policy was 
profoundly influenced by her tariff system than events in 
the Balkans before 1915. Italian diplomacy mobilised in supp­
ort of industrial expansion, with disastrous results for her 
relationship with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Pear of these 
powers’ penetration into Balkan and Ottoman markets began to 
feature regularly in Italian journals from early in the cent­
ury. Here, for example, Jacopo Trochia discusses in La Rassegna
30 ’II congresso...’, pp. 358-9
31 A. Grespi, 'Politica imperialista e investimenti capit­
alistic!', Gritica Sociale. XXIV, 1-15 March 1914, pp. 
73-5 at 75
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Nazionale the proposed railway line from Vienna to Salonica:
Col tempo Salonicco, testa di linea di una ferrovia 
austro-ungarica, non pub mancare di divenire un 
porto tedesco, la cui sfera d'influenza si estend- 
era non solo al Canale di Suez, ma anche alio Stretto 
dei Dardanelli, ora che le finanze tedesche sono 
proponderanti a Constantinopoli e che con capitali 
tedeschi si costruisce la ferrovia da Konick al 
Golfo Persico, traverso 1’Asia Minore. . .Ma se questo 
e un pericolo lontano, non mancano le ragioni di 
allarme per pericoli immediati, ai quali giova 
contrappore pronti rimedi. E certo che la ferrovia 
da Serajevo a Mitrovitza ha un scopo strategico 
definito dalla mira dell’Austria di completare a 
suo profitto 1*investitura di tutta la parte della 
peninsola Balcanica che va dal suo hinterland al 
mare e 1'Albania in mani austriache significherebbe 
l'equilibrio dell'Adriatico distrutto.
The author then makes the point which will be echoed by
Italian diplomats and industrialists in the years ahead:
Una ferrovia diretta dal nord-ovest al sud-est, 
dalle frontiere della Bosnia a Salonnico, serve 
soltanto agl1interessi dell’Austria Ungheria e 
della Germania; gl’interessi delle popolazioni 
balcaniche e di tutto il resto dell’Europa contin­
ental esigono al contrario una linea orientata dal 
nord-est al sud-ovest, dal Danubio all’Adriatico.32
Such a line would offer new trading opportunities
for Prance and Italy:
Poste in comunicazione per mezzo della magnifica 
arteria del Basso Danubio, 1’Adriatico col Mar Nero, 
si apre al commercio russo, bulgaro, serbo, monten- 
egrino, albanese, uno sbocco nuovo e diretto sui 
paesi latini. La Francia, 1’Italia e la Svizzera 
sono dispensate dal ricorrere alle vie dell’Europa 
centrale per i loro scambi coi paesi Balcani interni, 
scambi che invece prenderanno la via di Venezia e 
dell'Adriatico. Per noi avrebbe speciale importanza 
il fatto che il gran focolare dell’industria lomb- 
arda potrebbe aprirsi per Venezia un nuovo e forse 
importante mercato di esportazione.
La due linee balcaniche, quella che 1'Austria 
costruisce e questa che gl’interessi nostri dovrebbero 
contrapporvi avrebbero direzioni diametralmente 
opposte, quasi a simbolizzare le due opposte 
tendenze; quella delle nazioni latine che aspirano 
a rafforzare la loro egemonia sui mari, e quella 
della razza tedesca che opera a conquistarla.33
32 'Le ferrovie dei Balcani e l'avvenire del Porto di 
Venezia1, La Rassegna Nazionale, CXXI (1901), pp. 508-18 
at 511-12
33 ibid., p. 513
93
Trochia went on to predict an economic renewal in Venice, 
a prediction which was rapidly fulfilled. As the research 
of A. Tamborra and in particular of R. Webster has helped 
reveal, the commercial empire of Giuseppe Volpi, based in 
Venice, worked to develop Italy’s commercial influence in 
the Balkans.^ Volpi and other Venetian financiers had foun­
ded the Societa per la Miniere d’Qriente, a company registered 
in Salonica which aimed to exploit the mineral resources 
of the Ottoman Empire. This was followed two years later 
in 1903 by the Sindacato italo-montenegrino, whose control 
of the state tobacco monopoly brought in large and increasing
revenues -rising from just under eighty million Austrian
35crowns in 1907 to over 155 millions in 1910.
Efforts to build a financial and industrial infra­
structure in the east capable of challenging Austria’s 
position took a further step in December 1905 with the 
creation of the Compagnia di Antivari. Although avowedly a 
Montenegrin company, all the initial capital of four million 
crowns came from within Italy. Half of this sum was raised 
by the Banca Commerciale Italiana, which (as has been shown) 
was eagerly backing Volpi!s endeavoursHowever it is 
the composition of the remaining capital which best reveals 
the extent of financial and industrial interest in the 
Balkans. Among those involved were representatives of all 
the other major banks (which along brings in by implication 
virtually all the main sectors of industry, given the dire­
cting role of the banks in Italy); Attilio Odero, president 
of Cantieri Navali Riuniti, vice-president of Ilva and a 
board-member of such firms as Terni and Siderurgica di 
Savona; Giuseppe Orlando, president of Terni and on the 
board of all the above companies; Ronaldo Ricci, a leading 
figure in Ligurian industry; Erasmo Piaggio, president of 
the Lloyd Italiano shipping line; the president of the
34 See Tamborra, art. cit.; R. Webster, L’imperialismo... 
pp. 357-436
35 Tamborra, pp. 98-100
36 The respect felt for Volpi can be measured in the remark 
of the industrialist Ettore Oonti that, ’Ai tempi gloriosi 
della Repubblica Veneta, Volpi sarebbe stato un magnifico 
Ambasciatore', E. Conti, op. cit., p. 85
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37Paduan chamber of commerce and sundry other industrialists.
The French journalist Charles Loiseau (who as will be seen 
took a close interest in all these events) had no doubt 
Volpi!s main aim was to challenge the assumption in Vienna 
that Austria alone would build all railway lines in Monte­
negro, as part of a more general challenge to her ascendancy 
in the area. Loiseau wrote to a French diplomat in Rome in 
August 1906:
De l'aveu des fondateurs de la Compagnie du port d' 
Antivari, leur but a et£ surtout politique et cons- 
iste:
1. h empecher le Gouvernement austro-hongrois d’ 
installer un de ses ressortissants au Montdn^gro, 
comme concessionnaire du port d1Antivari et du 
chemin de fer;
2. k s'assurer un d£bouch£ maritime et le benefice 
d'un precedent...
and then win the concessions to build an Adriatic-Danubian
«Z Q
railway, with outlets at Antivari and S. Giovanni di Medua. 
Agreement had been reached with the Montenegrin government 
in June 1906, and the rail link from Antivari to Viz Pazar 
opened in January 1909, with the port itself opening later 
in the same year.
Yet by then the Italian government had received ano­
ther alarm, in the shape of Aehrenthal's announcement that 
work on the long planned railway line running from Vienna 
to Salonica was about to commence. The quite incompatible 
economic drives of the two powers, and the implications this 
had for the future of their alliance, was further revealed 
in June 1908, with the agreement reached between Italy,
France, Russia and Serbia for the construction and operation 
of a rival line from western Serbia to San Giovanni di 
Medua. Once again the Italian share of capital for this
venture came from the leading banks, metallurgical, shipping
39and various other industrial sectors. While it is true 
that many of these schemes developed little beyond the orig­
inal announcement of great intentions -this plan of 1908, 
for example, led only to studies of the lay-out of land on 





then successive Balkan wars caused it to peter out quietly
-one can see in the interests which supported them a strong
dissolvent of an alliance already under strain.
The possibility of Italy being driven from the
Triple Alliance by such economic differences had been raised
in a remarkably prescient work of 1901 by Charles Loiseau,
in which he invited Italians to imagine ’a quel rang oscure
descendrait la pEninsule italique, au cas ou la balkanicjue
deviendrait un boulevard allemand sur la MEditerranEe•1
He urged the Italian government to work with Prance and
Russia against the German capture of Balkan markets, and the
prospect of a 3,400 kilometre rail line through Asia Minor
and Mesepotamia, linking the Bospho-rous to the Persian gulf.
Loiseau suggested an alternative economic future in which
la juxtaposition du rail et de l'eau, de la front- 
iEre frangaise, jusqu'E Odessa, sans emprunt aux 
territoires de l'Europe centrale, permettrait done 
d'Etablir une magnifique artere franco-italo-russe, 
dont le profit se dEvelopperait entre ces territoires 
et la MEditerranEe. ArtEre d*Emancipation, de preser­
vation et de prEvoyance.41
The French observer even predicted the ground on which such
cooperation might develop, arguing that if Italy decides
a rectifier les grandes lignes de sa politique 
commerciale et k s'inspirer dEsormais de sa posi­
tion entre deux mers, il lui faut la coopEration 
d’autres puissances. Le relEvement des ports et 
du pavilion italiEn dans lfAdriatique dEpend d'un 
systEme appropriE de relations Economiques avec la 
Prance, d'une part, les Etats balkaniques et la 
Russie de 1*autre. Et ce systEme se fonde peut-Etre 
moins encore sur des conventions douanieres que 
sur des travaux a exEcuter hors du territoire 
italien.42
In the light of these remarks, it is of some interest that 
in 1906 the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas had gained a 
substantial financial stake in the Banca Commerciale, and
40 C. Loiseau, L'Equilibre adriatique (L'ltalie e la question 
d'Qrient) (Paris 1901), p. 237. Much of Trochia!s 
article cited earlier reproduced Loiseau1s arguments, 
which he praised as based 'non su inafferrabili ragioni 
diplomatiche, ma sugli interessi commerciali che constit- 
uiscono a loro volta la base della politica moderna* , art. 
cit., p. 509
41 C. Loiseau, op. cit. , p. 192
42 ibid., pp. 235-6
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followed this with an attempt to join in Volpi's Antivari 
company. The attempt was rejected, but the railway agreem­
ent of 1908 gives further evidence of the potential for 
economic cooperation between France and Italy. Another 
French observer, Camille Barrere, ambassador in Rome and 
one of the diplomats most eager to win Italy away from the 
Central Powers, reported in March 1914 (following a meeting 
with the secretary general of the Consulta) that the econ­
omic interests of Italy and Austria in the Balkans were 
entirely opposed and in constant conflict:
meme parmi les elements austrophiles de ce pays, on 
ne se fait gu&re illusion sur l'appui de l'Autriche 
et que dans les Balkans se poursuit actuellement, 
sur le terrain des int£r§ts economiques, une lutte 
d1influence tres vive entre les diplomates des deux 
pays. On peut se demander si la distinction qu’on 
se plait a faire ici entre les int£r§ts politiques 
et economiques pourra resister longtemps a la 
force des choses. Beaucoup de gens en doutent.43
Barrere had already recorded De Martino in much the same
mood late in the previous year, when the Italian diplomat
had suggested that French and Italian capital should work
for a Danube-Adriatic line in opposition to the plans of
44Germany and Austria-Hungary. Tittoni also confided to the
French ambassador that the whole question of the Balkan
railway lines was of the most central importance to Italy,
and confessed that he found her interests far closer to
45France and Russia than to her allies. Finally one can
cite the reaction of San Giuliano to Vienna’s announcement
of her war-aims in August 1914; these were unacceptable to
Rome for their expansion of Albania at the expense of
Serbia, and for 'privilegi economici in Serbia e probabile
soluzione contraria ai nostri interessi delle questioni
delle ferrovie Danubio-Adriatico che rappresenta un capitale
46interesse italiano.'
43 D.D.F., Series 3, vol.IX, no.420, Barrere to Doumergue,
9 March 1914
44 D.D.F., Series 3, vol.VIII, no.687, Barrere to Doumergue, 
29 Dec. 1913
45 ibid., vol.IX, no.124, Barrere to Doum., 22 Jan. 1914; and 
no.184, note of 29 Jan. 1914
46 P.P.I., Series 5, vol.l, pp.55-6, San Giuliano to Bollati, 
7 Aug. 1914
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As in the case of Italian aspirations in Africa, one 
can only understand her desire for greater influence in the 
Balkans in 1915 as part of a policy pursued over the previous 
decade. When emissaries of both the Banco di Roma and the 
Banca Commerciale Italiana arrive in Belgrade in April 1915 
with the aim of establishing an Italian bank, this merely 
marks another stage in the Italian efforts to open up new 
markets in the east. The French minister in Belgrade incl­
udes in his report on this event an article in a Serbian 
newspaper which suggested that
l'ltalie cherche a procurer a son industrie la route 
la plus courte et la moins chere possible vers la 
Serbie. La seule route a cet effet est celle qui 
conduit de la cdte adriatique de l’ltalie h la 
c6te albanaise et, de la en Serbie, par une courte 
voie ferree.47
The minister also records the formation of an Italo-Serb 
committee, linked with the commercial institutions of sev­
eral Italian cities. Italy's interest in Albania was clearly 
influenced by important strategic considerations, in partic­
ular the need to hold -or at least keep in the hands of a 
malleable state- the port of Valona. Yet this alone cannot 
explain the constant preoccupation of the Italian govern­
ment with the coastline facing her across the Adriatic -as 
shown, for example, in Tittoni's advice to San G-iuliano in 
September 1914 that 1io metto per noi in prima linea il
possesso di Yalona, e soltanto dopo, quello delle terre 
A ft
irredente.' Rather, it fits into a pattern of eastern
expansion, and to what the United States ambassador Page
called the desire for 'an abiding foothold on the Eastern
49shore of the Adriatic.' Control over Albania offered both 
economic possibilities in the immediate area, and served as 
a bridge-head for the drive into the Balkans. Intervention 
in 1915 is a direct product of this aspiration, since 
nothing Austria could conceivably have offered in the
47 P .P.P. , Series 3, vol. X, no.144. Report of M. Descos,
22 April 1915
48 P.P.I., Series 5, vol.l, p.495, Tittoni to San Giul.,
28 Sep. 1914
49 W . W. Gottlieb, Studies in Secret Diplomacy during the 
First World War (London 1957), p.22b
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negotiations of 1915 would have satisfied the Gonsulta; a
point made clear by Andre Torre, deputy and extremely well-
informed Rome correspondent of the Gorriere della Sera, in
a letter advising his editor that San Giuliano’s successor
as foreign minister, Sidney Sonnino, wished to occupy all
of southern Albania;
la grande questioni oggi non riguarda come sapete 
il Trentino, bensi il dominio dell1Adriatico, la 
prevalenza etnica dell'italianita o dello slavismo 
in questo mare, e infine e sopra tutto il dominio 
commerciale di questo mare nei rapporti dell'oriente 
balcanico e dell’oriente asiatico. Per questa trip- 
lice importanza 1’Adriatico non pub essere abband- 
onato ne all’Austria nh alia Slavia meridionale.50
Again it is important to sense the substantial continuity
of Italian policy toward Albania, stretching back to the
remarks of Francesco Guicciardini (twice foreign minister
in Sonnino's brief government's) in an article of 1901,
remarks which also bring out the links between strategic
and economic influences on foreign policy:
L'Albania domina l’ingresso del mare Adriatico, che 
e uno dei polmini per cui la patria nostra respira 
e vive; 1'Albania ha sulle sue coste golfi e rade 
che, in mano di una Potenza militare, diventerebbero 
delle vere teste di ponte verso 1'Italia; 1'Albania 
e destinata a possedere, come gia al tempo dell' 
Impero romano, una delle maggiori vie commerciali 
d’Europa, quale e quella che mettera in diretta 
comunicazione gli Stati balcanici coll’Italia e con 
gli altri Stati che si rispecchiano nel bacino 
occidentale del Mediterraneo.51
Albania was vital as a means to control the Adriatic, across
52which great new markets were thought to be waiting.
In particular, many southerners hoped this reorien­
tation of foreign policy would bring new possibilities of 
trade. This is evident in the attitude of two deputies, 
Antonio Salandra and Antonio de Viti De Marco, whose radic­
ally opposed views on most questions of domestic politics 
was here submerged in the need to support the common
50 L. Albertini, Epistolario, 1911-1926 (Milan 1968), vol.l, 
p.295, Torre to Albertini, 30 Oct. 1914
51 F. Guicciardini, 'Impressioni d'Albania', 1.A., f. 709,
1 July 1901, pp. 17-58 at 53
52 See, for example, C. Marangoni, 'I Balcani e 1'Italia che 
lavora', L'Esp. Comm., XXVIII (1913), pp.241-53; and 'La 
Serbia e le sue relazioni economiche con l'ltalia', L’Esp. 
Gomm., XXIX (1914), p.248
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interests of their Apulian constituencies. Salandra's 
demand for improvements to Italy’s Adriatic railways in 
June 1908 was made quite explicitly with an eye to future 
expansion:
Brindisi e Salonnico sono i due scali emili per i 
quali l’Europa civile tende a riversarsi verso quel 
Mediterraneo orientale, che finalmente dopo secoli 
di oppressione delle barbarie turca, accenna a 
rifiorire a civilta nuova. Or bene, noi tutti pare- 
cchie volte abbiamo sentito dalla voce eloquente 
dei ministri degli esteri, che si sono succeduti 
a quel banco, parlare della necessita di essere 
parati a questa competizione pacifica. Ma molto 
piu che coi discorsi dei ministri degli esteri bis- 
ognerebbe prepararsi con fatti, con opere non 
tardive; poichb qui si tratta di preoccupare certe 
posizioni prima che altri le occupino. Quando gli 
altri le avranno occupate sara ben piu difficile 
sostituirci a loro...la politica del Mediterraneo, 
la politica dell'Adriatico, non si fanno se non 
fasciando di ferro, ferro civile, le sue coste...
Ora l'unita economica dell’Adriatico, che deve fare 
capo a Venezia, di cui noi vogliamo essere i satel- 
liti fedeli come lo fummo in altre epoche, questa 
unita economica dell'Adriatico non si ottiene se la 
linea che lo costeggia non diventa una grande linea 
internazionale.53
Confirmation of Salandra’s view that 'la question di Valona
54e da noi pugliesi sentita, si puo dire intimamente', came
in the period of neutrality, when a broad bloc of local
opinion demanded intervention in the war in order to secure
Italy's position in and across the Adriatic. The leading
radical, Viti Be Marco, spoke in March 1915 of the links
between 'interessi pugliesi' and 'rivendicazioni nazionali*,
claiming that
Questa pub dirsi per alcun aspetti, la guerra delle 
Puglie...Questa triplice politica, doganale, port- 
uale e ferroviaria, tende ad assicurare all'Austria 
il monopolio economico dei Balcani con l'esclusione 
dell'Italia e soprattutto delle Puglie, che dalla 
posizione geografica, dalla vicinanza e da precede­
nt! storici, sono chiamata a profittare dei rapporti 
commerciali e di cultura, che in regime di liberta, 
si formerebbero certamente fra Stati balcanici e 
1'Italia.
E specialmente per le Puglie interesse evidente 
che il blocco austro-tedesco sia sconfitto, che le 
nazionalita balcaniche facciano tramontare per sem- 
pre la politica dell'inorientamento dell'Austria,
55 A. Salandra, Discorsi parlamentari (Rome 1969), vol. 2,
PP* 597-8 
54 ibid. , p.757, 7 Dec. 1912
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che tra noi e gli stati balcanici si stringano
vincoli di amicizia che aprano la via della penet-
razione economica dell'Italia nel vicino Oriente 
...1'Austria e la lunga mano della Germania nei 
Balcani fino all'Egeo. La Turchia e la lunga mano 
della Germania nell'Asia Minore fino al Golfo Per- 
sico; epperb chi a noi contende il dominio di 
Trieste e dell'Adriatico non e piu soltanto l1 
Austria, ma piu dell'Austria, ce lo contende la 
Germania.55
Just as in 1911 war was considered above all as a harbinger
of progress and prosperity. As the Provincia di Lecce
argued, Italy should support the Serbian cause, since
gli italiani della sponda occidentale adriatica ed 
in ispecial modo i pugliesi dovranno essere ingen- 
eratori economici di quel popolo forte, valoroso, 
ma stremato da tre lunghe guerre...La libera Serbia 
certamente aprira con gioia le sue porte ai prod- 
otti italiani e noi pugliesi, se con la nostra 
attivita sapremo conquistare il nuovo e vasto campo 
commerciale balcanico, saremo figli di quella 
'terza Italia' che rinnovata moralmente attende la 
grandezza economica.56
In the south at least there was little concern for 
the irredenta, and even those working for neutrality argued 
their case largely in economic terms. Antonio Lopomo, a 
priest employed by the German authorities who toured Basi­
lica and Calabria in the months prior to intervention, 
based his arguments for neutrality
soprattutto sul fatto che solo con una leale politica 
filotedesca 1'Italia potrebbe assicurarsi anche per 
l'avvenire un prospero sviluppo economico. A fianco 
della grande nazione tedesca 1'Italia potrebbe 
sentirsi sicura e raggiungere i grandi scopi che 
come nazione giovane e bisognosa di sviluppo si e 
prefissa. Poiche questa popolazione e totalmente 
indifferente alle questioni irredentistiche e non 
si interessa minimamente all'acquisto del Trentino 
o di Trieste, e sensibile a simili argomenti.57
As will be seen, the expansionist motive for intervention 
had by 1915 been greatly reinforced by the desperate econ­
omic crisis brought by the European war, a crisis which 
revealed Italy's subordinate role in the international 
trading order. However the dependence of northern industry
55 A. Viti Le Marco, La guerra europea (Florence 1918) > 
p.373
56 28 Sep. 1911
57 Report of 22 April 1915. Cited in A. Monticone, La Germ­
ania e la neutrality italiana (Bologna 1971), pp.463-4
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on armaments production for the state, which plays such an
important part in the events of 1915, is complemented by
the demand from southern interests for a greater Italy.
Intervention in the war came as the great opportunity to
bring this about -in the words of the Corriere Meridionale,
Ora, se realmente dobbiamo portare il nostro cont­
ribute, abbiamo il diritto di assiderci al banche- 
tto imperialistico...La politica irredentistica e 
poca cosa nell'ora attuale. Quando da Pietrogrado 
ci si fa sapere che il conflitto importer^ muta- 
menti collossali, abbiamo il diritto di allargare 
il problema anche dell'Italia. II conflitto attuale 
h un conflitto di egemonia; 1'imperialismo, non 
h e non pub essere basato esclusivamente sul princ- 
ipio di nazionalitb,. 58
With Salandra as prime minister, the southern agrarian inter­
ests (which he had faithfully represented throughout his 
career) were clearly in the strongest position to press for 
war -to end both the region’s historical under-development 
and the immediate social and economic crisis of 1915* At 
the same time it has been seen that the inorientarsi of 
Italian foreign policy precedes by many years Salandra’s 
premiership, developing largely under the control of Gioli- 
tti, despite his many doubts over Italian expansion and his 
personal and political ties with the north. Intervention 
serves the needs of both industrialists, increasingly 
dubious of Giolitti’s foreign and domestic policy and 
anxious for a fresh start, and of agrarian groups; indeed 
it is the most striking example of the two groups’ working 
alliance, the culmination of the Consulta* s attempt to 
create a breathing-space for the Italian economy. Events 
in Albania were watched with such concern since this was 
the launching area for Italy's new eastern sphere of influ­
ence .
La Vita Italiana all'Estero, a journal edited by 
Giovanni Preziosi which pressed for Italy's expansion and 
during neutrality would marshall the critics of the Banca 
Commerciale, argued in August 1914 that
Per 1'Italia e vitale interesse che la peninsola
58 ’Imperialismo e irredentismo', 18 Feb. 1915
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baleanica, immensa regione che promette di diven- 
tare fiorentissimo campo di produzione e di consumo, 
ahhia le vie commerciali aperte verso 1*Italia, 
cioe verso 1*Adriatico, e le abbia chiuse verso 
i mercati e i porti dell'Impero Austro-Ungarico.59
The best means to ensure this is an independent Albania,
which ’non e fine a sk stessa, ma e un mezzo al fine, e che
questo fine e 1’affermazione reale ed effettiva dei nostri
interessi nei Balcani.'^ This view was plainly shared in
the Consulta, since in early 1914 as much as 250,000 lire is
frequently being spent on propaganda in Albania.^1 In April
of that year San G-iuliano had approved the proposals of
his secretary general for an Italo-Albanian committee, to
be based almost entirely on commercial interests -the usual
leading banking and industrial groups, heads of chambers of
commerce and representatives of shipping companies and the
state railways. Sonnino's insistence in article seven of
the Treaty of London on a neutral Albania open to Italian
economic penetration is a reaffirmation of his predecessor's
policy rather than a response to new prospects opened up
by the war. In March 1915 Sonnino explained to Imperiali,
ambassador in London, 'le ragioni che consigliano la costit-
uzione di un piccolo Stato neutro dell'Albania Centrale';
after stressing his concern for the fate of the Albanians
themselves, he turned his attention to Italy's particular
need to
creare uno Stato neutrale che faccia da cuscinetto 
nei riguardi militari tra Valona territorio attiguo 
da un lato e la Serbia dall'altro od impedisca che 
il nostro possesso venga interamente circondato dalla 
Grecia e che, nei riguardi economici e sociali, resti 
aperta 1'influenza civile italiana per effetto della 
tendenza stessa di quelle popolazioni di appogg- 
iarsi a noi per essere difesa dai vicini.63
59 La Vita Italiana all'Estero, IV (1914), pp.83-4. See also 
'Problemi economici dell'Albania', L'Esp. Comm., XXVIII 
(1913), pp.235-7 on the area's potential as a source of 
raw materials and a market for Italian industry, in add­
ition to its ability to receive many of her emigrants.
60 ibid. , p.84
61 A.G.S., C.S., b.8, f.63, San Giul. to Salandra, 21 March 
1914
62 R. J. B. Bosworth, art. cit. , p.574
63 Cited in M. Toscano, 'L'intervento dell'Italia nella 
prima guerra mondiale', N.A., f. 2007, March 1968, pp. 
303-23 at 310
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The desire for a neutral Albania to promote Italian 
expansion against the menace of German and Austrian compet­
ition, while given urgency by the economic difficulties 
encountered after 1907, comes through in an article by 
Papafava in the Giornale degli economisti of 1902, which 
also helps to place the importance of Albania in the context 
of Italy’s wider interests. Papafava warned of the dangers 
of
i cannoni austriaci puntati contro 1*Italia nei 
porti albanesi...Giova alia prosperity economica 
di tutti i paesi commercianti coll1Albania che 
cessi in quelle regioni il governo turco, ma nuoc- 
erebbe all’Italia avere, a poche ore dalla Terra 
d'Otranto, 1'Austria potente invece dell'impotente 
Turchia...1’Albania autonoma diverrebbe per noi un 
cliente sempre migliore, pacifico, facilmente all- 
eato, uno Stato cuscinetto proteggente 1’Adriatico 
contro gli slavi e i tedeschi.
Anche piu importante e l'autonomia della Maced­
onia. Troncherebbe ogni rivality, spegnerebbe ogni 
gelosia tra le grandi potenze nei porto di Salonn- 
ico. A Salonnico mira appunto 1’Austria dall’ 
Erzegovina, e a Salonnico la spingono i pangerman- 
ici: il loro sogno h che l'impero tedesco, assorbito 
1’austriaco, si estenda un giorno dal Baltico all' 
Adriatico e all'Egeo. Piu barriere mettiamo al poss- 
ibile realizzarsi di tanta strapotenza politica e 
meglio £.64
His conviction that Italy necessarily stood to gain from
the Ottoman Empire's dissolution was not shared by all, but
the debate over policy toward the Turks is conducted always
with a view to the outcome which best serves the cause of
Italian expansion. So when, for example, Imperiali cables
Salandra soon after the outbreak of war on the dangers of
a collapse of the Ottoman Empire, he does so on the grounds
that, 'Hoi...non abbiamo alcun interesse al disgregamento
Impero Ottomano, abbiamo anzi interessi comuni con l'lngh-
ilterra a mantenerle in vita, facilitando lo sviluppo econ-
omico sue provincie asiatiche, col concorso del nostro 
66capitale.' y For San Giuliano, the likelihood of asiatic 
Turkey collapsing was so strong that Italy had rapidly to 
stake out her zones of economic influence^and it becomes
64 How in P. Papafava, Dieci anni di vita italiana (1899- 
1909J., vol. 1, pp.220-26 at 223-24
65 A.G.S., C.S., b.2 , f.17, tel. 1069, Imperiali to Sal., 
13 Aug. 1914
66 See, for example, A.C.S., C.G., b.29, f»90, San Giul. 
to Giolitti, 17 July 1913
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a moot point to what extent this policy helped bring on
the outcome he feared,
San Giuliano outlined his ambitions in the Ottoman
provinces in a message of September 1913 to Camillo Garroni,
ambassador in Constantinople; he insisted on
la necessity e l'urgenza di stringere amichevoli 
rapporti colla Turchia e di sviluppare nell'Asia 
Minore tutta una rete d'interessi economici ital­
iani.
Indipendentemente dalla difficolta internazi- 
onali, non mi fu possibile ottenere un largo conc- 
orso del capitale italiani, che per esigenze 
interne anche il Ministro del Tesoro vuol limitare, 
ma ha ottenuto qualche coae...dal Comm. Joel (of 
the Banca Commerciale) e alia sua volta il Comm. 
Stringher (head of the Banca d1Italia) ha promesso 
di fare di piu nell'inverno del 1914.
Mi h parso necessario intensificare questa 
attivita economica in quelle regione dell*Asia 
Minore, che pareva meno difficile potesse piu 
tardi diventare italiana, il giorno in cui non 
fosse piu possibile mantenere lfintegrity territ­
orial della Turchia Asiatica.67
Italy's foreign minister had of course worked patiently to
bring Giolitti around to accepting war in North Africa in
1911, and had then dealt the Turks another major blow with
the occupation of the Dodecanese islands in the following
year. While the desire of naval chiefs for a base and coaling
station in these islands had played a part in their seizure
and retention, San G-iuliano was far more interested in
their potential role in helping foster Italian economic
influence in the area of Asia Minor still unclaimed by other
European powers. Once Italy had control of the Dodecanese,
' Ci6 che a noi soprattutto importa e che prima di sgomberare
le isole ci siano assicurate in modo impegnativo serie
b8concessioni economiche nella zona di Adalia.1 While 
the islands had been taken in the course of a conflict 
fought primarily for greater influence in North Africa, 
their location in the Aegean within easy reach of Asiatic 
Turkey helped swing the whole emphasis of Italian policy 
e as t.
Italian exporters followed with interest the efforts
67 ibid., b. 22, f. 59D, San Giul. to Garroni, 10 Sep. 1913
68 ibid., b. 15, f. 21, San Giul. to Giolitti, 27 Dec. 1913
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of the Young Turks' regime to introduce economic reforms;
Caxli argued at the 11° Congresso degli esportatori italiani
in Qriente that
La soluzione del problema fondiario creera il bisogno 
di ampie forniture di macchine agricole e di attrezzi 
rurali; il miglioramento degli attuali mezzi di 
comunicazione, ed ancor piu, la creazione di nuovi, 
rendera necessarie grand i forniture di materiale 
ferroviario; l'assetto dei porti, dei mezzi di tras- 
porto cittadini, il fornire le citta delle comodita 
derivanti dalla moderna civiltk, creera il bisogno 
di impianti elettrici, di forniture di automobili, 
di trams, di condutture, ecc.; il risveglio edilizio 
che gia s'e accentuato a Gostantinopoli e che, nat- 
uralmente, non tardera a propagarsi in altri centri, 
fara sentire il bisogno di tutte quelle comodita 
che sono la caratteristica della casa moderna.69
G-iolitti's claim in his memoirs that the Italian bid for 
concessions in the region was largely political, in motive ^  
conflicts with the reports of almost all contemporary obser­
vers, and indeed with the nature of Europe's interest in 
the Ottoman Empire. The conflicting railway schemes were 
only the most dramatic expression of a general rivalry among 
the powers for access to and control over the markets of 
Asia: a struggle which, in the view of L'EspIorazione Comm- 
erciale in 1914,
In questi ultimi tempi...si e fatta anche piu 
affannosa e ciascuna vi cerca nuove vie di sbocco e 
di approvvigionamento, nuovi campi di sfruttamento 
alia propria attivita. II lavoro non b piu di 
singoli soltanto, ma opera coordinata di tutta la 
nazione, tendente all'esecuzione di un piano siste- 
matico, lungi veggente, di conquista economica e di 
ipoteca politica della regione.
E 1'opera di ogni nazione, il singolo sistema 
rientra in quello massimo comune, dell'Europa 
intera, che tenta, ora principalmente dal punto di 
vista economico e finanziario, la conquista civile 
dell'Oriente.71
Italy's bid to join in these activities soon drew alarmed
reports from French diplomats; the vice-consul in Rhodes
informed Doumergue that
69 '11° Congresso...', p.529
70 G-. G-iolitti, Memorie . . . , p.513
71 A. Terzolo, 'Interessi europei nell'Asia turca', L'Esp. 
Comm., XXIX (1914), pp.459-62 at 462
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les Italiens ont inaugur£ un vaste programme dfinf­
luence dont Rhodes est le centre le plus actif...il 
est a prdvoir qu’elle finira par acqu^rir une situa­
tion de premier ordre en Asie Mineure...la presse 
italienne et la Gouvernement lui-meme ne se cachent 
pas pour claironner que 1'heure des renonciations 
et de l'effacement a fini de sonner pour la Jeune 
Italie, consciente, d^sormais, de sa force et de 
ses droits.72
The French charge in Constantinople sent a long report in 
the following month detailing the extent of Italy’s penet­
ration into the Ottoman Empire, describing her as 'les plus
73dangereux de nos rivaux.'
Yet Barr&re came fair nearer the mark when he argued
that the time was in fact propitious for a Franco-Italian
rapprochment, given the far more significant conflict in the
area between Italy and the Central Powers.^ As the network
of Italian interests spread -fostered by entrepreneurs such
as Giuseppe Volpi, financed largely by the Banca Commerciale
and supported by the Consults.- so relations within the
Triple Alliance necessarily grew strained. For, as F. Bridge 
75has argued, Berchtold was also extremely anxious to gam 
concessions in asiatic Turkey and help to restore Austria's 
position in the area. A large part of the meeting between 
San Giuliano and Berchtold held in April 1914 had been 
devoted to just this topic, with little profit for the 
Austrians: as their foreign minister was quick to point out, 
the implication of an Italian zone stretching as far as Eski 
Adalia in the east (as announced by San Giuliano) was an 
humiliatingly small zone for the Habsburg monarchy. Indeed 
this was only the last in a series of rebuffs suffered by 
Berchtold. In June 1913 the Italian government gained German 
acceptance of their activities to the west of Alaya (the 
western boundary of Berlin's sphere of influence), while 
in the following month Bernardino Nogara, agent of Volpi's
72 B.B.F., Series 3, vol. 9, no.213, Laffon to Doum., 3 Feb. 
1914
73 ibid., no.422, Boppe to Bourn., 9 March 1914. See on the 
same theme ibid., no.319, Dumpard to Bourn., no.354, Cam- 
bon to Bourgeois; and B.B. , vol.X/2, no.643, Rodd to Grey, 
30 March 1914
74 B.B.F., vol.9, no.415, Barrkre to Viviani, 20 June 1914
75 F. R. Bridge, 'Tarde venientibus ossa: Austro-Hungarian 
Colonial Aspirations in Asia Minor, 1913-14', Middle 
Eastern Studies, 6 (1970), pp.319-30
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Bocieta Commerciale d'Qriente, had reached agreement with 
the Ottoman authorities on exclusive Italian rights to make 
cartographic studies in southern Anatolia. Informed by amba­
ssador Avarna in August that Italy intended her sphere of 
influence to stretch from Alaya to the Gulf of Kos, Berch­
told then had Italian influence in Constantinople demonst­
rated to him in the autumn, with the Porte’s rejection of 
an Austrian request for harbour and road-building COnCe-
ry /-
ssions in Adalia. Berchtold then had to abandon his hopes 
for influence in this area, and when it became clear in the 
months before the outbreak of war that the only region San 
Giuliano was prepared to concede Austria consisted of swampy 
coastland, the Austrian foreign minister's policy had 
clearly failed disastrously. Bridge suggests that the failure 
to gain any position in Asia Minor may have been a factor in 
Austria's attitude during the July crisis, especially since 
the strong German support on offer then was in complete
contrast to the disagreements over policy in the Ottoman
77Empire.
The Consulta did not only disturb the Austrian gov­
ernment with its policy in Asia Minor -Britain too faced 
demands for an accomodation of Italian interests. Grey appre­
ciated that Austro-Italian economic rivalry worked against 
the Triple Alliance; Rodd had informed him of a meeting of 
January 1911 with Luigi Luzzatti, in which the prime min­
ister described 'the strength of the influence which Germany 
and Austria have now acquired in the Turkish Empire, an
influence which was having a sinister effect on the interests 
7ftof Italy.1 Then in November of the following year Imperiali
told Grey that
Italy desired the complete independence, both polit­
ical and economic, of Servia. The Ambassador laid 
much stress on the word "economic", and said that 
Italy would ask for full liberty of commercial 
competition in the Balkan Peninsula on the same 
conditions as any other power...San Giuliano could 
not defend in the Italian Parliament conditions of
76 ibid., pp.322-27
77 ibid., p.328
78 B.I)., vol. 6, no. 426, Rodd to Grey, 12 Jan. 1911
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economic privileges for Austria in Servia that would 
place Italy at a disadvantage. He laid much stress 
on this point...It was clear to me from this conver­
sation that, while Italy is at one with Austria in 
disliking that any port on the Adriatic might fall 
under the influence of a strong Power...she is 
almost equally apprehensive that Austria may obtain 
commercial privileges, and she does not wish to be 
left alone with Austria as regards Albania.79
Paced with the Italian desire for a railway project which 
directly challenged the concessions already awarded to a 
British company for a line from Smyrna to Aidin, Grey's 
attitude -despite much bluster and outrage- reveals an anxi­
ety to placate San Giuliano. He minuted a report from Rome 
of October 1913, in which the Italian foreign minister had 
been described as likening his country 'to an unexpected 
guest at dinner for whom space must be made' and insisted 
on Italy's legitimate desire 'for expansion of her commer­
cial interests', 'We need not oppose anything in Asia Minor
that does not conflict with the rights of the Smyrna-Aidin 
80R(ailway).' Ambassador Rodd told Grey that, 'The one... 
point which (San Giuliano) considers of imperative importance 
is that Italy should find some sphere for economic and 
commercial development in Turkish Empire', and reminded him 
that 'the final orientation of Italy in Europe is not yet 
determined and I feel that we still have some fair prospect
81of inclining the scale in the most advantageous direction.'
He also pointed out in March 1914 the Austro-Italian ill-
82feeling caused by economic rivalry in the region of Adalia.
Grey himself went rather beyond the position of his 
earlier minute, admitting in April that 'H.M.G. have exerc­
ised considerable pressure upon the directors in order to
83induce them to come to terms with the Italian parties.' 
Agreement had been reached in that month, following a visit 
to London by Nogara, without whose involvement no Italian 
treaty of the period seemed possible: but it came only
79 ibid., vol. 9/2, no. 210, Grey to Rodd, 15 Nov. 1912
80 ibid., vol. 10/1, no. 151, Dering to Grey, 15 Oct. 1913
81 ibid., no. 167, Rodd to Grey, 6 Dec. 1913; and no. 221, 
Rodd to Grey, 30 Jan. 1914
82 ibid., no. 441, Rodd to Grey, 30 March 1914
83 P.R.O., P.O. 371/2118, Grey to Hakki Pasha, 25 April 
1914
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after the British railway company had -in the words of Grey-
'gone out of their way to meet the Italians on every point.
They have, not without some persuasion on the part of this
Office, accepted practically every one of Signor Nogara's 
84proposals.' It would clearly be wrong to claim any major 
significance for this agreement in relation to Italian 
policy in the months ahead. Yet at the same time it fits into 
a pattern of constant expansionism into an area already 
over-crowded with competing schemes. The contrast between 
the policy of G-rey, quite willing to damage British commer­
cial interests in the Ottoman Empire in the hope of thus 
bringing nearer Italy's evacuation of the Dodecanese, and 
the profound clash of Italian and Austro-G-erman objectives 
in the Balkans and Asia Minor, underlines Italy's unsatis­
factory diplomatic position in the months before Sarajevo. 
G-rey's concessions were of the greatest importance to 
Italy's railway projects. As G-iuseppe Bevione (nationalist 
correspondent for La Stampa in Libya in 1911, who spent 
much of the next two years roaming Asia Minor in support 
of Italy's imperial mission) admitted, Italy's schemes 
would have been worthless without the British company's
permission to build a 150 kilometre line from Adalia to the
85lakes. Bevione saw Italy's projected rail network as of 
supreme importance, since it 'e la basa prima di ogni infl­
uenza economica. I risultati che essa dk sono superiori a 
quelli di qualunque altra iniziativa, soprattutto perche le
concessioni ferroviarie hanno nell'Impero ottomano un carat-
8 6tere esclusivo.' Citing an almost five-fold increase in 
German exports to Turkey between 1897 and 1911 and the 
progress of Berlin's own great railway plans, he warned that 
German economic penetration in the Ottoman Empire 'assunse 
l'aspetto di una silenziosa, ordinata marcia di conquista'; 
'Tutte le energie tedesche in Oriente sono subordinate ad 
un progetto; il Baghdadbahn...La ferrovia di Baghdad si 
identifica cosl profondamente colle ambizioni teutoniche in 
Turchia, da cessare di essere un mezzo di penetrazione per
84 ibid., minute by Grey on Rodd to Grey, 3 March 1914
85 G. Bevione, L'Asia Minore e 1'Italia (Turin 1914)> PP*
91-5
86 ibid., p. 91
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R7diventare un fine a se stessa.’ For Bevione,
la concessione di Adalia non e che un'anticamera. 
Adalia stessa non pub essere che una tappa della 
nostra marcia. I tre sangiaccati a cui si limita la 
concessione di studi per la ferrovia non sono adeg- 
uati alia nostra potenzialita, non possono soddis- 
fare le nostre legittime aspirazioni,..1'impianto 
di una banca italiana seria a Smirne, non soltanto 
pub essere un buon affare preso in sb, ma b la 
condizione necessaria pel successo di qualsiasi 
altra nostra iniziativa in questa zona. In Oriente 
la banca e 1’avanguardia della penetrazione econ­
omical elimina le difficolta, spiana la strada, 
prepara 1'ambiente...A Smirne dobbiamo lavorare con 
tenacia, con fede, con sacrifici, perehe Smirne ^  
b il cervello e il cuore dell'Anatolia occidentale.
The deep suspicion of Germany expressed in this work
of 1914 -Bevione complains that Italy's supposed ally fe piu
sollecita a difendere la sua linea di Baghdad da una nostra
irradiazione da Adalia nella direzione di Konia, che non a
89sostenerci contro le forze avverse'- is shared by other 
observers. Bernardino Nogara, reflecting at the end of August 
1914 on the likely impact of war on Italy's position across 
the Adriatic, certainly had no doubt from where the main 
threat lay:
Si pub essere certi che il trionfo della Germania 
nella guerra significa il protetterato tedesco in 
Turchia...Da questo punto di vista l'avvenire dell1 
Italia andrebbe cosi compromesso che sarebbe necess- 
ario uscire dalla neutralita per impedire che la 
Germania maturi il suo sogno mediterraneo.90
Similar fears lay behind the campaign for intervention on
the side of the Triple Entente begun by h'Adriatico, a
regional daily financed by Volpi and the Banca Commerciale,
91in September 1914. Such fears are also alive in the Cons­
ults.. San Giuliano, explaining his terms for negotiation 
with the Entente powers to his ambassadors in Paris and St. 
Petersburg, insisted that in the event
di spartizione dell'Impero Ottomano 1'Italia vi avrb.
87 ibid. , pp. 12b and 1J>6
88 ibid., pp. 73, 78 and 83
89 ibid., pp. 219-20
90 Cited in S. Romano, Giuseppe Volpi: industria e finanza 
tra Giolitti e Mussolini (Milan 1979), P* 59
91 ibid., German progress with the Baghdad line had 
been watched with alarm by Italian interests over several 
years: see L'Esplorazione Commerciale, XXVII (1912), p. 
155 and pp. 267-8; 'La linea di Baghdad', XXVIII (1913),
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la sua parte colla nota zona di Adalia e qualora 
la Germania debba rinunziare ai suoi interessi in 
Asia Minore la detta zona sara estesa a favore dell1 
Italia fino a Mersina inclusa con hinterland 
economicamente adeguato;
while if the Ottoman Empire survives, Italy!s zone of infl-
92uence must still be enlarged. De Martino made much the 
same point to San Giuliano's successor four months later in 
January 1915, urging Sonnino that, 'L'obiettivo fondamentale 
della nostra politica deve...essere sempre il seguente: 1* 
Italia, alia soluzione del presente conflitto, non pub 
trovarsi dalla parte del vinto', for then 'il vitalissimo 
problema adriatico sarebbe tuttavia per sempre e definit- 
ivamente risoluto a danno dell'Italia e a tutto vantaggio 
degli slavi.' Italy 'passerb a potenza adriatica di second' 
ordine...Nessun motivo avrebbero i vincitori di far partec- 
ipare 1'Italia alia prevedibile liquidazione del vinto 
Impero ottomano', and she will have no part 'nei vasto campo 
di azione politica ed economica che si aprira in Asia 
Minore.'^
Finally, an idea which took on an almost millen- 
arian importance for many Italians by the eve of war, and 
which needs to be discussed in any survey of Italian imper­
ialism and its relevance to intervention in 1915 -the image 
of Trieste as a key to the control of eastern markets. Idea 
Nazionale put this point most succinctly, arguing in October 
1914 that from the control of Trieste would flow 'il nostro
imperialismo commerciale, e marinaro e politico su tutto 1'
94Oriente mediterraneo.'^ Others were more effusive; the 
nationalist Francesco Coppola explained two months later 
just why the Austrian offer of the Trentino was useless for 
Italy:
pp. 321-33; and A. Terzolo, 'La ferrovia di Baghdad e la 
penetrazione germanica in Oriente', XXIX (1914), PP* 47-59
92 P.P.I., Series V, vol. 1, p. 476, San Giul. to Tittoni and 
Carlotti, 21 Sep. 1914
93 S. Sonnino, Carteggio, 1914-1916 (Bari 1974), pp. 141-46 
at 141-2, 9 Jan. 1915
94 ’Per la democrazia 0 per 1'Italia?1, 30 Oct. 1914
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Non h solo il Trentino che noi vogliamo. Noi vogliamo 
col Trentino, e il Litorale, e Trieste, e l'Istria e 
la Dalmazia, tutte le antiche e nobili consanguinee 
terre d'Italia. Noi vogliamo il dominio dell’Adri­
atico, noi vogliamo la parte che ci spette del dom­
inio dell'Oriente e del Mediterraneo, noi vogliamo 
il nostro posto sempre piu grande di grande nazione,qp 
noi vogliamo la nostra parte nella storia del mondo.
Behind the rhetoric lay a clear appreciation of the inability 
of Berlin and Vienna to satisfy Italy's interests by negot­
iation. As Coppola wrote in March 1915, the defeat of her 
erstwhile allies was a vital interest of Italy, needed to 
further
la nostra espansione economica. In primo luogo questo 
problema si identifica con quello di Trieste, perche 
Trieste e il massimo porto del commercio del Levante 
con I'Europa centrale. In secondo luogo si ident­
ifica con quello di Fiume e dalla Dalmazia come porte 
del nostro commercio e della nostra esportazione nei 
Balcani: commercio ed esportazioni di grande avvenire 
perche gli Stati balcanici vanno appunto oggi metten- 
dosi in valore e pensando da uno stadio all'altro 
della vita civile, e per conseguenza hanno crescenti 
bisogni; commercio ed esportazioni fino ad ieri 
monopolizzati dall'Austria, e nei quali noi dobbiamo 
sostituirci all'Austria escludendola. In terzo luogo 
esso si identifica con quello dell'Asia Minore, che 
appunto dalla liquidazione dell'Impero Ottomano puo 
prendere un valore economico enorme, sia come via 
ai traffici interni dell'Asia. II problema della 
nostra espansione economica non puo quindi risolversi 
che insieme e nella stessa direzione con quelli da 
cui dipende. Anche esso ci impone oggi la guerra 
agli Imperi centrali.96
The same point had been made by Alfredo Rocco, writing on the
eve of war:
II dominio commerciale e politico, del Mediterraneo 
orientale presuppone il dominio dell'Adriatico e 
specialmente, di Trieste. Chi possiede Trieste, 
domina commercialmente 1'Oriente e chi possiede 1' 
Adriatico, domina politicamente 1'Oriente. E poiche 
ci occorre il dominio di Trieste e dell'Adriatico, 
ci occorre l'esclusione dell'Austria dal dominio di 
Trieste e dell'Adriatico.97
95 'L'offra del Trentino’, Idea Nazionale, 10 Dec. 1914
96 'Le ragioni politiche della nostra guerra’, Idea Nazionale, 
17 March 1915. See in the same vein, G. Bruccoleri, Lai 
conflitto europeo alia guerra nostra; Liario di un giorn- 
alista, agosto 1914-giugno 1915 (Rome 1915). p.182
97 'Armiamo 1'Italia per tenerla pronta agli eventi', II Lovere 
Nazionale, 1 Aug. 1914, now in Scritti e discorsi politici
(1913-34) , vol. 1 La lotta nazionale della vigilia. e dur­
ante la guerra (Milan 1958), pp. 129-35 at 131. See also
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While such opinions might he dismissed as the desid­
eratum of nationalists, with little hearing on Italian 
foreign policy (although any distinction between the liberal 
ruling class and a seperate nationalist movement is hardly 
possible, as will be seen), the same attitude is repeated 
in circles even closer to the industrial world than were the 
nationalists. Riccardo Bachi, whose annual surveys of economic 
life show a brilliant understanding of the condition of 
Italian industry and commerce, accepted in his summary of 
1914 that
L'unione di Trieste alia madre patria aggiunge all1 
economia nazionale un grosso emporio raccogliente 
molto traffico del Levante, un mercato avente per 
talune merci importanza europea; reca una cospicua 
aggiunta alia scarsa flotta mercantile italiana e 
aggrega all1Italia alcuni organismi finanziari 
poderosi. Questa unione...sara poi fattore di imman- 
cabili innovazioni nella politica economica 
nazionale.98
Most revealing of all however is the long article by Mario 
Alberti on 1 Trieste e la sua fisiologia economica' , publi­
shed in Rivista delle Societa Commerciali between October 
and December 1915. Alberti, an economist and native of 
Trieste, had been canvassing the importance of the port for 
several years. He believed that the events of 1915» in 
particular the likely demise of the Ottoman Empire, vindicated 
his analysis:
La lotta, la granda lotta dev1essere fra i porti sud- 
latini e gli empori nord-germanici!...I porti merid- 
ionali devono impadronirsi nuovamente (per non abband- 
onarli piu mai) di tutti i traffici fra il Levante, 
l'Oriente, l'Europa di mezzo. Queste correnti comm­
erciali gravitano naturalmente su i porti mediterranei 
e adriatici; sono un flusso perenne di ricchezza, 
che la dissoluzione dellfimpero ottomano in Asia 
preannuncia rigogliosamente crescente.
Che l'indomani della guerra vittoriosa veda 
anche il trionfo degli antichi empori nostri: di 
Genova, di Venezia, di Trieste, di Fiume.99
The final part of Alberti's article outlined the
'La situazione dell'Italia dal punto di vista italiano', 
15 Aug. 1914, in ibid., pp. 143-9
98 R. Bachi, L'Italia...1914, p. XVI
99 Riv. delle d o c. Comm., V (1915), p. 960
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ways in which industry and agriculture could expect to 
benefit from an Italian Trieste and Adriatic. He stressed 
above all
L*utile che alia economia italiana derivera dalla 
potenzialita di assorbimento e di espansione merca­
ntile inerente alle terre ed alle coste orientali 
dell' Adriatico. L'agricoltura del mezzogiorno 
continuera ad avere uno sbocco notevole per i suoi 
precoci prodotti del suolo, mentre invece, se la 
guerra non fosse scoppiata, sarebbe pesata la su di 
essa...la minaccia di un dazio proibitivo (by Austria- 
Hungary which) avrebbe reso assolutamente impossibile 
ai nostri agricoltari di smerciare nella Venezia 
G-iulia (comprese Piume) e nella Dalmazia i forti 
quantitativi di ortaggi che sinora vi mandavano... 
Insediatosi il regime politico italiano a Trieste e 
a Piume, non sara piu possibile un sabotaggio 
austriaco degli agrumi italiani. La produzione delle 
paste alimentari acquistera nella Venezia Giulia uno 
sbocco importante...I pescatori chioggioti e del 
litorale occidentale dell'Adriatico non saranno piu 
minacciati dalle autoritk austriache nell'esercizio 
della loro professione...100
Alberti then turns to several of the cartels which had been
struggling on against limited home markets and fierce foreign
competition for several years:
L'industria italiana degli zuccheri...non avrebbe 
piu da temere il ripetersi di crisi di sovraproduz- 
ione...poiche non solo avrebbe nelle nuove province 
uno sbocco di primo ordine, ma anche, col mezzo del 
mercato zuccherario triestino, che e di fondamentale 
importanza per i Balcani e per il Levante, potrebbe 
iniziare un vigoroso movimento d1esportazione• Anche 
la siderurgia italiana, una volta annessa la Venezia 
Giulia al Regno, avrebbe nei cantieri triestini, 
monfalconesi, fiumani e delle isole del Quarnero dei 
compratori che fino adesso erano riforniti dai cart- 
elli del ferro dell'Austria e della Germania, poiche 
un dazio insuperabile impediva qualsiasi tentativo 
di concorrenza da parte del prodotto italiano. L' 
industria cotoniera avrebbe nuove regioni di smercio 
nell'Italia redenta ed uno strumento di esportazione 
nei commercio triestino, dappoichk esso, unita Trieste 
all'Italia, dovra cessar d'essere 1'intermediario 
dell'esportazione cotoniera austriaca nei Levante e 
nei Balcani per divenire il mezzo con cui l'industria 
cotoniera italiana conquistera definitivamente i 
mercati dei paesi balcanichi, della Turchia ecc. In 
generale, poichk troppo dovremmo dilungarci a voler 
esporre dettagliamente i vantaggi che ad ogni singolo 
ramo industriale deriveranno dall' annessione della
100 ibid., pp. 1019-20
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Venezia Giulia, della Dalmazia e del Trentino, 
diremo che tutte le produzioni italiane troveranno 
in queste regioni sbocchi di notevole importanza.101
He continues that the control of Trieste and Fiume will 
strengthen Italy's position in trade and tariff negotia­
tions with Germany and Austria^-Hungary -dissatisfaction with 
Germany's commercial stranglehold over Italy, and with the 
tariff structure in general, will be seen to be an important 
aspect of the debate within the industrial community over 
intervention in 1915* He also insists on the industrial 
potential of Trieste itself, since
la posizione interna di questa porto -che penetra 
proprio sin dentro nell'Europa centrale- e cosi 
propizia da consigliare la creazione di tutte le 
industrie lavoratrici di materie prime provenienti 
dalle regioni africane ed asiatiche del bacino Medit­
erraneo e dalle Indie, consentendo poi un risparmio 
non insensibile sui costosi noli ferroviari, con 1* 
inoltro mediante ferrovia del prodotto perfetto di 
piu alto valore in luogo dell'ingombrante e ben piu 
povera materia prima.102
Finally, Alberti claims that control of the Adriatic
coast will boost Italy's rail and shipping networks, bringing
them into the hub of the transit of passengers and goods
across Europe -a point made already by Trochia in 1901 and
by Salandra six years later, although Alberti looks back
103even further to Cavour for endorsement of this idea.
Central to his argument is once again an image of Germany 
and Austria-Hungary as the stumbling-block to Italy's expan­
sion into the region she has a vital need to control:
Col passaggio di Trieste, Fiume, Zara, Spalato, 
ecc., all'Italia, la navigazione italiana nell' 
Adriatico vedra aprirsi un grande avvenire di svil­
uppo e di prosperity, poiche non ci saranno piu i 
"pools'1 austro-germanici e le influenze finanziarie 
austriache a fiaccare e a scoraggiare qualunque 
iniziativa italiana. Annessa la Venezia Giulia e 
la Dalmazia, dopo la sconfitta dell'Austria, la 
ferrovia Danubio-Adriatico gioverebbe enormemente 
all'Italia, di cui favorirebbe la penetrazione econ­
omica nei Balcani...da Venezia e Trieste...potrebbe 
dipartirsi la linea transbaleanica superiore per 
Belgrado, Craiova, Bucarest, Costanza, ferroviaria- 
mente; oppure...fluvialmente, attraverso tutti i 
Balcani, con piccola spesa di trasporto, lungo la
101 ibid., p. 1020
102 ibid., p. 1019n
103 ibid., p. 1034-
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Sava ed il Danubio. Allora, mediante il canale 
navigabile da Venezia a Milano, il centro indust- 
riale d’Italia sarebbe unito, con via fluviale... 
col Mar Nero, mentre da Bari, attraverso I1Adriatico 
e con le ferrovie albanesi, 1*Italia centrale 
raggiungerebbe rapidamente Salonicco, da una parte, 
e con la linea di Antivari-Ipek-Mitrovizza-Nisc- 
Danubio si unirebbe anch’essa, alia arteria fluviale 
dei Balcani...1’Italia sopraintenderebbe a tutto 
quanto il traffico Adriatico; sarebbe la grande 
instauratrice di nuovi commerci fra 1'Adriatico ed 
i Balcani, fra 1’Adriatico ed il Levante. Non piu, 
allora, inquietanti concorrenti di soverchianti 
marine straniere nell1Adriatico; non piu la press- 
ione di potenti commerci esteri tendenti a seacciare 
dall'Oriente i traffici italiani! Allora, finalmente, 
1’Adriatico sarh proprio dell'Italia e per l’Italia.104
In the past Italy had often ignored these markets, and
attempted instead to break into the major economies of
Europe and the United States; yet such attempts are bound
to founder on the tariff barriers which these states can
erect. With her new ports on the Adriatic, Italy will be in
a better position to extend her ’penetrazione economica nei
paesi in corso di sviluppo, che costituiscono i germi delle
105risorae avvenire’, and which will become even more valu­
able in the light of such trends as the United States’ gro­
wing monopoly of trade with South America.Alberti 
107cites these figures for the commerce between Europe and 
Asia Minor passing through Trieste in 1913 which do indeed 
suggest the potential expansion of an Italian economy in 
control of the port (figures in crowns):
Asia Minor would become even more of a lucrative market
once freed from the constraints of Turkish rule, and
Trieste’s value as the meeting point of the Adriatic and 
Mediterranean shipping lines and the rail routes from 
central Europe will be all the greater.
104 ibid., pp. 1021-22
105 ibid.
106 ibid., p. 1022n












Here, then, in the pages of the official journal 
of Italian joint-stock companies, is the most open express­
ion of Italy's desire for a new hegemony over the regions 
to her east -a goal which, while encouraged by her interv­
ention in May 1915, in fact pre-dates that decision and is 
indeed a crucial influence on Salandra's move toward war. As 
a correspondent of II Socialista argued in September 1914 > 
the true motive for the government's consideration of inter­
vention with the Triple Entente
non h ragione irredentista, ma e ragione economica 
. . .Bisogna annientare gli Austro-G-ermanici, perche 
i loro capitali vogliono alimentare le industrie 
italiene, e vogliono impedire ai nostri prodotti 
di trovare nuovi e liberi mercati al di la dell1 
Adriatico, nei paesi non ancora capaci di bastare 
a s6 stessi.108
This analysis would probably have been accepted in commercial
circles favouring war -with the Rassegna dei lavori pubblici,
for example, which asserted two months later that 'questa,
come nessun'altra, h guerra di egemonia commerciale e di
predominio economico...1'Italia stessa interverra, se mai,
nella guerra a tutela d'interessi economici e per la conq-
109uista di vantaggi economici.' (Germany's special envoy m  
the peninsula for much of the period of neutrality, Prince 
Bernhard von Bulow, included in a report of January 1915 
the opinion of Otto Dittmann (a (German in touch with many 
leading military and industrial figures in Italy, who at 
one point had even edited La Lega liavale), that various 
important figures in the Gonsulta believed military defeat 
for Austria would offer Italy great opportunities of econ­
omic and political development in the Balkans which she 
must profit from.'L^
Irredentist and economic concerns could also run 
happily in tandem. This was true over Trieste, for example, 
or the Trentino -whose rivers, as L'industria Elettrica 
somewhat vaguely admitted, were an extremely valuable
108 Cited in M. Patica, Qrigini del fascismo e del comunismo 
a I.apoli (1911-15) (Florence 1971),' p.345
109 'La guerra e i trattati di commercio', Hov. 1914, p. 34
110 Cited in Monticone, op. cit., pp. 551-52
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source of hydro-electrical power: *11 Trentino italiano,
affratellato e rigenerato, compensera, con le sue ricchezze
naturali, i sacrifici che dovranno sostenersi per liberarlo
dal secolare servaggio e dalla decadenza economica cui era
ridotto. ' Since the Austrian government had agreed (under
German pressure) to cede the Trentino to Italy as the price
for her continued neutrality, it might seem that the area’s
fate was not an issue in the decision for intervention. There
was however much doubt as to the sincerity of this concession
-a fear ably worked on by the French, with Delcass£ passing
on to Tittoni an intercepted telegram from Jagow to Tschir-
schky of 12 April 1915, in which the Central Powers were
revealed agreeing on a plan first to compensate Italy, then
to attack her on completion of the European war to regain 
112all land ceded. Monticone has also uncovered a suggestion
from the German industrialist Mannesmann to the Wilhelmst-
rasse that Italy be given a pledge of no war of revenge, to
113be followed at a future date by just such a war. The Brit­
ish representative in Berne cabled Grey in March 1915 that, 
'Austro-Hungarian financiers have been confidentially 
informed that Imperial Government is firmly resolved to 
recover at future date territories she is now compelled to 
surrender to Ital y . M i l i t a r y defeat of Germany and 
Austria-Hungary would alone win Italy some degree of security 
in her new territories, and such an outcome could only be 
reached through alliance with the major powers opposing 
Berlin and Vienna. Hence the Italian government's commit­
ment to the Entente alliance through the Treaty of London, 
to be followed in August 1917 by the accords of Saint Jean 
de Maurienne, intended to grant Italy another slice of the 
Ottoman Empire. The watchword of Italian foreign policy in 
this period might well have been these words, which appeared 
in an economic journal two months before intervention:
'L'Oriente, diciamolo una buona volta ben chiaro, lo si pud
111 'II Trentino e le nuove risorse idrauliche', 9 (1915), 
pp. 129-30
112 A. Monticone, op. cit., pp. 551-52
113 ibid., pp. 624-25
114 P.R.O., F.O. 371/2375, Acton to Grey, 16 March 1915
119
115conquistare andando in Oriente e non per vie traverse.'
Hence too the alarm and astonishment amongst the
powers treating with the Italian government as they realised
the extent of her claims. Sazonov was particularly unhappy,
grumbling at Sonnino's exaggerated demands -especially his
desire to gain control of both sides of the Adriatic- and
the highly unsatisfactory treaty which Britain and Prance
were in such a hurry to sign; Grey seemed to work only to
116defend Italian predominance in the Adriatic. Delcasse
later told Wickham Steed that the French government had felt
obliged to accept Italy's demands, believing her interven-
117tion would half the length of the war; while Imperiali
reported Grey's opinion of these demands as 'alquanto ecce-
ssive e considerevolmente oltrepassanti quelle enunciate
118nelle conversazioni dell'agosto ultimo scorso.'
Yet however unhappy these three powers may have been
with the concessions extorted from them, they were obviously
far more able to make such offers than were Germany or
Austria-Hungary. Salandra later claimed that, 'Al lettore
odierno le nostre richieste (to Vienna) non parranno ecces-
119sive; parranno forse modeste e insufficient!'; but while
Italian demands on the Trentino, first set out clearly in a
memorandum of 8 April, were relatively modest, the extent
of her aspirations in the Adriatic made any negotiated
settlement unlikely, just as they had threatened the accord
with the Triple Entente. Bollati compared Italy's terms to
those a conqueror would seek to impose on a totally defeated 
120enemy. Sonnino demanded an autonomous Trieste, control of
115 D. Haselli, '!'atteggiamento dell'Italia rispetto ai suoi 
interessi politici ed economici in Oriente', Economista 
dell'Italia moderna, 6 March 1915, p. 8
116 S. Sazonov, Fateful Years, 1909-16: The Reminiscences of 
Serge Sazonov (London 1928), p. 263; Sazonov to Bencken- 
dorff, 31 March 1915, Int. Bez. 11711, nos. 456 and 564
117 H. W. Steed, Through Thirty Years 1892-1922: a personal 
narrative (London 1924), vol. 2, p. 66; R. Marchand (ed. ), 
Un livre noir: Diplomatic d'avant-guerre et de guerre d' 
apres les documents des archives russes (1910-1917) (Paris 
n.a. but 1922-31), vol. 3, p. 100, Report of Isvolsky,
23 March/5 April 1915
118 S. Sonnino, op. cit., pp. 271-4 at 272, 9 March 1915
119 A. Salandra, La neutrality italiana (1914): ricordi e 
pensieri (Milan 1928), p. I2C>
120 Avarna Di Gualtieri, C., art. cit ♦ , p. 379, Bollati to 
Avarna, 14 April 1915
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Yalona and its hinterland, and of all the islands off the 
Serbian coast from Spalato to Ragusa, plus a total aband­
onment by Austria of all interests in Albania: as Monticone
argues, this programme implied a radical change in the
121Adriatic balance of power in favour of Italy. For the 
Italian government this was a war to defeat the main obsta­
cles to her expansion, a war of clear-sighted self-intereat 
alone -for, in San Giuliano’s words, ’l’interesse maggiore 
dell'Italia, e maggiormente minacciato, e nell1Adriatico.
Non abbiamo alcun interesse ad altri campi dell’attuale
122conflitto, come per esempio 1'indipendenza del Belgio.'
The logic of Italy's drive into areas where she clashed reg­
ularly with her allies led to the end of the Triple Alliance 
and to intervention; this quite aside from the pressures 
Britain was able to apply in the months of neutrality. The 
offers of the Austrian government came only after great 
German arm-twisting, and could easily be retracted; Salandra 
had been told by Bulow in December 1914 that Trieste was a
vital interes't of the Habsburg monarchy which she could
123not be expected to yield. In any case the concessions
from Vienna would not block Germany's path into the Balkans
and Asia Minor, and were made only in the hope Italy might
renounce ’a Trieste, all'Istria e alia Dalmazia italiana e
al dominio dell'Adriatico assicurante avvenire nostra
124penetrazione economica nei Balcani e in Oriente.'
Indeed it seems that the whole course of negoti­
ations between Italy and her allies amounted to little more 
than an exercise in mutual deceit and prevarication. Not 
only did the Italians doubt the value of any negotiated 
agreement, in fact Salandra's government never seriously 
expected to reach any such settlement with its former 
allies. On publication of the Italian Green Book some days 
after her entry into the war, Rodd cabled Grey that
The point which a study of the correspondence... to
121 Monticone, op. cit. , p. 335
122 P.P.I., Series 5, vol. 1, p. 412, San Giul. to Imper­
iali, 16 Sep. 1914
123 A.G.S., G.S., b.l f.5* Memorandum of Salandra, 19 Dec. 
1914
124 P.P.I. , p. 526, Carlotti to San Giul., 4 Oct. 1914
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my mind brings out strongly, is that Baron Sonnino 
...never really intended to come to any agreement 
with the Austro-Hungarian Government...(He) always 
gave me to understand that it was practically out 
of the question that Austria could ever offer terms 
which could be acceptable to Italy...he never inte­
nded that these negotiations should have any further 
results than those of gaining time and of providing 
Italy with a plausible case.125
This interpretation is confirmed by the correspondence
between Salandra and Sonnino for the period, which reveals
the prime minister advising that negotiations must be kept
going with Vienna in order to avoid an ultimatum from the
Central Powers before negotiations in London have been 
12 6concluded. Monticone suggests Italy had opted for war at
least prior to the memorandum of 8 April, which was designed
merely to avoid a premature break rather than to serve as
127a basis for serious negotiations.
Yet if the decision for intervention can only be 
explained by trends in Italian foreign policy over the 
previous decade, it was of course also affected by immediate 
developments in 1914-15, primarily the progress of the war. 
The assumptions governing Italy's policy once the war had 
begun ware stated by San Giuliano in August 1914: 'Non h 
possibile impegnare l1Italia in un guerra se non si ha la 
quasi certezza di vittoria sin dalle prime operazioni
"I no
militari.' News of early French defeats along the Meuse
led him to cable Imperiali on the need far caution, and the
danger of staking Italy's existence on a single card; such
129an approach 'non h eroico, ma e saggio e patriottico.' 
Reports in September that Germany had been halted on the 
Rhine then encouraged San Giuliano to advise the opening of 
negotiations in London, while Salandra also admitted the
125 P.R.O., F.O. 371/2375, Rodd to. Grey, 26 May 1915
126 S. Sonnino, op. cit., pp. 248-49, 27 Feb. 1915, and pp. 
293-94, 16 March
127 A. Monticone, op. cit. , pp. 376-77. See also A. Link 
(ed.), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Princeton 1980), 
vol. 32, p. 475, House to Wilson, 3 April 1915, quoting 
the opinion of the U.S. ambassador in Rome that Italy 
will join the Triple Entente when she believes they
are a few months away from victory.
128 A.C.S., C.S., b.2 f.17, Memorandum of San Giuliano, 26 
Aug. 1914
129 L.I). I.. .. , p. 241, San Giuliano to Imperiali, 25 Aug. 
1914; ibid., p. 160, San Giul. to Sal., 16 Aug. 1914
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importance of this demonstration of German fallibility in 
Italy’s attitude.1^0 By the first months of 1915 the Cons- 
ulta was alarmed by the persistent rumours of a possible 
separate Austro-Russian peace settlement, and even more by 
the likelihood of a British expeditionary force reaching 
Constantinople. Rodd’s belief that the consenquences of a 
successful attack on the Dardanelles 'is greatly preoccup­
ying opinion here’ finds support in the despatch to Imperiali 
in London of permission to open talks with Grey within 
hours of news arriving from the London embassy that the 
British Admiralty was confident of being at the Ottoman
131
capital in a few days. Sonnino noted in his diary the
importance of such an Anglo-French operation in the decision
to end months of prevarication, and had pressed Salandra
132into giving his consent to a firm commitment in London.
Italy could not risk being left out of any settlement over 
Asia Minor, and Sonnino was especially anxious to avoid 
any substantial gains in the region for Greece.
Here again the priorities of Italian foreign policy 
are clearly revealed; the timing of intervention may be 
influenced by military developments in Europe, but is 
rooted in the domestic requirements which had already made 
her foreign policy so restless and ambitious in previous 
years. Italy’s approach to the war had in fact been fore­
seen in a remarkable memorandum presented to Tsar Nicholas 
II in February 1914 by the Minister of the Interior, P. N. 
Durnovo. Discussing the likely course of a future war,
Durnovo argued that Italy would not join the German side if 
she had any conception of her real interests. The expansion 
which she hoped for on political and economic grounds 
could only be won at the expense of Austria and Turkey; 
it would therefore be natural for Italy to depart from 
an alliance which aimed to save the territorial integrity
3.30 ibid., pp. 500-1, San Giul. to Sal., 29 Sep. 1914; A. 
Salandra, op. cit. , p. 190
131 P.R.O., F.O. 170/850, telg. 1, Rodd to Grey, 1 Jan.
1915; A.S., telg. ris. spec, di gab. in partenza, vol. 
427, Sonnino to Imperiali, 3 March 1915; A.C.S., G.S., 
b. 9, f. 73
132 S. Sonnino, Diario, 1914-1936 , ed. B. F. Brown and P. 
Pastorelli (Bari 1972), pp. 96-7; Carteggio, p. 255, 1 
March 1915
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of these countries. It was not even inconceivable that Italy
might join the powers opposing Germany, in order to secure
for herself the most favourable position in the subsequent
133division of the spoils. Yet while accepting that Italy's 
decision in 1915 was -in the words of an observer sympat­
hetic to Italian intervention- for ’une guerre d'expansion
-1 «7 i
et de conquete', it is important to look also at the 
repercussions of neutrality on Italian social and economic 
life to understand fully the pressures which built up for 
intervention.
133 F. A. G-older, Documents of Russian history (London 1927) 
P- 9
134 J. Bainville, La guerre et l'ltalie (Paris 1916), p. 223
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The Crisis of neutrality
Brunello Vigezzi's contention^ that economic issues
played a distinctly minor part in Salandra's diplomatic
manoeuvring of 1914-15 has won widespread acceptance in
Italian historiography -Paolo Spriano, for example, finds
little evidence in his study of pre-World War I Turin of an
2
impulse to war amongst Piedmontese industrialists. The 
expansionist drive of many years standing which conditions 
Italy's territorial objectives in the months of negotiations 
leading to intervention is notably absent from Vigezzi's 
analysis. There is a similar lack of attention to the crisis 
of production and export which helped make neutrality an 
economic dead-end. Salandra's diplomacy needs to be seen 
in part as an attempt to revive a drooping industrial 
sector and break out of steady economic decline. Neutrality 
had been canvassed as a great opportunity for the Italian 
economy, which would be able to supply agricultural and 
industrial goods to both power blocs. Instead it had caused 
further disasters, and social unrest which threatened to 
bring a repetition of 'Red Week'. By the spring of 1915, 
intervention would be seized on increasingly as a new 
panacea, with diplomatic realignment foreshadowing a new 
alignment on the economic front.
In August 1914 San Giuliano referred to the 'diffuso 
e pericoloso malcontento' caused by the mounting economic 
problems of pre-war Italy, and warned that intervention in 
the impending war might impede the rapid economic
1 Argued most recently in 'L'imperialismo e il suo ruolo...'; 
The decision for intervention 'e essenzialmente di natura 
politica...(the product of) un processo squisitamente 
politico', p. 49
2 P. Spriano, Socialismo e classe operaia a Torino dal 1892 
al 1915 (Turin 1958), p. 94
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development needed ’per preservarsi da piu gravi cataclismi 
politici e sociali.'^ Yet by the autumn it was already clear 
that far from pro-spering while the rest of Europe destroyed 
itself, Italy had little economic future under neutrality; 
and little political future either, since the background 
of soaring prices and unemployment would soon bring alarming 
disturbances. San Giuliano's musings on the importance of 
domestic questions in the development of foreign policy 
have been taken as merely another form of diplomatic finesse 
- the dangers of revolution are exaggerated in order to 
justify inflated Italian demands on present and potential 
allies.^ Rather it seems that Italy’s foreign minister had 
a real understanding of the constraints and dependencies 
underlying her diplomatic relations. An examination of the 
reasons for and symptoms of Italy’s economic crisis may help 
explain why intervention with the Triple Entente is accepted 
as a prerequisite for the economic progress which San 
Giuliano (and many others) sensed was vital, and place inter­
vention as essentially a bid for economic and political 
salvation by an increasingly beleagured regime.
In this perspective, the problems of neutrality seem 
insoluble in part since they are imposed on the economic 
impasse of previous years, culminating in the crisis of 1913. 
The continuity is clear in economic writings of the period, 
notably in an article by Gino Borgatta which appeared in 
La Riforma Sociale in January 1915. Borgatta summarised 
Italy’s economic problems in recent years:
La depressione si rispecchia nella debolezza del 
mercato finanziario, nelle basse quotazioni e non 
intense contrattazioni tanto di titoli a saggio 
fisso quanto di titoli a saggio variabile: nel 
continuato rallentamento degli investimenti nuovi 
netti nelle societa per azioni: nell’ulteriore 
aumento della gia paurose cifre della nostra emig- 
razione...della disoccupazione sul mercato del 
lavoro, del rallentamento e sfiducia del risparmio 
privato.5
3 P.P.I. , Series 5, vol. 1, pp. 2-3, San Giul. to Avarna,
2 Aug. 1914
4 See R. Pryce, 'Italy and the Outbreak of the First World 
War’, Cambridge Historical Journal, XI, 2 (1954), pp.
219-27 at 222
5 'Imperialismo, Nazionalismo, Organismo Industriale in Italia 
alia vigilia della crisi’, La Riforma Sociale, XXVI (1915), 
pp. 81-99 at 89
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Turning to recent events, he had no doubt that
La guerra e scesa...ad alterare la vita politica 
ed economica del Paese, in un periodo in cui, per 
preesistenti condizioni, essa presentava gia caratt- 
eristici elementi di crisi, perdurare di problemi 
etnici, economici, politici, bisogno di raccoglim- 
ento e ricostruzione interiore...(factors) che 
indubbiamente hanno influito e influiranno sull* 
atteggiamento assunto dall1Italia in quest1ora 
tragica.6
Bachi suggested that !si pu6 ritenere essere stato sotto
qualche aspetto benefico e providenziale che la guerra sia
awenuta dopo che l'economia italiana, da oltre un quad-
riennio subiva quel graduale processo di rallentamento, di
7
infiacchimento.’ However his summary of the immediate
effects of war showed extreme gloom:
i complessivi lineamenti dell’annata economica 1914 
in Italia hanno deciso carattere di depressione. II 
commercio con l’estero segna una grossa diminuzione; 
la maggior parte delle industrie presentano un 
rallentamento...i profitti hanno subito una grossa 
falcidia...il volume delle transazioni bancarie per 
gli istituti ordinari & assai ridotto e l’anormalita 
del movimento creditizio, le molte sofferenze, il 
ribasso in molto valori hanno seriamente scossa la 
compagine prezzo delle merci...i mesi del 1914 
durante i quali si inizio (the war) sono nel 
movimento degli affari segnalati da bruschi turbamenti 
creditizi e monetari, dalla interruzione nei traffici, 
da arresto nell1attivita industriale, da improvviso 
peggioramento nel mercato finanziario.8
The same pessimism came in Bonaldo Stringher’s annual report
as head of the Banca d'ltalia. In March 1914 he confessed
that, ’Nella storia economica e finanziaria l1anno 1913 si
Q
contrassegna con le parole; generalmente sfavorevole' ; 
twelve months later he reported with equal understatement 
that ’la neutralita...non l1ha salvata -come non ha salvata 
la Svizzera e l’Olanda e i paesi scandinavi- dalle conseg- 
uenze economiche e finanziarie prodotte per la ripercussione 
di quel cozzo gigantesco.’10 Another economist reckoned that
6 ibid., p. 81
7 R. Bachi, L»Italia...1914, p. IX
8 ibid., pp. X-XI and VII
9 Banca dfItalia, Relazione del direttore generate (Rome
1914), p. 5
10 Banca d’Italia, Relazione del direttore generate (Rome
1915), p. 6
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Italian exports fell in value between 1 August and 31 
December by over 360,000,000 lire.^
The outbreak of war in Europe also brought Italian 
emigration to a sudden halt, in economic circumstances 
which would otherwise have led one to expect a steep 
increase. On 6 August the Italian government suspended 
emigration rights of all those eligible for military service; 
in addition emigrants from previous years often became 
unwanted aliens in their adopted homes and were returned 
unceremoniously to Italy. As a result the annual figures for 
emigration, which had only fallen below an annual total of 
half a million twice since 1900, dropped from nearly 900,000 
in 1913 to under 500,000 in 1914 and then to only 146,019 
in 1915. The state now had to cope with the problems raised 
hypothetically by the journal Pnita in 1912, in reply to 
Claudio Treves' attacks on emigration -how to defuse a 
situation in which hundreds of thousands of workers 'preten- 
dessero dallo Stato, con alti salari, quel lavoro che i 
privati non vogliono, e per lo piu non possono dare neppure 
a salari di fame.'1  ^The dangers involved were soon apprec­
iated by the government; Sonnino suggested to the prime 
minister in August that one or two more classes should be 
called up, as 'e tanto disoccupazione di meno e tantomeno 
pericolo di disordini^ Hans von Plotow, German ambassador 
in Rome, reported rumours to Bethmann-Hollweg in September 
of the possibility of a volunteer legion for Libya, formed 
expressly to lessen the extensive unemployment amongst 
repatriated emigrants.1^ " The remittances from emigrants and 
foreign tourists were also of continuing importance to 
Italy's balance of payments. Her pattern of trade, with 
such luxury goods as silks and wine numbered among leading 
exports while the peninsula depended on imports for much 
food, fuel and agricultural and industrial machinery, always
11 G. Prinzivalli, L*Italia nella sua vita economica di 
fronte alia guerFa (Milan 1915). P. VI
12 Cited in P. Manzotti, op. cit. , p. 196
13 S. Sonnino, Carteggio, p. 14. 9 Aug.
14 Cited in Monticone, op. cit., p. 44. Plotow claimed to 
have been told this by San Giuliano
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made Italy prone to large trade deficits. Traditionally
these were offset by invisible earnings from those choosing
to visit or forced to leave Italy -in Luigi Einaudi's
view, 'Certo, tutto l!edificio poggia sulla continuazione
15delle rimesse nella cifra consueta1 : yet in 1914 both were 
drastically reduced, and were bound to run at an extremely 
low figure throughout the war.
Another major problem for the Italian government 
was the almost total dependence on other states for all 
vital commodities. San Giuliano again appreciated the 
importance of this position; writing to Imperiali early in 
August 1914 on a possible alliance with the Entente powers,
he stressed Italy’s need for an assured supply of coal -the
government
per ragioni economiche che profondamente influiscono 
sulla situazione politica interna e sulla prepar- 
azione materiale e morale del popolo italiano ai 
sacrifici ed ai rischi d’una grande guerra non 
pub neanche prendere in esame tale possibilita se 
1*Inghilterra non consente subito alia esportazione 
del carbone verso 1’Italia.16
The crucial importance of this issue is spelt out in a
second message from the foreign minister to London on the
same day, warning that: 'Conflitto internazionale rende
difficile provvista carbone ed industria nazionale h
17minacciata arresto generale.' ' Ambassador Rodd also wrote
later of the pressure 'from a high quarter* for the rapid
transit of coal from Britain, without which Italian indu-
18stry would face wholesale closures. Ninety per cent of 
the eleven million tons of' coal imported by Italy in 1913 
had come from British pits. With Germany curtailing her 
exports to preserve stocks for her own use, there was 
little prospect of switching to such sources of supply 
-a switch which would in any case have been extremely 
expensive, since most machines in Italy had been designed
15 'Come 1'Italia paga il deficit della sua bilancia comm- 
erciale?', Corriere della Sera. 9 Jan. 1912, now in 
Cronache..., vol. Ill, pp. 377-81 at 381
16 D.D.I., p. 115, San Giul. to Imperiali, 11 Aug. 1914
17 ibid. , p. 115n
18 R. Rodd, Social and Diplomatic Memoirs, 1902-1919 
(London 1925) , vol. 3, p. 229
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for high quality Cardiff coal, and major alterations would
19have been needed to adapt them to Ruhr coal. Thus Britain 
was revealed to hold an alarming degree of control over 
Italy's future economic progress. Italian industry was in 
any case suffering from the extraordinary rise in coal 
prices during neutrality -a rise of no less than one hundred 
per cent between October 1914 and March 1915.^° The Rivista 
delle oocieta Commerciali commented in the latter month 
that
Fra le varie e dolorose conseguenze della guerra, 
che turbano profondamente la vita economica nazio- 
nale, gravissima appare la difficolta che si .^vverte 
negli apprdVigionamenti del carbone fossile. E 
difficolta che si traduce in aumento fortissimo 
del costo del combustibile e in dimunizione di 
disponibilita.21
Imports of coal fell by just over one million tons in 1914
(the figure which a government inquiry of August 1914 had
reckoned to be Italy's annual surplus to immediate demand),
and by a further 200,000 tons in both January and February
221915. The journal also reproduced this table, which would
have brought home to all industrialists their overwhelming
25dependence on Britain:
Italian imports of coal (in tons)
Total G.B. Germany France U.S.
1911 9,595,882 8,767,552 442,935 100,110 14,068
1912 10,057,228 8,637,219 889,501 170,565 68,032
1913 10,810,860 9,368,159 949,113 164,674 93,529
Even the import companies handling the coal trade in the
leading port of Genoa were controlled in good measure by
Anglo-French capital, which had supplanted German-owned
24firms in the decade before 1915. Francesco Nitti's earlier
19 See F. Von Macchio, Wahrheitl F first Buiow und ich in Rom, 
1914-15 (Vienna 1931), pp. 44-45 ’
20 0. Sacerdote, ha guerra e la crisi del carbone (Rome 
1917), p. 30
21 'La crisi del carbone fossile', V (1915), pp. 225-35 at 
225
22 ibid., pp. 230-31
23 ibid., p. 225
24 G. horia, Investimenti e sviluppo economico a Genova alia 
vigilia della prima guerra mondiale, vol. 2 1883-1914 
(Milan 1973), pp. 529-30. In August 1914 Einaudi reported 
an attempt by industrialists in Genoa 'coadiuvati dal
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25warnings on the need to develop hydro-electric power and
so end dependence on foreign coal were amply justified in
these months; for, as Einaudi accepted, any interruption
of supplies would he disastrous 'non solo dal punto di
vista economico, ma soprattutto dal punto di vista politico- 
2 6sociale.' The Cabinet meeting of 8 August also agreed on
the urgent need to insure coal supplies, or the already high
27unemployment would become still worse.
The soaring cost of coal had been caused largely by
an equally rapid rise in shipping insurance, which quadru-
28pled in the first few months of war. Britain controlled
almost all the shipping routes so vital for Italian trade,
and could drive all her merchant vessels from the sea. In
pre-war years, Britain had in any case handled more passenger
and freight traffic to and from Italy than had ships of
2q
Italian registration. The Italian government opted for 
neutrality in August 1914 in the knowledge that the country 
imported about one-half by value of its raw materials; in 
addition to coal, two-thirds of her iron also came from 
abroad, as well as large quantities of cotton, wool and 
linen, almost the entire contents of her chemical fertilisers 
and even great amounts of cereals. An average of just under 
ninety per cent of goods imported and nearly seventy per 
cent of goods exported between 1911 and 1915 had arrived 
by sea, a very large proportion travelling through either 
the Straits of Gibraltar or the Suez Canal. Those firms 
which risked their products on the oceans faced the govern­
mental threat from Berlin to sink all merchant-shipping 
found within war-zones (a contributory factor in the proh­
ibitive cost of insurance, as Sonnino noted^0), in addition
governo' to regain control of coal transport. Cronache..., 
vol. IV, pp. 14-20 at 16, 'L'approvvigionamento del 
carbone ed il rischio di guerra’
25 F. Nitti, II partito radicale e la nuova democrazia 
industriale (Turin 1907). pp. 147-48
26 I. Einaudi, op. cit. , p.14
27 E. Martini, Diario..., p. 21. Cabinet of 8 Aug.
28 See 'La crisi...', p. 235; and L. Einaudi, op. cit. , p. 159
29 C. E. McGuire, Italy's International Economic Position 
(London 1927), p. 271
30 S. Sonnino, Diario..., pp. 86-7. Entry of 13 Feb.
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to constant delays and harassment by the British navy.
British naval forces could also menace at will 
most of Italy's 4,000 miles of coastline; this threat to 
her indefensible coasts and coastal cities was later cited
31by Salandra as an important pressure for initial neutrality.
The vulnerability of her colonies in the Red Sea and the
Mediterranean to blockade and bombardment also conditions
Italy's response to the war, a fact fully appreciated by
Britain -in December 1913 her naval attach^ in Rome had
suggested Italy's occupation of Libya 'much increased her
dependence upon the sea, and, consenquently, her vulnerab-
32ility to attack from that element.' Rodd also reported 
early in August 1914 on Italy's need for freedom of the sea 
between Sicily and Libya in order to provision her many
troops in the colony, a dependence which he felt explained
33in part her neutrality. Confirmation of this comes in 
Minister of Marine De Revel's alarmed note to the prime 
minister on his fears of a war against Britain; in Sonnino's 
diary entry of the same day, 1 August, on the likely bomb­
ardment of Genoa and Naples and the isolation of Libya 
and Eritrea in any war fought against the combined naval 
strength of Britain and Prance; and in Ferdinando Martini's 
view that
Nk...con la quasi certezza che 1'Inghilterra sare- 
bbe scesa in campo ella stessa, noi potevamo gettarci 
in un conflitto contro la flotta sua, esponendo 
alia distruzione tutte quante le indifese nostra 
citta marittime. E non dico delle colonie che 
potevamo reputare sin dal primo giorno perdute, 
rischiando di condannare alia capitolazione i 55,000 
soldati che abbiamo in Libia.34
Such fears, together with Italy's vital need for maritime
trade, gave Britain an almost limitless scope for economic
35and political leverage.
31 A. Salandra, op. cit. , pp. 92-93
32 Cited in Bosworth, op. cit. , p. 290
33 BjJ). , XI, p. 344, Rodd to Grey, 2 Aug. 1914
34 A.C.S., C.S., b.2 f.16, Di Revel to Salandra, 1 Aug. 1914;
S. Sonnino, op. cit. , p. 9; F. Martini, Lettere (i860- 
1928) (Verona 1934) , p. 489, 7 Aug. 1914. On the same 
theme, see G. Bevione, 'Neutrality armata', Idea Nazio- 
nale, 6 Aug. 1914
35 And explain the remark of one Italian diplomat to P. Cam- 
bon in the previous century that Italy would remain in the 
Triple Alliance until told by Britain to leave it, D.D»F. , 
Series 3, vol. 1, Cambon to Poincare, 25 Jan. 1912
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In addition to all these fetters on Italian diplo­
macy, she also looked to another entente power, Russia, for 
much of her food imports. Despite the incentive of tariff 
barriers, domestic producers had never been able to grant 
Italy self-sufficiency in cereals. In 1913, for example, 
she had imported one quintal of wheat for every three prod­
uced at home, while one-fifth of the oats and one-seventh 
of the maize consumed came from abroad. Two-thirds of Italy’s 
wheat imports came through the Dardanelles, a fact which 
the Economist suggested in February 1915 might tempt the 
Italian government to join any military operations in therz c
area. In September 1914 Italy could import only 242,760
quintals of wheat, a drop of over half a million quintals
on the figure twelve months earlier. These problems were
made all the graver by a poor harvest in 1914 -estimated at
forty-six million quintals, as against fifty-eight millions
in 1913. Salandra referred in the chamber in December 1914
to the 'condizione disagiata di alcune provincie del Regno,
37nelle quali il raccolto era mancato a causa della siccita', 
and warned of likely shortages along the Adriatic war-zone 
-an area especially dependent on shipment by sea. Such 
shortages soon occurred,together with a serious shortfall 
in Sicily and Sardinia. Even when cereal exporting countries 
had not -as with Russia and Romania- been entirely cut off 
by the war, insurance costs again rocketed to prohibitive 
levels: the monthly average for the shipment of wheat and 
maize from Buenos Aires to Genoa rose from 0-80 lire per 
quintale in January 1913 to 15-33 lire per quintale two years
70
later. One further problem was that Italy's poor harvest
39came as part of disappointing figures across the world.
Even where cereals could be obtained in some quantity -in 
the United States, for example^ they became increasingly 
expensive.
36 'Conditions in Italy', LXXX, Feb. 27 1915, p. 430
37 A. Salandra, Disc. pari...., vol. 2, pp. 999 and 1000-01
38 L. Einaudi, La condotta economica e gli effetti sociali 
della guerra italiana (Bari 1955), p. 95
39 See L. Einaudi, Cronache..., IV, p. 45
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The inevitable result of all this was a rapid rise 
in the price of essential foodstuffs. Einaudi warned in 
Corriere della Sera that 'la questione frumentaria continua 
ad appassionare il pubblico italiano't°and urged the govern­
ment to abandon all tariff duties on grain. Following distur­
bances in several districts (including several days of rioting 
in Catania) he wrote to Luigi Albertini on the grave risk 
the government was taking in delaying this reform. By February 
1915 Einaudi, a bitter opponent of atate interference in the 
free market, believed it 'converrebbe per ragioni di ordine 
pubblico (si) il governo potrebbe dare un sussidio ai cons- 
umatori piu miserabili, i quali non possono pagare i prezzi 
attuali del frumento.'^1 Napoleoni Colajanni made the same 
point in II Messaggero -either the tariff would have to be
reduced or Italy 'ebbe i gravissimi tumulti della primavera
42di sangue del 1898!' The south seems to have been hit 
worst by both shortages and rising prices. The president 
of Lecce chamber of commerce complained in December 1914 
that
La provincia di Lecce manca assolutamente di cereali, 
di legumi e di altri generi di prima necessita... 
da oggi non ci si puo approvvigionare che in America 
e che 1'importazione dall'America richiede mezzi 
finanziari di cui gli importatori locali sono sprov- 
visti; che per fronteggiare le difficili condizioni 
alimentari ed evitare pericolose perturbazioni 
sociali occorre innanzi tutto provvedere all'immed- 
iata importazione di grano.43
It is again important to stress that the social and 
economic tensions of neutrality marked a deterioration in 
what was already an alarming situation. The government's 
weakness had been highlighted by the uprising of June 1914, 
but this was only the most dramatic expression of popular 
disaffection. Strikes in the opening three months of 1914 
were most widespread in the Campania, and included workers 
in the textiles, gas and metallurgical industries. In 
April the prefect of Naples asked for a delay in the depar­
ture of several army units 'in considerazione attuali
40 ibid. , p. 45
41 ibid., p. 60
42 24 Dec. 1914
43 Cited in F. G-rassi, II tramonto dell* eta giolittiana nel 
Salerno (Rome 1973), p. 28b
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condizioni questa citta, a seguito sciopero generale
tramviario e operai tabacco, nonchk agitazioni di altre
classe impiegati e lavoratori, ed anche in vista prossima
ricorrenza 1° maggio.'^ The outbreak of war brought fresh
problems. Activity in the port of Naples fell away sharply
-in the last quarter of 1914, it stood at only sixty per
cent of the previous year’s level, and picked up only with
the large scale shipments of grain ordered by the Italian
army. The collapse of emigration and tourism ruined many
hoteliers; in January 1915 the Naples chamber of commerce 'in
considerazione del disastro che ha colpito i grandi alberghi,
chiede per i proprietari l'esenzione della tassa di ricc-
45hezza mobile e la concessione di larghi crediti.' Prod­
uction in metallurgical and engineering companies plummeted 
through 1914 and 1915, forcing many firms -especially 
smaller concerns- to reduce hours and dismiss labour. In 
the twelve months to October 1914 unemployment increased 
sixfold in the three circondari of Naples, Casoria and 
Castellammare di Stabia.^
Social and economic problems also mounted on Italy's 
Adriatic coast. In the province of Lecce one local deputy 
told Salandra of the need to develop local railway lines 
'per dare lavoro alia numerosa classe operaia che comincia 
a sentire i disastrosi effetti della disoccupazione estesa 
su vastissima scala.'^ All the main areas of employment 
were in deepening crisis (in particular the fishing industry), 
prompting the radical deputy Viti De Marco to warn that 
' Se la guerra dovesse durare tre anni, e 1'Italia dovesse
essere neutrale ed armata, in fondo non vedo che la
48liquidazione economica delle Puglie.' Such economic 
difficulties soon led to demonstrations and a rising agitat­
ion amongst the peasantry. The opinion of one government 
official in Gallipoli in February 1915 that 'le condizione
44 Cited in M. Fatica, Origini del fascismo e del comunismo 
a Hapoli (1911-15) (Florence 1971), p. 134
45 ibid., p. 250. On the general crisis in this sector, see 
'La crisi dell’industria dei forestieri e degli alberghi’, 
N.A., f. 1028, Nov. 1914, pp. 255-bO
46 Fatica, op. cit. , p. 255* Many thousands more were on 
short-time.
47 Chimientri to Sal., 3 Dec. 1914, Grassi, op. cit. , p. 356
48 A. Viti De Marco, La guerra europea (Florence 1918), p. 23
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dell'ordine pubblico in questo capoluogo non sono ancora
normali; perdura, infatti, un*allarmante disoccupazione e
49vi e un vivo malcontento* was proved correct witn serious 
disturbances in the following month. Venice suffered enorm­
ously from various government prohibitions on exports, the 
virtual halt in tourism and the transformation of the 
Adriatic into a zone of war. This last development had 
afflicted the whole Adriatic coast, with extensive Austrian 
mining posing a threat to all Italian shipping. As Mario 
Alberti lamented in Giornale degli economisti,
L1Italia neutrale vide la sua costa adriatica, da 
Venezia a Brindisi, ridotta in uno stato terribile 
di atonia, perche la navigazione dovette essere 
sospesa completamente nel "mare nostrum" (come 
suona ironico questo epiteto, nelle condizioni 
attuali della dipendenza italiana dal possesso 
austriaco della costa orientale.50
Barone's research on Sicily in the months of
neutrality reveals the catastrophic state of both agriculture
and industry in the region. The problems over shipping
were especially damaging for the trade in citrus fruits,
which represented half the value of the island's exports.
In the second half of 1914 exports of these products from
Catania reach only 95>550 quintals, as against 455>520
quintals in the second half of 1913. Cut off from Russian
and American markets -which accounted for one-third of
exports on the eve of war- producers had to turn to European
markets, only to meet fresh difficulties in the shortage
of space on Italy's severely strained railway network. Here,
the lack of coal also led from February 1915 to a sharp
curtailment of freight traffic. Early in December 1914 a
group of Sicilian and Calabrian deputies met with Salandra
to press for reductions in the cost of freight charges,
which had risen six-fold since the opening of the war.
There were problems too in the production of wine, dried
fruit and grain. The crisis in grain -due once again to
the closure of traditional markets and the impossibility
of developing links with fresh markets such as the United
49 Grassi, op. cit., p. 290
50 M. Alberti, 'La questione adriatica'> L (1915)> pp. 430- 
32 at 432
136
States in current conditions- is seen by Barone as partic­
ularly threatening to the area’s social stability, ending 
the profitability of small and medium-sized estates, and 
forcing mass dismissals and a fresh upsurge in the activ­
ities of the peasant leagues. Prom September 1914 agitation 
spreads rapidly throughout the island, often taking the 
form of violent attacks on proprietors, but centred on an 
attempt to gain improvements in the patti agrari and reduc­
tions in the cost of food. Industry also faced immense 
difficulties, in particular the sector linked to agricul­
tural production. European demand for calcium citrates 
forced up the price in the first months of war; a comitato 
dei fabbricanti di citrato was formed to defend Sicilian 
producers, but by February 1913 the Qitrata Sicilia teet­
ered on the brink of collapse. Production in the sulphur 
industry tumbled in the summer of 1914 , and also fell 
rapidly in the construction industry due to a lack of impo­
rted raw materials. Industry suffered in general under the 
rigid credit restrictions, and the handicaps to sea-borne 
trade -the passage of goods to and from Catania fell by 
forty-five per cent between 1913 and 1915. The constric­
tions on emigration also had a special relevance for Sicily. 
Emigration from the region fell from 116,061 in 1913 to 
46,610 in 1914 and then a mere 16,169 in 1915; while a 
large proportion of the half a million repatriated emig­
rants returned to Sicily. In the opening months of 1915 
both town and countryside were in turmoil over the cost of 
living (many of the increases being blamed on grain spec­
ulators) and unemployment.^1
Northern Italy fared little better under neutrality. 
Minister of Colonies Martini noted with alarm the level of 
unemployment in several provinces, especially Udine, and 
the likely social repercussions of this -1 dell'interno
principalmente io comincio a preoccuparmi e ne ho ben 
52donde.1 In March 1915 one senator praised the government 
for its programme of railway building around Priuli, which
51 On all this, see G. Barone, 'Guerra e sottosviluppo’, in 
G. Barone et al, op. cit. , pp. 74-83
52 P. Martini, uiario, p. 70. Entry of 2 Sep. 1914. By Feb­
ruary 1915 there were 50,000 unemployed in the province 
of Udine, Rassegna dei lavori pubblici, 18 Feb. 1915» P* 
102
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provides work for returning emigrants and for those who
have lost their jobs in recent months. Salandra knows that
facendo questo fa molto bene a quella popolazione, 
e che il danaro che si spende e bene speso, perche 
la miseria e cattiva consigliera, mentre il lavoro 
contribuisce a mantenere la tranquilita e l'ordine, 
che, se sono sempre necessari, lo sono molti di 
piu in questi momenti.53
In Brescia, the Zust automobile firm dismissed two-thirds 
of its employees just six weeks after the outbreak of war; 
while the largest steel company in the region was threat­
ening to lay off its entire work-force. Jobs were also lost 
in the silk branch of textiles, with reductions of pay 
forced through in the cotton and wool sectors. In Bologna, 
the prefect reported in late September 1914 of soaring 
prices and unemployment -17,000 agricultural labourers were 
without work, along with 3,300 building workers and 2,500 
industrial workers. In Piedmont, the Fiat company had in 
August 1914 put their workers on short-time; or rather on 
shorter time, since a five hour day had already been intro­
duced the previous month. Agnelli had begun to feel the 
effect of foreign competition (especially from the United 
States) in the months before war. Exports dropped from 10,
522,000 lire in the first six months of 1913 to 7,785,000
54lire for the same period in 1914. Fiat then faced addit­
ional problems in obtaining vital raw materials, and in 
continuing an export trade which now accounted for seventy- 
five per cent of its sales: war led directly to the closure 
of the Latin American market, increased tariffs in some 
European countries and initially a blanket ban on exports
by the Italian government, though Agnelli's pressure suce-
55eeded in gaining some exemptions to this in September.
For Fiat the military contracts which multiplied from the 
autumn of 1914 helped put the firm on a better footing; but 
Gastronovo suggests that the automobile industry, along 
with other important sectors such as textiles and iron and
53 A.P., Senato del Regno, tornata del 29 marzo 1915, p. 
1721. Senator Tami
54 V. Gastronovo, op. cit. , p. 80
55 ibid.
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steel producers, saw little future for Piedmont in conti-
56nued neutrality. Once companies had sold surplus stock
retained from previous years' over-production, the realities
of Italy's dependent position in the international economy
struck home. A study at the end of August 1914 hy the Uff-
icio municipale del lavoro in Milan of over 90,000 workers
revealed over 12,000 unemployed, and more than 47,000 others
on short-time. A similar study in Turin one month later of
almost 44,000 workers found over 4,000 unemployed and over
5727,000 on short-time. Finally, one can cite the problems 
in the port of Genoa, which again are accentuated rather 
than caused by neutrality. Doria has described its contin­
ual decline to 1914, when 'ridotte al minimo la competitiva
e al massimo 1'inefficienza, il porto di Genova era dunque
58giunto al limite della degradazione.’ The upheaval in 
trading patterns after August 1914 reduced Genoa to comp­
lete chaos and dislocation: half of the import-export
companies formed in the port between 1905 and 1914 had gone
59into liquidation after five months of Italy's neutrality.
By the autumn of 1914, then, Italy seemed to be 
headed straight toward social and economic collapse. This 
panorama of the country under neutrality has shown the 
consenquences of the intractable problems faced by Italian 
producers in all areas of the economy and country; diffic­
ulties which were summarised in the Banca Oommerciale's 
report of March 1916:
La rottura dei rapporti coi paesi nemici, e le 
difficolta e sospensione di comunicazioni con 
altri paesi belligeranti causarono profonde var- 
iazioni nelle correnti commerciali fra 1'Italia 
e l'estero, e radicali mutamenti e sensibili 
fluttuazioni nelle importazioni e nelle esportaz- 
ioni.
In seguito alia intensificata domanda, spec- 
ialmente per usi militari, nonche all'offerta 
ridotta da limitazioni del commercio internazio- 
nale ed all'accrescimento di alcuni elementi di 
costo, i prezzi delle merci subirono notevoli
56 ibid., p. 84
57 R. Bachi, L'ltalia...1914, p. 189
58 G. Doria, op. cit., p. 455. See also L. Einaudi, Cron- 
ache, vol. IV, pp. 138-76 on the near collapse of the 
port.
59 ibid., p. 455n8
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rialzi. Sui prezzi dei prodotti agricoli nazio- 
nali influirono anche, malgrado i divieti di 
esportazione, i raccolti piuttosto scarsi. Sulle 
merci di provenienza estera, gravarono sensibil- 
mente le difficolta di trasporti, l'elevato costo 
dei noli, nonche gli spostamenti sensibili nei 
rapporti monetari e di credito fra 1’Italia ed 
alcuni paesi stranieri.60
Moving from the symptoms of this economic breakdown
to its causes and possible resolution, one can discern
several motives for industrial pressure for intervention
with the entente. All the major industries were suffering
from a ruinous combination of raw material shortages and
the closure of traditional markets. As the months passed,
it became ever more clear that Italy could not halt her
drift towards disaster without the assistance of the entente
powers. Britain's control of the sea was the dominant
influence on Italian economic life, shaping her trade
patterns at will during 1914-15. Imports from and exports
to Germany had fallen by twenty-four and eighteen per cent
respectively between January-July and August-December 1914,
while trade with Britain over the whole of 1914 had for the
first time in many years approached the figures for Italo-
German trade.01 In 1915 Britain became Italy's leading
62source of raw materials. The implications of this were 
soon appreciated in industrial circles, already aware that 
the Italian government's announcement of her neutrality 
in August 1914 had been followed rapidly by the release of
100,000 tons of coal from Britain, and the assurance of 
safe navigation for a further 200,000 tons from the United 
States. The importance of coal supplies for the metallurg­
ical industry, for example, is revealed in an article in 
La Metallurgia italiana in 1916, reflecting on the diffic­
ulties of neutrality:
L'andamento di queste officine, che in generate 
era stato abbastanza soddisfacente durante i primi 
sette mesi dell'anno 1914, venne foscia fortemente
60 Banca Gommerciale Italiana, Relazione letta all'assem- 
blea generate ordinaria del 15 marzo 1916 (Rome 1916)
61 R. Bachi, L'Italia...1914. P P .  46-47; Annuario Statis- 
tico Italiano, 1915, p. 178
62 R. Bachi, L 'Italia...1915, P* 51
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ostacolato dallo scoppio dell'immane guerra che 
tuttora perdura.
A far tempo dal mese di agosto per le manc- 
anza di adeguate scorte, tutte indistintamento si 
risentirino della deficienza e del maggior costo 
dei combustibili i cui prezzi...ebbero un subit- 
aneo e fortissimo rialzo nel detto mese di agosto, 
decrebbero alquanto nei due successivi, per ripre- 
ndere, in novembre, la marcia ascensionale contin- 
uata di poi in modo impressionante.63
A meeting of the Associazione fra gli industriali metall- 
urgici italianifs directors in December 1914 heard from 
their president, Giorgio Falck, that the British govern­
ment (on the advice of ambassador Rodd) 'tende a facilitare 
1'approvvigionamento del rottame dall1Inghilterra e dai 
Paesi soggetti all’influenza britannica': it is also 
prepared to allow the export to Italy of ferro-manganese, 
given a pledge that this is only intended for domestic 
use. In Falck's opinion, ’Queste concessioni evitando alia 
industria italiana un arresto della sua attivita, non 
possono fare a meno di crescere le simpatie di cui la Gran 
Bretagna gode in Italia.'^
Clues to the attitude of industrialists also appear 
in other trade journals. In December 1914 the Rassegna dei 
lavori pubblici included a strong plea by an anonymous 
industrialist for Italy to commit herself to the Triple 
Entente. Britain's coal and her control of Suez and Gibra­
ltar make illusory any idea of Italian independence in 
opposition to British interests; in any case Italy has no 
reason to remain loyal to the Central Powers, who have 
thwarted her economic expansion in the Balkans in recent 
years. In the Adriatic there is 'un mercato che si apre 
pieno di promesse'; while
v'& tutta una rinnovazione industriale, edilizia, 
civile, nelle Russia...e chi potrebbe profittarne 
meglio dell'industria italiana? V'e tutta una 
sistemazione nel massivo balcanico, tutta una 
rinnovazione nell'Asia minore e nell'Asia prop- 
riamente detta che sotto la pressione capitalis- 
tica trasforma ormai la sua economia dalla past- 
orizia nomade a forme piu avanzate di produzione.
Da quale parte e verso quale gruppo gravitano
63 La Metallurgia italiana, VIII (1916), p. 119
64 La iaetallurgia italiana, VI (1914), pp* 69-70
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dunque gl'interessi industriali dfItalia, tenuto 
conto dei due momenti di cui vive un1industria: 
della materia prima e del mercato?65
Three months later an editorial in the same journal took
N
a similar line, arguing that, ’E tutto l'avvenire economico 
del paese che...spingerci a mutare completamente di orient- 
amento politico’; the importance of British coal was again 
stressed, along with the need for assured supplies of iron- 
ore (especially when the mines of Elba became exhausted in 
the near future) and timber from Russia. In contrast Italy 
has the potential to produce all the goods imported from 
the Central Powers, and in any event Germany is certain to 
become even more protectionist after the war.^
Here is one reason for Italy's diplomatic switch 
in May 1915 -the pressing need to reattach herself to the 
international trading system, so regaining desperately 
needed raw materials and markets. Luigi Einaudi's warning 
that ’nk credo ragionevoli ed opportune le speranze di 
chi crede che 1'Italia possa sul serio giovarsi della sua 
situazione di potenza neutrale per ottenere dal commercio 
internazionale beni in quantity maggiore di prim!' had 
proved correct. The urgency of the matter was understood 
by San G-iuliano. On 1 October he asked the Italian ambass­
ador in the United States to try to arrange a loan of sixty 
to 100 million dollars, since with the changed pattern of 
commerce and the loss of Italy's usual invisible earnings, 
'venne a mancare in Italia un forte contingente di cambi
necessario a fronteggiare le esigenze dei nostri impegni
68mercantili con l'estero.’ In short, Italy ran the risk 
of defaulting on foreign debts, a problem brought to crisis 
by neutrality, but which had been in the background of 
Italian politics for some years. Italy's commercial and 
banking debt outstanding and unliquidated at any given 
moment has been put (on a conservative estimate) at 500
65 'Un industrialiste' , 'L'industria italiana e la guerra 
europea', 8 Dec. 1914, pp. 627-28
66 'la politica del carbone', 9 March 1915, PP» 141-43
67 L. Einaudi, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 24
68 D.D.I., Series 5, vol. 1, p. 512, San Giul. to Macchi,
1 Oct. 1914
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million lire on the eve of European war; a figure rising 
steadily, since the excess of domestic requirements over 
international earnings forced up this 'floating indebted-
hQ
ness.' 7 Efforts between 1912 and 1914 to gain western 
capital for expansion in the Balkans had failed: the strain 
on Italian finances caused by the demands of the Gonsulta 
had led Minister of Finance Tedesco to send G-iolitti a desp­
airing note in January 1914 -'Al ministero degli esteri si 
crede che la grande politica si faccia coi grandi mezzi, e
non si pensa che finanziariamente 1'Italia non 6 ne la Francia,
70n6 1'Inghilterra, ne la Germania.' So the crisis in ind­
ustry is only part of an equally deep crisis in the state's 
finances, which conditions the Italian government's attitude 
to intervention. As San G-iuliano warned Salandra in August 
1914, 'Impossibile prestito con Francia e Inghilterra 
finche siamo neutrali', while in the following month Rodd
assured Italy's foreign minister that Britain will help
71with a loan once Italy joined the war.
The need for military contracts in such a difficult 
economic climate also pushes much of the industrial bourg­
eoisie toward support for intervention. In Liguria, only 
firms locked into the fulfilment of state contracts are in 
reasonable profit on the eve of war. Engineering firms 
survive the crisis of 1907 and expand rapidly in the years 
of general depression. The flourishing condition of Ansaldo 
and Vickers Terni, and even the improving condition of Ilva 
after 1912, is a direct result of their access to a steady 
flow of military orders, and is in striking contrast to the
decline in other important industries such as textiles and 
72chemicals. Three of the four leading shipyards in Liguria 
-Societa anonima italiana Gantieri Officine Savoia, Fiat-San 
Giorgio and Societa Esercizio Bacini- also expand rapidly 
(to an annual average of fourteen per cent in plant invest­
ment); the first two of these companies depended almost
69 G. McGuire, op. cit. , p. 287
70 G. Giolitti, Quarant'anni, vol. Ill, no. 116, 14 Jan. 1914
71 D.D.I. , p. 214, San Giul. to Sal., 22 Aug. 1914; ibid.; p. 
443, San Giul. to Imperiali, 19 Sep.1914; see also ibid., 
p, 451, Imperiali to San Giul., 21 Sep. 1914
72 Doria, op. cit. , pp. 538-42
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entirely on state contracts, while the one Ligurian firm
in this sector struggling before 1914, the Cantieri Navali
73Riuniti, had no share in such profitable work. Doria
cites the comments of one local paper in March 1913:
Sul litorale che, da levante a ponente, si incurva 
ad arco su Genova, sono sorti cantieri navali che 
vanno sempre piu restringendo la sfera del proprio 
lavoro alia costruzione di incrociatori, di grandi 
corazzate e di torpediniere• Lavoro proficuo, 
senza dubbio, ma piu per gli industriali che l'eser- 
citano che per la industria tipica regionale storic- 
amente ed economicamente considerata.
...I cantieri locali perb non hanno messo 
alcun impegno per attirarsi e conservare le ordin- 
azioni di navi mercantili, tutti solleciti come 
sono sempre stati fin qui nel disputarsi la costr­
uzione delle grandi corazzate che lasciano ampio 
margine di grossi e piu facili guadagni per gli 
industriali.74
Other firms naturally tried to move into this privileged
branch of the economy. The Societa Alfa decided in 1912 to
add projectiles to its output (centred until then on
railway rolling stock, itself a relatively sheltered
world), and in 1914 reported that government orders 'fanno
75intravvedere un miglior avvenire.' The moral that war 
meant work and expansion may also not have been lost on 
public opinion; while the prefect's reports, ordered by 
Salandra on the eve of intervention in an attempt to gauge 
popular attitudes to any Italian involvement in the struggle, 
evidently should be used with some care, it is interesting 
that the prefect of Genoa felt able to claim with such 
certainty, 'Qui non si avuto contrasto di tendenze: la popol- 
azione si e manifestata per l1intervento, ed i neutralisti, 
rarissimi, non hanno importanza e seguito.'
Piedmont under neutrality presents a similar picture, 
with the growing problems of production bringing the tradit­
ional response of a turn to the state for support. In 
November 1914 Martini records in nis diary a conversation in
73 ibid., pp. 540-41
74 Corriere Mercantile, 7 March 1913, ibid., p. 53b
75 ibid. , p. 537
7b B. Vigezzi, La Giolitti... , p. 34b. Vigezzi, in repro­
ducing all the reports, points out the very unclear idea 
of industrial and commercial opinion presented in them, 
p. 332 n.18
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which Senator Ricci, ’che vive tra il ceto industriale e
oancario del Piemonte e della Liguria, mi dice che ormai
non soltanto si sente la inevitability della guerra in quel
ceto, ma si h persuasi che guai maggiori sovrasterebbero se
77la guerra non avvenisse.’ The mood amongst Piedmontese 
industrialists is further revealed in the formation of a 
Comitato per la preparazione in January 1915; this body incl­
uded leading figures from banking and industry (including 
Agnelli), and the adhesion of the Lega Industriale in February 
symbolised a clear commitment to intervention. The reasons
for this choice were outlined by the Gazzetta del Popolo:
%
E infatti evidente che quando il contegno neutrale 
dell1Italia accennasse a divenire definitivo - 
anche se di questo fatto non esistesse altra prova, 
altra condizione che il trascorrere del tempo- 
certe nostre industrie piu o meno prontamente perde- 
rebbero i loro committenti occasionali, e perder- 
ebbero ogni possibility di rifornimento per le 
materie prime e il combustibile. Un calcolo fondato 
sulla neutrality definitiva sarebbe dunque per i 
nostri industriali e uomini d’affari sostanzialmente 
errato...Nessuno di essi e cosl sproweduto di 
senso pratico e di acume da cadere in un simile 
errore•78
While it is true that important individuals such as 
Agnelli did not give unqualified support to Salandra’s 
government -Agnelli himself indeed retained much of his 
sympathy and admiration for Giolitti- yet the massive depend­
ency on war orders made any support for continued neutrality 
quite irrational for much of industry. None more so than Fiat, 
whose own advertisements early in neutrality made this 
dependence quite clear:
Fiat: 1'automobile di guerra...Napoleone si comp- 
iaceva di chiarire che le sue vittorie erano in gran 
parte dovute alle gambe de’ suoi soldati...dall1 
immane conflagrazione uscira vincitore chi avra 
potuto mettere in campo 1’ultimo camion!...Gia 
durante la nostra gloriosa campagna di Libia si udi 
nel deserto il ritmo del motore Fiat e tra le strade 
accidentate, i burroni e le colline pietrose si 
assistette al passaggio veloce e sicuro dei numer- 
osissimi carri automobili forniti all'esercito ital- 
iano dalla grande Fabbrica Torinese...Anche degno di 
nota speciale & il nuovo tipo di autoambulanza di
77 F. Martini, op. cit. , pp. 24b-7» Entry of 29 Nov. 1914
78 ’II Piemonte calunniato', 18 April 1915
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79lusso a quattro barelle.
From October 1914 the firm prepares for vastly expanded
production, introducing new work routines to speed up
output. In January 1915 Fiat reached agreement with Fiom
to dissolve the current wage agreement in order to extend
working hours, while a substantial loan is also arranged
with the Banca Commerciale and the Credito Italiano to
80finance further investments in plant. The result of
these preparations can be followed in Bachi!s report on the
progress of the motor industry in 1914:
Mentre nei primi mesi dell’anno continuava per 
questa industria l'andamento sfavorevole descritto 
nel precedente annuario, e mentre nei primissimi 
tempi dopo lo scoppio della guerra l'attivita indu­
striale subi una ulteriore contrazione, negli ultimi 
mesi dell’anno questa industria fu beneficata da un 
febbrile e proficuo lavoro...la Fiat...segna per 1* 
anno 1914 una produzione di 4800 macchine con un 
progresso di 1500 sull’anno precedente.81
By the end of 1915 Fiat will have supplied the army with 
over 2,000 lorries, plus considerable numbers of planes, 
tractors and other vehicles, as well as a quantity of mac­
hine-guns and explosives. Agnelli’s close links with the 
Ministry of Vvar dated from the Libyan war of 1911-12, when 
Fiat’s motorised transport had functioned extremely well.
The ministry's decision of September 1914 to spread such
motorised transport throughout the army had proved a boon 
82to the company.
Military orders also solved the problems of woolen
Q *Z
manufacturers, suffering from the closure of markets (espe- 
cially the Ottoman Empire) and shortages of raw materials - 
cotton from the United States and dyestuffs from Germany. 
Large orders of cloth had also come from Britain in the 
autumn of 1914. Again, only metallurgical firms and ship­
yards in Naples in receipt of military custom -Societa
79 Cited in A. A. Mola, Giovanni Giolitti; Grandezza e deca­
denza dello Stato liberate (Cuneo 1978), p. 218
80 See V. Castronovo, Economia e Societa in Piemonte dall' 
unita al 1914 (Milan 1969), pp. 346-51
81 R. Bachi, op. cit., p. 163 P
82 Y. Castronovo, Giovanni Agnelli (Turin 1977 )5 PP« 75-74 
85 R. Bachi, op. cit., pp. 156-58
84 The Economist, LXXIX, 28 Nov. 1914, p. 957
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metallurgies Giacomo Corradini, Cantieri Pattison, Armstrong 
and Perriere del Vesuvio among others- began to show signs 
of recovery in the spring of 1915. This lifeline was init­
ially beyond smaller firms, which were still dismissing 
labour -in textiles, for example- on the eve of intervention. 
The region saved itself by extending trading links with 
Britain and the United States, which provided a vital market 
for Italian goods. By January 1915 half of the commercial 
activity in the port of Naples was accounted for by British 
shipping: in contrast, German ships (formerly the third most 
important) had almost totally vanished, thus giving a prac-
p cr
tical demonstration of Britain1s naval superiority. Neut­
rality had thus shown Italian industry its twofold dependency. 
In sectors such as iron and steel, engineering, textiles and 
the shipyards, government contracts alone brought solvency; 
while Britain's pivotal position in the Italian economy had 
been heavily underlined. The trading possibilities of this 
situation were not lost on interested parties in Britain, 
with the Chamber of Commerce Journal in London recommending 
that 'British manufacturers and shippers should not fail to 
avail themselves to the very utmost of the present unique
opportunity of securing a footing in the Italian markets...
8 6where a predominant position was held by Germany.' A 
German observer, Hugo Stinnes, had sensed the importance of 
commercial questions in Italy's political decisions. Early 
in neutrality, he had urged the German government to do all 
it could to favour Italian trade and exports, believing 
neutrality might be prolonged if economic interests found it 
profitable
Yet beyond the acute need for assured supplies and 
outlets, and for the state to act as a surrogate client in 
the emergency of 1914-15, there were also more positive 
grounds for industrial opinion to back intervention with 
the Triple Entente. Chief among these was the desire to end 
German influence over the Italian economy, and to replace
85 See M. Fatica, op. cit., pp. 244-51
86 XXxiII (1914)> p.
87 A. Monticone, op. cit. , p. 78
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this with a new tariff structure linking Italy to the ent­
ente powers and excluding Germany and Austria-Hungary# In 
this context, intervention serves to realign Italy econan- 
omically, in the hope of thus solving her economic diffic­
ulties rooted in a limited home market: earlier efforts at 
expansion within the Triple Alliance had only revealed the 
insoluble clash of interests with her partners. However, 
both renunciation of this alliance and intervention with 
the entente were purely means toward an independent and 
stronger Italy. Anglo-Italian collaboration, in the opinion 
of La Metallurgia italiana,
non potra ne dovra concretarsi in una sostituzione 
...della penetrazione inglese alia penetrazione 
germanica. L1Italia oggi non sta conducendo una 
guerra di sostituzione, ma di liberazione integrale: 
una guerra di dedizione a se stessa, il piu poss- 
ibile a se stessa.88
The months of neutrality had witnessed the opening stage
in Italian realignment, with an attack on the putative
domination of Berlin over Italy's economic life, a control
supposedly furthered by the power and influence of the
Banca Gommerciale.
Images abound during the fierce campaign against 
the Gomit of its essentially parasitic role in the Italian 
economy. Yet this ignores the bank's crucial role in finan­
cing the peninsula's industrialisation in earlier decades, 
following its foundation -on Grispi's support for the 
suggestion of Bleichroder that Italy needed a bank organ­
ised on German lines- in 1894, with ten million lire equity 
capital and offices in the Piazza della Scala. The bank's 
central importance can be measured in its rapid expansion; 
by 1903 capital had multiplied eight-fold, by 1911 thirteen­
fold. With deposits and savings accounts also expanding 
rapidly, the Banca Gommerciale was by 1910 the largest 
privately run corporation in Italy; holding forty per cent 
of the total assets of ordinary credit banks, it was
88 YII (1915), p. 821
148
undoubtedly in a position to dictate the supply and terms
8Qof industrial credit. Complaints were soon heard that 
the bank warked above all to extend German influence thro­
ughout Italy, with the requirements of indigenous industry 
coming a poor second. The extent to which the Banca Gomm­
erciale did indeed act as a German proxy >is still disputed
90amongst historians, but any examination of the bank's 
remarkable position in 1914 helps explain the wild reaction 
against it during neutrality. With the Italian government 
at the very least considering war against Germany, the 
Comit was revealed to be in control of much of the country's 
strategic industry, ranging from electricity to chemicals, 
iron and steel and engineering. The electrical power ind­
ustry had been developed almost entirely under the bank's 
aegis, through the creation of the Societa per lo Sviluppo 
aelle Imprese Elettriche in Italia which supplied capital 
to new companies. The Banca Gommerciale had cooperated 
with the Societa Edison to gain control of the industry; 
the president of this enterprise, Carlo Esterle, was by 1912 
on the board of no less than seventeen electrical firms.
Two years later he joined another board, that of the Banca 
Gommerciale, having been a leading shareholder in the bank 
for several years. In addition to the strategic importance 
of electricity generation, the Gomit's involvement was 
held widely to be linked to the requirements of the German 
electrical machine industry. The alarm of industrialists 
is evident in the jibe of Ettore Gonti on his preference
for working with the savings banks, which do not try to
91gain control of the firms they help finance.
The B.C.I. also controlled the electro-chemical 
industry, with Esterle again on the board of several firms.
89 See J. Cohen, Finance and Industrialisation in Italy, 
1894-1914 (Hew York 1977), pp. 85-90
90 S. Romano believes the bank was guided 'da criteri econ- 
omici e in ultima analisi italiani', op. cit., pp. 32-33; 
while G. Are suggests that the alarm among industrialists 
was indeed justified, 'La storiografia...', p. 227
91 E. Conti, op. cit., p. 58. See also the remarks of the 
nationalist economist Carli at the first nationalist 
congress, Atti..., pp. 152-53
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The 'Super1 trust, created in 1911 to corner the produc­
tion of super-phosphate fertilisers under the auspices of 
the Banca Commerciale and the Credito Italiano (another 
hank whose name was believed to belie its guiding spirit), 
soon controlled ninety per cent of the market. Even more 
impressive were the immensely complex financial and pers­
onal links by which the Banca Commerciale enmeshed vital 
elements in the iron and steel, engineering, shipbuilding 
and merchant marine sectors. With the exception of Ansaldo. 
the entire output of Italian heavy industry was within the 
orbit of the Gomit and the Gredito Italiano, while in ship­
building the Cantieri Navali Riuniti, formed by the B.C.I. 
in 1906, was the largest such firm in Italy. On the pers­
onal level, two examples reveal the overlapping director­
ships used to create this immensely powerful financial and 
industrial complex. Giuseppe Orlando, president of the iron 
and steel trust Terni, was also on the board of Ilva, Sider- 
urgica di Savona and the C.N.R.; while the president of the 
latter company, Attillo Odero, in turn had the additional 
posts of Ilva's vice-president, and a member of the boards 
of Giderurgica di Savona, Terni and the mining trust Elba.
Both men also helped bring the armaments firm Vickers
92Terni under the Gomit's wing. Clearly it would be hard
to exaggerate the importance for Italy's future development
of this bank, which in 1909 had taken on and defeated Gio-
93litti's government. Two years before this episode Franc­
esco Nitti had warned of the need 'renderci economicamente 
e industrialmente liberi dagli stranieri, sopra tutto dalla
Germania', and of 'banche, a benefizio di stranieri e ital-
94iane solo di nome, sorreggono non lodevoli intraprese.'
The nationalist campaign in 1914-15 differed from such 
criticisms only in its harsher tone -alarm at the ultimate 
loyalties of the Comit, 'quella Banca che ha le braccia in 
Italia e la testa a Berlino', and its director Otto Joel,
'II capo supremo del grande stato maggiore pangermanico in
92 J. Cohen, art. cit., pp. 377-82
93 See G. Giolitti, Quarant' anni..., vol. II, no. 694
94 F. Nitti, op. cit., pp. 60 and 141
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95Italia', is widespread, and the doubters will include Prime 
Minister Salandra.
Giovanni Preziosi, editor of La Vita Italiana all* 
Estero, devoted much of his journal to detailing Italy's 
enslavement by the Gomit. In May 1914, for example, he 
attacked the negotiations between Italy and the Central 
Powers over the division of work-zones in Asia Minor as an 
abject surrender by the Consulta to German pressure. Preziosi 
pointed out
questa strana coincidenza: mentre, a dire dei 
critici, dominava 1*influenza del Banco di Roma 
(i.e. during the Libyan war), 1'Italia avrebbe 
iniziato una politica forte e vigorosa; dominando 
invece una banca commerciale italo-tedesca, la 
politica italiana si asservisce ai voleri e agl' 
interessi della Germania e dell'Austria.96
In recent years 1le banche allora da organi propulsori dell'
economia nazionale si trasformano in piovre, che soffocano
le libere iniziative e tentano perfino di premere sulla
97politica dello Stato.' Along with many others, Preziosi
seized on Giolitti’s use of the two leading figures in the
bank, Joel and Nogara, during negotiations both for an end
to the Libyan war and over the work-zones in Asia Minor;
earlier, in his second ministry, Prime Minister Giolitti
also made use^of the Banca Commerciale to pressure Austria
over a wine tariff treaty. Indeed a series of political
events beginning with the Treaty of Ouchy in 1912, when
1infiltrarsi nelle vene del Governo un sottile veleno, che
ne h andato paralizzando l'azione patriottica ed energica',
and including the early and secret renewal of the Triple
Alliance, and the appointment of diplomats in sympathy
with that alliance both in the Consulta and in key embassies,
were all explicable only with reference to the Comit's 
98diktat. The Societa Commerciale d!Qriente at Constantinople 
is an agent of the bank, and so -in Preziosi’s logic and
95 G. Preziosi, La Germania alia conquista dell'Italia 
(Florence 1915), pp. 12 and 89
96 Edit. 'II fattore bancario nella politica estera italiana', 
La Vita Italiana all'Estero, May 1914, pp. 321-26 at 322
97 ibid., p. 325
98 ibid., pp. 325-6
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that of other critics- of Germany, while within Italy 'tutte
le Industrie siderurgiche, metallurgiche e meccaniche, salvo
poche eccezioni, sono dipendenti dalla Banca Commerciale
che trae da questa condizione di fatto una forza incalcol-
abile.' The bank was simply a Trojan horse, the means by
which Germany dominated Italian life:
A questo era ridotto la Triplice Alleanza: la Germ­
ania lavorava internamente in Italia per andarne 
paralizzando la virtu e 1'attivita, fino arenderle 
impossibile di opporsi con la forza a che 1'Austria, 
per conto proprio e indirettamente per conto della 
Germania, esplicasse il suo programma di espansione.
Questo lavoro della Germania si e andato 
compiendo a mezzo di una organizzazione perfetta, 
con agenzie d*informazioni, con impianti industriali, 
con missioni, con propaganda nella stampa; ma la 
colonna dorsale di tale organizzazione e stata la 
banca.99
Preziosi even spread his inquiries beyond Italy to 
take in the bank's deletorious influence in Britain and 
Prance. Another strident critic, E. M. Gray, seized on an 
article in a German economic review in which the Banca 
Commerciale's primary task of gaining control over Italian 
industry was allegedly admitted. Even as rational an 
observer as Gaetano Salvemini could claim (fully a year 
before intervention) that, 'La politica estera italiana e 
fatta oggi nel solo ed esclusivo interesse e sotto le sole 
ed esclusive indicazione della Banca Commerciale; Deutschland
99 G. Preziosi, op. cit. , pp. 68, 59 and 8
100 E. M. Gray, Guerra senza sangue (Florence 1916 ), p. 86 
The virulence of this campaign was even echoed in Brit­
ain, where Dr. E. Dillon described 'the crafty scurvy 
way in which the natives were enlisted in the German
cause which was decked for their behoof in Italian colours'; 
the Banca Commerciale 'wormed itself into the economic 
organism of the kingdom, grubbing up capital as it wriggled 
forward, undermined native industries and institutions...
The result was a sort of Teutonic freemasonry of trade 
and industry from which all independent Italian merchants 
were excluded.' From the Triple to the Quadruple Alliance. 
Why Italy went to War. (London 1915), pp. 74 and 77. It can 
also be measured in the comment in a work of 1920 praising 
Preziosi, 'oramai silenzioso -1'inchiesta, speriamo, dira 
il perche.' F. Tempera, La guerra e la pace d'Italia 
insidiata dalla Banca Commerciale di Joseph Toeplitz (Rome
1920), p. 10
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uber alles!’^ '*' Nitti, whose remarks in 1907 have already 
been cited, published a work in 1915 detailing the extent 
of foreign capital in Italy. In a speech at Naples in Feb­
ruary 1915, he complained that
in Italia, il commercio in molti porti e sotto il 
controllo di societh tedesche; molte aziende, anche 
con capitali belgi e francesi sono state finora dir- 
ette da tedeschi; le rappresentanze delle maggiori 
casi inglesi sono state per molto tempo nelle mani 
di sudditi tedeschi.102
In the following month the radical Di Cesaro described an 
incident in which
Avendo un ammiraglio osato chiedere la consegna 
immediata di una ordinazione di armi prodotte dalle 
industrie che sono sotto il controllo della Comme­
rciale si vide in quarantotto ore destituito e sost- 
ituito da un altro ammiraglio che proprio per caso 
era il fratello di uno dei negoziatori della pace 
italo-turca di Ouchy.103
The accuracy of these attacks is of less importance
than the general mood they convey in a broad section of
public opinion, that the most powerful economic institution
in the country had as its raison d1etre the shackling of
Italian industry and commerce. These suspicions of German
activities on occasion approach the absurd -one observer
sees in the growing number of hotels in the Trentino owned
by Germans a conspiracy to erode the Italian nature of the
104region, ’una colonizzazione di nuovo tipo.’ Yet even the 
more reasonable fears over a ’German' Banca Commerciale 
would seem to have been unfounded. G-ermans had begun selling 
their shares in the bank soon after its foundation, and as 
early as 1904 their holdings were insignificant. This trend 
continued over the next decade; to the extent that Italians 
had taken up almost 200,000 shares, while G-erman interests 
accounted for just over seven thousands. German control of 
the consiglio d'amministrazione was equally mythical; while
101 G. Salvemini, Come siamo andati in Libia e altri scritti 
dal 1900 al 1915. ed. A. Torre (Milan 1963). p. 3<-4
102 E. Ivl. Gray, L’invasione tedesca in Italia (Florence 
1915), p. 159
105 ibid., p. 129
104 V. Gayda, L1Italia d'Oltre Confine. Le provincie italiane 
d’Austria (Turin 1914), p. 439
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a majority of its members were foreign, this can in no way 
be equated with German control. In 1907, for example, five 
of the eleven members were Italian, only two German. The 
bank tended by its very nature to look beyond the Italian 
frontiers for capital and investment, but in fact the Ital­
ian economy had greatly benefited from Otto Joel’s knowl­
edge of international finance. Yet the departure of all 
foreigners from the Banca Commerciale’s directing body on 
the eve of intervention marked a triumph for the unremitting 
attack orchestrated by the nationalists, and underlines 
the demand amongst industrialists for a 'degermanisation1 
of the bank. This whole controversy over the Gomit is impor­
tant not for its revelation of German control of the penin­
sula, but rather as an attempt on the part of elements of 
Italian industry to use the climate of neutrality to shrug 
off their growing dependency on bank credit in general.
The long-standing reluctance of Italian investors 
to risk their money in the industrial sector had been rein­
forced in the years before 1914 by the undeniably poor 
performance of so many firms. As the Banca Commerciale 
itself accepted in its report of 1914, there had persisted
1une certaine repugnance pour tout placement en titres 
105industriels•* Problems in obtaining credit led Dante 
Ferraris, president of the Lega Industriale, '.to argue in 
1914 that 'socialmente ed economicamente per l’avvenire 
stesso della Nazione', it was vitally important to create 
a new credit institution in order to channel funds to ind­
ustry. Such funds were often said to be lacking in Italy, 
an idea which 'e sfatato sia dagli ingenti depositi di 
denaro che continuamente vanno crescendo presso le casse
10 6postali e quelle di risparmio...il denaro sia abbondante.' 
However the power of the Banca Commerciale and other banks 
had to be ended if industry was to obtain desperately 
needed credit; equally, the power of the existing bank
105 Banca Commerciale Italiana, Rapports du conseil d1admi­
nistration (Milan 1915), p. 8
106 Cited in M. Abrate, op. cit. , pp. 145-46
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structure was such that it could only be challenged by a 
vertically integrated, self-financing industrial group 
-such as the group which the Perrone brothers of Ansaldo, 
with the assistance of French capital, successfully formed 
in the period of neutrality. The political circumstances 
of 1914-15 came as a godsend to the Perrone1s, enabling 
them to dress up in patriotic garb what was essentially a 
technical financial operation -the foundation of a bank 
firmly under their control to provide credit as and when 
needed.
Ansaldo had failed in their efforts between 1908 
and 1910 to interest Otto Joel in backing a series of 
naval contracts with the Ottoman Empire, a fact later dred­
ged up during the campaign against the B.C.I. as a further 
example of its hostility to Italian industry. The company 
report of Ansaldo for 1912 dwelt on the need for autonomy 
in strategically important sectors:
per garantire la propria esistenza aveva bisogno di 
liberarsi da ogni dipendenza, mettendosi in grado 
di sopperire con mezzi propri, alia fornitura di 
tutti gli elementi che costituiscono oggidi l’unita 
navale di guerra. Un tale programma assicurava un 
triplice ordine di benefici e cioe: garanzia della 
nostra esistenza industriale, possibility di parte- 
cipare alle gare all’estero, affrancamento del paese 
da una pericolosa servitu verso lo straniero in 
fatto di armamenti navali. Questo programma noi 
abbiamo seguito con fermezza...107
By 1913 the company claimed to have freed itself from all 
outside capital; in fact exclusion from the Gomit1s circle 
led to constant difficulties over credit. The European war 
heightened these problems, while at the same time offering 
prospects of enormous expansion for a firm involved in 
supplying the state with a large proportion ©f its arma­
ments, Efforts to gain ten million lire credit from the 
Banca Commerciale in the early months of neutrality had 
failed, and Ansaldo suffered further from the bank morat­
orium enforced by the government on the outbreak of war. 
Mario Perrone warned the prime minister that
107 Cited in E. Gazzo, I centi anno dell'Ansaldo, 1853/1953 
(Genoa 1953), p. 361
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poiche non ci e pin possibile rivolgerci agli 
Istituti di Credito per ottenere quel giro di 
capitali che ci h necessario, se il R. Governo 
non verra in nostro aiuto sowenendoci con forti 
anticipazioni sulle somme delle quali ci e debitore, 
ci troveremo ben presto nella impossibility di 
pagare gli operai e nella necessita di doverli 
licenziare.108
Later in August 1914 Perrone again communicated with Sal-
andra, advising him that the war
dara un grave colpo a molte industrie straniere e 
sara per contro vantaggiosa a quelle delle nazioni 
che riusciranno a traversare pressocchk indenni la 
crisi attuale ed e percio necessario che le indus­
trie italiane siano mantenute in pieno grado di 
efficienza...bisogna che si prepari con tutte le 
sue forze a scendere nel campo del lavoro proficuo 
ed a conquistare quei mercati che le Nazioni bell- 
igeranti avranno nel frattempo perduto.109
The foundation of the Banca Italiana di Sconto in 
December 1914 gave Ansaldo the financial base for its immense 
war-time expansion, and gave Salandra a political base for 
his assault on Giovanni Giolitti's position. Government 
sponsorship of this bank’s emergence will be discussed 
later; but Ansaldo's involvement was defended (in its submi­
ssions to a post-war inquiry into the Banca Italiana di 
Sconto's disastrous collapse) as a patriotic response to 
the Gomit1s machinations:
Noi eramo perfettamente al corrente dei mezzi, dei 
metodi, della forza di questo monopolio bancario. 
Eravamo convinti che esso avrebbe costituito un 
pericolo grave per la sicurezza del nostro Paese 
se fosse stato trascinato in una grande guerra...
Ed e appunto nella lotta dovuta sempre sostenere 
contro la coalizione bancaria industriale...che si 
debbono ricercare le origini, il concetto e i determ­
inant! -precedenti alia guerra- del cosidetto sistema 
verticale Ansaldo.110
In fact Ansaldo was clearly concerned above all with its own
financial and commercial position, and proved willing to
encourage the development of French political and economic
influence in the peninsula as a means to secure that position.
108 Cited in E. Galli Della Loggia, ’Problemi di sviluppo indu­
striale e nuovi equilibri politici alia vigilia della 
prima guerra mondiale: la fondazione della Banca Italiana 
di Sconto’, R.S.I., LXXXII (1970), pp. 824-86 at 836
109 ibid., p. 835n25
110 Gazzo, op. cit. , p. 387
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The involvement of French capital in the Banca Italiana 
di Sconto comes as only the culmination of a growing 
participation of western European finance in Italy, concen­
trated largely in Liguria. In this region Germany was widely 
believed to have exacerbated the crisis of 1907, in the 
hope of driving down share values and gaining control of 
Italian companies at the lowest possible price.Links- 
had developed rapidly with France in a whole range of indu­
stries -among them automobiles, mining, chemicals, sugar- 
refining, explosives, foodstuffs and the public services.
Yet if the motives of German investment were suspect, even 
the most virulent critic of Berlin might have been given 
pause for thought by the report of a French diplomat foll­
owing Italy's economic crisis of 1907:
II faut que de 1*Stranger il vienne d'autre fonds 
pour remplacer ceux qui sont rentrds en Allemagne.
Si nous avons conscience de nos inter£ts politiques 
et economiques, c’est nous qui devrions prendre la 
place vacante. Mais il faudrait le faire avec methode 
et en prenant nos precautions necessaires...Si nos 
capitaux se d^cident a jouer un rdle digne de notre 
puissance financiere sur le marche italien, il 
sera necessaire de les faire accompagner et d'obt- 
enir 1'elimination graduelle du personnel allemand 
et des italiens inf£od£s a la finance allemande.112
Already in the autumn of 1906 the Banco della
Liguria had turned to the Credit Lyonnais for financial
support; while French shares in the Banca Commerciale rose
from 5,556 in 1904 to 36,280 in 1907 (against a combined
Austro-German total of just over six thousand), and by 1914
113stood at 48,922 -six times the Austro-German figure. A 
consortium of French banks had in 1907 provided an injec­
tion of seventy-five million lire capital into the Credito 
Italiano, an event which also brings two French financiers 
onto the board and foreshadows this bank's growing import­
ance in Liguria."*'^’ The Genoan chamber of commerce pointed 
out during the war that
111 Doria, op. cit., p. 517nl5
112 Tamborra, art. cit. , p. 110
113 Doria, p. 518nl7; B. Gille, Les investissements franc - 
ais en Italie (1815-1914) (Turin 1968), p. 372
114 Doria, p. 518
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gia qualche anno prima della guerra 11 orientamento 
finanziario italiano era rivolto verso la Francia 
e 1'Inghilterra e per opera degli stessi nostri 
maggiori organi bancari, che prima erano il tramite 
di collegamento con la finanza e la politica germ- 
anica.115
The part played hy French capital in the creation of the 
Banca Italiana di Sconto is most important in the process 
of reorientation; indeed the foundation of this bank symbol­
ises the French financial and political triumph over Germany, 
Both the Societa Bancaria Italiana and the Societa Italiana 
di Gredito Provinciale, whose merger in 1914 created the 
B.I.S., offer further examples of the multiplying French 
investment in Liguria; a process not without political impl­
ications, as can be seen in this report of the Louis Dreyfus 
et C,ie bank of Paris to the French government :
Les sympathies francophiles de la Bancaria primi­
tive...come celles de la Provinciale correspond- 
aient avec celles de la Banca di Sconto...L'Ambas- 
sade frangaise a Rome a connu tous les details des 
longues negociations prealables au groupement des 
trois Banques. La fusion, approuvee par elle, a ete 
effectude au moment jugd opportun par elle au point 
de vue national. La penetration frangaise a ete 
op£rde discr&tement il y a quelques annees deja 
aupres de la Bancaria et de la Provinciale..,L’ 
appoint important des capitaux frangais a encore 
accru lors de la fusion. On peut affirmer que 
les sympathies actives et constantes, pour la France, 
de la Banca di Sconto, sont accept^es par 1*opinion 
publique italienne, si sensible.
The Bancaria had immediately broken all relations on the
opening of the war, assuming ’la m§me attitude que celle
libqu’aurait eue una banque frangaise elle-m§me en Italie.’
The presence of the Perrone brothers as founder
share-holders in the Banca di Sconto -the bank which its
director Angelo Pogliani claimed ’venne da lui fondata
il 30 dicembre 1914 in previsione dell'entrata in guerra
dell'Italia e per servire precipuamente ai bisogni della 
117guerra stessa’- marks the convergence of interests between
115 ibid. , p. 518nl7
116 ibid. , p. 520n22
117 Arch. Senato, Processo alia Banca di Sconto, n. 311* 
Yerbale della seduta del 1 feb. 1926, p. 51
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a French government anxious to secure Italian intervention 
in the war, and Ligurian industry, with its belief that -in 
the opinion of the Genoa chamber of commerce in October
1914- 'II prestigio e l'interesse del Paese esigono che 
le Banche libere vengano rafforzate' in order to make 
available more credit, 1sulla quale si impernia tutto il
1 1 R
problema della ripresa delle nostre operazioni commercial:..
Nitti's researches showed that by 1915 France had around
150,000,000 lire invested in Italian banking and industry,
while over forty of the forty-three million lire paid out
119to foreign investors in the public debt went to France,
However, as the French commercial attache in Rome had
advised in October 1911, these investments did not always
bring commensurate political influence:
des fonds franpais pr£tds en Allemagne ont permis 
a la finance allemande d'op^rer dans la p^ninsule; 
ainsi nos capitaux ont facility h nos adversaires 
la conquSte du marche financier, industriel, et par 
suite commercial de l'ltalie, avec toute l1infl­
uence que comporte une telle action. Aujord'hui 
la crise allemande va obliger nos rivaux a un 
mouvement de retraite. Bdja certains grands etabl- 
issements italiens, jadis infeodds a 1'Allemagne, 
marquent un revirement de notre cdte. Nous aurions 
tort de ne pas profiter de cette situation. Mais... 
j'insiste sur ce point que l'apport de nos capit­
aux, qu'il s'agise de renforcer une situation deja 
acquise, ou d'en creer une nouvelle, doit entrainer 
avec lui une influence adequate dans les conseils 
d1administration, doit comporter une influence 
morale et materielle francaise dans le pays. Bn 
d'autres termes, cet apport doit £tre direct et 
public.120
In April 1914 the French military attach^ makes a
similar point:
II y a, ce semble, a retirer de la facon dont 
l1Allemagne a amorcd son emprise economique sur 
l'ltalie un enseignment qui merite d'etre m£dite: 
la France bien mieux arm£e que sa rivale d'outre- 
Vosges sous le rapport financier, pourrait en tout 
cas, si elle le voulait, par des proc6d£s analogues, 
exercer sur ce pays-ci une action dont les effets, 
sous quelque angle qu'on les considere seraient loin
118 A.G.S., Carte Torre, b. l,f. 5, sf. 62. Memorandum of 
24 Oct. 1914
119 F. Nitti, 11 capitale..., pp. 44-45
120 Galli Bella Loggia, art. cit. , p. 845n48
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d’etre negligeable. Elle y parviendrait d’autant plus faci- 
lement que la Banca Commerciale, par son dispotisme, s'est 
aliene quantity d’esprits qui voient clair aujord’hui, dans 
son jeu, et s1en liberaient avec joie le jour ou des circos- 
tances favorables le leur permettraient,121
122The French government's involvement in the Banca di Sconto
is only another step in the expansion of that nation's
political influence in Italy. Within only a few months of
intervention, French interests will attempt nothing less
than a take-over of the Banca Commerciale, and will also
be pressing ahead with a series of investments in armaments,
chemicals, hydro-electricity, ship-building and public- 
123works. The scope of French ambitions was clearly not 
limited to bringing about Italian intervention, but rather 
aimed to bring the peninsula firmly into the political and 
commercial orbit of Paris. German hegemony would be eradi­
cated and swiftly replaced by that of France -as one French 
paper wrote in March 1915, 'II serait necessaire, indispens­
able m£me, pour donner une plus grande extension a notre 
commerce en Italie qu'une grande banque frangaise fasse,
pour les fournisseurs frangais, ce que la Banque Commerc-
124iale Italienne, fait pour les Allemands.' Although the 
most direct means of achieving this -control of the B.C.Im­
proved impossible, French interests were well protected by 
the Banca di Sconto, which in its report for 1917 remarked 
that, 'Des le debut...notre pens£e avait ete de renforcer
et d'accroitre les liens qui nous unissent au marchd fran- 
125cais.' In November 1915 Paul Claudel arrived in Rome on
an economic mission to study the means 'de reconquerir le
12 6champ abandonne.. .aux enterprises allemandes.' By the
121 ibid. , p. 844n4b
122 For Delcass6's involvement, see P. Milza, 'les rapports 
economiques franco-italiens en 1914-15 et leur incide­
nces politiques', R.H.M.C., X1Y (1967), pp. 31-70 at 58
123 See ibid. , p. 60 ff.
124 Le Temps, 15 March 1915. For the links established early 
in the war between Credito Italiano and various British 
banks 'diretti a promuovere e sviluppare il finanz- 
iamento d'imprese industriali d'ogni natura in Italia1, 
see G. Colombo, Fatti economici: le grandi banche in 
Italia nel 1915 (Rome 1916), p. 11
125 B.I.S., Rapports du conseil d'administration (Rome 1917), 
p. 15
126 P. Claudel et al, Correspondence, 1897-1938 (Paris 1952), 
pp. 283-84
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spring of the following year, Claudel could report to
Briand on the strength and expansion of the Banca di Sconto
(which already held over 300 million lire of deposits), and
127the evident difficulties of the Banca Commerciale. Finally, 
one can cite the opening in December 1915 of the Societa 
partenopea per industria metallurgiche ed elettriche (Spime) 
in Naples, in a large modern plant built largely with French 
capital. Several small armaments firms had combined to cash 
in on intervention, but had gained the necessary finance 
only with the assistance of Ambassador Tittoni in Paris, 
who had no difficulty interesting various French banks in
•I O Q
supplying funds.
Here then is one influence working on the reactions
of industrialists to war which has not been given sufficient
attention in many studies of neutrality. French financial
investments in banking and industry increase rapidly before
1914, and this from a substantial initial base. Out of just
under 500 million lire of foreign investment in Italy in
September 1910, France accounted for 124.5 millions and
Britain for a further 107.9 millions, while the combined
total of Germany and Austria-Hungary did not even approach 
129fifty millions. Britain also had a considerable influence 
in Liguria, through companies such as Armstrong Whitworth, 
which reached agreement with the Perrone's in 1903 on amalg­
amation into the one company, Ansaldo Armstrong (though this 
alliance was dissolved in 1912); and Vickers Sons and Maxim
Ltd., who joined with Terni in 1906 to build armaments
130plants in La Spezia. In addition to the influence of such
investments, one can also trace other commercial ties between
Italy and the Triple Entente. Ansaldo reached agreement in
1910 with the French firm Schneider, which gave the Perrone's
131access to the great artillery factories of Creusot.
127 P. Milza, art. cit. , p. 61
128 See M. Fatica, op. cit. , pp. 434-36
129 0. McGuire, op. cit. , pp. 267-68
130 See Doria, pp. 525-26; Gazzo, p. 354
131 See Ansaldo!s report for 1910, in Gazzo, p. 372
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Fiat also looked increasingly to entente markets 
before 1914. The company had won the first orders for mil­
itary lorries from the Russian government in 1912, and then 
taken part in a large delegation of industrialists from 
Turin who spent the entire month of June 1913 treating with 
Tsarist officials in St. Petersburg and Moscow for further 
orders and the building of an automobile plant. Fiat-San 
Giorgio also profited in the opening months of war from
orders for submarines from both the Russian and British 
132governments. Castronovo suggests that by 1914 the Turin
chamber of commerce saw in good relations with France 1il
punto di riferimento insostituibile dell*economia piemon-
133tese e del suo ordinato sviluppo'; while the historian of
Liguria’s economic development is equally trenchant on the
political repercussions of the region's ties:
Gli equilibri delle presenze economiche straniere 
sono dunque mutati in Liguria rispetto alia fine 
dell’Ottocento e ai primissimi anni del Novocento; 
e sono mutati soprattutto grazie all’intervento 
francese, a favore dell'Intesa e a danno della 
Germania. Tutto questo non transpare solo dalle 
attivit& industriali e dai servizi pubblici: non 
va sottovalutato il contributo degli interessi del 
commercio marittimo e del ceto armatoriale...una 
parte sempre piu autorevole degli ambienti econo- 
mici regionali aveva quindi modo di far pesare la 
propria propensione antitriplicista.134
As the war in Europe progressed, the dangers grew of Italian
isolation from the international movements of capital and
raw materials, and in particular of northern Italy being
uncoupled from all its vital markets. The desire of the
leading industrialist Bonnefon-Crappone for the formation
135of a Franco-Italian zollverein suggests the direction 
in which opinion is moving, as does the growing sympathy 
and financial support for the nationalist movement. This 
movement of opinion was gradual and uneven, but one can 
also cite Charles Benoist's impression in January 1915 
that Piedmont and Lombardy were strongly interventionist;1^
132 V. Castronovo, Economia..., p. 347; and Agnelli, pp. 
81-3
133 ibid. , p. 79
134 Doria, p. 533
135 Milza, art. cit. , p. 57
136 C. Benoist, Souvenirs (Paris 1934), vol. 3, p. 254
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and Ettore Conti's view that the war would bring diffic­
ulties, but also the chance of increased profits. While 
Conti had favoured neutrality in August 1914, he grew 
alarmed at the economic implications after only some days 
-’rimanendo per ora fuori del conflitto, il paese e stato
preso da un specie di collasso. II traffico b di colpo
137diminuito in modo impressionante;' An editorial in the
Hivista delle Societa Commerciali in May 1915 described
industry's response to intervention:
Nella prima settimana dalla dichiarazione di guerra 
i corsi della rendita nostra sensibilmente aument- 
arono. E l'aumento si mantenne, anzi aumentb nella 
settimana successiva. II che, dimostra come l'ing- 
resso dell'Italia nel conflitto fosse accolto da un 
innegabile senso di fiducia tanto all'estero che all' 
interno.138
G-iven all this, it seems hard to accept the conclusion of 
139Milza (reached in the face of much evidence in his own 
article to the contrary) that in neither the Franco-Italian 
trading relations nor the financial links can one find an 
explanation for the political decision of 1915*
This argument appears even less convincing if one 
examines the role of industrial pressure for new tariff 
alignments in Italian intervention. With protection under 
powerful assault within Italy, and the date for a renewal 
of all tariff treaties approaching rapidly, war was seized 
on as a complete vindication of the whole structure of 
tariffs and subsidies; the strategic importance of heavy 
industry gave a rationale for protection beyond self-int­
erest. Unita argued that
Era tutti gli ideali della democrazia che la guerra 
dovrebbe avere travolto senza speranza di lasciar 
risorgere, uno dei primi sarebbe quello del libero 
scambio fra le nazioni...II principio della divis- 
ione internazionale del lavoro, fondamento di tutta 
la teoria libero-scambista, troverebbe la piu effi- 
cace smentita nella realth dei fatti; la nazione 
piu forte e meglio preparata alia guerra sarebbe 
quella, che in tempo di pace si fosse messa in
137 E. Conti, op. cit. , pp. 110-11 and 101
138 V (1915), p. 483
139 art. cit., pp. 69-70
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condizione di produrre all'interno tutti quei 
beni che sono necessari alia difesa nazionale nel 
piu largo senso della parola...unico dovere degli 
antiprotezionisti sarebbe quello di recitare il 
mea culpa e diventare anch’essi fautori della prot- 
ezione doganale per creare una forte autonomia 
economica della nazione.140
Mounting hostility to G-erman export policies before 1914
also conditions the reaction of industrialists to the war.
ha Metallurgia italiana attacked the Stahl Verband's practice
of dumping ’alio scopo di annientare la nostra industria
siderurgica1, while another critic believed German dumping
had
uno scopo lontano, subdolo e violento, ispirato ad 
un concetto politico-militare, il quale e quello di 
ostacolare lo sviluppo delle nostre industrie per 
dominare in definitiva il nostro mercato. Era una 
delle armi piu potenti per ncolonizzareM l!Europa 
e, in modo particolare, 1’Italia.141
Carli attacked in particular similar German methods in the
machine-tool industry as;'una forma speciale di tenaglia
142hinde nb ur ghi ana.’ La Riforma Sociale devoted its issue
of March 1914 entirely to the question of dumping, observ­
ing that, 'Da qualche tempo il pericolo dell’invasione 
commerciale germanica, raffigurato dal 'dumping’, viene 
formando l'oggetto delle quotidiane lamentele dei protez- 
ionisti italiani, a corto di argomenti. ’
Such arguments were in fact redoubled on the outbreak 
of war, when
i concorrenti stranieri fanno ogni sforzo per sfog- 
are il piu largamente possibile ed a qualunque 
condizione i loro prodotti sul mercato italiano... 
la Germania, in special modo, ha provveduto a rend- 
ere piu intensa ed efficace la sua penetrazione in 
Italia, moltiplicando i suoi agenti...(and operating 
in general that her trade) possa essere venduta in 
Italia a prezzi tali che non ammettono possibility 
di concorrenza da parte della industria italiana, 
gravata a sua volta dal maggiore costo delle materie 
prime.144
Italian heavy industry could not survive German competition
140 ’Observer1, 'Guerra e libero scambio', in P. Golzio and
A. Guerra (ed.), La cultura..., vol. 5, p. 438
141 V (1913), p. 78; P. Carli, L'Altra guerra (Milan 1916),
pp. 16-23 at 22, 'La dipendenza economica dell'Italia'
142 ibid. , p. 23
143 XXV (1914), p. 193
144 La Metallurgia italiana, VI (1914), p. 615
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without either extended tariff harriers or expanded demand. 
Italy had to intervene in the struggle in Europe, which -for 
the president of the Associazioni fra le societa Italiane 
per Azione, urging industrialists to subscribe to the war- 
loan in June 1915- 'e guerra non pure di redenzione polit­
ica, ma anche, e non meno, di redenzione economica...Ricor- 
diamo tutti con quali male arti la insidiosa penetrazione
tedesca ha cercato per oltre un trentennio di asservire le
145nostre industrie.1 Yet beyond the hostility to Germany
lay the hope that alliance with the entente would bring
assured sources of raw materials and markets, and open
new prospects for the Italian economy. War broke just as
the debate over Italy's future tariff structure reached a
peak; as one economist commented,
L'avvicinarsi del momento nel quale 1'Italia dovra 
decidere quali saranno per essere i criterii diret- 
tivi del prossimo periodo della sua politica doga- 
nale -periodo che avra inizio eollo scadere dei 
trattati di commercio colle potenze centrali, e 
cioe col 31 dicembre 1917- ha risvegliato in modo 
eccezionalmente vivace il dibattito delle varie 
tendenze, e le polemiche circa il nuovo assetto
da darsi al nostro ordinamento doganale.146
Many industrialists did not wish to wait three 
years for reform -the textiles magnate Ettore Ponti deman­
ded 'urgenti misure, che possono essere attuate anche prima 
della scadenza prefissa per le innovazioni doganali...noi 
domandiamo una pronta riabilitazione morale ed attuazione 
pratica di quei metodi di protezione essenzialmente solid- 
aristici.' In November 1914 the Rassegna dei lavori pubb- 
lici suggested that 'questa, come nessun'altra, e guerra 
di egemonie commerciale e di predominio economico...L'
Italia stessa interverra, se mai, nella guerra a tutela d' 
interessi economici e per la conquista di vantaggi econo- 
mici.' The question of protection should not be dropped
because of the war, 'in quanto toglierebbe ai nostri nego-
ziati quell1arma che e prezziosissimo dell'intervento nella
145 Riv. delle Soc. Comm., V (1915)? P* 611. See also E. 
Alasia, 'L'economia italiana di fronte alia chiusura 
del mercato germanico', Giornale degli economisti, LI 
(1915), pp. 94-119: 'L'azione economica tedesca era 
ancora in uno stadio di preparazione', p. 118
146 C. Tarlarini, 'I sindacati industriali ed i dazi doga­
nali', Riv. delle Soc. Comm., IV (1914), p. 381
147 'Per la tutela dell1 economia nazionale’, ibid., p. 4-91
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guerra e che potrebbe essere fatta valere anche ai fini
148dei nuovi trattati.' Carli also discussed Italy’s dip­
lomatic alliances in terms of future tariff reforms, 
believing that after the war the government’s economic 
policy
doversi incardinare su questi concetti: un largo 
giuoco dei dazi preferenziali sulla base della 
tariffa generate convenientemente riveduta, per 
la potenze amiche; un elevamento delle difese 
contro il blocco tedesco.149
Italy
si trova ad una tale svolta della sua storia che 
pub scegliere la via, ed e la prima volta che essa 
pub scegliere la via liberamente: o quella della 
dipendenza, o quella dell*autarchia...o continuare 
a vivere il sistema cosmopolita, o vivere il prin- 
cipio nazionale.150
So industrial interests viewed the war, ’la quale
piu che per questioni politiche si b combattuta per affran-
carsi dall’espansione invadente della Germania e per dispu-
tarsi l'egemonia commerciale del mondo’, as a necessity to
win Italy the right to join in post-war agreements against
the Central Powers, for ’guai a quella nazione che non si
trovera con esse e non sara ai primi posti per cercare di
prendere ovunque la successione del commercio tedesco-
151austriaco, soprattutto nei paesi come la Serbia.' The 
absence of any criticisms of Britain's export bans (an 
action which caused industry immense difficulties) is a 
striking feature of the various trade journals during neut­
rality. La Metallurgia italiana limited itself to the hope 
that such bans would soon be lifted -'Ed b da augurarsi, 
nell'interesse dei due paese, che piu stretti diventino,
anche per altri prodotti, i rapporti commerciali dell*Italia
152colla Gran Bretagna.' Suggestions soon followed of a 
commercial and customs league between Italy and the Triple 
Entente. In the view of Richard Bagot, a propagandist for
148 'La guerra e i trattati di commercio', 3 Nov. 1914? P* 
611
149 E. Carli, 'II protezionismo doganale e la guerra euro- 
pea', Riv. delle Soc. Comm., V (1915), pp. 561-70 at 57.0
150 P. Carli, op. cit., p. 324
151 ’I balcani e l'avvenire economico d'ltalia', R.d». 1.p.,
20 April 1915, pp. 229-30
152 VI (1914), p. 680
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the allied cause in Italy,
Le informazioni datemi da molte ditte italiane, 
rappresentanti quasi ogni ramo della vita commerc­
iale ed industriale del paese, mi avevano persuaso 
che una grande parte dei negozianti italiani vedeva 
nella alleanza politica con la Gran Bretagna una 
via...di potersi liberare dall'incubo tedesco, e 
di tornare a quelle relazioni piu strette coll’ 
Inghilterra.153
The Russian market was also eyed with much interest.
A mission from the Italian Ministry of Agriculture, Industry
and Commerce had spent over a year in Russia in 1913-14
studying the country's economic potential and gathering
154information for a new tariff agreement. Carli believed 
that, 'La Russia e l'Asia Minore possono essere per noi un 
campo maraviglioso di rifornimento di materie prime (oltre 
che di grano), mentre dall'Italia dipartir& una corrente di 
manufatti pei loro mercati'}^^ a prediction echoed by an 
editorial in the Rivista delle Societa Commerciali in 
March 1915:
Per fortuna sembra che il futuro si delinei favo- 
revole all'Italia nostra...Tutta l'economia della 
penisola balcanica si svilupper& e sar& sempre 
piu inquadrata nel nostro sistema economico...
E sar& l'economia russa che, sviluppandosi, inte- 
nsifichera sempre piu i suoi rapporti col Medit- 
erraneo; sara l'economia dell'Asia Minore che sara 
sempre piu valorizzata. E dalla penisola balcanica 
e dalla Russia e dall'Asia Minore noi potremo trarre 
in gran copia le materie prime necessarie affinche 
1'Italia possa sempre piu largamente vendere i prod- 
otti delle sue industrie a codeste nazioni ancora 
economicamente alio stato di subordinazione.156
As will be seen, this and other journals developed these
ideas during the war, depicting Italy's great economic
future expanding in cooperation with Britain, Prance and
Russia.
With German products excluded, there would obviously
153 R. Bagot, L'Italia. 1'Inghilterra e la guerra di dom- 
ani (Florence 1916), p. 33 • Bagot was anxious for such 
an alliance to occur, elsewhere contrasting German 
trade which brought political subjugation with mutu­
ally profitable trade with Britain. See Anglo-Italian 
Commercial Policy (Bologna 1916), p. 29
154 See G. Castagna, 'L'organizzazione del commercio ital- 
iano in Russia', L'Esp. Comm., XXIX (1914), PP* 1-11
155 F. Carli, op. cit. , p. 26
156 Cited in Caracciolo, art. cit. , p. 998
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be far greater opportunities for Italian industry at least 
to gain full profit from the limited domestic market. Theo­
ries of a possible autarchical future for Italy first appear 
during neutrality, forming a main theme of much nationalist 
propaganda. An article which appeared in the official 
journal of the Italian joint-stock companies one month 
before intervention hoped that in future
ciascuno si abituasse a provare un sentimento di 
compiacenza nel pensare che agli oggetti che egli 
impiega ha posto mano solo gente che parla la 
nostra lingua, che divide con noi sofferenze e 
gioie; e vorremmo che da questo sentimento fosse 
portato a preferire la merce nazionale alia stran- 
iera.157
This view was echoed in the review two months later by 
Carli, one of several nationalist theorists to publish 
long articles in what by the eve of war served as a plat­
form for the intellectual meeting between Italian industry 
and nationalism. He claimed 'che la nostra guerra avrh... 
questo inestimabile vantaggio -di sviluppare nel nostro 
popolo la fede in se stesso e nelle cose proprie e di svol- 
gere in lui quei germi di nazionalismo economico che gia 
prima della guerra cominciavano a intravedersi.' A 
committee consisting of politicians and industrialists 
had been formed in Rome in November 1914 'di svolgere atti- 
vissima azione per sostituire nel consumo interno i prod- 
otti italiani ai prodcrtti stranieri, stimolando in tal modo
il sentimento nazionale al migliore e maggiore sviluppo
159economico del paese.’ Here again the war will bring
further developments in such attitudes. Six months after
intervention one economist discussed the need
dare il massimo sviluppo a tutte le risorse paes- 
ane, di guisa che non si importi quel che si pub 
ottenere convenientemente in paese...II nostro 
compito pertanto dovrebbe essere quello di elim- 
inare le importazioni non necessarie, specie se 
si tratti di elementi complementari delle Indust­
rie nazionali gia in esercizio.160
157 G. Tarlarini, 'II nazionalismo del consumo', Riv.
delle Soc. Comm., V (1915), p. 400
158 'II protezionismo doganale e la guerra europea', ibid., 
p. 569
159 ha Met, it., VI (1914), p. 673
160 G. Valenti, La guerra e l'economia nazionale dell'
Italia (Siena 1915), p. 30
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The attitude of industrial opinion to intervention
was thus conditioned by problems and aspirations dating
back many years; their support for Italian involvement
in the war comes from causes far deeper than the desire
for vastly inflated profits. These remarks of Bonnefon
Grappone from 1912 read as a political programme which
comes to fruition with Italy’s intervention in the war
three years later:
Dobbiamo muovere alia conquista del mercato nazi­
onale , della fiducia del consumatore italiano: 
dobbiamo dimostrare al paese quello che sappiamo 
fare, quello che facciamo: dobbiamo metterlo di 
fronte alia realta delle cose convincerlo che 1' 
industria nostra, per quanto giovane, non e piu 
in stato di inferiority di fronte all'industria 
estera...Noi non chiediamo per questo favori a 
nessuno; combattendo questa campagna a nome dell' 
industria italiana sappiamo di combattere per 1' 
avvenire economico d'Italia...i milioni che ora 
vanno all'industria estera in cambio dell'import- 
azione dei suoi prodotti potranno alimentare 1' 
industria nostra...161
Dissatisfaction grew steadily at the two seeming constants 
of Italian life, the political domination of Giovanni 
G-iolitti and the supposed economic dominance of Germany.
By 1914, the convenient slur that these two phenomena 
could in fact be equated, and hence so much of Italian 
industry's failings explained, had won widespread accep­
tance. In June 1915 the Rassegna dei lavori pubblici, an 
industrial journal published in Rome, saluted Italy's 
intervention in the war, which helped end Giolitti's 
'infausta politica...affaticata soltanto a postergare la 
dignity ed i piu alti interessi della patria dinanzi ai
menomi desideri di Berlino e di Vienna e paurosa di ogni
162atto che potesse denotare diffidenza' toward them.
Unrest is also clear in support for the nationalists, 
and for the Comitato nazionale per le tariffe doganali e 
i trattati di commercio, a pressure-group founded by the 
association of joint-stock companies. It was crucial too
161 Cited in A. Pepe, Storia della CGdL dalla guerra di 
Libia all1intervento, 1911-1915 (Bari 1971), P. 87




Political and economic mobilisation for war
Perhaps the one trait common to all elements of 
liberal Italy's ruling class during the period of neutra­
lity was an extraordinary lack of confidence in the future 
of the monarchical system -the doubters including even the 
king himself. Nor is this entirely suprising, given the 
events of 'Red Week' in June 1914. Lotti has described this 
mass uprising, in which large parts of the country effort­
lessly shrugged off all governmental authority.^" Nationwide 
demonstrations were organised (largely by anarchists) against 
the punishment of a soldier who had attempted to murder his 
commanding officer during the Libyan war. These received 
immense popular support, and led to rioting in Turin and 
many other cities, and to the founding of ephemeral repub­
lican governments in parts of Romagna and the Marches.
Although troops soon regained control, government concern over
what Brunello Vigezzi calls 'the only serious Italian
2
attempt at revolution there has ever been’ is attested to 
in the voluminous files sent to the prime minister on almost 
every aspect of the affair. Red Week showed the disaffection 
of large numbers of the population, suffering in Italy's 
prolonged depression. Three months before these alarms, the 
government had reports of about twenty thousand syndicalists 
active in the Parma area alone. The socialist party was 
also moving away from collaboration with the government as 
encouraged by G-iolitti, and was taking an increasingly hostile 
attitude to the liberal state.
1 L. Lotti, op. cit.
2 B. Vigezzi, 'Italian Socialism and the First World War', 
Journal of Italian History, 2 (1979), pp. 232-56 at 237. 
Giolitti explained that he voted for Salandra's government 
since, 'Era in causa l’ordine pubblico nella piu alta 
espressione. La caduta del Ministro sarebbe stata il 
trionfo dell'anarchia', B. Vigezzi, 'Le 'rivelazione’...', 
p. 165
3 A.G.S., Min. dell Interno, Direz. Gen. della Pubblica
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In particular, the socialist party shared in criti­
cisms of the militarism in liberal Italy: criticisms which 
were widespread by 1914 and indeed played a central part 
in the demonstrations leading to Red Week. Socialist 
obstruction to the passage of financial measures through the 
chamber continued in June and July 1914, prompting the 
Gorriere della Sera to complain that 'si era sfrenato in 
Italia un vento di puro e semplice anarchismo che aveva 
soffiata nelle follie sindacaliste, ispirando la piu aperta 
celebrazione del sabotaggio.At the same time, the party 
made steady progress in local and national elections, culmi­
nating in their capture of many leading cities in the admin­
istrative elections of June 1914. In Bologna, the prospect of 
the socialists following up their victory in six out of eight 
seats in the national ballot of 1913 (with over 42,000 votes, 
compared to under 22,000 in the election of 1909) by triumphing 
in the following year!s vote, caused much alarm. In the 
opinion of Aweriire d1 Italia,
h facile immaginare quale potrh essere un'amminis- 
trazione socialista del nostro comune se i socialisti 
dovessero per disgrazia trionfare nelle elezioni 
di domenica. Bologna non potrh sopportare un'onta 
di tale natura, non deve soggiacere alia rapace 
trivialita di alcuni, ed ai forsennati criteri ammin- 
istrativi di altri; ma con un gesto memorando farh 
argine all'onda sovversiva, gridando dall'urna: no, 
di qui non si passa!5
The report of the prefect of Bologna to Salandra on the need
'unire in un fascio imponente tutte le forze costituzionali,
presentando un blocco sufficiente a resistere all!attacco
che le masse socialista daranno. . .con quell'accanimentO' che
e loro consuetudine’^  is echoed in Awenire df Italia, which
pressed for
una intesa su larga base dei partiti e dei gruppi 
costituzionali, nel duplice intento di riawicinare 
quelle forze vive di comun sangue latino che avevano 
disperso le loro forti energie su gli scogli politici, 
e di operare insieme una difesa efficace contro 1’
Sicurezza, Ufficio Riservato 1911-15, b. 69, f. 93
4 25 June 1914
5 23 June 1914. Cited in N. Onofri, op. cit. , p. 44
6 ibid., p. 50
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assalto socialista.7
Such an anti-socialist bloc was finally achieved 
on the eve of the election, but to no avail: the elections, 
held on the day of Franz Ferdinand’s murder in Sarajevo, 
produced the first ever socialist administration in Bologna. 
Concetto Valente, nationalist and then fascist, claimed 
in 1921 that, 'La sera del 15 luglio 1914’ -the first sitting 
of the socialist controlled council- 'preconizza la giornata 
del 21 novembre 1920', when the fascists ’assalirono Palazzo 
d'Accursio* to prevent its socialist successor from assem­
bling: 'Fin dall*estate del 1914 i socialisti con la loro 
predicazione contro la guerra e contra l'autorita dello
3
Stato hanno preparato l’attuale lotta.1 La Rassegna Nazio­
nale exhibited the same mood in its reflections on the 
lessons to be learned from Red Week:
La raffica e passata; ma e unanime il sentimento 
che essa non debba esser passata invano, e che non si 
debba puramente e semplicemente riprendere la 
strada per un istante interrotta,senza nulla mutare 
nell1indirizzo politico e sociale del governo. E 
quindi indispensabile che le energie confortanti 
rivelatesi anche in quest’occasione in tutta Italia, 
non vadano sciupate per mancanza d’indirizzo pratico e 
concorde; & indispensabile che sorga un uomo od un 
partito che innalzi una bandiera intorno alia quale 
possano raccogliersi tutti gli uomini di buona 
volonta: e necessario ed urgente ristabilire... 
il sentimento del dovere, della disciplina, del 
rispetto alia legge e all'autorita.9
The Italian government turned to the vital decisions of war
or neutrality against this background of recent socialist
advance and of insurrection. The immense political gains
for the liberal state from the successful war of 1911 have
been described; and three years later, while domestic
considerations initially kept Italy neutral, Salandra edged
toward intervention in the ensuing ten months with internal
political problems very much in mind.
Tne radical Napoleone Colojanni, commending an
7 ibid., p. 50
8 G. Valente, La Ribellione antisocialista di Bologna 
(Bologna 1921), pp. 9 and 12
9 'A proposito dei recenti disordini', La Rass. Naz., XXXVI 
(1914), vol. CXCVIII, pp. 5-7 at 5-6
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article by an army officer published in Gorriere della Sera
shortly after the outbreak of war on the possible gains
from intervention, argued that 'la mobilitazione per 1*Italia
significa rimediare alia conseguenze tuttora esistenti dello
sciagurato indirizzo, del disordine amministrativo, organ-
ico, disciplinare, degli ultimi anni.'10 The same argument
was put forward by Alfredo Rocco early in September:
Noi crediamo...alia virtu rinnovatrice della guerra... 
In Italia, tutti lo sentivano, la situazione era diven- 
uta intollerabile. Lo Stato esautorato, la nazione 
disgregata: la ricchezza pubblica sperperata, la dis- 
organizzazione penetra dovunque; la scala dei valori 
sociali rovesciata, e al sommo della cosa pubblica 
portati gli uomini piu scetteci, pih adattabili, piu 
pronti all'intrigo, piu proclivi ad accrescere e colt- 
ivare le peggiori passioni delle masse; le leghe degli 
impiegati sovrapposte alio Stato; in alcune regioni 
l'arbitrio e la violenza privata superiori ai giudici 
ed alle leggi; tutta l'attivita dello Stato confis- 
cata a vantaggio della generazione vivente. Ora, gia 
la guerra che altrove si combatte avra alcuni benefici 
effetti per la riorganizzazione dello Stato e la 
disciplinare nazionale. Ma la rigenerazione morale 
dell'Italia non pub venire che da una "nostra" partec- 
ipazione alia grande guerra. La quale, stringera insi- 
eme, di fronte al pericolo, tutte le forze vive della 
nazione, creera la disciplinare nazionale, rafforzera 
l'autorita dello Stato, farb. tacere tutti gli inter- 
essi particolari, tagliera la strada, per venti anni, 
ad ogni possibilita di sfruttamento dello Stato da 
parte dei suoi impiegati e degli operai politicanti 
parassiti della finanza pubblica e in tal modo esaut- 
orera e liquiderb definitivamente i mestieranti che 
creano la loro posizione politica facendo gli inter- 
mediari del ricatto ai danni dello Stato.11
Participation in the war would of necessity strengthen the
claims of the state, of the military and of the hierarchical
values believed by many to be on the verge of collapse in
Italy in 1914. On 1 August, the prefect of Ancona -centre of
the disturbances in June- warned Salandra that 'la calma
12attuale non pub essere che apparente', a report which can
only have heightened the prime minister's conviction that
the affair had been a carefully organised plot, soon to be 
13repeated. L'Azione shared in such fears that 'Andavano
10 Rivista Popolare, 15 Aug. 1915, p. 399
11 'Mentre 1'Italia s'adagia nel torpore della "neutralita 
benevola", II Lovere Nazionale , 5 Sep. 1914, now in 
op. cit. , pp. 169-75 at 172-73
12 Cited in B. Vigezzi, L'Italia..., p. 301
13 See, for example, A.G.S., Min. dell. Int., Direz. Gen.
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verso la guerra civile: la storia ci riscatta e ci pone
14faccia coi doveri della difesa nazionale.' War would 
only serve the cause of national regeneration if a relat­
ively brief victory could be assured; while a disastrously 
unsuccessful campaign might instead tip Italy over the 
brink into revolution* Hence San Giuliano's insistence that, 
Non e possibile impegnare 1*Italia in un guerra se non si 
ha la quasi certezza di vittoria sin dalle prime operaz- 
ioni militari. Mi pare percib ormai certe che dovremo mant- 
enere neutralita.’^
This pessimistic assessment of Italy’s political 
and military strength came initially from the events of 
June 1914, but was given further sustenance by the mounting 
unrest during the months of neutrality. By December 1914, 
Avarna could write that
nella Romagna, nell'Umbria, Emilia e nelle Marche, 
ove si h contrari alia guerra, il governo non esiste 
che di nome...Salandra non nego la caso, aggiungendo 
che gli armamenti che si facevano ora non erano 
diretti soltanto a far la guerra all Austria Ungheria, 
ma anche a prevenire i rivolgimenti interni.16
In the following month Martini noted in his diary further
unrest in Catania and elsewhere over the high price of bread
17and lack of grain* His fears that Italy was drifting
steadily toward revolution were echoed by many deputies in
a debate on the country's economic and political crisis held
by parliament over several days at the end of February
1915- Giacomo Ferri warned that 'tutto si sconvolge, tutti
i pubblici poteri si confondono, si esautorano e si ripet-
eranno piu gravi i dolorosi fatti della settimana rossa’;
while another deputy spoke of the need 'provvedere a tranq-
uillare il paese dinanzi al pericolo che si aggrava ogni
giorno non solo per la mancanza del pane, ma specialmente
per la mancanza di lavoro, che diventa sempre piu acuta e 
1 ftdolorosa.' The contribution of the famous southern socialist
della Pubb. Sic., Uff. Ris. 1911-15, b. 91, f. 207, sf. 
Affari generali, Salandra to prefects, 11 July 1914
14 9 Aug* 1914
15 A.C.S., CS, b. 2, f. 17, t. 987, San Giul. to Sal., 26 
Aug. 1914
lb Avarna Di Gualtieri, C., art. cit* , pp. 389-90
17 F. Martini, Diario..., p. 311. Entry of 24 Jan. 1915
18 A.P., Sessione 1913-15, Disc., vol. VI, t. del 22 f ebb. 
1915, p. 6261; Dugoni, ibid, t. del 23 febb., p. 6329
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deputy, De Felice-Gruiffrida, is of especial interest, dire­
ctly linking these problems with intervention:
la popolazione insorge contro i Municipi e un po1 
anche contro i deputati, che ritiene responsabili, 
non si sa perche, della deficienza del lavoro e 
dell'aumento del prezzo del pane; ma non e lontano 
il giorno, se prowedimenti radicali non saranno 
adottati, nel quale le popolazioni comprenderanno 
la vostra responsabilita, e noi, se non provvederete, 
ci metteremo alia lora testa...Io sono per la pace, 
quando la pace e possibile; sono per la guerra, quando 
la guerra h necessaria.19
In this month too, Charles Benoist recorded a conversation
with former foreign minister Luzzatti on Italy's need for
20war 'pour se purifier politiquement.'
There can be no doubt that large numbers of Italy's
ruling class saw little future for the monarchical system
without substantial gains from the war; gains which had to
be won by armed intervention rather than negotiation. In
September 1914 Luigi Albertini met with Antonio Salandra,
and agreed with the prime minister on the terrible risk to
Italian institutions if her neutrality proved ineffectual.
Borghese wrote to Albertini on the same theme, asking 'Bon
le pare che la "neutralita assoluta" ci porterebbe, fra 1'
21altro, in brevissimo tempo alia fine della monarchia?'
The published correspondence between Avarna and Bollati, 
Italian ambassadors in Berlin and Vienna, also reveals sim­
ilar fears. Both diplomats were strong supporters of the 
Central Powers, and feared the government worked for war in 
order to prolong its existence, as well as that of the 
monarchy. As Avarna commented on 19 September,
In sostanza da noi si vuole profittare ad ogni costo 
dell'occasione presente per completare l'unita nazi­
onale. E teme che se alia fine della guerra il governo 
non fosse in grado di annunziare al paese l'acquisto 
delle provincie irredente, questo indignato lo spazz- 
er& via e vi sara allora da temere forse anche per 
la dinastia.22
Bollati accepted that the government wanted war to save itself
19 ibid., t. del 24 marzo, pp. 6360-61
20 C. Benoist, op. cit. , p. 249. Martini also told Benoist of 
Italy's need for war to save the monarchy, ibid. , p. 246
21 L. Albertini, Venti anni..., p. 342; Epistolario, vol. 1, 
p. 270
22 art. cit. , p. 256, Avarna to Bollati, 19 Sep. 1914
176
and the dynasty, an interpretation confirmed in the next 
months. With the first street demonstrations over interv­
ention in March 1915, Avarna feared that ’la situazione h 
tale ormai che il governo si trova di fronte al dilemna
guerra o rivoluzione, e si decider^, naturalmente per la
25pnma per evitare possibilmente la seconda. ’ Both ambass­
adors were very much out of sympathy with Salandra’'s gover­
nment: in September Bollati had predicted that if Italy made 
no gains from the war, ’il paese indignato spazzera via il
governo -e questo sarebbe poco male- ma potrebbe mettere
24in pericolo la dinastia.1 It might be argued that their
criticisms sprang from resentment at rejection of their
advice, or show the influence of their viewpoint in Berlin
and Vienna. Yet Martini records Salandra himself as fearing
that ’il paese non ci pardonerebbe mai di aver lasciato che
l’Europa mutasse il suo assetto politico senza nessun nostro
beneficio’; while Martini told the prime minister of his
fears for Italian institutions in the event of prolonged
neutrality, and on another occasion offered Foreign Minister
25Sonnino the usual choice between war and revolution. All 
these forebodings came within six weeks of war being decl­
ared, again well before the dire social and economic implic­
ations of neutrality became fully clear.
Sonnino was also unhappy at Italy’s future prospects. 
De Martini, Secretary-G-eneral of the Consulta, advised him 
that neutrality might bring Italy the Trentino, but on 
sight of Slav gains in the Adriatic and her own loss of 
position in the eastern Mediterranean,
Ogni beneficio dell’acquisto del Trentino sara 
neutralizzato. E i partiti sovversivi dopo l’assaggio 
del giugno scorso, avrebbero troppo buon gioco. 
L’azione di essi trascinerebbe il paese a un movi- 
mento interno di conseguenze incalcolabile, col 
punto di partenza di esigere stretto conto dei 
miliardi di spese militari.26
Sonnino’s insistence at a meeting with Bulow in December 1914
25 ibid., LXII, p. 78. 7 March 1915
24 ibid., p. 259. 24 Sep.
25 F. Martini, op. cit., p. 59. 15 Aug.; p. 95, 15 Sep.; p. 
99, 16 Sep.
26 S. Sonnino, Carteggio, 1914-16 (Bari 1974), pp. 141-46
at 145
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that the fate of the monarchy depended on the satisfaction
27of national interests was no diplomatic ploy, hut a
conviction which can he found scattered throughout his
diary for the period. In February he reflects that
La monarchia di Savoia non avere nel Regno, se ai 
eccettua il Piemonte, altre radice che quella della 
personificazione delle idealita nazionali, radice 
tanto forte da aver potuto reggere e vincere di fro- 
nte al lungo contrasto col Papato e al dilagarsi del 
socialismo nel suo periodo piu rivoluzionario; ma 
che doveva mantenersi viva e vegeta, sotto pena di 
morte dell'intero organismo.
If the monarchy fails to represent national sentiments,
no
1sarebbe andata incontro alia rivoluzione.' The Central
Powers hope that unrest in Italy over the recent earthquake
and the price of food will hinder her entry into the war,
but the truth 'h che tutte queste divisioni...sparirebbero
per incanto pel solo fatto dell'entrata in guerra la quale
verrebbe cosi ad assumere un pregio speciale: quello di
fare da diversivo, da unificatore degli animi, e da pacifi-
29catore all'interno.' Olindo Malagodi, editor of La Tribuna,
was told by Sonnino in December that failure to use the war
’compiere l'unit& nazionale' would have an effect ’assai
grave su la situazione interna': Malagodi noted that 'h
evidente che per Sonnino, come per G-iolitti, costituisce la
30massima preoccupazione,' Salandra too had confided similar
31fears to Malagodi. The prime minister also told Pietro 
Bertolini, one of his ministers, that the country's instit­
utions would not survive if Italy emerged from the war empty- 
32handed.
This aspect of the debate over intervention -'si 
tratta del re', as Senator Blaserna told Bulow at the begi­
nning of January- was understood by ambassadors in Rome.
Bulow sent many reports to Berlin warning that the government
27 S. Sonnino, Diario, p. 4-9. Entry of 18 Dec.
28 ibid., p. 89. Entry of 16 Feb. 1915
29 ibid., p. 81. Entry of 1 Feb. 1915
30 0. Malagodi, Conversazioni della guerra, 1914-19» ed. B. 
Vigezzi, (Milan I960), vol. 1, p. 31
31 ibid., p. 40. 11 Jan.
32 P. Bertolini, 'Diario (agosto 1914-maggio 1915)*, N.A. , 
f. 1221, Feb. 1923, p. 217. 29 Oct.
33 Cited in Monticone, op. cit. , p. 235
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might opt for war as a means to avoid even more traumatic
events. Rodd also advised that
If Italy were to let this opportunity of accompl­
ishing her destiny go by, not only would this 
Government be instantly swept away...but the repu­
blicans and the extreme left would carry all before 
them if the country were to fail in establishing its 
title to share in the settlement.
Rodd's view was echoed by T. Nelson Page, Ambassador of the 
■34.
United States. Victor Emanuel III clearly did not inspire
great confidence. Martini believed that even the king had
no faith in the monarchy1s future -'nato borghese sarebbe
35 „repubblicano e forse socialista. ’ Bulow reported the king
as fearing for his throne if Italy did not obtain generous
compensation, and of warning a group of politicians that
whereas the failure of Italy at the Congress of Berlin in
1878 had only harmed those involved in the negotiations, a
3 6repetition of such failure would undermine his position.
In May 1915, Graf Stefan Tisza told Burian that the king’s
fear of revolution drove him to support war, a claim later
37supported by Count Sforza. Victor Emmanuel had suffered 
humiliation at the end of April, with the victory of a 
republican over a constitutional candidate in an election 
at Borgo. Yet it seems unlikely that the king played any 
decisive role in the move toward intervention; on the 
outbreak of war Torre depicts him as in a state of nervous70
collapse, offering to abdicate if required, and he may 
well have simply followed the advice of Salandra over the 
next months, particularly since the prime minister and 
Sonnino were clearly working toward intervention.
Three years after the close of World War I, the
34 On BVilow, see ibid., pp. 154, 158, 222, and 267; P.R.O., 
F.O. 170/853, no. 12, Rodd to Grey, 14 Jan. 1915; T. Nelson 
Page, Italy and the World War (London 1920), p. 198
35 F. Martini, op. cit. , p. 393. Entry of 24 April 1915
36 Cited in Monticone, op. cit., pp. 158 and 227
37 G. S. Tisza, Briefe, 1914-1918 (Berlin 1928), p. 206. See 
also pp. 204 and 215; W. Sforza, ’II regno di Vittorio 
Emanuele III', N.A., f. 1766, Feb. 1948, pp. 114-21 at 
118-19
38 L. Albertini, Epistolario. vol. 1, p. 257
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sociologist Achille Loria suggested that an awareness of
internal gains from involvement in that war was central to
decisions in governments across Europe: he discussed
un’altra ragione secreta, inavvertita eppure poss- 
ente, che rende ormai a tutti necessario, o supre- 
mamente desiderato, l’esplodere di una guerra 
mondiale. Da gran tempo invero le basi dellfordine 
sociale paion minate e 1*irrequietudine crescente 
delle folle costituisce per le classi proprietarie 
una crescente minaccia, tanto piu grave quanto meno 
pubblicamente affermata.59
Loria believed this interpretation was of especial relevance
to Italy in 1914-15, where
dinanzi ad una situazione tanto critica non bastano 
gli armamenti; e necessaria la guerra, la quale sola 
appresta alle passioni irrequiete un revulsivo provv- 
idenziale. Che essa soffoca ogni dissidio di classe 
sotto l'incubo irrevocabile della patria minacciata, 
aceomuna i cittadini dei ceti pih varii nella iden­
tity di interessi e di cimenti educata dalla trincea; 
cancella il problema economico sotto l'assillo rodente 
del problema politico e patriottico; scava infine in 
seno a tutte le istituzioni liberali una larga pare- 
ntesi, ristaurando la censura, gli stati d’assedio, 
il governo militare, il bando d'ogni libero moto e 
cosi crea una botta di fuoco, un vescicante che 
distrae prowidamente l!attenzione dal problema 
sostanziale e minaccioso, una impareggiabile val- 
vola di sicurezza, che salva pel momento da una 
esplosione interna altrimenti inevitabile.40
It is precisely this benefit of war which can be 
sensed underlying many of Salandra1s remarks during neutr­
ality. In a speech of 26 February 1915, for example, where 
he urges that
occorre la preparazione morale...a fronteggiare la 
gravissima situazione internazionale che si h 
prodotta e che nessuno puo sapere quanto durer&. Ma 
la preparazione morale del paeae non e fatta di 
comizi e di conflitti; & fatta di pensoso raccogli- 
mento, di disciplina morale, non di anarchia.41
Or even more explicitly in his speech on the very eve of
intervention, in which Salandra demanded extraordinary
powers for the government:
59 A. Loria, Aspetti sociali della guerra mondiale (Milan
1921), p. 50
40 ibid., pp. 52-5
41 A. Salandra, Discorsi parlamentari, vol. 5, p. 1019
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I eontrasti di partiti e di classi, le opinioni 
individuali...debbono oggi sparire di fronte a una 
necessita che supera ogni altra necessita, ad un 
idealita che infiamma piu di ogni altra idealita: 
la fortuna e la grandezza d1Italia.
Ogni altra cosa dobbiamo da oggi dimenticare 
e ricordare questa sola: di essere tutti Italiani, 
di amar tutti 1*Italia con la medesima fede e con 
il medesimo fervore. Le forze di tutti s'integrino 
in una forza sola: i cuori di tutti si rinsaldino 
in un sol cuore; una sola unanime volont& guidi 
verso la meta invocata; e forza e cuore e volonta 
trovino la loro espressione unica, viva ed eroica, 
nell1esercito e nell'armato d1Italia e nel Capo 
Augusto, che li conduce verso i destini della 
nuova storia!42
After which the chamber closed until December. When the
prime minister asserted that 'la pace interna dovr& essere
a qualunque costo assicurata...Ad altri tempi le compet-
izioni politiche ed economiche; ad altri tempi le gare fra
i partiti, i gruppi, le c l a s s i h i s  justification was the
need to present a united front before the rest of Europe;
but one can see this political truce equally as an end in
itself, a chance for the forces of liberalism to recoup
lost ground.
Behind the incantatory demands for unity lay a very 
substantial political gain for the forces supporting Sala­
ndra. His call is answered by leading radicals. Sacchi told 
the chamber in December 1914 that, 'E questa l'ora in cui 
tutti i partiti debbono dimenticarsi dfessere tali, perche 
al di sopra di essi si affermi nella sua concordia il pens- 
iero della Nazione.'^ Yiti De Marco's change of heart is 
even more striking. As recently as 1914 an impassioned 
opponent of protection -
LE INDUSTRIE CHE SI SONO SVILUPPATE NON HANNO PIU
BISOG-NO della protezione e debbono gradualmente
RINUNZIARVI (come l’industria del cotone): LE 
INDUSTRIE CHE, AD ONTA DELLA TRENTENNALE INFANZIA 
PROTETTA, NON SONO RIUSCITE AD ACCLIMATARSI, DEBBONO 
LIQUIDARE IN TEMPO Pltf 0 MENO BREVE
was soon campaigning for war and in practice strengthening
42 ibid., p. 1042. Speech of 20 May
43 A.P., C.D., Legis. XXIV, t. del 3 die. 1914, p. 5533
44 ibid., p. 5b44
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Salandra1s ministry, fdal quale poi ci dividono parecchie
questioni di politica di grande importanza, ma che in
45questo momento passano in secondo linea.' Labriola also
offered the government his support, in a message of September
1914 (the opening words of which echo G-iolitti's dismissal
of the socialist threat on the eve of Italy's last war):
il governo non si preoccupi dell1opposizione dei 
socialisti. Se il governo decidesse un intervento, 
alcuni di noi sono in grado di paralizzare la qual- 
siasi azione dei socialisti "ufficiali". In questo 
momento gl'interessi permanenti del paese debbono 
passare su tutte le preferenze politiche.46
The adhesion of radical and democratic forces to the
cause of Italian intervention in the war did nothing to alter
the fundamentally conservative impulse in Salandra's policy.
Rather, their support (offered always without the least
influence on the development of government policy) served
merely to demonstrate that policy's success. As Angelo Tasca
reflected many years later,
la pattuglia dei partigiani della guerra "rivoluz- 
ionaria”, "democratica", e ben presto sommersa dall' 
adesione degli elementi piu reazionari, che vedono 
nella guerra, qualunque essa sia, il mezzo d'annu- 
llare il verdetto rosso delle elezioni del 1913* La 
vecchia borghesia, minacciata nei comuni ed al Parl- 
amento, neutralista per spirito conservatore, si 
converte alia guerra per finirla con la politica 
riformista che sgretola i suoi privilegi e che 
provoca l'irruzione di nuovi gruppi sociali nella 
vita politica del paese.47
This interpretation is shared by Mario Missiroli, himself 
active in the struggle against socialism in Bologna immed­
iately before the war:
In realta, la borghesia italiana, nella sua enorme 
maggioranza, non aveva voluto la guerra; e non la 
aveva amata. L'aveva accettata come un sopruso e vi 
si rassegnb solo quando pote credere, nel suo intimo, 
che essa importasse una minima somma di sacrific'i e 
valesse, oltre tutto, a sedare il movimento social- 
ista, che si dimostrava gia cosi audace e avido e 
bramoso di potere. Le elezioni del 1913 e l'avvento
45 A. Yiti Le Marco, Italy and England (Florence 1914, 15), 
pp. 19 and 13
46 G. Le Biase, 'La un carteggio inedito Salandra-Li San Giu- 
liano: la neutralita italiana (luglio-ottobre 1914)', 
Quaderni di cultura e storia sociale, 3 (1954), pp. 194-95
47 A. Tasca, Hascita e avvento del fascismo (Florence 1950),
p. 6
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dei socialisti nei grandi Comuni avevano chiaramente 
indicato che qualche cosa di profondo, di radical- 
mente nuovo si maturava nella politica italiana: non 
era difficile sentire che nuovi ceti si sprigionavano 
dal mondo operaio ed artigiano; che una nuova democ- 
razia, a sfondo sociale, stava per sorgere in sost- 
ituzione dell'antica borghesia, invecchiata nei 
quadri fissi e negli uomini. Alla borghesia reazion- 
aria la guerra era parsa un male, ma un rimedio effi- 
cace contro il socialismo che nessuna astuzia giovava 
piu a ridurre nelle proporzioni o a domare.48
Just as intervention in 1915 comes as the culmination
of Italy's expansionism, so too this decision is the clearest
example of the attempt to use foreign policy as a means of
political cohesion within Italy, in line with the phenomenon
observed by Max Weber, that every successful imperialist
policy of coercing other powers normally also strengthens
the domestic prestige and power of those classes and parties
49under whose leadership the success occurred. Much the same
idea can be found in a work published in Italy as early as
1906 entitled II sentimento imperialista. Studio psico-
sociologico, in which the author argues,
Gosl 1'imperialismo si risolve negli uomini politici 
in un programma unionista, in un programma di coord- 
inamento, di coesione interna -facilitato nell'app- 
licazione dall1indifferenza, dalla calma del gruppo 
riguardo alle questioni di politica interna...
Percib 11imperialismo, che e unione di un gruppo 
nella vita internazionale, h 1'ultima leva potente, 
che nel tempo presente serve a sradicare, ad esaur- 
ire, anche col sacrificio di antiche idealita e di 
interessi materiali, certi problemi, che parevano . 
insiti nella vita politica interna dei singoli 
gruppi.50
The occupation of Yalona toward the end of December, while 
in line with Italy's Adriatic interests as described earlier, 
also had a domestic function, Minister of Colonies Martini 
wrote to Salandra in mid-September on his alarm at socialist 
and republican activity, and at a possible repetition of 
the events of June 1914: 'A frenare e divertire le impazienze,
48 M. Missiroli, II fascismo e la crisi italiana (Bologna
1921), p. 3
49 M. Weber, Economy and Society: an outline of interpret­
ive sociology (Berkeley 1979), vol. 2, p. 920
50 G. Amadori Virgili. Cited in Are and Giusti, art. cit. , 
pp. 148-49
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mi parve opportuna 1’occupazione di Valona che desse frat-
tanto a noi agio di veder piii chiaramente nella generale
condizione delle cose, e a prepararci a possihili imprese 
51maggiori.1 Sonnino also advised the prime minister of the 
need
fare una cosa popolare: che distrae la menti da 
tante altre troppo pericolose questioni, dando 
modo al Governo di preparare un'azione piu seria 
e generale nel marzo...che riempira le discussioni 
parlamentari...che dark a te personalmente una 
grande forza politica.52
Fears that such drastic action was needed to halt the drift 
toward collapse could only have been reinforced by further 
socialist electoral triumphs in March and April of 1915; 
supplementary elections in Bologna, Montecchio, Gorgon­
zola and Ferrara centred on the question of intervention, 
and showed a clear socialist advance on their position of 
1913. Government measures against the administration of 
Bologna on the outbreak of war led Gritica Sociale to 
suggest that 'questa guerra sembra a molti lo sbocco voluto
di una guerra interna di partiti costituzionali, per reint-
53egrare i piu conservatori nel potere.'
Yet this confidence in the salutary effects of war
-the belief expressed by Borghese in 1915 that 1tutte le
nazioni combattenti di oggi saranno rinsaldate, divenute
eroiche, irrobustite da un forza sociale non sospettata
finora...1’intera coscienza nazionale trovera la sua reden- 
54zione'- would prove to be misplaced. Immediate events on
the close of the war suggested that Nitti’s gloomy remarks
in a letter to Giolitti -'Certamente la trasformazione
sociale sara piu profonda di quella prodotta da qualsiasi
altro evento ricordato dalla storia; e la borghesia ne
55paghera le spese sotto tutte le forme1- were a far more 
accurate assessment of the political ramifications of
51 F. Martini, Lettere» p. 495. 15 Sep.
52 A. Solmi, 'Carteggio tra Salandra e Sonnino nella prima
fase della neutralita', N.A., f. 1510, Feb. 1935, PP» 
483-503 at 493. 26 Sep. See also P.P.I., p. 518, Sal. 
to Imperiali, 3 Oct. 1914
53 'In faccia all'evento!', XXV (1915), lb-31 May 1915, p.
14 b
54 G. A. Borghese, Italia e Germania (Milan 1915), P- 319
55 F. Nitti, Rivelazioni, pp. 570-71
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Italian intervention. However, Nitti wrote this in December 
191b, by which time Italian troops were already well into 
their second winter at war : yet the assumption of an extr­
emely short war, made so largely by Italy’s participation, 
was fundamental to all debate over joining the campaign.
The exaggerated respect for Italy’s military prowess, which 
had won her such favourable terms in the Treaty of London, 
seems to have been shared equally in Rome. Giolitti recorded
the expectation among deputies that the war would last only
56three to four months once Italy joined in, and the same
confidence shapes the policy of Salandra and Sonnino. By
early in 1915 both men believed that the war had reached a
decisive stage, and intervention in May was timed partly to
avoid a winter campaign. Nitti claims to have found the
prime minister nonplussed by his remarks in the summer of
1915 on the need to prepare the army materially for the 
57winter. The assumptions of Salandra’s policy are clear in 
his remarks to the Senate in December 1914 that, 'se, un 
secolo fa, il 1815 fu l’anno della pace che noi dovemmo 
stracciare per ricostituirci a nazione, io mi auguro che 
il 1915 sia l’anno di una pace, dalla quale 1’Italia acqu-
C  Q
isti maggior gloria e grandezza.' Sonnino too did not
expect the fighting to last beyond the autumn, and negot-
59iated in London on this assumption. Hence the demand for 
a loan of fifty million pounds from Britain -sufficient 
to cover one month of war, which was raised to sixty mill­
ions and then had to be supplemented by a second Anglo- 
Italian financial agreement, providing for a further loan 
of 122,000,000 lire at a later date. The Italian government 
did not hesitate over intervention per se; rather, in the 
words of Luigi Einaudi, 'si manovrasse per cogliere, a 
proprio vantaggio, il momento migliore per spiccare dall' 
albero la pera matura della partecipazione breve e vittoriosa
56 Gr. Oiolitti, Memorie, p. 322
57 E. Nitti, op. cit., pp. 402-3. See also 0. Benoist, op. 
cit., pp. 251-52
58 A. Salandra, Disc. Pari., p. 1009. 18 Dec.
59 S. Sonnino, Diario, p. 49. Entry of 18 Dec. Albertini 
held the same opinion: see Epistolario, vol. 1, p. 268, 
Alb. to D ’Annunzio, 7 Jan. 1915
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alia lotta dell*intesa.' Such a victory would bring 
domestic and territorial rewards. The remorseless progress 
of socialism would be halted, and fresh support won for the 
agrarian and industrial groups backing an expansionist 
foreign policy. Finally, Griovanni Ciolitti's central posit­
ion in Italian politics would be destroyed.
The disparity between Giolitti and his successor 
comes through in the former prime minister*s readiness to 
reach a negotiated settlement with Austria-hungary in 1914- 
15- Even a radical such as Viti De Marco, whose party had 
until March 1914 been one of the mainstays of Griolitti’s 
political dominance, opposed any compromise with Vienna
in quanto il problema della rivendicazione nazionali 
non si risolve ma si aggrava con lo strappare all* 
Austria, ancora alleata, un vescovado, per aggiungere 
una prefettura al Regno d*Italia; la democrazia vuole 
la guerra, sol perchb vuol risolvere un grande prob­
lema: quello dell'unita e dell*indipendenza politica 
d*Italia in Europa.6l
While Italy must fight with the Triple Entente, it is clear
that the country has different interests from these powers:
Donde segue la necessita del nostro intervento armato, 
per arrivare al nuovo Congresso della pace col 
’fatto compiuto.* E non basta preparar le armi.
Questo dovr& avere le sanzione del Congresso della 
pace il che non h possibile senza accordi preliminari 
con gli Stati dell*Intesa e con la Serbia.62
Widespread agreement on,the need for Italian intervention
provided the terrain for a sectarian move against G-iolitti,
and for a national policy redefined in Salandra*s terms.
Hoone understood this more clearly than G-iolitti himself,
who remained silent in 1915 but wrote later that
Era evidente che non mancava chi cercava di sfru- 
ttare quella situazione agli effetti della politica 
interna; e ci furono parecchi che, pretendendo di 
fare del superpatriottismo, accusando gli altri, 
in realta compivano una pericolosissima opera di 
disgregazione•b3
The Piedmontese statesman had been inundated with warnings
from deputies of Salandra’s intentions, and of efforts to
bO L. Einaudi, La condotta economica, p. 34
61 A. Viti De Marco, Un trentennio, p. 350. Speech of 20 Feb.
62 ibid.
63 G. Giolitti, op. cit. , p. 335
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discredit him as !un austriacante!!?1^
In July 1914 Salandra had moved against ' Giolittian'
prefectures, such as those in Bologna and Rome. Further
heads rolled in the following May, including three of the
four prefects in Piedmont and the prefect of Florence -the
latter described by Rodd as ’ostentatiously demonstrative
in his Germanophile sentiments since the outbreak of the 
65European war.' The autumn and winter months were spent
waiting on developments in Europe, and in consolidating
his hold on power. Vigezzi has shown how in the autumn of
1914 the decision for war became caught up in attempts
to discredit G-iolitti’s handling of the army, and to depict
Italy as militarily prostrate at such a crucial point
6 6because of his years of misgovernment. In these months, 
and again in January 1915, Salandra's thoughts turned 
toward a possible election to strengthen his position. The 
prime minister's efforts won the backing of all those eager 
for the final dispatch of G-iolitti. La Voce politica 
argued in May 1915 that, 'Salandra ha il compito storico 
di liberarci dai prefetti giolittiani, dai delegati di 
pubblica sicurezza giolittiani, dai magistrati giolittiani, 
dai deputati giolittiani e da Giolitti stesso.’ Prezz- 
olini, writing in a special issue of La Voce politica enti­
tled 'Abasso G-iolitti!' , also discussed intervention prim­
arily in domestic terms:
e forse bene che G-iolitti non sia morto per mano 
di una folia indignata o di un oscuro esecutore 
delle volonta nazionali. G-li sara punizione maggiore 
veder la rovina propria e l'altrui vittoria e comp- 
iersi il grande destino d'Italia nella propria 
assenza.68
The title of this article, 'La Rivoluzione antigiolittiana' , 
suggests the angle from which many pressed for intervention
64 G. Giolitti, Quarant'anni, pp. 117-18. Falcioni to Giol#, 
7 Jan. 1915
65 P.R.O., F.O. 371/2575, Rodd to Grey, 14 April 1915
66 B. Vigezzi, Da Giolitti..., pp. 389-90
67 'La Voce', 'Salandra Conservatore', La Voce politica, May 
1915, now in A. G-olzio and A. Guerra (ed.). La cultura 
italiana del '900 attraverso le riviste, vol. 5 (Turin 
1962), p. 747
68 ibid., pp. 742-45 at 744
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in May 1915. The loathing felt by many for Giolitti is
expressed in this attack in Lacerba on
La vile canizza giolittiana, l’ignobile, Iosco, 
vomitativo Giolitti; gli analfabeti dell”’Avanti’’, 
i preti, i giornalisti venduti, i generali bulo- 
wiani, la melma fetente universitaria, professorale, 
filosofica; la ciurmaglia, bavosa, laida del senato 
...tutti questi sbirri, e cortigiani e ambiziosi e 
interessati -con che moneta pagheranno prossimamente, 
quando 1!Italia, raggiunti a dispetto della loro 
vigliaccheria e infamia, i suoi fini di nazione 
civile e fatta per 11 awenire, trovera il momento 
di fare i conti con essi?69
Even a Giolitti prepared to fight Austria would not be wan­
ted
perche Giolitti non e degno di farla, perchk qui 
non si tratta soltanto di scegliere tra la guerra 
e il disonore, ma tra la giustizia e la sopraffa- 
zione. La guerra deve purificare la vita italiana 
e non dar nuova forza al polipaio giolittiano.70
War gave an opportunity to discredit Giolitti, who ’nel
1915, con la tesi del 'parecchio1...tenta di tradire 1*
Italia e di riconquistare il potere per esercitarlo al
comando del suo padrone Bernardo von Bulow.’ ^  The desire
to sweep away the whole Giolittian edifice of power is
stated most extremely by Mussolini, writing in Popolo
d’Italia only a few days before intervention:
La disciplinare deve cominciare dall’alto, se si 
vuole che sia rispettata in basso. Quanto a me, 
io sono sempre piu fermamente convinto che per la 
salute d*Italia bisognerebbe fucilare, dico fuci- 
lare, nella schiena, qualche dozzina di deputati 
e mandare all1ergastolo un paio almeno di ex-mini- 
stri. Non solo, ma io credo, con fede sempre piu 
profonda, che il Parlamento in Italia sia il bubbone 
pestifero che avvelena il sangue della Nazione. 
Occorre estirparlo.
C’b da rabbrividire al pensiero che si trovano, 
in questo momento, a Roma, piu di duecento deputati.
E costoro tramano, brigano, ciarlano: non hanno che 
una pensiero: conservare la medaglietta; non hanno 
che una speranza: quella di entrare -sia pure come 
la quinta ruota del carro- in qualche "combinazione” 
ministeriale. Intanto, con l'ostentato ritorno di 
Giolitti a Roma, noi siamo costretti ad occuparci
69 A. Soffici, ’Sulla soglia’, Lacerba, III (1915), now in 
G. Scalia (ed.), La cultura..., vol. 4* PP. 589-90
70 ibid. , p. 595
71 !La Voce’, ’Carriera del Oav. Giovanni Giolitti’ , La 
Yoce politica, May 1915, now in La cultura..., vol. 5, 
pp. 746-51 at 751. The many insinuations of a deal made
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della "situazione parlamentare". Siamo, cioe, rico- 
ndotti alle nostre miserie. E triste.72
The nationalists, too, would move from a condemnation of 
Giolitti to rejection of the whole political system in 
which he could operate: but the effect of this in the imme- 
diate debate over intervention was to provide further support 
for the prime minister's move against Griolitti.
Salandra's manoeuvres were assisted by Italy's poli­
tical system, which granted inordinate power to a prime 
minister with the confidence of the king and military, 
Salandra's scant regard for his colleagues or parliamentary 
opinion in the development of foreign policy was in no sense 
innovatory -San Giuliano had written to him in September 
1914 advising that 'in genere io penso (come Griolitti) che 
convenga parlare il meno possibile di politica estera in 
Gonsiglio dei ministri.' However the reticence of both 
Salandra and Sonnino led even Martini, the only minister 
to be taken into their confidence, to complain in March 1915 
of excessive secrecy and to insist on the need to consult 
more with the Cabinet.^ The Verbali dei Gonsiglio dei 
Ministri show clearly that Salandra's fellow ministers had 
absolutely no say in Italy's passage from the Triple Alliance 
to the Triple Entente, from neutrality to intervention. As
Salandra wrote to his foreign minister, 'noi due soli' made 
75policy. Sonnino's reserve had been notorious in Italian 
political life for decades, and drew from Bdlow the compl­
aint that in a nation of chatterboxes he had to deal with
rj r
the only man who would not speak. Many ministers might 
have agreed, when at a Cabinet meeting of 7 May they 
were informed by Sonnino that Italy had left the Triple 
Alliance three days earlier, had committed herself to the
between Billow and Giolitti heard at the time and subsequ­
ently are refuted by Monticone, op. cit. , pp. 559-80. Much 
was even made of the presence of Giolitti's son-in-law at 
the head of Allegmeine Elektrizitat Gesellschaft.
72 Popolo d'Italia. 11 Ma.v 1915
73 D.D.I., Series V, vol. 1, p. 343, San Giul. to Sal., 5 
Sep. 1914
74 Diario, p. 373. Entry of 29 March. See also L. Albertini, 
Epist., vol. 1, pp. 264-5, Ojetti to Alb., 24 Aug. 1914
75 A. Monticone, 'Salandra e Sonnino verso la decisione dell' 
intervento', R.S.P.I., XXIV (1957), pp. 64-89 at 69. 16 
March 1915
76 J. Bainville, op. cit. , p. 195
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entente powers and to joining the war at the end of the
month. Despite this fait accompli, and the accompanying
pressure for loyalty to agreements made and the honour of
the country, several ministers made clear their preference
77for a negotiated peace with Austria. At a cabinet meeting 
two days earlier, there had been no discussion of the inter­
national situation (apart from Libya), although Blilow was
then told that the cabinet had found his most recent offer 
7ftunacceptable. The armed forces too suffered under this 
approach. On 11 May, the chief of the naval general staff 
had to write to Salandra inquiring after the terms of any 
naval agreement in the Treaty of London; similarly, Minis­
ter of Marine Viale's request to Sonnino on 19 May for 
some clue as to when hostilities might begin received the 
foreign minister’s attention four days later, when he
79replied that war would be declared the following day.
It seems clear, then, that Salandra and Sonnino, 
having opted for war, were able to disregard the doubts of 
many even in their government, and commit Italy against the 
Central Powers. The confusion caused in parliament by Sal­
andra1 s silence is revealed in a letter from Filippo 
Turati to Anna Kuliscioff of December 1914:
Mi diceva Fradeletto stamane di essere uscito allora 
da un crocchio di tre deputati lui compreso, che 
avevano tutti votato per l’ordine del giorno Bettolo: 
lui Fradeletto perchk, neutralista, e convinto che 
Salandra non fara la guerra; il secondo, perchk 
vuole la guerra per e con la Francia; il terzo 
perchk vuole la guerra per e con 1*Austria!80
The prime minister was not however working in complete 
independence of public opinion, in the sense Steiner sugg­
ests Grey felt able to disregard domestic opposition to his
on
policy. In fact the struggle between neutralist and
77 Monticone, op. cit. , pp. 544-47
78 Martini, op. cit., p. 405; Monticone, op. cit. , p. 533
79 G. Gifuni, ’Tre memorabile giornate’, p. 87; A.S., pacco 
236, disp. 99, Viale to Sonnino, 19 May; pacco 240, tel. 
23, Sonnino to Viale, 23 May
80 Cited in B. Vigezzi. Giolitti e Turati: un incontro 
mancato (Milan 1976), p. 632
81 Z. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World
ar (London 1977)
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interventionist forces in 1914-15 is in part a projection 
of the political disagreements within the liberal ruling 
class, with intervention marking a rejection of G-iolitti’s 
approach by important elements of that alliance. The emer­
gence of Salandra and the adumbration of his 'national' 
policy has already been described as a result of the mount­
ing distrust of Giolitti amongst employers. It was however 
in the conditions of imminent war that this policy came 
into its own and won substantial popular support. Salandra 
seized early on the profound changes European war would 
bring to political life in Italy. Acknowledging Giolitti's 
support for neutrality early in August 1914, he argued 
that
Non mi nascondo perb le gravi ragioni che militavano 
per un diverse risoluzione; e so bene che gli avven- 
imenti, i quali si svolgeranno nessuno pub dir come, 
faranno sorgere altri problemi e imporranno altre 
risoluzioni, le quali, oltre che sulla politica 
estera, avranno conseguenza di massima importanza 
sulla politica interna e sulla politica economica 
del paese.82
Salandra*s unusual brand of liberalism, consisting
largely of a celebration of the power of the state over all
sectional demands -as contained in his electoral address of
1915, which argued that
ogni desiderio di progresso, ogni osservanza di 
tradizione, ogni aspirazione di persone o di classe, 
ogni interesse materiale e subordinato alia conser- 
vazione, alia grandezza, all'esaltazione della 
Patria. Liberalismo in Italia voile e vuol dire 
patriottismo 83
- found the perfect political terrain in 1914-15. Patriotism
was annexed by Salandra and his followers -as he argued,
'la fiamma, la sostanza ideale del'liberalismo italiano,
& il patriottismo, e l'amore di patria...rivendico al mio
partito il diritto di asserire sopra qualunque altra cosa,
84ed eventualmente contro tutti, 1'idea della patria.'
Giolittifs cooperation with the socialists should be repl­
aced by 'azione di resistenza alia minacce del socialismo,
82 P.P.I., Series 5, vol. 1, p. 5nl
83 Gited in A. Bignardi, Ritratti liberali (Bologna 1969), 
p. 49
84 A. Salandra, Pise. Pari., pp. 792-93
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85azione di vigile e occulato rinvigorimento’, and the pers­
istent threat of social unrest quelled by a new assertive 
national policy. As the prime minister wrote in December 
1914,
La vita pubblica non h piu pacifico possesso; & 
lotta. Bisogna intenderla ed esercitarla cosl anche 
per i migliori: altrimenti saranno sopraffatti. Da 
noi le condizioni attuali son dovute in gran parte 
all'ignavia e all’inerzia delle classi dirigenti.
Se non si riscuotono, peggio per loro.86
Regardless of likely territorial gains, intervention would
of itself help in the political regeneration of Italy, in
ft 7the !trionfale riscossa1 among the liberal bourgeoisie
he had called for some jears earlier, and the defeat of
anti-militarism through a brief and triumphant military
campaign. Salandra admitted that the fierce action against
public meetings or demonstrations taken in February 1915
1 e inspirita ad un solo concetto: al concetto di evitare
che lfantico funesto fermento della guerra civile, che
avvelena ancora coi suoi residui lfanima italiana, non si
88manifesti in questo momento.'
When the prime minister broke his ambiguous silence 
in mid-October to speak of Italy1s ’sacro egoismo*, this 
was seen generally as a diplomatic gaffe caused by inexper­
ience: yet his remarks can be seen equally as a rallying 
cry to the groups within Italy who had supported Salandra 
in the hope of just such an approach. Certainly many soci­
alists suspected his government of attempting to give 
Italian political life a more authoritarian tone. One deputy 
claimed Salandra’s policy during June 1914 represented ’una 
nuova linea di politica interna’; or rather, a return to 
the old methods of 1898, a charge repeated by De Felice,
who detected ’in tutto cio che avviene oggi un odore di
89*98. Sento tornare l’anima del Ministro Pelloux.’ The 
point had been made most powerfully by Labriola two months
85 Cited in F. Boffi, II pensiero politico di Antonio 
Salandra (Citta di Castello 1914), p. 2-9
86 G. Gifuni, Salandra inedito (Milan 1975), p. 63
87 A. Salandra, La politica..., p. XXIII
88 A.P.C.D., Legis. XXIV, t. del 26 feb. 1915, p. 6482. See 
also La neutralita, p. 435
89 A.P.C.D., Le^is. XXIV, p. 3871, Mosti-Trotti; ibid. , p. 
3874, De Felice
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earlier, in a speech, to the chamber rejecting Salandra1 s 
government as an anachronism, a negation of all the devel­
opments in the previous ten to fifteen years:
Troppo 1898 c1^  intorno al suo Gabinetto, onorevole 
Salandra.••Quindici anni addietro un Governo pres- 
ieduto dall1onorevole Salandra sarebbe stato un 
fatto normale, ora 1!onorevole Salandra non pub 
dissimularsi che il paese b passato su di lui...
Se la democrazia parlamentare oggi non celebra i 
propri funerali, essa deve riconoscere che non si 
affida la difesa della democrazia a coloro che non 
ebbero mai in essa fiducia e derisero costantemente 
i suoi principi.90
War brought many strange alliances, however, and by December
91Labriola was offering the government his support, further 
tribute to the success of Salandra1s policy. A policy 
which revolved on the idea that, as one senator proposed 
to Giolitti,
una guerra, combattuta dall1Italia, sarebbe, forse, 
propizia occasione per riunire gl!italiani e strin- 
gerli intorno al vessillo della Patria! Cib che 
sarebbe fatale per 11ordine interno, lo intende 
ormai ognuno che conosce l!umore del Paese: la 
partecipazione dell1Italia ad una guerra contro 
la Francia e 11Inghilterra. Simpatica alia maggi- 
oranza degl1Italiani sarebbe una nostra azione 
contro l1Austria! Questo e indubitato!92
The debate over intervention also marks another
stage in the passage of catholic forces into liberal Italy,
a process already assisted by the war in Libya. Catholics
would no longer have !alzarci di letto un!ora prima degli
altri, datevi con tutte le vostre forze a vincere il liber-
93alismo italiano.1 The Duca di Gualtieri, a senator and
leading Sicilian landowner, had already pointed out in La
Rassegna Nazionale early in 1913 that catholic deputies
elected in recent years
riconoscono il Regno d1Italia con la sua capitale 
Roma, giurano con animo sincero e non per burla 
come i sovversivi, fedelta al Re e alle istituz- 
ioni e si propongono di cooperare al maggior bene
90 ibid., t. del 3 aprile 1914, p. 2198. Much was made of 
the presence in the Cabinet of Cavasola, prefect of 
Naples in 1898
91 ibid., t. del 4 die. 1914, pp. 5571-75
92 Quarant1anni, no.153, Senise to Giol., 31 March 1915
93 Civilta Cattolica, 1899, cited in V. Castronovo, La 
stampa italiana nell!eta liberale (Bari 1979), P* 193
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di quello e al consolidamento di queste, e in cib 
d'accordo con i loro colleghi di destra e del 
centro.94
The apparent strength of those hostile to Italy's institut­
ions should inspire
non l'astensione politica, ma la partecipazione agli 
affari pubblici, non l'inerzia che molto somiglia 
all'indifferenza e alia paura, ma la virile energia. 
Non si respinge il nemico tenendosene lontano e 
senz'altre armi che le querimonie e la imprecazioni, 
ma andandogli risolutamente incontro e combattendolo 
nel campo stesso delle sue stragi e devastazioni.95
The socialist progress in the elections of 1913 again has
a catalytic effect on political alliances, leading for
example in Florence (where socialist candidates had won
fifty-two per cent of the votes) to an agreement between
catholic and conservative forces for a joint programme against
the socialists. The president of the Unioni Elettorale Catt-
olica Fiorentina (U.E.C.F.) believed that if
in seguito a dei chiari accordi e leali patti si 
potrb, in awenire stabilire una piattaforma elett­
orale con gli conservatori, i cattolici non dovr- 
anno respingere l'occasione per fronteggiare il 
nemico comune.96
Such a constitutional bloc was indeed formed in
Q7
Florence in November 1914. Grassi has described the same
catholic challenge to socialist influence in the south, and
the mounting disaffection with Giolitti by the elections
of 1913. The Gentiloni pact marks not Giolitti's tactical
acceptance of catholic support, but rather 'il clamoroso,
anche se non ammesso, capovolgimento dei rapporti di forza
tra cattolici e liberali, che divennero da quel momento
98prigonieri di quell*alleanza.' He cites the comments of 
the Provincia di Lecce on the position of one of Giolitti's 
candidates under the pact:
Se i clericali avessero potuto disporre di un uomo
94 'Cattolici e clericali’, Rass. Haz. . CLXXXIX (1915), pp. 
3-19 at 3
95 ibid., p. 19
9b Cited in P. L. Ballini, op. cit. , p. 284n76
97 See ibid., pp. 299-325
98 F. Grassi, II tramonte..., p. 73
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proprio, con una certa base, Pellegrino non sarebbe 
stato il loro candidato; hanno trovato conveniente 
alle loro mire, ai loro interessi, associarsi al 
Pellegrino per la conquista della amministrazioni 
locali, per la lenta ed incessante penetrazione.99
Rossi also traces through the pages of the catholic syndic­
alist journal, II Lavoro Italiano, the emergence of imperi­
alist and productivist ideas which will provide a further 
reservoir of support for Salandra, and condition the position 
of catholic forces on the issue of intervention. There is no 
trace in this journal of the old hostility to liberal gover­
nments; instead, in Rossi’s opinion, 'si delineava una 
organica collocazione del movimento di massa diretto dai 
cattolici a fianco della classe dirigente, sia sul piano 
sindacale che su quello politico.'100 The Sindacato nazionale 
dei lavoratori della terra, formed in July 1914, demanded 
a 'guerra alia scioperomania (and to) tutta la mentality, e 
1'armamentario sowersivo del socialismo e del sindacalismo 
rosso.'101 Its leader, Giambattista Valente, was virulently 
hostile even to the reformist unions, opposing any amnesty 
for the railway workers involved in the events of Red Week; 
he argued that the
Scopo proprio del sindacato operaio e di tenere le 
varie condizioni di salario e di lavoro piu elevate 
e favorevoli che sia possibile alia maestranza, 
entro gli indeprecabili limiti delle legge economiche 
e della legge morale...We segue che il sindacato 
operaio b di sua natura una macchina non rivoluzion- 
aria, ma anzi anti rivoluzionaria, tendente clob a 
elevare e a consolidare la classe operaia nel grembo 
della attuale society.102
The employers' journal, the Bollettino della Lega industriale,
published an article by the economist Giuseppe Prato on the
value of these catholic peasant leagues, suggesting that 'b
uno stato di cose ottimo, dal punto di vista strettamente
economico, perche costituente un ostacolo formidabile alia
10*5formazione del monopolio.' Catholic peasant organisations 
also often gave an electoral base to clerico-moderati
99 ibid., p. 55
100 Ivl. G. Rossi, Le Origini..., p. 382. On this journal, ibid., 
pp. 375-84
101 Grassi, op. cit., p. 299
102 Rossi, op. cit., p. 377
105 V (1911), p. 123
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candidates in the vote of 1915. Nationalist candidates also 
gained catholic backing, as did Salandra*s candidates in 
the supplementary elections of 1915. Socialist and catholic 
forces also clashed over the fate of peasant smallholders, 
with catholics favouring their diffusion in the countryside 
as a means of eradicating the economic dissatisfaction 
which caused social unrest.
The natural tendency of catholic forces first to
enter the liberal state and then to cooperate with Salandra
-described by Labriola as, fL*uomo del catechismo nelle
scuole, 1*anti-divorzista, l*avversario della precedenza
del matrimonio civile, il collaboratore di Pelloux e l’ader-
ente di tutte le misure di eccezione contro il socialismo1
who will compel !i democratici a servire i cattolici1- ^
in the face of alarming trends within Italian society is
reinforced by the continuing integration of catholic finance
into the economy. This was already present in almost every
sector of the economy by the time of the Libyan war, and
developed rapidly in subsequent years: the formation of
the Federazione bancaria italiana in January 1914 (through
a fusion of all confessional banks) gave the Banco di Roma
a credit network spread across northern and central Italy.
With the state debt soaking up an increasing proportion of
capital, northern catholic banks -especially the Piccolo
credito bergamasco and the Banco ambrosiano- played a
crucial role in the financing of small engineering firms,
105chemicals, public utilities and the building trade. The 
Banco di Roma maintained its interest in investments beyond 
Italy by financing companies such as the Soc. italiana per 
la navigazione e il commercio nella Somalia italiana and the 
Soc. elettrica coloniale italiana, as well as investing in 
the Levant.
The endorsement of Italy*s right to colonial expan­
sion, first signalled in the demand for greater control over 
East Africa and Libya, became still firmer with this mingling
104 A.P.G.L., Legis. XXIV, t. del 3 apr. 1914, pp. 2198-99
105 M. G-. Rossi, op. cit. , pp. 303-7
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of secular and catholic finance, and their common need to 
look beyond Italy for profitable investments. An article 
in La Rassegna Nazionale in January 1913 moved from a celeb­
ration of the economic and political profit drawn from Libya, 
which
risuscitando in noi italiani la coscienza nazionale, 
il ricordo di quanto seppero e vollero fare gli avi 
nostri e rendendoci consci di quanto volendolo, pur 
noi potremmo fare- ha prodotta una vera rivoluzione 
morale nel sentire di tutti, sicchb una espansione 
coloniale, la quale apra nuove terre, nuovi campi 
d'azione alle energie italiche, e ora da ognuno 
trovata come la cosa piu sensata, naturale e necess- 
aria, mentre prima molti per preconcetti vieti, o 
per piccine ragioni d’interesse di partito, l'avver- 
savano...Il popolo comprese infatti che, fra pochi 
anni, potra riversare ed a flotti sempre crescenti 
i suoi emigranti nella Libia; e di questa fara vera 
continuazione dfItalia. Lo spazio invero non manca 
laggiu,106
to a demand for further decisive action in Eritrea and
Somalia. Eritrea had little potential for receiving emigrants,
but, 'II capitale vi pub trovare remunerative impiego nella
cotoni coltura, nell1allevamento del bestiame, anche in
certe parti nella granicoltura ecc. ecc.' Yet while in
Eritrea 1 si b tentata con successo la cultura del cotone, la
quale va vieppiu estendosi...h anzitutto in Somalia per
speciali ragioni di terra e clima che si possono ottenere
le qualita piu fini, migliori.1 The region could also support
maize, sesame and other crops, the rearing of cattle for
export into Italy, and a trade in animal hides:
Insomma per il capitale italiano laggiu havvi merav- 
iglioso impiego di danaro a farvisi...Queste terre 
capaci di varietb grandissime di produzioni (ed io 
non accennai se non alle piu rimunerative) si 
prestano gia fin d!ora a pratica valorizzazione; e 
sono per il capitale vere terre promesse.107
The accuracy of Mallarini!s analysis is of less importance
than the space given to it by this journal, and in particular
the repeated insistence on the need for a strong banking
structure in these colonial or under-developed areas
106 A. G. Mallarini, 1 Libia, Eritrea e Somalia di fronte all’ 
economia nazionale', La Rass♦ Naz., XXXV (1913), vol. 
CLXXXIX, pp. 239-58 at 239-4-0
107 ibid., pp. 254-55. See by the same author, 'L'avvenire 
politico ed economico dell'Italia in Etiopia’, L’Esp. 
Comm. , XXIX (1914), pp. 300-05; 'Una 1 Banc a per l'estero"
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to further Italy’s economic penetration -an idea already 
described in an earlier article by the same author, and 
by Bevione over Asia Minor.
Bernardino Nogara, director of the Soc. Gommerciale
d’Oriente and perhaps the most central figure in Italy's
imperialism in the Balkans and Asia Minor, had cooperated
with leading figures in the Banca Commerciale throughout
Giolitti!s long ministry. Yet as Webster has shown, Nogara
was also linked closely with clerical interests within
Italy, a fact demonstrated by the Rome chamber of commerce’s
decision in 1912 to appoint him as a delegate to the Ottoman
Public Debt. A brother of Nogara was a prelate in the
Vatican, while Bernardino Nogara himself would in 1929 be
asked to help in the reorganisation of the Vatican’s fina- 
108nces. In 1915 the crucial role of catholic finance in 
the Italian economy wins support for expansion and for 
ambitious hopes of territorial gain, modifying the stance 
on intervention which is already lent ambiguity by the 
strong sympathy felt for Salandra*s domestic programme and 
an appreciation of the integratory nature of war. Heeding
San Giuliano's earlier warning against relying on only one
bank for financial backing of expansion, the prime minister 
had in February 1915 reached agreement with the Banco di 
Roma on the need for a negotiated settlement of their 
differences. This agreement was of immense value to the 
bank, which by 1915 had overreached itself and entered into 
something of a crisis. Improved relations were also vital 
for Salandra, who at this point was constructing a banking 
structure capable of challenging the Banca Commerciale.
While Ernesto Pacelli's bank had no immediate part in the 
foundation of the Banca di Sconto, the campaign against 
the Gomit naturally worked to its advantage. In June 1914 
the industrial journal Rassegna dei lavori pubblici defen­
ded the Banco di Roma Isara clericale, ma b italiano*_ 
against criticisms in parliament; the deputies do not attack 
other banks for ’essersi abbarbicati come piovre alia 
nostra economia nazionale asciugandone tutti i rivoli
108 R. Webster, L*imperialismo industriale..., p. 454
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produttori, salvo a dare il colpo di grazia al nostro 
109credito.’ A Comit weakened, or even forced to depart 
from the Piazza della Scala, promised "better things for a 
Banco di Roma restored to government favour.
While it seems clear that the Pope worked consist­
ently for peace and for an Austro-Italian settlement in 1914- 
15^^ not all catholics were averse to intervention. The 
distinction -made especially "by the nationalists?^ between 
the Vatican and Italian catholics is clear in the last few 
months of neutrality. In February 1915 the Count Dalle 
Torre spoke (with the Pope’s authorisation) of a conditioned 
neutrality which the Italian people would end whenever the 
government saw fit:
E sara sacrificio vittorioso non soltanto di nuove 
conquiste, ma di nuovo risorgimento di coscienza 
civile perch& dalla prova uscira il popolo temperato 
ed educato al sentimento delle sue responsibility, 
al dovere verso l’avvenire del suo Paese, ad una 
visione piu vasta e piu generosa della sua azione e 
della sua influenza, che non sia, come fin*ora, il 
solo interesse, per quanto legittimo, di classe.
La neutrality condizionata, la necessita dell' 
intervento non appena gli interessi e le aspirazioni 
d'Italia positivamente lo reclameranno, per noi, 
rappresentano tutto questo: la fiducia ciod di una 
maggior potenza all’estero, e di un civile progr- 
esso all’interno nella coscienza pubbllca.112
Rassegna Nazionale gave prominence to the following declar­
ation signed by prominent catholics, almost all close to 
the review:
Con profondo dolore vediamo nel Corriere della Sera 
spesso confuso tutti i cattolici con i fautori della 
neutralita assoluta. Noi sottoscritti dichiaramo, 
certo interpreti della maggioranza della Nazione 
italiana e cattolica, che qualora il Governo chiam- 
asse alle armi per il nostro buon diritto, saremo 
tra i primi. I cattolici, a nessuno secondi nell1 
amor patrio, sono non soli pronti ad ogni sacrificio, 
ma trovano lievi gli oneri or ora imposti, perche 
vengano di tutto punto agguerriti, esercito e flotta, 
affinchk 1’Italia, "non rimange da possibili ingra- 
ndimenti di altri Stati relativamente diminuita."113
109 Edit. ’Le Banche ed i Partiti’, 30 June 1914
110 See Monticone, op. cit. , pp. 541-44
111 See, for example, P. Coppola, ’Vecchi stati d’animo’, 
Idea Nazionale, 22 Dec. 1914
112 Cited in G. Quadrotta, II Papa, 1’Italia e la Guerra 
(Milan 1915), pp. 94-5
113 ’Notizie’, CCI (1915), p. 126
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Another article in the same edition praised
l’energia e la saviezza politica dell1on Salandra, 
che ha gia dato tante prove di prudenza e di ability, 
rivelando le doti preziose d!un vero uomo di stato, 
ci danno ragione a bene sperare...nel paese...cessati 
gli allarmi e frenate le impazienze, nasce un senti- 
mento di fiducia nel governo, e di concordia nazio- 
nale...Fiducia e concordia degne d!un popolo forte 
che non vuol vedere compromesso per sempre l!avvenire 
della nazione italiana*114
The spectre of Giolitti’s return to power is ever 
present in the catholic press, threatening as it would the 
new course in domestic politics. La Liberia wrote in Dece­
mber 1914 that
Col ritiro del catastrofico ministero Giolitti... 
e con la salita al potere dell*on Salandra, il 
Governo ha riacquisato finalmente la coscienza 
della propria funzione civile, politica e sociale.
Una mano forte regge le redini dello Stato; non & 
piit la piazza che comanda-, non si scende piu a 
vergognosi patti coi sowersivi.il5
The desire for an end to internal division which the church
shared with Salandrian conservatives was again rehearsed
once Italy had entered the war, this time by the Archbishop .
of Brindisi:
Ci6 che oggi si richiede necessari amente e: sincera 
ed indiscussa obbedienza in coloro cui sono affidati 
i destini della Patria; unione e compatezza di animi, 
sacrificando sullfaltare del dovere supremo che ci 
incombe ogni passione di parte che fin qui ha potuto 
tenerci divisi.116
Rassegna Nazionale claimed that
In tutte le diocesi d'Italia i Vescovi dirigono ai 
fedeli lettere piene di amor patrio, esortandoli 
ad accorrere volenterosi sotto le bandiera, indic- 
endo pubbliche preci per il trionfo delle armi 
nazionali, promovendo colla parola e coll’esempio 
sottoscrizioni per 1’assistenza morale e materiale 
dei soldati e delle loro famiglie.llY
114 P. Nunziante, ’L’ltalia e la guerra*, ibid., pp. 5-12 
at 12
115 11 December 1914
116 Cited in Grassi, op. cit., p. 345. See ibid., pp. 342-45 
for the response of southern clergy to the war. The Proc­
urator General of Trani believed the ’azione spiegata dal 
clero di queste tre provincie pugliesi si mantenne nel ca- 
mpo. religioso con ammirevole spirito di patriottismo, con-
dividendo le ansie e le gioie del momento delle rispettive 
popolazioni per la grandezza della patria’, ibid. , 342
117 ’Rassegna politica1, CCIII, p. 425
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It would seem therefore that while the church as 
an institution continued to oppose any attack on the Vat­
ican’s traditional defender, Austria-Hungary, yet many 
catholics regarded the possibility of intervention with at 
least mixed feelings. In this they perhaps showed a deeper 
understanding of the implications of the war than those 
'democratic interventionists', including the freemasons, who 
saw only the prospect of removing the regimes in Berlin and 
Vienna, An understanding too of the implications of Salan­
dra1 s policy, intended to shift the axis of Italian politics, 
bolstering the monarchy and other institutions. The prime 
minister's policy offered one solution to the problem 
identified by Sonnino in 1881, which the events of June 1914 
suggested was as real as ever, despite all Giolitti's 
efforts to bring the masses into the state:
La grandissima maggioranza della popolazione, piu 
del 90 per cento,..si sente estranea affatto alle 
nostre istituzione; si vede soggetta alio Stato e 
costretta a servirlo con il sangue e con i denari; 
ma non sente di costituirne una parte viva ed 
organica e non prende interesse alcuno alia sua 
esistenza ed al suo svolgimento.118
In addition to unifying the nation in a war against 
Austria, Salandra1s policy also demonstrates at work the 
alliance between agrarian and industrial interests in Italy, 
The assimilation of opinion which had formerly been vocif­
erously hostile to his government helps undermine the 
campaign against Italy's protective tariffs, the linchpin 
of this alliance. Leading free-traders switch their attention 
to the more immediate and imposing issue of war or neutra­
lity. Viti De Marco's recantation has already been menti­
oned; by the eve of intervention another important critic 
of protection, Luigi Einaudi, was active in the Turin Comi- 
tato di preparazione for the war, and in La Riforma Sociale 
of June 1915 he emphasised the need to defeat a German-
dominated union in central Europe which controls the Balkans
119and dominates Asia Minor. At the same time the economic
118 Cited in E. Chabod, Storia della, politica estera ital- 
iana dal 1870 al 189b (Bari 1969)", P* 389
119 'Guerra ed economia', now in Prediche (Bari 1920), pp. 
1-42. On Giretti's support for intervention, see A. Papa, 
'Edoardo Giretti', Belfagor, XXV (1970), pp. 50-70 at 62-3
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groups dependent on tariff protection found in war their 
justification* Salandra was of course a staunch defender 
of the tariff on grain, warning that any repeal or reduc­
tion would cause ’l1ammiseramento progressivo di tutte le
120economie interessata nella produzione granifera.1 He had
even opposed the temporary tariff reduction passed in Febr­
uary 1898 in an attempt to alleviate social unrest, and its 
extension later in the year, since
tutta la nostra economia nazionale, o almeno tutta 
l’economia agricola, ha il suo assetto sul dazio 
dei cereali: dazio elevato se volete, ma non pih 
elevato forse di quelli che sono stati istituti 
a protezione di altri rami dell'industria nazionale, 
e non certo compensatore degli enormi pesi fiscale 
che lo Stato ha imposto sulla terra.121
It is a measure of the social crisis which developed 
in Italy during neutrality that the prime minister had to 
concede a similar reduction in 1914. The principle of 
protection could not however be questioned, especially since 
Salandra shared fully the fears of a German threat to Italy1s 
economic independence -in particular, the alarming possib­
ility that Berlin was circumventing Italy’s tariff barriers 
by producing in effect within Italy itself. Any adjustment 
of the system should aim at strengthening rather than disma­
ntling Italy’s tariffs: a position foreshadowed by Sonnino’s 
complaints in 1910 of other countries
accrescono sempre piu le loro esportazioni artific- 
ialmente provocate e restringono le importazioni 
forestiere. E giunto il momento nel quale 1’Italia, 
pur persistendo ad offrire a tutti gli stati la pace 
economica internazionale, si deve preparare alia 
difesa di grandi e leggittimi interessi nella ipotesi 
che il suo appello conciliatore non sia assecondato. 
Quindi il governo ha tutto predisposto per aprire 
subito una sincera e pubblica inchiesta, nella quale 
saranno interrogati tutti gli interessi...col prop- 
osito di preparare, ove ci lo impongono gli atti di 
ostruzione degli altri paesi, la tariffa massima e 
minima, tenendo conto dei grandi progressi fatti 
dal 1887, sino ad oggi e delle inevitabili maggiori 
specificazione nei dazi. Nessuno potr& ascriverci a 
torto di non voler rimanere nel mondo i solitari 
adoratori di un principio che tutti avessero
120 A. Salandra, Disc. Pari., vol. Ill, p. 1227. Relazione 
per le modificazioni delle tariffe doganali, 27 May 1887.
121 ibid., vol. II, p. 223. 27 April 1898. For his attitude 
in Feb. 1898, ibid., pp. 210-20, and opposition to
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violato.122
Industrial opinion over intervention moves slowly 
to the position taken by Salandra and Sonnino soon after 
the outbreak of war. Military intervention is accepted as 
the only way to escape the spiral of economic depression 
and dependence, creating through the traditional prop of 
military contracts (though on a vastly increased scale) and 
the new trading configuration brought by alliance with the 
entente powers fresh possibilities of economic rejuvenation 
and restored social stability. Neutrality brings to a head 
several trends in Italian economic life -the desire for 
control of eastern markets as a means toward economic auta­
rchy; the extreme reliance on state contracts of a large 
element of heavy industry; and alarm over the enormous 
power of the Banca Commerciale, representing both the control 
of bank capital over industry and the putative ability of 
Germany to thwart via this bank any Italian attempt to 
chart an independent course in industrial development. All 
these factors, together with the growing influence of French 
capital in the peninsula and the reminder of Italy’s funda­
mental dependence on Britain, lead industry to view diplom­
atic realignment with favour. At the same time that these 
economic imperatives mobilise industry behind Salandra, 
their domestic political interests also run in tandem with 
the prime minister. By 1914 support for Giolitti has been 
withdrawn by powerful sections of industry; the coupling of 
Giolitti with Otto Joel’s bank, both equally in thrall to 
Berlin, reinforces the prime minister’s political position 
during the months of neutrality. The events of 1914-15 thus 
remove both domestic and international impediments to the 
development of Italian industry -as this celebration of the 
beneficial results of Giolitti’s departure and intervention 
published in La Metallurgia italiana in January 1916 makes 
clear. War
ci ha gia dato 1*indipendenza industriale; ha servito
122 Cited in Corbino, op. cit., p. 250
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a svelare a noi stessi tutte le energie fattive 
che sonnecchiavano timide e nascoste, spaventata 
dalla invadenza e potenza straniera; tutte le energie 
male aiutate, poco incoraggiante da uno Stato i cui 
ministeri tecnici avevano un solo altare fra l*inc- 
enso e le candele, difeso dai pontefici di una 
burocrazia rigida, esigente e rigorosa con l*indus- 
tria nazionale, tenera, troppo tenera con l*industria 
estera, il dio Krupp e tutte le deita minori dell’ 
Olimpo industriale tedesco...1*industria meccanica 
nostra ora respira un*aria nuova...un*aria veramente 
italiana, giacchk gli stranieri non invaderanno piu 
i suoi uffici, i suoi reparti, non limiteranno piu 
la sua attivit&, non la soffocheranno piu nei loro 
amplessi f inanziari.123
The demand for action against the Gomit had won a
quick response from the government, Torre told Albertini
early in September 1914 that he had met with Salandra !di
metterlo in attenzione sullo spionaggio germanico ed aust-
riaco, che si estende alia Consulta largamente e solidamente
per mezzo di tanti e soprattutto per mezzo della Banca Comm-
124erciale e dei suoi amici. Di cifc egli era informato.’
The prime minister told Ferdinando Martini in the same month 
of his intention to expel Otto Joel in the event of war, 
and later repeated his suspicions of the Banca Gommerciale: 
’Dato il caso di mobilitazione dell1esercito c*& una banca 
che pu6 adoperarsi a impedirmela o almeno ad accrescermene 
le difficolt^.' Francesco Nitti wrote to Pio Perrone of 
Ansaldo in March 1915 insisting on the need to free Italy 
of all foreign capital, a theme which had already featured
I p L
in his pre-war writings, Bonaldo Stringher, head of the 
Banca d’ltalia, had as early as 1907 favoured the formation 
of a bank with purely Italian capital, and in 1914 -accor­
ding to a work written in defence of Angelo Pogliani , head
of the Banca di Sconto- both Salandra and Stringher ’abbiano
127dato il loro fervido benestare' to Pogliani*s suggestion 
of a new bank, Salandra had also moved against the Comit, 
forcing all German and Austrian members of the board to
123 VIII (1916), p. 41
124 L. Albertini, Epistolario, vol. 1, p. 274.
125 F. Martini, op. cit. , p. 81, entry of 8 Sep.; and p. 
122, entry of 25 Sep.
126 See Galli Della Loggia, art. cit., pp. 842-43
127 For his views in 1907, see F. Bonelli, La crisi... , p. 
152n6, and E, M. Gray, Guerra..., pp. 88-9; in 1915, C. 
Rossi, L*assalto alia Banca Italiana di Sconto (Milan
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leave the country, and placing Senator Luigi Canzi (a friend 
of the prime minister) as its president. All this confirms 
Bachi’s contention in 1915 that the foundation of the 
Banca di Sconto ’si riconnette col movimento ostile agli 
influssi esteri sui maggiori istituti di credito e col 
generale movimento di nazionalismo economico.’
Pogliani*s bank began with capital of fifteen 
million lire, but in March 1915 the chamber received prop­
osals from the government for an alteration in the commer­
cial code, aimed essentially at smoothing the way for a 
further merger of banks in the context of the struggle to 
free Italy from dependence on the Comit. With the merger 
of the Soc. Bancaria Italiana and the Soc. Italiano di 
Credito Provinciale in June 1915, the effective banking 
life of the B.I.S. begins. The significance of this measure, 
rushed through parliament on the very last day before the 
Easter recess, was not lost on deputies, and led to an 
extremely revealing debate in both chambers. In the lower 
house, both critics and supporters of the proposed limita­
tions in the diritto di recesso (i.e. the right of those 
shareholders who disapproved of a merger to withdraw their 
capital from the firm involved in such a move) had no doubt 
of its objective. Por Enrico Perri, ’Questa legge & una 
legge particolare; noi sappiamo che si sta formando nel 
nostro paese un aggruppamento che vuole avere nell’econ- 
omia nazionale una funzione che io credo utile.' He argued 
that
C’e un capitale straniero in Italia che limita la 
sua azione ad un. programma soltanto di propria 
(ed altrui) utilita economica, tipo capitale belga, 
francese, inglese, e c’& un capitale straniero che 
al programma economico della sua azione aggiunge 
un programma, direi, politico, tipo capitale germ- 
anico, di propria egemonia con piu o men grande ed 
esteso asservimento o inceppamento della economia 
e delle energie nazionali...Ora un disegno di 
legge, che, sia pure come prowedimento transitorio, 
incoraggia i capitali italiani, le societh italiane 
che abbiano analogia di intendimenti economici, ad 
una unione solidale che possa dar loro una maggiore
1950), p. 39. This T/vork is based on interviews with 
Pogliani.
128 R. Bachi, L’ltalia...1915, p. b9
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energia a beneficio del nostro paese, io penso che 
sia un progetto degno della nostra approvazione.
E questo penso cosi per il momento eccezio- 
nale che attraversiamo, come, e tanto piu, per dopo 
la guerra, giacch&, dopo la guerra, i capitali 
stranieri avranno bisogno di reintegrarsi e di 
reimpiegarsi ciascuno nel proprio paese.
L*Italia, quindi, dovra pensare allora a prov- 
vedere alle proprie necessity con le proprie risorse 
e con le proprie forze.
Questo disegno di legge incammina il popolo e 
l!economia pubblica italiana a pensare a far da sb, 
ed e per questo che io 11approvo!129
Eugenio Chiesa believed the bill!s urgency came from
il buon miraggio dell1emancipazione dal capitale 
tedesco e apparve di ragion pubblica che, auspice 
il Governo e la Banca d*Italia, si costituiva un 
istituto bancario italiano, dal quale doveva cres- 
cere, colla fusione di altre forze, contrapposto 
alia Banca Commerciale.130
A third deputy, Alessio, criticised the parliamentary comm­
ission which had studied the governments proposals:
La Commissione, che vuol rendere permanente quanto 
nel pensiero del Governo e soltanto transitorio, 
sembra piuttosto il riflesso di ceti capitalistic! 
intesi a rafforzare le formazioni del grande capitale, 
e miranti ad ottenere in questo momento quanto forse 
in un tempo normale non potrebbero conseguire.
The changes in Italy's commercial code 'costituiscono un
ulteriore modo di asservimento del piccolo al grande
capitale1; the government
voglia promuovere la concentrazione di alcune banche 
minori, costituendo un organismo piu potente e piu 
solido, onde vincere l'opposta azione di istituti 
di credito di origine straniera, dei quali abbiamo 
avuto troppo a dolerci in questi ultimi anni.131
The aim of Salandra's ministry was understood and accepted
-a fusion of these banks 'permette loro precisamente di
poter sistemare la propria situazione finanziaria e di
poter rispondere alle urgenze dell'industria, dell'agricol-
tura e del commercio, che sono oggi quanto mai sentite in
Italia.'132
When the measure reached the upper chamber, Senator
129 A.P.C.D., Legis. XXIV, t. del 22 marzo 1915, pp. 7852-53
130 ibid. , p."7867
131 ibid. , pp. 7832-33
132 ibid., p. 7847. Tovini
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Ettore Ponti stressed its great importance for the Italian 
economy, and in the process cast much light on the diffic­
ulties faced by Italy in the years even before the immense 
problems raised by neutrality:
Si tratta di una grava crisi economica, che h 
comune a tutti gli Stati d’Europa, e che anzi e 
stata forse una delle principal! cause efficienti 
della conflagrazione internazionale. Si tratta, 
diro cosi, di una crisi economica di sviluppo; 
indubbiamente larga di buone promesse per un avvenire 
remoto, ma della quale tuttavia hanno sofferto e 
soffrono tutti quanti i paesi d’Europa, se non del 
mondo, gia retti a regime doganale protettivo, in 
cospetto segnatamente ai forti eccessi di produzione, 
i quali tendono a menomare, a deprimere i prezzi sui 
mercati interni, e non possono trovare conveniente 
sfogo, sovente per immatura preparazione, sui mercati 
esteri e colonial!.
Di qui, massime per 1*Italia nostra, che non 
ha ancora la robustezza economica di altri paesi, le 
gravi perdite subite, il grave disagio sofferto da 
molte society industriali e commerciale, nonch&, 
per naturale ripercussione, da molti istituti di 
credito e da una gran parte della classe lavorat- 
rice.
Onde per molte Society anonime, la necessita 
impellente di reintegrare le perdite avvenute, e di 
far fronte con ulteriore e costosi perfezionamenti 
tecnici alle piu raffinate esigenze dei mercati 
esotici; onde la necessita di rimuovere in via 
definitiva gli ostacoli opposti non solamente alia 
emissione di obbligazioni, ma agli incrementi di 
capitale, sotto qualsivoglia forma...E ci5 inquant- 
och& gli incrementi di capitale che in passato, 
perdurando la efficienza della protezione doganale, 
potevano avere un carattere puramente facoltativo, 
oggi, di fronte alia mutata situazione, vengono a 
costituire una condizione indispensabile di restaur- 
azione, di esistenza, di sviluppo di molte societa; 
mentre da un’altro canto gli ostacoli opposti a 
questa trasformazione, massimamente l’esercizio del 
diritto di recesso.•.sono venuti a costituire un 
facile strumento di oppressione e di ostruzionismo, 
a non dir peggio, per le minoranze, in danno delle 
maggioranze, ed in danno del patrimonio comune.133
The requirements of industry, outlined here by one of its
leading representatives in Lombardy, thus converge with
the political interests of Salandra, and both profit from
the emergence of a new financial and political base. The
employer’s journal Rivista delle Societa Commerciali also
supported the measure -the removal of any impediment to
133 A.P., Camera dei Senatori, Legis. XXIV, t. del 27 marzo 
1915, p. 1676
207
mergers and increases of capital could only help ’ all’int- 
eresse nazionali della produzione’ though the journal 
favoured a permanent reform taken on principle rather than 
in the context of an emergency. However the governments 
worries were not entirely over, as can he seen from Isvol- 
sky’s report of a meeting between French and Italian minis­
ters held in Paris in March 1916:
Salandra et Sonnino craignent visiblement que la 
guerre avec l’Allemagne provoque des difficultes 
interieures, en particulier sur le terrain £cono~ 
mique. Briand m!a dit que cette dernikre consider­
ation conserverait toute sa vigueur tant que l'ltalie 
ne s1affranchirait pas de la d^pendance financiere 
dans laquelle elle se trouve toujours vis-k-vis de 
l'Allemagne et que pour cette raison on!£tudiait les 
moyens de remplacer en Italie les capitaux allemands 
...Lors de son passage h Paris, Asquith a dit h 
Briand que les ministres italiens lui avaient fait, 
h. Rome, h. peu pr&s la mgme r£ponse.l35
Intervention with the Triple Entente had however 
been a prerequisite for the new financial and trading ties 
without which Italy could not hope to prosper outside the 
orbit of the Central Powers. Industry deserts the Piedmo­
ntese leader under whom industrialisation had occurred, 
but whose policy of a negotiated settlement with Austria- 
Hungary offered little hope of economic salvation, and 
swings behind the southern landowner clearly moving toward 
intervention. The threat posed by organised labour and a 
political order willing to compromise with its represent­
atives v/as sY/ept away, as industrialists achieved a new 
power and authority with the emergence of Salandra. The 
open channels of communication between the two are suggested 
in a speech by the president of Confindustria in March 
1915:
L*industria italiana non poteva vivere senza cre­
dito , non poteva produrre senza rifornirsi di 
materie prime, non poteva immobilizzare capitale 
in un momento in cui il capitale era scarso, nella 
continuazione del lavoro se non avesse avuto prob­
ability che i suoi prodotti avrebbero potuto essere 
venduti. Tutti problemi formidabili alia cui
134 V (1915), p. 253
135 R. Marchand (ed.), Un livre noir..., vol. 3, book 2, 
p. 272, 25 March/7 April 1916
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soluzione non perfetta nemmeno oggi, la Confed- 
erazione ha portato il suo contributo continuo, 
alacre e costante. Essa ha fatto pratiche presso 
gli istituti bancari perchb accordasserO’ agli 
industriali piu larghe possibilita di credito, ha 
interessato il Governo perchb fossero emanate 
disposizioni che rendessero meno difficile la con- 
tinuazione della vita industriale, ha cercato di 
evitare prowedimenti che dopo un momentaneo sollievo, 
potevano essere fonte di piu gravi crisi, le 
pratiche per ottenere la riattivazione degli scambi 
internazionali e specificamente, che fossero resi 
piu facili i rifornimenti delle materie prime e 
anzitutto del combustibile e perchb, nei limiti 
imposti dagli interessi superiori della Nazione, 
fossero regolate le nostre esportazioni in modo da 
permettere alle nostre industrie di conservare le 
eonquiste fatte e aggiungerne di nuove sui mercati 
esteri.l3b
The Italian state had always shown overriding concern
for the health of its industrial sector; but faced with
the problems of neutrality, employers moved to increase
their political influence, since
la soluzione di tale problema non b piu o e in 
minima parte nella possibilita dell’iniziativa 
privata; siamo in momenti in cui solo 1*azione 
dello Stato pub essere efficace sia pur, lo ricon- 
osciamo, entro certi determinati limiti posti dalla 
forze delle cose. Alio Stato noi siamo percib 
costretti a rivolgerci oggi piu sovente e a chie- 
dere ad esso di metterci almeno in condizioni tali, 
che le nostre iniziative private possano utilmente 
esplicarsi. Del resto non mai, come in questi tempi 
di crisi internazionali lo Stato b diventato qual- 
cosa di reale e di concreto. Le comunitb sociale 
che si chiudono in se e confondono nel loro seno 
le individuality dei singoli come grandi famiglie, 
si stringono nelle ore del pericolo intorno ai loro 
capi e lasciano a questi la direzione assoluta,
1*iniziativa piu ampia, Oramai anche nella vita 
commerciale internazionale non sono piu i singoli 
che trattano e dispongono, sono gli Stati cui 
appartengono. Anche per 1*Italia e cosi: ed b percib 
che anche noi alio Stato, come a tutore dei nostri 
interessi, siamo costretti a rivolgerci, ed a 
sperare dall*azione dei governanti quell1opera 
vigile ed attiva che sola pub prowedere nelle 
attuali contingenze.137
136 Cited in A, Pepe, Storia della CG-dl.. • , p. 280
137 ibid. , p. 281
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The political cohesiveness and consciousness of employers, 
already evident in the vigorous challenge to labour in 
various disputes in 1912-13, is thus reinforced by the 
immediate difficulties in the months after August 1914, 
and then by the growing commitment to war* Salandra1s 
government tried to ease the credit problems of industry 
first by a moratorium on bank loans, followed at the end 
of 1914 by the creation of the Consorzio per Sowenzioni 
su Valori Industriali (C.S.V.I.). Pounded on the initiative 
of the Banca d1 Italia (with twenty-two million lire provided 
largely by Stringher1s bank), this body institutionalises 
state aid to industry, which had previously been granted 
indirectly in the form of contracts or in times of emerg­
ency , such as in 1911."^^ Industrial pressure had also 
gained wholesale exemptions from the export ban imposed on 
1 August. In Piedmont, for example, both the textile and
engineering sectors intervened with the government to halt
139the damaging block to their exports in a time of crisis*
With neutrality proving an economic and political 
calamity, and the increasing production, of firms with 
military commissions clear to all, the weight of industrial 
opinion came down decisively for intervention. Not simply 
from a desire for contracts and profits, but as part of 
a complex struggle between rival visions of the best means 
for the country to insert itself into the competing Euro­
pean power blocs and imperialisms; and with Italy*s survival 
as an economically viable and hence governable state seen 
by many to be at stake. One can perhaps see in Italy's 
passage from neutrality into war an example of Gramsci's 
idea that
Si pub escludere che, di per se stesse, le crisi 
economiche immediate producano eventi fondamentali; 
solo possono creare un terreno piu favorevole alia 
diffusione di certi modi, di impostare e risolvere 
le questioni che coinvolgono tutto l'ulteriore 
sviluppo della vita statale.140
138 P. Grifone, 11 capitale finanziario in Italia (Rome 
1945), pp. 31-2
139 See G. Prato, II Piemonte e gli effetti della guerra 
sulla vita economica e sociale (Bari ly25), p. 80
140 A. Gramsci, Note sui Machiavelli, sulla politica e 
sullo stato moderno (Turin 1955), p« 48
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How far did the hopes wnich industrialists cnerish
in 1915 bear fruit in the war years? In looking briefly
at developments in the Italian economy after intervention,
one can trace some continuities between pre-war problems
and their resolution in war production. These were not
fortuitous by-products of Italy's decision to join the
Triple Entente, but ratner predictable gains arising from
tnat decision. Most immediately, the social and economic
trauma of neutrality passed rapidly. Einaudi had confidently
predicted this as early as 28 May 1915, writing that 'I
servizi ausiliari della guerra, le officine di armamento
e di riparazione, le fabbriche di forniture militari avranno
tali urgenze di lavoro che i disoccupati potranno facil-
141mente trovar lavoro.1 Peace also returned to the
countryside. In Bachi's opinion,
La pace rurale dominata nel 1915 e tanto piu note- 
vole in quanto, senza la guerra, l'anno 1915 sarebbe 
stato segnalato da grandi lotte, poiche scadevano 
i patti colonici nelle provincie di Parma, Rovigo, 
Ferrara, Bologna e Ravenna e vasti conflitti 
sarebbero indubbiamente scoppiati.142
In Emilia, scene of the most violent and prolonged struggles
before the war, strikes fell from an annual figure of
thirty-two in 1913 (involving over forty thousand labourers)
to three in 1915 and just one in each of the next three
years.
Not only had the country returned to work, but it 
had done so under conditions extremely favourable to 
employers. Neppi Modona has described the rigorous discipline 
imposed on the work-force, beginning with the Provvedimenti 
straordinari in materia di pubblica sicurezza passed on
*1 J *7
the very day of Italy's entry into the war. The cumul­
ative effect of the many laws and regulations passed in the 
course of the war was to dismantle the power of the unions, 
ahd place workers in those factories decreed vital for 
military output under military jurisdiction. Any worker
141 L. Einaudi, Cronache..., vol. IV, p. 194
142 R. Bachi, L'Italia...1915, p. 185
143 G. Neppi Modona, op. cit. , p. 197ff.
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absent without good reason for five days from an auxiliary 
factory could be charged before a military tribunal with 
treason, facing a possible death sentance. Salandra1s gov­
ernment received a flood of demands from employer’s that 
their factory should come into this category -the number 
of auxiliary firms rose from 221 at the end of 1915 to 
nearly 800 in June 1916, and to just under 2000 by the end 
of the war.^^ All existing wage contracts were prorogued 
until three months after the end of the war, with regional 
committees of industrial mobilization given the power to 
settle by decree any disagreements on wages or working 
conditions. Troops and the Carabinieri came into the fact­
ories to enforce all these conditions.
Those industries with long experience of fulfilling 
state contracts came into their own between 1915 and 1918, 
and were able to solve many of the problems which had plagued 
them before the war. They were helped in this by what the 
report of the Banca Commerciale in 1915 described as ’the 
considerable and prompt cash disbursements made by the 
G-overnment in payment of supplies. ’ The economist 
Colombo sensed already in 1916 that
L’annata economica (1915) si d aperta, dopo un 
quinquennio di perdurante depressione e dopo un 
semestre di violenta crisi..., (with a) processo 
di riorganizzazione, prima c©n penosa lentezza e 
poi con assai maggiore celerita (based) largamente 
sulla trama dei rifornimenti militari...proprio la 
data della dichiarazione di guerra all’Austria segni 
nell'anno il momento in cui ad un periodo sfavore- 
vole ne succede un altro favorevole: in tal modo 
la nostra entrata in campagna...ha determinato una 
rinnovata vitalita in un rinnovato regime.146
This was certainly true for the flagging iron and steel 
industry, victim of endless acerbic attacks on its parasitism 
and inefficiency. Military orders had always been the 
staple diet of this industry, but the vastly increased 
scale of orders from 1915 ended the crisis of over-produc­
tion, as Bachi's remarks again underline:
144 See C. Fua, op. cit., pp. 200-1, for a breakdown of 
these figures by region and industry
145 Report of the Board of Directors (London 1916), p. 12 
(English copy)
146 G-. Colombo, op. cit. , pp. 5 and 8
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Per l’industria siderurgica l’anno 1915 e contra- 
ssegnato da un1attivit& febbrile innegabilmente 
essenziale e propizia ai bisogni della difesa 
nazionale... I1industria e stata pienamente volta 
alia produzione di armi e proiettili...la societa 
sindacate hanno cosi potuto sensibilmente migliorare 
la loro posizione patrimoniale e la retribuzione 
del capitale azionario: talune fra esse hanno 
distribuito dividendi dopo che da vari anni non 
potevano concederne. Le quotazioni delle azioni 
sui mercato libero hanno subito grandi rialzi.147
The triumphant annual report presented by Ilva in
March 1916 also makes abundantly plain just what a windfall
the war would prove:
L’anno 1915, che restera memorabile nella storia d’ 
Italia per l’inizio della Guerra Nazionale, segna 
una data importante anche per la siderurgica ital­
iana. ..essa ha potuto dimostrare la sua grande 
utilita, diremo di piii, la imprescindibile necessita 
della sua esistenza e del suo sempre maggiore svil­
uppo... tutta la nostra attivitk h stata assorbita 
dai rifornimenti necessari alia preparazione prima, 
al proseguimento poi della guerra.
Noi ci mettemmo completamente a disposizione, 
come era nostro dovere, del Sottosegretariato per 
le armi e munizioni, non solo per quanto potevamo 
fare con gli impianti esistenti, ma anche per nuove 
fabbricazioni ed ampliamenti.
]5 cosi che provvedemmo al triplice impianto 
a Bagnoli, Piombino e Portoferraio...e cosi che 
accelerammo la messa in marcia di due nuovi altri 
forni...e cosi che mettemmo mano alia costruzione 
di nuovi forni Martin a Torre Annunziate, a Pra e 
S. Giovanni Valdarno e a dare maggior capacita 
produttiva alia acciaierie di Bagnoli e Piombino, 
e cosi che iniziammo 1*impianto di presse per proi­
ettili a Savona, che funzioner& in aprile.148
The summary of company reports in La Metallurgia italiana
exude a mixture of relief and self-congratulation, and
above all of frenetic activity, with factories 1lavorano
attivamente, febbrimento alia produzione di materiale 
149bellico.1 ^  War is again seized on as the best possible 
rebuff to the industry's many critics; in the words of the 
report of Soc. Miniere di Montecatini, Italy's intervention 
'ha reso ancor piu evidente il sommo interessi che ha ogni 
nazione di rendersi, per quanto possibile, indipendente
147 R. Bachi, op. cit. , pp. 149-50. See also G. Scagnetti, 
op. cit. , p. 351
148 La Metallurgia italiana, VIII (1916), pp. 307-8
149 ibid., p. 313, Soc. Max and Co., Milan. See in general 
pp. 307-30
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dall'Estero nell*approvvigionamento delle diverse industrie 
e cosi di dare il maggior sviluppo all1industria minera-
Heavy industry must also have drawn great pleasure
from these reflections of Bonaldo Stringher in March 1916:
si pensi all1Italia in guerra senza l’ausilio o 
con un ausilio debole e misera della siderurgica 
nazionale, e da questo pensiero si traggono giuste 
direttive per l*avvenire. Per quanto ci riguarda, 
ci sentiamo, lieti di aver la efficamente sorretta 
nei giorni del pericolo, quando il nostro intervento 
fu fatto segno a critiche acerbe non ponderate.
Stringher accepts that without the war some firms in this
sector would have collapsed,
quello che a nessun costo non possiamo tollerare b 
che l’esperienza della guerra venga adoperata alio 
scopo di giustificare precisamente la causa della 
nostra impreparazione bellica iniziale e di impeg- 
nare lo Stato ad assicurare sin da ora al gruppo 
politico-siderurgica la continuazione indisturbata, 
nel nuovo periodo di pace, e forse anche ^aumento 
di un regime di privilegi e di favori.151
A rather different perspective on heavy industry
came from the post-war parliamentary commission on war
profits and expenses; reporting in 1923, the commission
had this to say on the activities of Ilvafs management:
mentre il paese era tormentato dalla guerra non 
mutarono il loro atteggiamento di speculatori di 
fronte ai dolori della Patria, assicurando all’ 
azienda da loro amministrata il piu lauti guadagni 
possibili...riuscirono in parte a far prevalere 1’ 
attivitb. borsistica sull'esercizio industriale e ad 
eliminare ogni concorrenza non solo nell*industria 
direttamente gestita dall’Ilva ma anche in quella 
sussidiata, aggravando cosi le condizioni fatte 
all'economia nazionale dalla protezione doganale.152
As will be seen, Ilva was not alone in taking advantage of
war-time conditions to strengthen their domestic monopoly.
The commission went on to attack the pernicious influence
of heavy industry in general,
una grande coalizione di interesse, che per vivere 
e prosperare ha bisogno dello Stato (protezione 
doganale, commesse di favore) e e tratta di
150 ibid., p. 313
151 Banca d1Italia, Relazione del direttore generale (Rome 
1916), p. 23
152 Relazione della commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta 
sulla. spese di guerra (Rome 1923) , vol. 2, p. 26
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necessita a influire sullo Stato, se non a domin- 
arlo; da ci6 derivano quei fatti di inquinamento 
della nostra vita pubblica, che cosi acerbamente 
offendono ogni cittadino amante del proprio paese.
A ci6 si aggiunga che il produttore di acciaio deve 
considerare suo cliente preferito lo Stato, in 
quanto ha bisogno di armi e di navi da guerra: e la 
conseguenza e che ha interesse a spingere lo Stato 
a moltiplicare e perfezionare sempre piu il suo 
armamento.153
Despite the rapid expansion of the railways, and her bid 
for a central role in developing the industrial infrastru­
cture of the Balkans and Asia Minor, a nation with as small 
a domestic market and so weak a position in international 
trade as Italy could not support heavy industry indefinitely 
under normal peacetime production. The demand for interv­
ention is a logical response to this problem, bringing 
forseeable benefits. For example, by 1916 all seventeen
steel and machine factories in Brescia were working entir-
1*54-ely for the military. In August 1915 Salandra had been 
forced to send a circular to his prefects on the need to 
act against war profiteering; the prime minister warned 
that
II problema della fabbricazione dei proiettili e 
munizioni col concorso della industria privata, 
mentre ha fatto sorgere nell!intero paese una 
quantity di ottime iniziative, ha purtroppo susc- 
itato anche in molte categorie di persone propositi 
riprovevolissimi di speculazione.155
The textile industry is also rescued from stagnation
by intervention; as Einaudi argued, ’L*industria cotoniera
raggiungeva cosi, col favore del tempo di guerra, quella
organizzazione accentrata e disciplinata a cui invano
taluno aveva voluto condurla nell*anteguerra per trarla da
156periodiche crisi di sovraproduzione.1 The industry was 
also able to sell off surplus stocks which had built up 
after years of over-production; while the Manifatture 
cotoniere meridionali in particular expanded rapidly during
153 ibid., 2, p. 53
154 A. Kelikan, ’From Liberalism to Corporatism: The Province 
of Brescia during the First World War1, in J. Davis (ed.), 
pp. 213-38 at 218
155 Cited in M. Fatica, op. cit., p. 433
156 La condotta..., p. 174. See also Bachi, op. cit. , pp. 
146-47, ’Ad ogni modo l’annata 1915 & fra le migliori 
ricordate dalla storia di questa industria...’
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the war, gaining control of all production in the south. 
Similar gains came in the wool sector. Imports of unprocessed 
wool had already tripled in 1915 against the average annual 
requirement between 1909 and 1913; while between 1 May 1915 
ahd 31 December 1918 the industry supplied 102,000,000 
metres to a value of 1,326,000,000 lire.'*"'^  Again, the phar­
maceuticals industry found ’nella cessazione della concorr- 
enza germanica un possente impulso; nuovi stabilimenti sono 
sorti e molte nuove sostanze e specialita terapeutiche
"I R ft
recate sui mercato.’ The nascent automobile industry
also found relief from pre-war difficulties in the production
of vast quantities of military vehicles: production not
only in support of Italy’s war effort, since ’L’esportazione
di tali articoli per ordinazioni di governi alleati e stata
159assai cospicua.’ Fiat’s interest in military contracts 
both at home and in allied markets during neutrality have 
already been described, and the expansion of Agnelli’s firm 
during the war can be seen in the vast rise in its capital 
base, from twenty-five and one half million lire in 1914 to 
almost thirty millions in 1915, thirty-seven millions in 1915 
and no less than 125 million lire in December 1918.^b^  Even 
before the end of 1915, Fiat had sent the Italian army 
over 2000 lorries and a variety of other vehicles and planes, 
and a further 1,700 lorries and 400 other vehicles to her 
allies. By October 1917 the firm had produced an average 
of seventy-five vehicles per day since intervention; and by 
the close of war, Fiat controlled ninety-six per cent of 
automobile production in Italy.lbl
Surveying all these developments in Gritica Sociale 
one year after intervention, Claudio Treves concluded 
that
e certissimo che, se, prima della dichiarazione 
della guerra e subito dopo, buona parte della 
borghesia era incerta, perplessa, angosciata anche,
157 D. Einaudi, op. cit. , p. 80
158 R. Bachi, L’Italia...1914, D. 151
159 ibid.
160 Fua, op. cit. , p. 232
161 G-. Prato, op. cit. , pp. 100-1
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temendo un altro agosto 1914, e la sua adesione 
alia guerra era contornata da molte riserve, ora 
essa si e data tutta con fiducia, con serenita e 
letizia, al suo dovere patriottico, mostrando uno 
zelo che cresce ogni giorno. La guerra convince la 
borghesia per i suoi immediati risultati economici, 
indipendentemente dall'esito storico-militare. (War 
is welcomed) come mezzo di superamento di crisi 
interne economiche, o come mezzo di eliminazione 
di "concorrenza moleste."162
Treves cites this passage in the annual report of the Banca
di Sconto, which suggests that opinion amongst industrialists
perhaps welcomed intervention even more eagerly than he
claimed, and which shows in particular how the economic
recovery in some sectors during neutrality is linked to war
production:
Tanto il periodo della neutralita, quanto quello 
della guerra, non furono senza vantaggio per alcuni 
rami della produzione. Le industrie meccaniche ed in 
particolare le automobilistiche, grazie alle copiose 
ordinazioni di casa ed all’estero, erano rifiorite 
di vitalita e cresciute di sviluppo. La siderurgia, 
non ancora uscita dal faticoso periodo del riordin- 
amento finanziario, libera ormai da ogni molesta 
competizione, si avvid rapida verso il suo assetto 
definitivo. Anche le industrie tessili, e fra esse 
prima la cotoniera, benchd non del tutto guarita 
dalla sopraproduzione, trovarano modo di vendere 
a buon patto gli stoks che tanto ne avevano appes- 
antito lo stato finanziario e allentato il ciclo 
della produzione. Non piu in questo campo fusi 
inattivi, orarii interrotti e officine inoperose. La 
guerra, con le prementi e improvvise richieste, 
guari situazioni non facili e ridestd energie 
manifatturiere sofferenti e sopite.163
Bachi's description of economic life through 1916-
II movimento degli affari e quanto mai febbrile... 
l’attivita di gran parte delle industrie -obliato 
oramai ogni lontano cenno di fiachezza- pulsa 
instancabile, si dilata, si moltiplica, invocando 
affannosamente nuovi mezzi, piu copiose materie, piu 
numerose braccia-lb4
captures the headlong expansion of so many leading companies
-llva, Terni, Fiat and above all Ansaldo. The central
role of the Perrone brothers in Italian political and
economic life, indicated in 1914-15 by their close
lb2 XXYI (191b), 16-31 May, pp. 145-47 at 147
163 ibid., p. 146
164 R. Bachi, L'Italia...1916, pp. V-VI
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relationship with Salandra1s government, and their part 
in the foundation of the Banca di Sconto, continued in the 
war years. By 1918 Ansaldo was the most powerful industrial 
complex in Italy, its capital having risen from thirty
million lire in 1916 to 500 million lire two years later.
165let this 1sviluppo eccezionale, quasi incredibile1, as 
one economic historian has it, is important not just as 
further proof of the value of war to heavy industry, but 
also for the use to which the Perrones put this new economic 
and financial strength. Essentially, the firm continues 
efforts to free itself from dependence on external finance, 
and secure through complete vertical integration a future 
course of autarchic development. In 1915 Ansaldo gained 
control of the Soc. Nazionale di Navigazione, a takeover 
intended to reduce the costs of maritime transport. This is 
only part of Ansaldofs expansion in 1915 -new plants also 
opened at Sampierdarena, Fiumara and Sestri. The Relazione 
dei Consiglio for the year sets out the company's overall 
objectives:
Nel procedere a questi nuovi impianti abbiamo avuto 
anche di mira quell'era futura di pace nella quale 
spettera all*industria italiana l'altro altissimo 
compito di servire ai bisogni della rinnovata civilta 
e di redimere il nostro Paese da ogni dipendenza o 
soggezione economica dallo straniero...11 quesito 
piu importante per noi come per ogni altro indust- 
riale, era ed e quello dei noli: scarsi erano e
sono i mezzi di trasporto, altissimi i prezzi. Ed
il problema & vitale, considerata la quantith di 
merce che noi dobbiamo importare dall'estero...Per 
contribuire a risolverlo, abbiamo promosso la cost- 
ituzione della Societh Nazionale di Navigazione; 
questa nuovo organismo e gi& in piena funzione: la 
sua flotta si compone gia di quattro unitA, altre 
ne costruiremo nel nostro Cantiere per suo conto, 
perchd essa possa svilupparsi in modo corrispondente 
alia necessita delle nostre importazioni.166
The attempt to capitalise on this period of high
public spending to end the pre-war reliance on hostile bank
capital continues through the war. Ansaldo won control of
the Miniere di Logne, beginning extensive explorations, as
well as opening new plants and shipyards and commencing the
165 Fua, op. cit., p. 202
166 G-azzo, op. cit. , pp. 390-91
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production of aeroplanes. By 1918 the firm employed 80,000 
workers, as against the 4-7,000 employed hy its arch-rival, 
Ilva. In fact the war-time expansion of these two giant 
firms was remarkably similar, with Ansaldo1s drive for 
vertical integration matched by the activities of Ilva, 
which absorbs iron and manganese mines, together with a 
number of electrical societies (intended to end the former 
dependence on coal) and certain companies to which Ilva is 
itself a supplier, such as Officine Pattison and Officine 
Meccanicne e Navali of Naples. ^  Einaudi sensed that by the 
end of 1916,
L'organizzazione economica dell1industria tende a 
concentrarsi -al luogo di costruttori navali, arma- 
tori e noleggiatori distinti, con interessi discor- 
danti e talvolta in aperto contrasto, sorgono flotte 
consacrate al trasporti di particglari ditte o di 
qualche pubblica azienda, le quali tentano cosi di 
sottrarsi alle alee dei noli oscillanti e crescenti, 
e si vedono compagnie di navigazione impiantare 
cantieri propri per la costruzione di navi.168
The massive but carefully planned growth and divers­
ification achieved by Andaldo during the war is assisted 
throughout by the Banca Italiana di Sconto. The Perrones 
tied this bank entirely to the requirements of their company, 
placing figures linked to Ansaldo at its head and gaining 
permanent control of a majority of the shares with voting 
rights. While Ansaldo prospered, so too did the bank; in 
the course of the war its capital grew to 315 million 
lire, with branches opened throughout Italy and abroad.
In return Ansaldo gained vital financial support -for
169example, in its major share issue of 1917* The Perrones
also continued their attacks on the Banca Commerciale as a
threat to Italy's independence. In 1918 an attempt was
170even made to 'storm' the Oomit ; following an attack on 
the directors of Ansaldo for this unsuccessful manoeuvre
167 See 'La concentrazione delle industrie e la guerra 
delle Nazioni', Riv. delle Soc. Comm., IX (1919)> PP* 
724-40
168 L. Einaudi, op. cit. , pp. 95-6
169 See P. Sraffa, 'The Bank Crisis in Italy', Economic 
Journal, 32 (1922), pp. 178-97, espec. 178-81
170 ibid., pp. 180-81
219
at the Comit's annual meeting in 1921, the Perrones. in 
turn used their shareholders1 meeting to defend these 
efforts to eliminate finally the Banca Commerciale:
s
E notoria ed antica la lotta che i dirigenti della 
Banca Commerciale conducono contro di noi, con ogni 
mezzo, subdolo ed aperto...Nel 1917> noi...acquist- 
ammo gradatamente azioni della Banca Commerciale sui 
pubblico mercato ove erano largamente trattate.
1'operazione...rappresentava una misura di legittima 
difesa contro le ostilit&, che gli uomini della 
Banca muovevano contro di noi per intralciare l1 
as.censione e lo sviluppo di aziende...
Abbiamo sempre considerato come un formidabile 
pericolo il dominio della Banca sull1industria: era 
tanto piu doveroso temerlo quando l'interesse delle 
industrie si confondeva con l!interesse stesso della 
Nazione, che aveva in giuoco la sua esistenza.
E tanto piu era legittimo il nostro timore 
rispetto alia Banca Commerciale, indiscutibile fili- 
azione dell'Alta Banca di Berlino, che nel marzo 
1915 disponeva ancora della maggioranza del suo 
Consiglio di Amministrazione; mentre gran parte 
delle sue azioni giacevano all'estero in masse 
compatte ed omnipotenti!171
The post-war occupation of the factories and Italy's uncer­
tain foreign policy was also explained by the continuing 
influence of this 'German' bank. Ansaldo continued to link 
its profitability and expansion with an end to Italy's 
political and economic subjugation: in November 1918 the 
Perrones insist on the need for maintaining high output 
as 'tutte le espressioni di quell'industria pacifica che
deve assicurare all'economia nazionale 1'indipendenza da
172ogni soggezione straniera.'
Interest in the idea of an economic alliance against 
Germany by the entente powers, and in the possibility of 
securing an agreement on Italian expansion and access to 
raw materials across the Adriatic, also continues in and 
after the war. Bachi believed the Italian econamy came out 
of the war
con una organizzazione piu complessa, piu rafforzata, 
meglio atta a fronteggiare le gravi difficolta del 
nuovo tempo e dei nuovi schemi di rapporti internaz­
ionali; e soprattutto, con un meccanismo indust­
rials assai piu esteso e possente: molto di questa
171 E. Gazzo, op. cit. , pp. 448-4-9 
!72 ibid., p. 425
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piu vasta organizzazione manifatturiera segna gran 
progresso, non solo quantitative.•.1*agevole collo- 
camento del prodotto durante gli anni di guerra, 
senza concorrenza, presso un unico cliente, col 
prevalente fine di raggiungere una rapida e copiasa 
produzione anche ad alto costo, non ha sempre addo- 
tto a una organizzazione tecnica appropriata per 
realizzare bassi costi e sostenere la concorrenza.173
Yet a crucial part of the advantage heavy industry hoped to
draw from intervention was an end to any such competition.
Organisation by trusts and the elimination of domestic
competition carried through before the war is followed by
efforts to exclude definitively all German trade. La Metall-
urgia italiana warned its work-foree in 1916 that 'la vitt-
oria degli imperi centrali vorrebbe dire, con la morte dell'
industria italiana, la classe operaia inondata dalla disoc-
cupazione e dalle miseria.’ Industrialists come to share
the conviction of the economist Mario Alberti -formerly an
advocate of free-trade- that
L'era del protezionismo, che da molti avanti la 
guerra si voleva prossima alia fine, si annuncia 
ora piu che mai ferma e duratura. Per molti indizi 
e per diverse vie il protezionismo doganale si 
presenta in futuro piu radicato che mai. Soltanto 
un rivolgimento completo di tutto l’assetto econo­
mico, soltanto l'avvento al potere...di uomini e di 
idee socialistico-anticapitalistiche...potrebbero... 
alterare le previsioni di immutato, anzi crescente 
protezionismo.175
In February 1916 their lobbying organisation, the Gomitato
-per le tariffe doganali, voiced its
vivissima preoccupazione che, a guerra finita, infl- 
uenze di ordine politico-internazionale impedissero 
l’adozione delle misure d’ordine doganale necessarie 
alia difesa economica del paese, e voluta anche 
dalla evoluzione tecnica verificatasi negli ultimi 
venti anni.176
Tariffs are needed to break German control of vital sectors 
of the Italian economy, and to allow an open field for the 
Italian companies anxious somehow to maintain in peacetime 
the levels of production possible during the war. So
173 R. Bachi, L»Italia...1918, pp. VII-IX
174 VIII (19167, p. 41
175 M. Alberti, op. cit., p. b05
176 L. Einaudi, op. cit. , pp. 144-45
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further space is given in the Rivista delle Societa Comm-
erciali for the nationalist Carlifs expos£ of Germany *s
insidious attempts to retain control of the peninsula’s
future development. Control of the electricity generating
industry has been won
per due vie; con 1'imposizione delle sue merci 
tecniche e nell’esportazione dei suoi capi tecnici 
...(Italy’s tariffs against the import of such 
machinery are a ) Difese irrisorie ed inconsistent! 
che sembrano fatte esclusivamente per agevolare 1’ 
invasione dei prodotti similari tedeschi in Italia.177
Italy must move within the tariff shield of her allies,
since
Uno dei nostri massimi problemi di domani sara 
quello di liberarci definitivamente dalla soggezione 
dalle macchine straniere, dai prodotti chimici 
stranieri...gli indici d!industrializzazione dobbiamo 
cercarli nell’aumentata importazione di materie 
prime e nella diminuita importazione di manufatti: 
niente altro.178
Nitti also returned to the influence of foreign capital 
already within Italy's tariffs, accepting that after the 
war such capital should no longer be accepted: a point 
also made by Cavasola, a minister in Salandra’s Cabinet.179 
War also gave to industrial production an unden­
iable importance in the very survival of the nation, enab­
ling firms such as Ansaldo to depict their activities as 
a patriotic response to government appeals and to force 
their requirements to the centre of national life. Announ­
cing the formation early in 1916 of a Comitato nazionale 
scientifico-tecnico per lo sviluppo e l’incremento dell’ 
industria italiana, the official journal of heavy industry 
hoped that from this and other new groups, 'v'b ragione 
veramente ad allietarsi come di un indice sicuro del risv-
eglio della coscienza industriale nel Paese, risveglio
180veramente fecondo per 11 awenire.' The move toward
177 P. Carli, 'L'indipendenza economica dell'Italia e le 
industrie meccaniche e chimiche’, V (1915), pp. 761-69 
at 765 and 766-67
178 ibid., p. 769. For Carli, 'Se c'era un paese il quale 
avesse dovuto dare il massimo impulso all'industria del 
macchinario elettrico, era proprio il nostro...ma per 
riscattarsi dal carbone, era caduto sotto la sudditanza 
delle macchine elettriche', ibid. , p. 765
179 G. Prato, Riflessi storici della economia di guerra 
(Bari 1919), p. 147
180 ha Met, it., VIII (1916), p. 118
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autarchy must bring in the political sphere a new aware­
ness of industry’s problems, an end to the treatment suff­
ered under Giolitti, since
Le industrie meccanica e metallurgica non possono 
avere un prospero sviluppo se il Paese non sente 
nel sangue, non respira nell’aria il germe indus- 
triale, se l’educazione nella scuola e nella 
famiglia non ne favoriscono lo sviluppo.181
Hopes for a resolution of industry’s problems
through co-operation with the Triple Entente are also
developed further during the war. In the event these ideas
of new economic expansion under the aegis of her allies
proved illusory: as II Messaggero complained in 1920,
La guerra che ebbe basi e moventi essenzialmente 
economici e fu, con giusta ragione detta una 
"guerra di materie prime", si h chiusa con un 
trattato il qualo ha caratteri spiccatamente, 
prevalentemente economici per tutte le potenze 
dell’Intesa, meno perd per 1’Italia.182
However in the summer of 1916 the Rivista delle Societa
Gommerciali was confident of the many benefits which would
flow from Italy’s intervention. An article by A. Eisen-
stadt -the title of which, ’Economica postbellica. A prop-
osito dei trattati di commercio! , once again reveals one
of the main preoccupations of industry- speculated on
whether the Triple Entente can
concretare la sua attitudine verso la Germania in 
altro modo che opponendo un "blocco economico" 
compatto, con dazi protezionisti, contro la sua 
invasione commerciale? La soluzione sembra impo- 
ssibile in un altro senso, per la semplice ragione 
che se l’Intesa non si prepara vigorosamente a 
ricevere l’attacco tedesco della "guerra dopo la 
guerra", la Germania, che da parte sua ha gia 
organizzato un arsenale perfetto per 1'invasione 
dei mercati dopo la guerra, riprenderh il sopra- 
wento.183
Italy will also gain by greater access to the English and
especially the Russian market:
Durante la guerra 1'industria italiana ha dimos- 
trato una vitalith cosi energica che forse in un
181 ibid., p. 43
182 Cited in Tempera, op. cit., p. 17
183 Riv. del. Soc. Comm., VI (1916), pp. 549-66 at 549
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awenire non troppo lontano potrk coprire il suo 
fabbisogno di macchine in casa sua. Per il tempo 
di transizione si rivolger& all1industria inglese 
o americana, ma i metalli andrci a cercarli in 
Russia, dove potr& trovare anche il legno...E la 
Russia aumenterk le sue importazioni di automohili 
e di macchinario elettrico, di seterie italiane, 
di pelli, di calzature, di zolfo ecc....La Russia 
e destinata a diventare il grande serbatoio ove 
gli alleati andranno a rifornirsi di materie prime 
...(Italy needs) di trasformare la Russia da forn- 
itrice esclusiva di grano in una fornitrice di 
carhone e di ferro.184
These are the new patterns of exchange which will
develop after the war; both Prance and Italy
troveranno in Inghilterra degli sbocchi per i loro 
prodotti agricoli (come per certi prodotti di 
consumo manufatti), la Russia invece offrirh loro 
un mercato per i prodotti delle industrie fondam- 
entali...le industrie...dell1Italia e della Prancia 
potranno trovare in Russia uno sbocco sufficiente 
per il loro primo movimento di espansione.185
Such hopes in the Russian market were not entirely fanciful,
as is clear from an announcement of the Russian Consular
Office in Genoa, reproduced in the journal L'Esplorazione
Commerciale in June 1915. This pointed out that the war
had upset trade patterns: much of the business formerly
done with Germany and Austria-Hungary was now open to
Russia*s allies, and that, !I paesi che occuperanno in
questo momento un posto sui mercato russo, naturalmente,
hanno la certezza di aumentare efficacemente la vendita
dei loro prodotti a guerra finita.1 Italy was also reminded
that, 'L'abbondanza di prodotti agricoli, di fibre tessili,
di prodotti forestali, minerari ed animali, pub consentire
scambi importantissimi. *
Eisenstadt*s article concluded on another theme
which has preoccupied industrialists and politicians for
over a decade: the perennial plans for a new network of
railways in the Balkans. The latest variant is even more
grandiose, involving a line starting in the Kuban and
creating a direct link between London and northern Persia,
184 ibid., p. 564
185 ibid., p. 563
186 'Per gli scambi commerciale italo-russi* , XXX (1915)» 
pp. 286-67
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so competing with, the Baghdadbabn and offering Italy great
trading opportunities:
Se la ferrovia transcaucasiana assume tutta l1 
importanza ehe le da la sua destinazione come 
legame tra l!Europa e l’Asia, il suo compito andra 
allargandosi nell'avvenire•
Non servir& solamente all’esportazione del 
carbone e del ferro russo in Italia, ma servir& 
anche di via di transito per le merci europee 
dirigentisi in Asia. La produzione industriale 
dell1Italia e della Francia, cercando sbocchi in 
Asia, trovera la via gia tracciata.
Un’altra condizione indispensabile per l’avv- 
iamento degli scambi tra l'Europa e 1’Asia sara la 
liberta delle vie marittime conducenti in Russia, 
vuol dire lfapertura dei Lardanelli e un Adriatico 
italiano.
Per un intesa economica tra gli alleati, il 
problema delle terre irredente, dell1Adriatico 
libero diviene un problema della piu alta, della 
piu vitale importanza per la Quadruplice.187
An earlier article in the same journal by Mario Alberti
also dwelt on the question of railway-building, linking
this with Italy’s exploitation of the great resources of
Asia Minor, which
e ricca di giacimenti minerari non per anco sfru- 
ttati: allume, antimonio, arsenico, asbesto, borace, 
cromo, carbone, rame, argento, oro, ferro, caolino, 
piombo, lignite, ferro magnetico, manganese, nich- 
elio, smeriglio, ecc. , ecc. , si trovano in rilevanti 
quantity. Ma h tutto un lavoro da compiere per 
metterq in valore queste miniere sin qui abbando- 
nate. E un campo aperto a molti decenni di proficuo 
intenso lavoro. La maggior difficolta opponentesi 
alio sfruttamento di queste miniere consiste nella 
mancanza di ferrovie, I due problemi sono strettam- 
ente collegati: quello dello sviluppo economico 
dell’Asia Minore con quello delle costruzioni ferr- 
oviarie. Le ricchezze interne dell’Asia Minore 
attendono le ferrovie per essere valorizzate; le 
ferrovie, alia loro volta, trarranno ricco alimento 
di traffico dalle produzioni e dai bisogni delle 
regioni interne quando, attraverso mezzi di comun- 
icazione meno primitivi, verranno a contatto con 
l’Europa...Questa, delle miniere, h una delle piu 
importanti risors.e avvenire dell'Asia Minore. II 
prodotto dello sfruttamento del sottosuolo dell’
Asia Minore contribuir^ in misura ragguardevolissima 
all'increment© dei traffici mediterranei, ci6 che 
si ripercuotera favorevolmente anche sui commerci
187 A. Eisenstadt, art. cit., p. 565
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adriatici cosi direttamente interessati e quindi 
anche sui porti di Trieste, Venezia, Fiume, Bari, 
ecc •
Alberti believed the region had an equally valuable 
potential for agricultural production, another idea already 
encountered in pre-war writings. Once the Ottoman regime is 
toppled,
II terreno dell’Asia Minore, potrebbe produrre con 
tutta facilita il triplo di quanto oggi da...I traf- 
fici che con l’Europa se ne svilupperebbero, andre- 
bbero indubbiamente ad accrescere il lavoro dei 
porti adriatici...La produzione granaria nell’Asia 
Minore b suscettibile di sensibile sviluppo...Note- 
vole b la produzione di cotone, che ha prospettive 
brillantissime nella pianura di Adana. L!allevamento 
del bestiame e la produzione della lana sono tutt’ 
altro che insignificanti.188
Yet in order to realise this great potential, Asia Minor
has need of an
aumento della populazione ed impiego di capitali. 
Ecco, dunque, che alle iniziative italiane si aprono 
occasioni meravigliose di lavoro e di impiego. L*
Asia Minore potra essere domani una meta della 
nostra emigrazione di uomini e di capitali. G-li 
uomini per portare alia luce le ricchezze del 
suolo, i capitali per creare le necessarie linee 
ferroviarie e gli impianti minerari.
Uomini, capitali e ferrovie. In questo trin- 
omio si riassume il fabbisogno di elementi per la 
risurrezione economica dell’Asia Minore, terra di 
grande passato e di non meno grande avvenire.189
Here one can see the pre-war Italian expansionism taken a
stage further, and once more expressing interests directly
opposed to those of Germany and Austria-Hungary.
The domestic origins of Italy’s drive into this
region is also made clear in a work by Paolo Revelli in
1917, mapping out Italy’s claims to control these lands
facing her across the Adriatic. Revelli argued that
II nucleo italiano in Adalia gia notevole prima 
della guerra, la forte colonia di Smirne, la nuova 
immigrazione durevole sfociata, dopo la pace, con 
impulso determinato o spontaneo nell’Anatolia 
meridionale, nel richiamo dei commerci si accres- 
cerebbero, e sulla trama di essi si stenderebbe 
come un rete colonizzatrice di uomini e di interessi,
188 M. Alberti, art. cit. , p. 1026
189 ibid., pp. 1026-27
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una fratellanza italiana cementata dalle comune 
necessity e dal comuno intento, che sarebbe 
ragione e conseguenza della fortuna nostra in 
Oriente...190
If Italy is victorious with Britain, Prance and Russia, 'il 
nuovo territorio garantirebbe ricchezza e avvenire alia 
patria’, with its potential for both agricultural and indu­
strial production. Britain might also help Italy to replace 
German influence in Mesapotamia. The rail route through 
Serbia, which must finally be built after the war,
torner& a nostra grande utilita se convenientemente 
sfruttata da raccordi e facilitazioni con le nostre 
ferrovie.
Ma il vantaggio italiano sara immediato e 
sicuro, quando potra essere compiuta quella ferro-via 
Adriatico-Danubio discussa alia Conferenza di 
Londra (a proposito dello sbocco serbo sull1Adria­
tico), che sara durevole alimento ai commerci e alle 
industrie nostre, e garantir& alle terre meridionali 
d’Italia la fortuna promessa dalle parole augurali^ 
di Antonio Salandra, nel gennaio 1913: "La fatalita 
storica trae la Puglia a inorientarsi. Ne fanno 
fede la sua configurazione, i suoi idiomi, i monu- 
menti della sua civilta: per la Puglia dovra lfItalia 
inorientarsi..."191
With this echo of Giolitti’s justification of the Libyan
war in 1911, Salandra prefigures the programme around
which Italy’s ruling elite will unite in 1915, again turning
to war for further economic and political profit.
190 P. Revelli, L1Italia e il Mar di Levante (Milan 1917)» 
p. 194
191 ibid., pp. 192 and 208
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Liberalism, nationalism and intervention
The movement of Italian nationalism has received 
an immense amount of attention in the last twenty years, 
much of it concentrating on the extent to which the devel­
opment of nationalism prior to Vtforld War I foreshadows 
the emergence of fascism,'1' This debate on the possible 
continuity between liberal and fascist Italy tends on 
occasions to obscure an understanding of nationalism as a 
movement with great importance and influence in its own 
right. The insistence in some studies on the literary 
origins of Italian nationalism, as opposed to the anti- 
semitic and authoritarian elements in its European counter­
parts, ignores the substantial political content of journals 
such as II Regno: its very first issue in 1903 carried 
Papini!s claim that
A un nazionalismo letterario e ideologico fatto 
di parole e di memorie, celebratore di vittorie 
o celebratore d!intelletti, h successo un nazio­
nalismo economico, fatto di cifre, costruito sul 
presente, celebratore di forze produttrici, di 
espansione di uomini e di ricchezze.2
In the same year Enrico Corradini asserted that
Noi siamo soprattutto espansionisti..•affermazione 
fondamentale del nostra programma, che bisogna la 
vita nazionale si orienti molto di piu verso la 
politica estera..,E per parte mia non rifuggo 
affatto neppure da un espansionismo militare;3
while an editorial in II Regno in May 1904 urging that
1*espansionismo prometteva la sicurezza interna, 
procurando l!entusiasmo dinastico e militare, 
contraweleno eccelente contro lo spirito
1 For a summary of a major conference on Italian nationalism 
held in Florence in November 1979, see R.S .1., XCII (1980), 
pp. 470-81; and for a selection of the papers read here,
R. Vivarelli.(ed.), op. cit. 2
2 D. Frigessi (ed.), La cultura italiana... (Turin I960 ), 
vol. 1, p. 63
3 ibid., p. 452
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savversivo, e potendo permettere in seguito una 
esportazione di uomini e da merci favorevole all’ 
economia nazionale4
could almost have served as a programme for the political 
party which the nationalist association became ten years 
later. Similarly, Silvio Lanaro’s description of nation­
alism as
la proiezione ideale e politica del blocco corpor- 
ativo-protezionista costituitosi in funzione dell1 
industrializzazione, e rappresenta pertanto -essi 
e non altri- l’elemento di continuity ideologica 
del capitalismo italiano, 5
while a possible interpretation of what Italian nationalism 
had become by 1914, helps little in distinguishing the 
various strands within a rather loosely organised and 
contentious movement, or to its development in the decade 
before the war.
Baffaele Molinelli has suggested that Italy*s humil­
iation during the Bosnian crisis of 1908 was crucial in 
the spread of nationalism to a wider public.b Certainly 
it is after this event that Foreign Minister Tittoni began 
to speak of currents ’mosse da un chauvinisme megalomane o 
imperialists che dir si voglia, e secondo le quali il 
G-overno manca di energia se non ricorre alia violenza ed e
7
pusillanime se rispetta gli altrui diritti.’’ Such an aggr­
essive attitude to political issues can be seen in the 
statute of the first nationalist group in Italy (formed in 
Turin), as published in the journal II Tricolore. Article 
two stated the group’s aim as
la diffusione e 1*applicazione pratica dei seguenti 
postulati che stanno alia base della dottrina 
nazionalista:
a) La nazione h la ultima e maggiore unita di vita 
collettiva. Nazionalismo significa unificazione 
nazionale e di conseguenza tende ad una costante 
propugnazione dell*irredentismo in base a ragioni 
italiane.
b) Opposizione del concetto di collaborazione di
4 Cited in S. Bertelli, ’Gli incunabili del nazionalismo’, 
Nord e Sud, XVI (1961), pp. 80-102 at 86
5 S. Lanaro, ’Nazionalismo e ideologia del blocco corporat- 
ivo-protezionista in Italia’, Ideologia, 1 (1967), pp. 29 
48 at-47
b R. Molinelli, Per un storia del nazionalismo italiano 
(XJrbino 1966), p. 42
7 A.P., C.D. , Legis. XXII, p. 22274
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classe a quello di lotta di classe e propaganda 
per un’intesa, fra le classi produttrici, indus- 
triale e operaia, base di un1unione nazionale 
per la conquista imperialista.
c) Elevazione del concetto di Monarchia pervenuta 
alia sua forma piu impropria, per una monarchia 
intesa come figura vivente della nazione, conqui- 
statrice e dominatrice.
d) Affermazione dell'Esercito e della Marina consid- 
erati come istrumenti coordinati ad una politica 
attiva, espansionionista della nazione* Meta 
della nazione b la preparazione della guerra 
vittoriosa*
e) Affermazione sul terreno economico dell'individ- 
ualismo integrale e quindi opposizione a quella 
leggi sociali che tendano a vincolare liberta 
individuali.
f) L*imperialism© b postulato diretto ed imprescin- 
dibile del nazionalismo. L’imperialismo b la 
formazione del patrimonio della nazione. Esso e 
industriale nelle colonie libere e militare nelle 
colonie di conquista.
g) Gulto delle tradizioni e degli eroi, e di Roma 
imperiale signora del mondo. 8
There could hardly have been a more absolute rejection of
the goals and methods of G-iolittian Italy.
An editorial in the first issue of 11 Tricolore in
April 1909 echoed many of these themes, stressing the need
for an
affermazione costante dell’idea nazionale, all’inf- 
uori dei partiti per un partito nuovo, il quale 
abbia per base il principio che la nazione b la 
maggiore ed ultima unita di vita eollettiva... 
opposizione costante al consolidarsi, nella vita 
politica del paese, di quante forme e concezioni 
portano alia democrazia statale...Con questo ardore 
di vita nuova, rinnovata dalla tradizione nazionale, 
con tale programma di negazione, non gia di assim- 
ilazione delle dottrine awersarie, con simile ideale 
di uno Stato dominatore in Patria, conquistatore 
fuori dei sacri confini, noi iniziamo oggi I1opera 
nostra di azione e di prop Uganda nazionalista. 9
The issues around which Italian politics would revolve in 
the coming years -and which are crucial to Italian interv­
ention in 1915- are already present in these remarks of the 
paper’s editor, Mario Viana, on the role of II Tricolore in 
developing
8 Cited in A. Todisco, Le origini del nazionalismo imperia­
lista in Italia (Rome n.d. but 1924), pp. 22-4-
9 ibid., pp. 10-11
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formule dottrinarie che conducono alia concezione 
teorica per ora dell1imperialismo. II quale non & 
altro ciie una forma di espressione di vita nazionale 
attraverso l!energia, il potere dominatore, la 
potenza militare, 1’emigrazione disciplinata e 1* 
espansione economica commerciale coloniale. 10
The origins of Italian nationalism seem then to come from 
the growing hostility to the social and political effects 
of industrialisation as presided over hy Giolitti, and 
the clear rejection of Crispi!s policies which he repres­
ented. It may also spring in part from the hostility toward 
Griolitti felt "by those social groups not represented in his 
system: membership of the first nationalist groups comprised 
many journalists, lawyers, students, academics and the 
local aristocracy.
The nationalist deputy Luigi Federzoni would later 
claim that nationalism ’fu una forza politica di destra, 
operante su un piano perfettamente costituzionale, per la 
salvaguardia dell’ordine sociale e legale, e per il rinvig- 
orimento dello spirito patriottico del popolo italiano.’
Such a definition does little to distinguish nationalism 
from the group of liberals who formed around Salandra 
before the war. Pederzoni himself accepted this, suggesting
in December 1913 that nationalism served as ’la piccola 
12avanguardia’ of liberalism. Gorradini too saw this new
movement as a form of surrogate liberalism, ’la dottrina
che lo stesso liberalismo ha reso necessaria, venendo meno
13ai compiti che avrebbero dovuto essere suoi.’ On a 
lecture tour of Italy in the winter of 1913-14, Corradini 
again spoke of nationalism as liberalism’s ’ awanguardia, 
una awanguardia bene accetta, specie da quando abbiamo 
dato prova di qualche valore nelle campagne elettorali'; 
however the two are linked ’soltanto come una gente d’un 
epoca storica che si conclude, puo esser vicina a una gente
10 ibid., p. 18
11 L. Pederzoni, Italia di ieri per la storia di domani 
(Milan 1967), p. 15
12 A.P., G.D. , Legis. XXVI, t. del 11 die. 1913, p. 351
13 E. Gorradini, Discorsi politici (1902-24) (Florence 1925), 
p. 191
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d'un epoea storica che s'inizia...il liberalismo pub segu-
itare a vivere, ma solo al patto. di rinascere nel nazion- 
14alismo.1 The task of the liberal party must be to pursue
una politica...di contenuto nazionale contrapposto 
al contenuto socialista...avrebbe dovuto riempire 
i vuoti fatti dal tempo nel suo programma con tutta 
una nuova fornitura di contenuto economico, di 
questo contenuto economico: cooperazione delle 
classi per una maggior produzione di ricchezza 
nazionale.15
liberalism in Italy ’non capi mai che intorno aveva awers-
arii politici, fortissimi di contenuto economico. Egli si
accontento di restare una veste dove altri aveva un corpo.’^
So nationalism had arisen, demanding ’II dovere in luogo
dell'esigenza. II rispetto della gerarchia in luogo dell'
17anarchia. La disciplina in luogo dell'agitazione•’
Corradini's criticisms .show that the nationalist 
movement aimed not to aid liberalism, but eventually to 
supplant it. However the general tone of nationalism -its 
insistence on territorial expansion and hostility to any 
compromise with socialism or organised labour- was always 
likely to garner support from that section of the liberal 
party hostile to Griolitti's approach to domestic and 
foreign policy. Enrico Corradini's description of nation­
alism as 'un tentativo per spostare il problema della vita
18nazionale dalla politica interna alia politica esterna'
is indistinguishable from Salandra*s emphasis on the
strength of the Italian state as expressed through foreign
policy. Similarly, his depiction of the movement as part
of 'una necessita storica...che la borghesia e le classi
dirigenti e la stessa nazione trovassero finalmente modo
di opporre i loro valori morali ai valori morali e alia
19predicazione del socialismo e della lotta di classe* 
could apply equally to the prime minister's ideas on the 
task of liberalism. Clearly both Salandra's rise to power
14 E. Corradini, II Nazionalismo italiano (Milan 1914), pp. 
122-3 and 140
15 E. Corradini, Disc. Pari., p. 187 
lb ibid.
17 ibid., p. 206
18 II Naz. it., p. 33
19 E. Corradini, La marcia dei produttori (Rome 1916), p. bb
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and the emergence of nationalism as an influential force
in Italian politics are themselves the symptom of a
changing political climate, the roots of which are suggested
in Sidney Sonninofs remarks in 1909 that, ’Corrono tempi
in cui, per 1’aspra competizione tra i popoli e la razze,
urge che un soffio di sano e virile nazionalismo rawivi
in tutti gli ordine di cittadini il senso della mutua loro
20interdipendenza e solidarieta.’
Even Francesco Nitti had suggested back in 1907 -in 
his work II partito radicale e la nuova democrazia indust­
rials- that * le questioni strettamente di politica interna 
avranno importanza sempre minore’; his idea of ’una vera 
politica radicale’ involving ’soprattutto contribuendo a 
una politica di produzione’ also evinces the same priorities
which will make the industrial world turn towards nation-
21alism before 1914. Given this extensive harmony of views,
the nationalist campaign for intervention -culminating in
the demonstrations of May 1915- cannot be seen as merely
an extraneous and unwelcome pressure on the government.
Corradini’s remarks in a speech of February 1914, that
'Mentre un capo del liberalismo pubblicamente negava la
nostra ragione di essere, perch& ci sono loro, i liberali,
un altro capo diceva a me in privato: Io vi considero come
22la mia estrema destra’, suggests far better their relati­
onship during neutrality, despite the foundation of a 
separate nationalist party in 1914.
Hostility to socialism had been a keynote of nati­
onalism from its appearance: an early edition of II Regno
attacked it as ’sentimentale, plebeo, teppistico e viol- 
23ento.’ Griolitti’s policies were lamented as leading to
a democratic state, which in turn would lead on to socialism.
Instead, ’Bisogna rinchiodare nel cervello dei lavoratori
che hanno un maggiore interesse a mantenersi solidali con
24i loro padroni e soprattutto con la loro nazione.’
20 S. Sonnino, Disc. Pari., vol. Ill, p. 287
21 F. Nitti, 11 partito..., pp. 118 and 122-3
22 II Naz. it., p. 122
23 Cited in Molinelli, op. cit., p. 21
24 E. Corradini, op. cit. , p. 69
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Reformism was also ’dedizione progressiva e pusillanime
dello Stato alle progressive e incalzanti pretese popolar-
esche’, making Italy a state ’ogni giorno piu esclusivam-
ente interprete e ministro della sacra e sovrana volonta 
25popolare!' Attempts to co-operate with the socialist
party only expose the liberals as weak and timid: instead
liberalism !avrebbe dovuto veder subito in quello il loro
nemici, non un disturbatore da tener a bada, ma il loro
nemico antagonista da combattere acerrimamente e senza 
2 6quartiere.’ Here again the nationalist position is only
part of a general scepticism toward Giolitti's efforts to
co-opt the socialists into the liberal state.
In a speech made to parliament in December 1913,
Labriola tried to explain why Giolitti’s 'dittatura b in
piena dissoluzione1, suggesting that his nationalist
critics were themselves only the symptoms of ’una situaz-
ione storica (which) pone termine al suo lungo governo
personale.’ He continued that
La Camera sa che tre nuovi fatti soprattutto contra- 
distinguono la nuova situazione. In primo luogo la 
presenza d’un nucleo nazionalista nell'Assemblea; 
in secondo luogo la presenza d’un gruppo notevole, 
di deputati socialist!, o indipendenti, o riformisti, 
venuteli addosso dal Mezzogiorno. Poscia...1’appar- 
izione in quest’Aula...del socialismo rivoluzionario 
...Ora questa nuova situazione non b di quelle, 
onorevole Giolitti, che ella possa piu dominare 
con i suoi criteri...Dieci anni fa il paese era 
sotto il segno di una constellazione arnica, la 
congiuntura economica ci era favorevole. Le esport- 
azioni e le importazioni crescevano...i salari pote- 
vano parimenti crescere.•.Predicare la pace e 1’ 
accordo delle classi e facile in questi frangenti 
...Oggi, no, che queste cose non si possono dire 
piu. L'astro favorevole si e spento, la constell­
azione e mutata, la congiuntura si b capovolta. 
L ’industria soffre un triste periodo di stasi...
II nazionalismo esprime anche esso questo mutata 
contenuto della vita nazionale. Anzi in Italia il 
fenomeno e mediocre come b mediocre la vita del 
capitalismo nel nostro paese...L’ltalia, tardi 
arrivata nel mondo della societa contemporanea, 
non e certo il paese dove i fenomeni dell’imperi- 
alismo e del’nazionalismo possano avere il maggiore
25 Idea ITazionale, 1 and 15 March 1911
26 E. Corradini, op. cit. , p. 100
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risalto. Tuttavia oramai il fatto e apparso, e 
con la sua novit& ha prodotto un mutamento gene- 
rale nellfaspetto della societa italiana.27
The nationalist programme addressed itself to the problem
of an Italian, state and economy floundering in the fierce
international competition before 1914. Giolitti’s decade
was rejected as a disastrous parenthesis: Italy could
only survive by a return to the policies of Francesco
Grispi.
Crispi had understood that !l,unita doveva essere
il punto di partenza di una grande opera di rinnovamento,
per ottenere all’interno la grandezza economica e morale,
e all’estero 1!affermazione della nazione italiana nel 
28mondo.1 He also sensed the relation between domestic 
and foreign policy:as Corradini wrote in an article comm­
emorating the battle of Adua, !in lui lfItalia provava il 
bisogno di avvalorarsi all’estero e all'interno con una
guerra, 1!Italia senza vittorie, con una guerra vittori^- 
29osa.’ A motion passed at the nationalist congress at
Florence in December 1910, that ’una politica veramenti
benefica all’interno non h concepibile senza una contemp-
30oranea politica estera consapevole e forte’, would be a 
leitmotif of nationalist ideology in the next few years. 
Speaking at this same congress (which agreed to the form­
ation of an Associazione Nazionalista), Corradini suggested 
that ’per un vero nazionalista.••questioni interne della
nazioni non esistono1 or ’sono false interne e possono
31sempre convertirsi in questioni esterne.’ Yet while
there was complete agreement on the need for an active
foreign policy, both for the economic benefits it would
bring and as ’uno strumento per rinnovare il personale di 
32governo’, this first congress also showed serious divisions
27 A.P., C.D. , hegis. XXIV, t. del 9 die. 1913, pp. 266-71
28 h. Federzoni, op.cit. 7~p. 19
29 E. Corradini, op. cit. , p. 249
30 ibid., p. 148
31 ibid., p. 28
32 ibid., p. 35
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within Italian nationalism. Attempts to include the word 
1 imperialista' in the association’s title provoked succe­
ssful opposition from a democratic wing, which was hostile 
to the group associated with Corradini and centred in Rome 
around the official newspaper Idea Nazionale.
These differences came to a head at the second 
congress, held in Rome in December 1912, and resulted in 
the departure of the democratic group, led by Paolo Arcari 
and Luigi Valli. Their passionate irredentism had been a 
source of much embarrassment to a majority in the assoc­
iation, despite its popular appeal. Any commitment to 
liberation of the irredentist provinces meant hostility 
toward Austria-Hungary, and by implication toward Germany: 
however many nationalists felt great admiration for the 
nature of these regimes. Irredentists such as Scipio Sighele 
insisted that whereas irredentism had formerly been ’un 
sentimento -alia luce del nazionalismo h diventato una 
disciplina’: but his open contempt for Austria-Hungary -
non h una nazione: h un’amministrazione...Essere 
austriaco non significa aver nel sangue il segno 
indelibile d’una razza: significa soltanto avere 
il timbro burocratico che accerta esser nato 
sotto un dato governo 33
- proved unacceptable. With their departure, the nationalist
approach to irredentism became opportunistic, exploited
internally to justify higher military expenditure and as
34a pretext for their attack on the socialist party. Expl­
aining their resignation at the Rome congress, Arcari spoke 
of 'la loro incompatibilita assoluta con lo spirito sistem- 
aticamente antidemocratico del congresso ispirato dall'
Idea Nazionale': while Picardi believed the decisions 
taken in Rome ’harmo dato al nazionalismo una veste di 
difesa borghese e capitalistica ch’esso non doveva assumere,
e se domani essi vorranno parlare al popolo, il popolo volg-
35era le spalle riconoscendo in loro dei nemici.'
33 'Irredentismo e Nazionalismo', now in S. Sighele, II 
Nazionalismo e i partiti politici (Milan 1911)> PP* 234 - 
54 at 248-49
34 On this, see G. Sabbatucci, 'II problema dell'irredent­
ismo e le origini del movimento nazionalista in Italia', 
Storia Contemporanea, I (1970), pp. 467-502 and II
(1971), PP. 53-106  ^ .
35 Cited in P. M. Arcari, Le elaborazioni della dottrrna
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However with the triumph of the Rome group nation­
alism became a more coherent and openly imperialist movement. 
Enrico Corradini’s position in 1909 -’si pub essere nazion- 
alisti soltanto in un modo: imperialisticamente...il nazio­
nalismo deve prefiggersi di spingere avanti lo spirito 
imperialista1-° now wins acceptance. The A.N.I.’s ambiguity 
to the European alliances now becomes deliberate policy 
rather than a symptom of confusion and division: beyond 
all Italy’s treaties and alliances was her overriding need 
for an end to internal divisions in a new period of imperial 
expansion. Nationalist claims to have forced the government 
to move in North Africa in 1911 were not without some 
truth; Barrere reported on the rise of nationalism , which
’est sorti des limbes...et rend la vie du (San Giuliano)
37peu enviable.’ In 1914-15 the priority for the nation­
alist movement will be to bring Italy into a war she must 
join to prove herself as a major European power, in the 
process resolving internal divisions and gaining further 
territories. In an age in which -in Corradini’s famous 
maxim- ’Tutto il mondo e imperialista o all'esterno o all1 
interno', nationalism affirmed the need for war as the 
means by which a nation ’possa prendere il suo posto,
7 Q
economico e morale, nel mondo', ending the appeal of 
socialism. Ending too the uncontrolled exodus from the
39south, denounced as ’un antiimperialismo della servitu, 
as Italy added to her list of colonies. Loathing for the 
western democracies and for Slavdom would be rapidly ditched 
in 1914s nationalism worked ’ridurre tutti i problemi della 
vita italiana...a due grandi problemi tra loro intimamenti 
connessi ed interdipendenti: un problema di ordine e di 
disciplina interna ed un problema di g u e r r a * I t a l y ’s 
problems could only be solved through war: as Pederzoni
politica nazionale fra l’Unita e l’intervento (1870- 
1914) (Florence 1934-9). vol* 5, P» 24; V. Picardi, Scr- 
itti politici e letterarl (Rome 1922), p. 84 
3b Todisco, op. cit. , p* 25
37 D.D.F., Series 2, vol. XIV, no. 3b, Barrbre to Be Selves, 
20' July 191-1---
38 E. Corradini, op. cit. , pp. 16 and 41
39 ibid., p. 40
40 Maurizio Maravaglia at the 1911 congress. Rizzo, p. 106
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had argued at the congress of December 1913,
occorre creare nella Nazione uno stato d,animo 
nuovo; occorre preparare, per un avvenire forse 
non lontano, lo spirito degli Italiani alia nece­
ssity di risolvere il grave problema nel solo modo 
in cui potry essere risoluto.•.11 vecchio irred- 
entismo democratico e sentimentale b morto. Incombe 
su noi, terribile e urgente, il problema della 
vita e dell1avvenire dell’Italia nell’Adriatico e 
in Oriente.41
The decisions of the Rome congress of 1912 also 
won nationalism the support of Alfredo Rocco, in whom it 
gained a prestigious and effective exponent of the primacy 
of foreign policy, and of the economic and political 
value of war. One can follow in Rocco’s writings the deve­
lopment of ideas which would prove attractive to elements 
of catholic opinion, to many industrialists and even to 
members of Salandra*s government. The relationship between 
economic and territorial expansion and the restoration of 
social discipline was spelt out by Rocco in a pamphlet,
'Che cosa 6 il nazionalismo e che cosa vogliono i nazion- 
alisti', published by the A.N.I. in 1914:
1. Bisogna fare ancora questo sforzo, bisogna 
intensificare la produzione interna, e portarla 
fino al massimo possibile, per prepararci bene 
alia seconda fase della nostra evoluzione econ­
omica, la fase d'espansione all’estero.
2. Bisogna, con serenity o con fermezza, apparecc- 
hiarci fin d’ora la fase d'espansione o di 
conquista...
Con queste due fasi: fase di produzione 
interna; fase di conquista esterna, noi potremo 
soltanto risolvere il nostro problema economico 
...per costituire saldamente la societa italiana, 
non vi y che un mezzo: richiamare vivamente 1' 
attenzione degli italiani sulla lotta che la 
nazione italiana combatte e piu combattery nel 
mondo...Si b visto, a questo proposito, quanto 
e servita la guerra libica...Nel nome della 
nazione, si cementery l'aggregato nazionale, si 
creery la coscienza degli interessi nazionali, 
si instaurera la disciplina nazionale.42
Nationalism 'vuole la preparazione alia guerra, perche
ritiene che, fatalmente, l'espansione della razza italiana
41 L. Pederzoni, Baradossi d'ieri (Milan 1924), pp. 253-54
42 Now in A. Rocco, Scritti.. . , vol. 1, pp. 67-90 at 72-3
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condurra alia emigrazione armata, ciok, alia guerra.’
Writing in Tribuna in January 1914, he developed this
image of war as armed imperialism:
il popolo italiano ha iniziato la sua espansione 
nel mondo, emigrando. Questa espansione oggi e 
disordinata, inorganica, cieca, fatta di sacrifici 
impari ai risultati. Bisogna renderla disciplinata, 
organica, consapevole, moralmente dignitosa ed 
economicamente proficua. E bisogna abituare il 
nostro popolo ad un'altra idea; che. in dati 
momenti e in date circostanze, 1*emigrazione Paci­
fica pub non essere piu conveniente, e che occorrera 
ricorrere ad unfaltra forma di emigrazione: 1’emigr­
azione armata, che e quanto dire la guerra: dico che 
bisogna preparare la coscienza nazionale, anche alia 
guerra. Un popolo che conta 42 milioni di individui, 
ed ha a sua disposizione un territorio ristretto e 
povero, ha diritto all'espansione e, fatalmente, 
quando avra acquistato la coscienza di se stesso, 
si espandera in tutti i modi, anche con i modi 
violenti. Esso lo fara, perche avra la forza di 
farlo.44
War was also necessary to defend Italian influence
in areas vital to her future development. Rocco argued in
July 1914 that the Balkan wars of the two previous years
'non hanno chiuso un'era nella storia dell'Oriente europeo;
ne hanno aperto una nuova’: while the question of Albania’s
future 'divenuto urgente, vuol dire la sicurezza delle
nostre coste messa in forse, la nostra posizione politica
45ed economica nell'Adriatico compromessa.’ At the same
time the reassertion of the nation-state’s importance over
that of the individual -or as Rocco wrote, the task of
nationalism ’salvare la societa italiana dalla polverizz-
azione individualista'is rendered even more urgent by
the uprising of June 1914, after which
11umiliazione del popolo italiano h al colmo. Ed & 
tempo ormai che la nazione si desti e faccia essa 
la sua rivoluzione; non la rivoluzione da commedia 
della demagogia sua padrona, ma quella del popolo 
contro la demagogia, per redimere finalmente la
43 ibid., p. 86
44 'La soluzione nazionale', 14 Jan. 1914, now in ibid., 
pp. 21-7 at 22
45 'Periodo di assestamento', II Dovere Nazionale, 18 July 
1914, in ibid., pp. 123-27 at 123-4 and 127
46 ibid., pp. 79-80
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nazione dalla servitu e dalla vergogna.^
These events were a product of decades of political misdi­
rection and folly:
Da quaranta anni i partiti politici italiani si 
erano occupati e preoccupati dei piu diversi prob- 
lemi: della liberty, che nessuno oramai piu minaccia; 
della democrazia, cio& della partecipazione del 
popolo al Governo, che, col suffragio universale, ha 
raggiunto i limiti estremi della sua realizzazione; 
del socialismo, ossia della ripartizione di quella 
miserabile ricchezza che la natura, avara e matrigna 
col popolo italiano, ci ha permesso di conseguire; 
della religione, che e una granda e rispettabile 
cosa, ma riguarda piu la coscienza interiore che 
1’azione politica; del femminismo, dell’antialcool- 
ismo e della vivisezione, ma nessuno (salvo Francesco 
Crispi, che ne morl di crepacuore), aveva parlato 
mai al popolo di quella piccola e miserabile cosa 
che h la nazione italiana. Ci si era dimenticati 
di questo particolare: che oltre l'individuo, oltre 
la classe, oltre l'umanita, esiste la nazione, la 
razza italiana.48
Rocco’s critique of post-unitary history is echoed by other
leading nationalists. Francesco Coppola wrote of Italy’s
need for
la guerra nazionale, rivoluzionaria ed imperiale: 
non 1’ultima guerra del Risorgimento ma la prima 
guerra dell'Italia come grande potenza...sopra­
ttutto per accrescere assolutamente e relativa- 
mente la sua vita mondiale secondo la sua necessita 
etnica e storica, per fondare su larghe basi il 
suo imperialismo.49
The government must also intervene in the war 'per redimere
1’Italia nella sua vita interiore, per affrettare, consol-
idare, consacrare quella rivoluzione morale che gia da anni
si andava oscuramente operando per dare all1Italia una
50coscienza nazionale ed una volonta imperiale.'
Such attitudes built on the sympathy felt by elem­
ents of catholic opinion for the nationalist stand against 
socialism, and the deliberate bid made by the Rome group 
for support in this quarter at the congress of 1912, with
47 ’Dopo lo sciopero.(I divertimenti della demagogia)', II 
Dovere Nazionale, 11 July 1914, ibid., pp. 111-14 at 114
48 ’Che cosa...1, ibid., p. 69
49 F. Coppola, La crisi italiana (Rome 1918) , p. LXVII
50 ibid., p. LXVI
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its strong criticism of masonry in the army and in general
as another corrosive influence in Italian society. Indeed
the rapprochment had first developed at the time of the
Libyan war. The head of the Banco di Roma supported Feder-
zoni!s motion at the II congresso degli italiani all*
estero afferming the ’urgente necessita di una azione
energica in Tripoli’: Soderini told the congress that,
51’Giudico patriottica la proposta dei nazionalisti.’ On
the outbreak: of war, Coppola argued in idea Nazionale
that the enthusiasm of many catholics showed how
il dissidio tra la coscienza religiosa e la 
coscienza nazionale in Italia, che aveva le sue 
origini nella formazione storica della nostra 
unita...ad onta di coloro che da una parte e dell' 
altro si studiano di tenerlo vivo artifieialmente, 
tende spontaneamente e necessar.iamente a sparire.52
In the closing months of the war in Libya, the nationalist
journal returned to this theme, calling openly for catholic
support in their common struggle:
Noi possiamo andare d'amore e d’accordo coi catt- 
olici in tante belle cose; potremo combattere 
insieme molte belle battiglie contro le influenze 
disgregatrici d*oltralpe...riconosciamo volontieri 
i loro mereti per l’imprese libica e siamo pronti 
ad accettarli come alleati qualora essi credano di 
poter camminare per qualche tratto insieme con noi.53
In May 1914 Federzoni defended the nationalists 
from charges of opportunism in their approach to Catholi­
cism, explaining that ^ 4
I nazionalisti vedono nei cattolici un partito 
che praticamente si differenza dagli altri partiti 
d’ordine, solo per alcune determinate affermazioni 
prograinmatiche...affermazioni che non contraddicono 
alle idealita nazionali. I nazionalisti considerano 
inoltre che l’unith della fede religiose e per la 
Nazione una forza di coesione oltremodo potente e 
pero degna di essere preservata da ogni attentato.
E riconoscono ancora che la credenza religiosa 
determina nella coscienza individuale una dispo- 
sizione di spirito, non certo necessaria, ma molto
51 Cited in M. G. Rossi, Le origini..., p. 213
52 Molinelli, op. cit., pp. 139-40
55 A. Zanetti, 'L’indirizzo politico del Nazionalismo’, Idea 
Nazionale, 19 Sep. 1912
54 Idea Nazionale, 14 May 1914
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propensa ad accogliere quell1elemento trascendente, 
che h indubbiamente nella nostra dottrina e che in 
nessun modo si concilia con la mentality material- 
istica.
The value of the catholic church as a force for national
cohesion is made all the more important by the events of
Red Week. Rocco wrote in June of religion as ' un supremo
elemento di coesione sociale e nazionale’, and of the need
'favorire e diffondere la coalizione cattolico-liberale-
nazionalista, che & lfunica abbastanza solida per opporsi
55alle forze antinazionali, socialisti e massoniche.' He
repeated this point on the very eve of European war, arguing
that in any choice between
i cattolici, che sono stati ottimi italiani durante 
la guerra libica, durante la recente crisi rivoluz- 
ionaria, e che sono i migliori cooperatori dell’ 
espansione nazionale in Oriente, e i radico- 
socialisti, che hanno combattuto contro 1*Italia 
a fianco della Francia, della Grecia e dei turco- 
arabi, che hanno tentato e vanno tentando di disgr- 
egare la nazione, mentre matura una gravissima 
crisi...non una, ma cento volte, proprio dal punto 
di vista nazionale, siano da preferire i cattol­
ici .56
The implications of this last point were clear to Barr^re,
who reported after the nationalist congress of 1914 on
the threat to France of any alliance with the catholics,
’car c’est en Orient et a nos ddpens qu’elle trouvera son
57application la plus naturelle et la plus facile.'
In fact the nationalists never advanced beyond coop­
eration on a local and ad hoc basis with catholic groups.
Yet the potential impact of such cooperation was shown by 
the nationalist victories in several by-elections in 1913, 
all achieved with catholic support. Most notable was the 
election of Federzoni and Medici del Vaseello to parlia­
mentary seats in Rome -an additional factor here had been
55 'Esama di coscienza', II Dov. Naz., 6 June 1914, now in 
op. cit., pp. 95-109 at 106 and 109
56 ’Gioia democratico-massonica per un articolo clericale', 
11 Dov. Naz., 25 July 1914, ibid., pp. 119-21 at 121
57 D.D.F., Series 5, vol. 10, no. 253, BarrSre to Doum.,
19 May 1914. See also Rocco, op. cit. , p. 82 on the 
role of the church in expanding Italy's influence in 
the world.
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the economic interests of the building industry (controlled
largely by catholic finance), hostile to Ernesto Nathan*s
58administration for its damaging tax on building-plots.
There was also much ideological sympathy for nationalism.
In 1910 the journal of the Lega democratica nazionale, a 
catholic body often at odds with the Vatican, had suggested 
that *il nazionalismo, considerato come nuova tendenza 
della psicha italiana e indice di una coscienza nazionale
che si rinnovella, mi pare che meriti di essere considerato
59con attenzione e oso dire anche con qualche simpatia.* 
Speaking at a conference on the theme Nazionalisti e catt- 
olici in Italia, the president of the catholic electoral 
association in Bologna argued that the two forces 'sono 
cosi poco in antitesi fra di loro che le aspirazioni dell1 
uno debbono essere in perfetta armonia con quelle dell' 
altro' ; while in May of the following year the catholic 
trust paper Avvenire d'Italia could ask, 'Saranno o non 
saranno possibile, vere e proprie alleanza nostra coi nazi­
onalisti? .. .non & piccolo guadagno per essi e per noi, e 
quindi per la compagine antisowersiva e per il paese.
While the firm nationalist commitment to war against the
61Central Powers in 1915 proved too much for some catholics, 
the bid for catholic support had served the nationalists 
well, mobilising opposition to Giolitti's policies and 
insuring that they did not drift to the periphery of Italian 
politics on the close of the Libyan war. It also demonstrates 
once again the growing involvement of catholic forces in 
political life, and the dissatisfaction with Giolitti's 
approach to both domestic and foreign policy which influ­
ences the reaction of Italian catholics to the war.
By 1914- nationalism had also won the attention of 
many Italian industrialists. Contacts between the two devel­
oped rapidly after the war in Libya, based on a nationalist
58 See H. Ullrich, Le elezioni del 1915 a Boma: i liberali 
fra massoneria e vaticano (Milan 1972), espec. pp. 51-3;
A. Carracciolo, Roma capitale dal Risorgimento alia crisi 
dello Stato liberale (Rome 1956)), pp. 258-68
59 Cited in Ganapini, op. cit. , p. 204
60 ibid., p. 197
61 See ibid., pp. 224-5
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commitment to protection and a productivist ideology.
Filippo Carli had argued at the congress of 1911 that
un movimento che da una parte sia risvegliatore, 
dall*altra rappresenti -sia pure soltanto come 
energia di propaganda- la coesione, la concentraz- 
ione, la sintesi, il metodo, sembra che non debba 
essere inutile. Certo, nel campo economico il 
metodo avra la realizzazione piu perfetta solo 
quando la borghesia industriale e commerciale, 
essendosi formata una salda coscienza collettiva, 
potra eliminare ’l'uomo politico’ e dare a se un 
autogoverno.62
The steps taken by industrialists along this path in the
next two or three years have been described earlier, and
justify Carli's claim in 1911 that
qualche sintomo dimostra pure che la borghesia ha 
raggiunto un certo grado di maturita nel senso 
della consapevolezza di un identity tra i propri 
interessi e quelli della nazione. Onde pub aspirare 
ad un autogoverno, vale a dire a dare a sb stessa 
le norme per il suo sviluppo ulteriore.63
The nationalist economist and theoretician was also secre­
tary of the Brescia chamber of commerce, and pressed for 
new technical colleges, each to.act as an ’Istituto di 
espansione economica soprattutto alio scopo di addestrare i 
giovani al commercio di esportazione.'^  The demand among 
industrialists for stronger government backing in their 
efforts to gain access to foreign markets is echoed by the 
nationalists. Enrico Corradini argued in 1909 that
il nazionalismo deve prefiggersi di spingere avanti
10 spirito imperialistica. L’imperialismo indust­
riale e gia nella coscienza italiana...Bisogna che
11 nazionalismo poggi su questo dato di fatto e si 
sforzi di dargli la massima intensita. II resto 
verrb. da sb. Enrico Ferri (a socialist deputy) non 
saprb, mai fino a che punto b stato nazionalista, 
semplicemente facendo voti per lo sviluppo del 
commerco italiano.65
The commercial struggle between nations was an integral
part of the continuous international rivalry, which would
lead inevitably to war: given this,
b2 II Naz. it. Atti..., pp. 176-7
63 ibid., pp. lb4-5. On Carli, see the entry by Silvio lan- 
aro in Dizionario biografico degli italiani (Rome 1977), 
pp. 152-61
64 Cited in S. Lanaro, Nazione e lavoro..., p. 181n34
65 Todisco, op. cit., p. 28
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il Nazionalismo vuole che l’attivita italiana 
divenga piu ardita ed intraprendente nei rapporti 
del commercio internazionale.
Vuole che i nostri prodotti industriale siano 
conosciuti ed apprezzati quanto meritano prima di 
tutto dagli italiani che non sentono abbastanza 
questa forma alta e nobilissima di patriottismo, poi 
dagli stranieri. E vuole che l’azione politica del 
governo sappia imporre e sostenere 1*esportazione 
dei prodotti italiani nella difficile concorrenza 
cosi come fanno le altre nazioni per la lo.ro prod­
uzione, la quale spesso soltanto perche meglio 
sostenuta, non perchb migliore, ha piu fortuna della 
nostra...Nello stesso Adriatico che ebbe in passato e 
deve avere in avvenire tante parte nella nostra vita 
nazionale la nostra bandiera commerciale si ritira 
di giorno in giorno a vantaggio della bandiera 
austriaca. 66
The most welcome aspect of nationalism’s defence of 
Italian industry came in their demand for increased prote­
ctive tariffs. Concern over possible tariff alterations had 
helped foster the new combative mood in industry; one speaker 
at the first congress of the association of joint-stock 
companies held in 1911 argued that
nella speranza di un miglioramento benefico dell’ 
opinione pubblica, e per guardarci da nuovi danni, 
dobbiamo provvedere a fortificare di piu salda fede 
e soprattutto di piu deliberata energia la tutela 
delle nostre ragioni, tanto piu che si approssima 
la scadenza dei trattati di commercio, minacciando 
ancora la sempre incerta stabilita dell *equilibrio.67
Reporting on the first nationalist congress in the same 
year, the Rivista delle Societa Commerciali singled out the 
debate on protection as ’II tema indubbiamente di maggior 
valore e di piu alta importanza.' In fact this issue had 
been the main cause of division at the first two congresses: 
but Idea Nazionale*s announcement in 1913 of their commit­
ment to protection marked a further victory for the Rome 
group, which now had a majority on the A.N.I.’s executive. 
With Roccofs adhesion to the movement, the nationalist 
position on this and other economic questions was given a 
new theoretical cohesion. Rocco urged the state to provide 
a structure of power and authority in which productive
b6 Cited in P. Perfetti, II Nazionalismo italiano (Milan 
1969), p. 130. L. Valli
67 Riv. del Soc. Comm., I (1911), p. 5
68 ibid., p. 17
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classes could work unhindered. Political structures should 
he based on the perpetuation of a rigidly stratified soc­
iety , with workers integrated into a system whose primary 
goal was increased production.
Employers1 interest in such ideas is signalled in 
the lengthy article by Rocco, ’Economia liberale, economia 
socialista ed economia nazionale1, published by their offic­
ial journal three months before the outbreak of war. Here, 
Rocco*s endorsement of protection as *uno sforzo reso 
necessario dalla maggiore poverta del nostro territorio, e 
senza il quale noi dovremmo rassegnarci a una dimunizione 
di produzione e di benessere1 is only part of a rejection 
of economic liberalism:
Ad una concezione individualistica, e quindi univ­
ersale ed assoluta, del fenomeno economico, corri- 
sponde necessariamente il sistema fisso del liber- 
ismo: ad una concezione nazionale, e quindi positiva 
e relativa, una politica contingente, secondo i 
paesi, i tempi e le industrie.69
Similar ideas were outlined in Rocco and Carli*s presen­
tation of *1 principi fondamentali del Nazionalismo econ­
omico1 at the nationalist congress of 1914, in which *11 
primo e fondamentale atteggiamento dell*economia nazion­
alista deve essere quello di violenta, assoluta, irreconc-
iliabile opposizione all*economia individualistica liberale 
70e socialista.1 The three motions on social and economic 
issues approved at this Milan congress amount to an 
alternative programme for Italy*s future industrial devel­
opment, and explain why industry was by this time helping 
to finance the nationalist movement:
Incompatibility con "1*individualismo economico 
tanto della economia liberale, quanto dell*economia 
socialista che si basano entrambi su una concezione 
atomistica cosmopolita e materialistica della 
societa e dello stato."
Rifiuto del libero scambio come principio 
generale e conseguente perseguimento d’una politica 
protezionistica per sopperire alia inferiority 
delle...condizioni naturali, per suscitare energie
69 A. Rocco, op. cit. , pp. 27-58 at 56-7 and 58
70 See P. Perfetti, op. cit., pp. 219-26 at 226
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produttive, per provvedere ad industrie nazionali 
con la preparazione militare, per rafforzare 1’ 
economia di alti salari e per contenere o limitare 
l1emigrazione.
Costituzione di sindacati industriali come 
"il mezzo piu efficace per cui dal regime della 
libera concorrenza si passa a quello della solid- 
arieta nazionale dei produttori e quindi il nesso 
per cui la concorrenza si sposta dall*individuo 
alia nazione rimanendo cosi tra le nazioni.”71
The growing links between industry and the nation­
alist movement can be followed in documents garnered during 
the post-war occupation of the factories, and then published 
in Avanti ? In the summer of 1913 Corradini began to request 
funds from a wide range of industrialists for a possible 
switch to daily production of Idea Nazionale. The nation­
alist leader worked closely with Dante Ferraris, the Pied­
montese industrialist with extensive interests in the 
electrical and armaments industries who acted throughout 
as the main link between the two groups. In November 1913 
Corradini wrote to him,
Spero che sara rimasto contento delle elezioni di 
Roma (in which the two nationalist candidates had 
been elected)...Lei avra visto anche i programmi su 
cui abbiamo dato battaglia conforme alia promesse 
che avevamo fatto...Essendosi questo progetto stra- 
ordinariamento avanzato con le elezioni di Roma, 
noi ci proponiamo entro questo mese di formare la 
Societa. Percib prego tanto Lei...di radunare gli 
amiei di costi e di deciderli nel senso che Lei mi 
disse 1!ultima volta che fui a Torino.72
He also sent Ferraris a prospectus for the new daily paper, 
which ’servira, credo, di aiuto in quella propaganda che 
Ella sta facendo per il nostro giornale presso gli indust­
riali di costi.’ Included in the documents published in 
Avanti ? are several replies from industrialists to Ferraris1 
requests for funds: Officine Savigliano, for example, 
pledged at least 150,000 lire ’alia progettata combinazione 
per fondare a Roma un giornale a difesa degli interessi 
industriali ed agricoli d’Italia'; while Ferraris himself 
wrote to one tardy contributor, Officine Meccaniche Italiane
71 F. Gaeta, Nazionalismo italiano (Naples 1965), pp. 
111-12
72 Avanti!, 26 Sep. 1920
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of Reggia Emilia, apologising for his 'insistenza dovuta 
alia assoluta necessita di far uscire il giornale al piu
?-z
presto possibile.'
It is clear from these letters that Ferraris also
had considerable influence on the editorial approach of
Idea Nazionale. He told the president of the Associazione
fra la Societa italiane per azione that
Gli articoli pubblicati sulla Idea Nazionale sono 
ispirati da certi signori, miei colleghi nell'ind- 
ustria, i quali hanno un profondo astio, per ragioni 
che pure conosco, colla Banca Commerciale...i nazi­
onalisti. . .sono e saranno protezionisti fino a che 
le nostre industrie siano non solo in grado anche 
di portare la loro concorrenza fuori del nostro 
paese.74
Another letter from the industrialist instructs the editors 
of Idea Nazionale to defend him against charges of connivance 
with French industrialists in attempting to obtain a comm­
ission from the Italian Ministry of War for manufacture of
75the Deport field gun." This is another example of the 
links between Italian industry and the entente powers- 
-Ferraris had been involved in the manufacture of this 
field-artillery piece with Vickers-Terni since 1912- which 
influences industrial opinion in 1914-15, by which time 
Ferraris is president of the Idea Nazionale*s new directing 
board. Nationalist propaganda had always been careful to 
stress the distinction between the menace of German capital 
and the activities of French firms such as Schneider, 'il 
quale non fa dell'industria politica, non fa accompagnare 
i suoi cannoni da spie...Creusot che non intende tali forni- 
ture mezzo di controllo e quasi di padronanza.' ^
Support for Idea Nazionale's switch to daily 
production came -in the journal's own words- 'da ogni parte 
d'Italia e da gruppi rappresentanti le piu varie categorie 
della economia italiana senza monopolio o prevalenza di
73 ibid.
74 Avanti!, 5 Oct. 1920
75 ibid. See on this episode R. A. Webster, Industrial 
imperialism..., pp. 73-5
76 S. i,i. Gray, Guerra... , p. 39
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sorte (providing) capitale interamente sottoscritto di 
77lira 700 mila.1 The editorial board presided over by
Ferraris (himself vice-president of Fiat and head of the
Turin Industrial League) draws in representatives of Ilva,
Terni, the sugar trust and various engineering and metall-
78urgical companies throughout Italy. In March 1914 Giretti,
free-trader and critic of Italy’s many trusts, argued in
the chamber that
coloro i quali in Italia e altrove si fanno i 
paladini del nazionalismo, coloro che predicano 
ed inculcano l’odio dello straniero, coloro che 
vogliono mettere la finalita della patria al 
disopra del benessere dei singoli cittadini, e 
anche fuori e al disopra della nazione stessa, i 
nazionalisti, in fondo, sono i servitori dell’ 
interesse piu internazionale che oggi esiste, 1’ 
interesse dei fabbricanti di materiale militari.79
The same point was made by another deputy, who wrote to
Giolitti in May 1915, 'A proposito della Idea Nazionale,
feci i miei ringraziamenti e le mie congratulazioni agli
amici di Torino che diedero il denaro necessario per fond- 
80arle.’ This was indeed the most blunt demonstration of
industry’s rejection of Giolitti. The secretary of Confin-
dustria, Gino Olivetti, explained why employers were now
looking to this new political force:
Le classe produttrici non possono non salutare con 
piacere l’affermarsi di un movimento che, di fronte 
al silenzio e all’inerzia attuale contro gli atta- 
cchi del socialismo, a tutto cib che h bene e fond- 
amento della costituzione nazionale ed economica 
italiana, ha gib, saputo opporre un tentativo di 
difesa energica e concreta. Soprattutto, poi, ha 
saputo porre in prima linea e proclamare la funzione 
di questi nostri industriali ed agrari, di cui non 
era possibile da anni parlare se non per deplorare 
l’assenza completa loro dalla vita politica e pubb- 
lica italiana.81
The response of Italian, nationalism to the first
77 Idea Nazionale, 50 May 1914
78 See Perfetti, op. cit., pp. 210-11
79 A.P., G.1. , Legis. XXIV, t. del 25 mar. 1914, p. 5166.
See also his article ’L*inutile rabbia dei protezionisti’, 
La Voce politica, VII (1915), in La cultura..., vol. V, 
pp. 799-800
80 G. Giolitti, Quarant’anni..., no. 205, Giovanelli to Giol., 
18 May
81 ’I nazionalisti e la borghesia lavoratrice’, L’Italia 
industriale ed agraria, March 1914
249
world wax is conditioned by this close relationship with 
economic interests anxious for war. After a short period 
of hesitation, the party commits itself to intervention 
with the Triple Entente, which will bring Italy opport­
unities of economic and territorial expansion, and an end 
to Giolittian Italy. The supposed link between all these 
benefits was the subject of an article by Gorradini in Idea 
Mazionale in October 1915, explaining that
Quadruplice e il programma della guerra: mentre 
conquistiamo i nostri confini nazionali e militari 
sulle Alpi e nell’Adriatico, mentre porremo il 
nostro diritto sulla nostra parte d’eredita orien- 
tale, dobbiamo liberarci e dal sistema politico 
del passato che prendeva nome da Giolitti, e dal 
sistema economico del passato che prendeva nome 
dalla Germania.82
The title of this article, 'Giolitti e la Banca Commerc-
iale’, suggests one of the main nationalist themes in the
months of neutrality. Intervention brought an end to 'l'anti-
militarismo di stato che culmino in Giolitti’, and with
his defeat *si riusci a iniziare un rinnovamento della
Q*Z
vita morale politica della nazione.’ The attack on Giol­
itti is itself only part of a virulent attack on the whole 
parliamentary system: for Coppola, ’l1 Italia supporta il 
suo parlamentarismo come gli adolescenti supportano certe 
malattie di sviluppo che automaticamente scompaio.no quandocu
viene l1ora della virilita.' Corradini’s equally lurid 
image of giolittismo as *un cadavere che appesta sul camm- 
ina dell’Italia1 would be taken a stage further by Idea 
Uazionale in the crisis of May 1915, wnen Pantaleoni
O C
called for Giolitti’s assasination. War would also end 
the alarming spread of social unrest -as an editorial in 
Idea Nazionale argued on the eve of intervention, ’Posto 
il dilemna: guerra o rivoluzione, noi diciamo ben altro... 
bisogna evitare il precipizio d’una rivoluzione, bisogna
82 10 Oct. 1915, in La Marcia..., p. 14
83 Corradini, ’L’uomo della lotta di classe e l'uomo della 
lotta di nazione’, I,N., 23 Oct. 1915, and ’Termine 
fisso’, 30 Sep. 1915, in ibid., pp. 172 and 70-1
84 ’Oltre il parlamentarismo’, I.N., 2 Nov. 1914




fare la guerra.1 Finally the economic theorists of nati­
onalism approached the issue of intervention with a view 
to the impending tariff negotiations: referring to the 
renewal of tnese agreements, Rocco observed in September 
1914 that ’L'aiuto delle nostre armate e delle nostre
squadre costituir& un argomento ben piu convincente della
87melliflua eloquenza luzzattiana!1
Yet while the nationalist party thus mirrors the 
demands and supports the requirements of Italian industry 
in its attitude to war, this is not an immediate result of 
the financial favours received from many of the industri­
alists pressing most avidly for intervention. Rather, the 
financial backing from these interests is itself recognition 
of nationalism’s value as a cultural and political movement 
of support for industrial development. Giuseppe Prezzolini’s 
belief in 1904 that the authors of Italy*s rebirth *sono 
nel porto di Genova, nelle officine di Milano, presso le 
cascate di Terni: sono dovunque ferve la vita pratica,
OQ
economica, nazionale’ had been a constant of nationalist
propaganda over the following decade. His image of 1 le due
Italies una dell1abitudine retorica, curialesca, affarista,
l’altra della inconscienza feconda d’energie ma senza direz-
ione -noi dobbiamo essere e la forza che distrugge la prima
89e la luce che rischiari la seconda1 is equally relevant to 
the politics of intervention. In pressing for war, the nat­
ionalists back those elements in Italy which they believe 
capable of enabling Italy to compete in the international 
struggle between nations, a struggle which preceded the 
outbreak of war and will continue after it has ended. The 
hostility of the nationalist party to Italy’s recent past 
has a good deal in common with the position of Salandra’s 
government, and the months of neutrality would indeed
86 ’11 nostro grido di guerra1, 16 May 1915
87 ’Periodo di preparazione o inertia imbelle e colpevole?1, 
II Dov. Naz., 12 Sep. 1914, op. cit., pp. 175-80 at 179
88 G. Prezzolini, *Le due Italie1, in Frigessi (ed.), La 
cultura..., pp. 500-03 at 503
89 ibid.
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witness much tacit co-operation between the two. Indeed, 
nationalist values permeate liberal opinion, in this period, 
a fact seen most clearly in the tone of the Italian press.
Indeed, a study of the Italian press in the events 
of neutrality and intervention soon suggests that in much 
the same way any discussion of liberalism (or at least 
Salandra's variant of liberalism) and nationalism in Italy 
before the war as two distinct movements is essentially 
artificial, so too there is no clear dividing line between 
a liberal and a nationalist press. The campaign for war 
by almost every non-socialist newspaper and periodical in 
1915 further reveals the acceptance of nationalist ideas 
of domestic regeneration and imperialist expansion through 
war amongst the staff and proprietors of all Italy’s 
leading journals. An early sign of this new political 
climate is the use made of nationalist correspondents 
during the Libyan war by several leading dailies, inclu­
ding the Gorriere della Sera and the ' G-iolittian’ Stanrpa. 
Even more important is the acceptance of nationalist ideas 
by Italy’s most influential newspaper, the Gorriere della 
Sera. The co-operation between this paper’s great editor, 
Luigi Albertini, Antonio Salandra and leading figures in 
the nationalist movement, also gives a further insight 
into the essentially domestic focus of the whole campaign 
for Italian intervention.
Albertini had no doubt of his influence and impor­
tance, describing the Corriere as a paper 'che aiuta il
90governo a dirigere l’opinione pubblica. ’ In May 1914 he 
advised the paper's Home correspondent, Andrea Torre, not 
to attack San Giuliano, who *oggi fa parte del ministero 
Salandra', since any suggestion of opposition to the Triple 
Alliance by the Corriere would have consenquences no
90 L. Albertini, Epistolario, vol. 1, p. 255, 3 Aug. 1914
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91foreign minister could rectify. The suggestion is often
made that Albertini1s period in London led him on becoming
editor to aspire towards a role for the Milan daily similar
to that of The Times, and certainly long before 1914 the
Gorriere had established an analogous reputation as a
paper somehow apart, able to speak: with authority and almost
on behalf of the government. Gramsci would later compare
the role of these two papers in his Note sul Machiavelli;
Si puo osservare che nel mondo moderno, in molto 
paesi, i partiti organici e fondamentali, per nec­
essity di lotta o per altra causa si sono frazionati 
in franzioni, ognuna della quali assume il nome di 
'partite’ e anche di partito indipendente. Spesso 
percib lo Stato Maggiore intellettuale del partito 
organico non appartiene a nessuna da tali frazioni 
ma opera come se fosse una forza direttrice a se 
stante, superiore ai partiti e talvolta h anche 
creduta tale del pubblico...Si pensa alia funzione 
del "Times" in Inghilterra, a quella che ebbe il 
"Corriere della Sera" in Italia...92
In 1914-15 the paper's support for Salandra and 
for intervention was indispensable in the political struggle 
against Giolitti, and the corruption which Albertini 
believed he encouraged in Italian life. Albertini*s loat­
hing for Giovanni Giolitti is an aspect of his more general 
distaste and despair at the course Italy had taken in the
new century, and his refusal to accept the changes brought
95by industrialisation. His wish to defend the state's 
integrity against the demagoguery encouraged by Giolitti 
-which in 1914 led Albertini to a short-lived faith in 
Salandra- is clear in this response to the general-strike 
of 1907:
*
E l1ora di elevare la contro-protesta, la protesta 
nostra di uomini che non hanno fatto getto della 
loro coscienza e sentono il dovere di parlare non
91 ibid., p. 259, 7 May 1914
92 A. Gramsci, op. cit. , pp. 20-21
95 Eor a different view, see G. Are, 'Economic Liberalism 
in Italy: 1845-1915', Journal of Italian History, 1 
(1978), pp. 409-51. Ar& believes 'Albertini has provided 
the key to the interpretation of the crisis and failure 
of Giolitti's liberalism by focusing on the crucial links 
between his economic and social policies and the methods 
adopted to create a government majority', pp. 450-1
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un linguaggio iroso, ma un linguaggio commosso, 
quale pub suggerire il piu puro amor di patria, 
il desiderio che l1Italia nostra non cada mancipa 
della piii cieca e faziosa tirannide di classi, le 
quali non dimostrano nb una fede nazionale nb una 
sociale, ma la fede sola nei loro interessi mater- 
iali piu grettamente e meschinamente interpretati, 
e non osservano nb autorita, nh leggi, nh patti.94
G-iolitti came somehow to personify all that was worst in
liberal Italy. Scialoja has described the Gorriere's
ferocious campaign against the prime minister’s planned
reform of life insurance in 1911, a campaign which aimed
1sempre piu evidente, di seppellire con il monopolio tutta
95la politica riformista del gabinetto Giolitti.' In part­
icular, Albertini strongly opposed the extension of univ­
ersal suffrage, complaining in April 1911 that with this 
measure,
La maggioranza costituzionale ha di nuovo fatto 
un profondo inchino, ma piu solenne che mai, alia 
minoranza sowersiva e chiesto i suoi ordini; e 
siccome dal 1900 in poi questi inchini si succedono 
con una frequente impressionante, cosl si prende 
l’abitudine di piegare la schiena; e non si accenna 
a volersi rialzare.96
It had seemed that with Italy’s war against the 
Turks, for which the Gorriere della Sera made a late but 
decisive demand, some of the drift and disintegration had 
abated. An article by Pasquale Villari (which Albertini 
chose to resurrect in his reflections on the period publ­
ished in the nineteen-fifties) once again suggests the 
domestic gains from war, gains which the Gorriere’s editor 
fully expected to be repeated in 1915. Villari, formerly 
president of the Dante Alighieri society and a leading 
figure in the liberal establishment, wrote in October 1912 
that
II fatto certo e che nel paese si formo il senti- 
mento profondo che questa guerra era destinata a 
costituire definitivamente la nazione, che la
94 'La nostra protesta', G.d.S., 14 Oct. 1907
95 A. Scialoja, art. cit., p. 988
96 L. Albertini, Venti anni... , Part 1, vol. 2, p. 63
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nuova, la grande Italia stava per divenire una 
realta riconosciuta da tutti. I nostri soldati 
partivano come nuovi crociati, acclamati dal 
popolo, che li portava sulle spalle. Pareva che 
tutti fossero animati da un pensiero solo. Ogni 
voce avversa era soffocati; ogni opposizione al 
governo era af fatto scomparso.97
The passage of universal suffrage added to Alber­
tini !s fears over Giolitti's policies. He wrote in November 
1913 that
II momento politico attuale e per me il piu oscuro 
che rammenti. Non si tratta di valutare 1'indirizzo 
soltanto della nuova Camera, imprese gik grave, 
ma anche di quelle che succederanno e che potranno 
risentire maggiormente l'effetto del suffragio 
universale.98
With this act, Giolitti 'ha riportato i socialisti indietro
QQ
di 20 anni', as he advised Salandra. The roots of Albert­
ini 's commitment to intervention are clear in his alarmed 
correspondence over the closing months of 1913: his pledge 
that 'faro il possibile per rimorchiare l'ala destra del 
partito liberate ’ is carried through in the next eighteen 
months, with the war used to discredit Giolitti. The mounting 
suspicion of the prime minister lead many to turn to 
Luigi Albertini offering advice and encouragement. Frade- 
letto insisted that 'la concentrazione di tutte le forze 
schiettamente, onestamente liberali s'impone, per la 
salute del paese', while Palamenghi Crispi believed that 
Giolitti 'merita di scomparire dalla vita pubblica', for 
with universal suffrage he 'ha assassinato il partito 
liberate...siamo sulla via della liquidazione delle istit- 
uzioni monarchiche'; a third correspondent told Albertini 
of the opinion of Leopoldo Franchetti (collaborator with 
Sidney Sonnino on his famous work on the Mezzogiorno and 
a supporter of Italy's mission first in Africa, then in 
Asia Minor) 'che tu solo puoi ricostituire il partito 
liberate, che tu solo mostri le qualitA del grande uomo di
97 ibid., p. 204
98 L. Albertini, Bpistolario, vol. 1, p. 215
99 Alb. to Sal., lb June 1914, published in Resto del 
Carlino, 3 April 1967
100 L. Albertini, op. cit. , p. 212, 4 Nov. 1913
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Stato':the Gorriere also had an important role in ending
the primacy 'delle forze inferiori locali sulle forze
nazionali', so that 'dopo un anno, due anni...il nuovo
partito gib. sarebbe pronto alia vi t a . A l b e r t i n i  himself
even favoured the emerging force of nationalism as a healthy
corrective to Italy's civil decline; as he told Antonio
Pradeletto in November 1913 , 'trovo in quella tendenza che
102pub riuscire utile in certi momenti alia vita nazionale.'
This was written days after nationalist triumphs in the 
elections held earlier in the month, and after receiving 
a telegram from one of those successful candidates, Luigi 
Pederzoni, thanking him for his paper's support; 'mi b 
alto conforto benevola lusinghiera approvazione maggiore 
giornale italiano. Accolga miei ossequi ringraziamenti 
vivissimi •'
Here then, in Albertini's desire for a revived 
destra and his sympathy for the nationalists, is foresh 
adowed the Gorriere's position in 1914-15* With the crisis 
of March 1914 and Giolitti's resignation, the paper immed­
iately swung behind Salandra's government. In April Alber­
tini wrote to the new prime minister that 'in quest'ora 
di sollevazione di tutti i funzionari dello Stato mi pare 
che il paese dovrebbe cominciare a capire che sorta di 
eredita Giolitti ha lasciato b creare al nuovo governo un 
ambiente f avorevole.' Pour months later he is still 
preoccupied with domestic policy -above all with the impli
cations of Red Week, for which (as Albertini consoled
105Salandra) 'la triste eredita morale giolittiana'- was held 
ultimately responsible. The extremely close co-operation 
between Albertini and the prime minister on the eve of war 
is shown in an exchange of letters, in which the Gorriere’s 
editor asked that 'Se a suo tempo mi informera o fara
101 ibid., Pradeletto to Alb., p. 216; Grispi to Alb., pp. 
21(d~7; Malvezzi to Alb., pp. 217-8
102 ibid., p. 211
103 ibid., p. 212
104 14 April 1914> Resto del Carlino, 3 April 1967
105 L. Albertini, op. cit. , p. 243. See also 'Di chi la 
colpa?', C.d.S. , 17 June 1914; and Venti anni..., Part 1, 
vol. 2, pp. 299-300
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informare sui criteri che saranno seguiti e sull’epoca
-onda possa regolarmi- mi rendera un vero servigio’; while
Salandra complained that 'tutte le organizzazioni del
disordine si sono per dieci anni lasciate attecchire e
fiorire, infiacchendo invece quelle del governo e dell1
ordine. Nulla posso dirle di sicuri finoggi.*'*'^ Albert-
ini’s alarm was compounded by socialist obstruction in the
chamber through June and July, adding to the impression
that the whole parliamentary system was under assault.
Early in July an editorial argued that ’II paese...ha
bisogno di un Governo che abbia un piano sistematico, che
il sistema esprima un ideale politico congruo, che l'ideale
politico rappresenti la sintesi degli interessi piu orga-
107nici e vitali della Nazione’, rather than the pursuit of 
sectional interests encouraged by Giolitti's methods of 
government.
The Gorriere della Sera was of course only one of
many newspapers increasingly opposed to Giolitti's unheroic
approach to economic and political problems; but, as Castro-
novo suggests, it was without doubt the most important in
the spread of unease at his progressive reforms amongst
the northern bourgeoisie. Castronovo also traces the
decline of one of Giolitti*s staunchest allies , the journal
Secolo, to the collapse of this political faith in Lomb- 
108ardy. it is indeed striking how the circulation of 
Albertini*s paper rises rapidly -from 94,000 in 1905 to 
112,000 in 1904, to 150,000 two years later and 550,000 
by 1915- while sales of the two other leading dailies in 
Milan, Secolo and Perseverenza, both fall steadily. Bagl- 
ioni follows a similar trend through the pages of one 
journal, II Sole, which moves slowly from sympathy for 
many of the workers* demands to complaints at the cost of 
social reform, at the granting of universal suffrage, and
106 Resto del Carlino, 5 April 1967
107 G.d.S., 7 July 1914. Socialist obstruction showed a 
'puro spirito rivoluzionario’, Epist♦, pp. 245-4, Alb. 
to Einaudi, 50 June
108 V. Castronovo, La stampa italiana nell’eta. p p .  229- 
50
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109indeed at Giolitti's whole approach; while Mola's study
of the local press in Piedmont leads him to conclude that
the majority of papers had drifted away from Giolitti well
before the war, often as an expression of local industrial
interests.'*''*"^  The same movement of opinion occurs in the
Marches; for example, in La Provincia, a liberal journal of
Pisaro -its equation of Giolitti with socialism back in
1911 has already been cited, and such attacks continued,
up to its depiction of the former prime minister in May
1915 as the cause of *scissione...nel campo liberale, che
ha interotto nel momento decisivo l1opera del governo
intesa a sospingere 1’Italia verso nuovi destini.'111
Mola1s suggestion of proprietorial influence
coming to bear on editorial policy is also relevant to
many of the national dailies. It can be seen most crudely
in the Giornale d'Italia1s eulogy of Salandra -along with
Sonnino, one of the paper’s leading shareholders- on his
becoming prime minister in March 1914:
Durante la brillante carriera parlamentare si 
distinse come profondo conoscitore della complessa 
macchina statale, come efficacissimo e forte 
oratore, come politico di grande equilibrio e di 
larga veduta. E uomo di poderoso ingegno, di 
nobile animo, d’alta idealita, di profonda cult- 
ura.112
During neutrality this paper gave room to Pantaleoni’s 
demand for the removal of Giolitti from the scene, although 
his call for this to be accomplished through assassination 
was not repeated here. Pantaleoni confined himself to 
attempts to blame Giolitti for Italy's supposed military 
unpreparedness in July 1914, with the implication that 
the nation's leading politician was in hock to Germany.
In February 1915, for example, he argued that 'II 
ministero Salandra ha preso e impegnato piu di un miliardo
109 G. Baglioni, L'ideologia della borghesia industriale 
nell'Italia liberale (Turin 1974), P P .  452-60
110 A. A. Mola, Stampa e vita pubblica di provincia nell' 
etk giolittiana, 1882-1914 (Milan 1971), pp. 315-81
111 Cited in G. Corradini, op. cit. , p. 225
112 20 March 1914. For Sonnino's letter to the paper's 
editor, Bergamini, advising him on the line to take in 
August 1914, see B. Vigezzi, L'Italia..., pp. 276-7
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per rimettere l’esercito in assetto, riparando a un dec-
ennio di demolizione tecnica e morale operata in un dec-
113ennio di governo giolittiano.'
The approach of Giornale d1 Italia to Italy's poss­
ible intervention shows other continuities with the political 
struggle within the peninsula. For example, Pantaleoni's 
insistence in April 1914- that the priority is 'ridarci un 
paese fortemente disciplinato. Che, se in questo il partito 
liberale non dovesse riuscire, non b lontana la guerra 
civile1 is echoed in an editorial one month before inter­
vention, arguing that
Solo da un rimescolamento cosl profondo pub sorgere 
una mutazione che ci consenta di reintegrare le 
forze e ricomporre il nostro corpo etnico e politico 
...Non opera di folle esaltate, non i accessi momen- 
tanei e ciechi di sentimento, ma fiducia e discipl- 
ina e concordia potranno a poco a poco rimettere 
il popolo italiano sulla via e ridargli la neces- 
saria condizione storica della sua libera esist- 
enza.114
The paper had little time for parliamentary debate in this
period when unity above all was crucial -
Questi infatti non e il momento nb di domandare nb 
di fare riforme, nb di tracciare o di discutere 
direttive politiche...II libero giuoco delle forze 
politiche e parlamentari non ha modo di esplicarsi 
in tale situazione e percib e perfettamente logico 
che i deputati (have decided) a tornare alle loro 
private occupazioni.115
Here the paper was of course following Salandra1s demand
for an end to political debate at such a vital point in
the country's history.
The Resto del Carlino too allowed its editorial
line to be adjusted for the benefit of the agricultural
and sugar-refining interests by which it had been purchased
in 1909. This at any rate was the intention of the paper's
113 'Giolitti', 10 Feb. 1915. Pantaleoni also used the 
paper to support ideas of Italy's future autarchical 
development. See 'Non Xenophobia, ma Autarchia', 24 
Dec. 1914
114 'Deficit piu morale che finanziario', 21 April 1914; 
Edit., 8 April 1915, cited in Castronovo, 00. cit.,
p. 268
115 Edit. , 10 Dec. 1914
259
new owners, as the journal of the Federazione Interprov-
inciale Agraria made clear:
Una fortunata vicenda ha permesso ad un gruppo 
di nostra parte di acquistare la maggioranza delle 
azioni della Societa anonima "Stabilmento Poligr- 
afico Emiliano", che gestisce una tipografia e il 
giornale quotidiano II Resto del Carlino. La 
nostra fede nazionale agraria, fedele al suo prog- 
ramma di prendere posizione in ogni campo, ha 
concorso largamente...alia combinazione finanziaria, 
nel pensiero che quel giornale, senza divenire 
organo della nostra classe, assuma per l'avvenire 
un1attitudine di obiettivita, di verita e di giust- 
izia nelle vicende varie onde si interesse la vita 
delle nostre organizzazioni.116
Malatesta suggests that the purchase of the Resto del
Carlino. formerly a G-iolittian paper, should be seen as
part of the growing combativeness of economic groups around
Bologna, which move beyond the defence of local interests
to the expression of their hostility to Giolitti on a
national level. At the same time it represents
una presa di posizione della dirigenza dell1agraria, 
legata all1industria nei confronti della base dei 
coltivatori, quanto della sua volont£i di arrivare 
a mediare -attraverso un1opera capillare di propa­
ganda- gli interessi dei bieticultori e dei saccar- 
iferi, al fine di rafforzare il fronte agrario- 
zuccheriero.118
From 1909 Mario Missiroli brings to the Bolognese 
daily the anti-positivist and anti-socialist ideas developed 
a"k II Regno, and attracted an editorial staff with nation­
alist sympathies. Missiroli himself used the paper to 
expound themes dear to the movement, as in this contribution 
of July 1910:
E la borghesia che deve sentire in se stessa i 
propri doveri, fra i quali principalissimo, quello 
di difendere la produzione, bene supremo, che sta 
al di sopra di ogni classe e di ogni partito. Mai 
come in questo momento si sent! il bisogno di una forte 
organizzazione della borghesia che, lungi dallfaver
116 Cited in M. Malatesta, op. cit. , p. 192
117 ibid. , pp. 224-5
118 ibid. , pp. 230-1
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esaurito il suo compito, e appena all'inizio. 
l'avvenire dell'Italia 6 tutto nell'industria 
e il passaggio dall'economia agricola a quella 
industriale produrrh indubbiamente delle formid- 
abili scosse, alle quali e necessario prepararsi 
fin d'ora. Una borghesia che non sa difendersi, 
tradisce tutta la sua storia.119
The appointment of Giovanni Amendola as Rome correspon­
dent marks a further stage in the development in Giornale 
d'italia of a liberal-nationalist line. Amendola shared 
Salandra1s concern for maintaining the authority of the 
state: in a review of the future prime minister's La polit- 
ica nazionale e il partito liberale in 1912, he speculated
on Salandra managing to reunite 'attraverso Silvio Spav-
120enta alia vecchia Destra l'attuale partito liberale'.
He also favoured an assertive foreign policy, backing
Salandra fully over intervention, though by this time
Amendola was with the Gorriere della Sera. The Resto del
Carlino had been among the earliest in demanding military
action in Libya, beginning a campaign for war in the
first months of 1911 which expressed the interests of
Emilian agrarians (supporters in earlier years of the
expansionist foreign policy of both Depretis and Grispi)
in Libya, both as an outlet for surplus population and
for its genuine potential for agricultural production.
Amendola then turned the paper's attention to the Balkans,
where he opposed Austria's activity and also any further
renewal of the Triple Alliance.
Malatesta describes the relationship between
Giolitti and the Emilian agrarians as one of 'alleanza- 
121opposizione’, and indeed the Resto del Carlino supported 
the Gentiloni pact eagerly as a means of checking the 
socialist advance. Yet the strain in this connubio became 
immense, as the socialists won sweeping victories, first
119 'II _crepusculo del socialismo’ , 23 July 1910
120 'La tradizione liberale e il problema anticlericale in 
un libro di Antonio Salandra', 19 July 1912. On Amen­
dola, see Malatesta, pp. 280-3, and G. Carocci, Giovanni 
Amendola nella crisi dello Stato italiano, 1911-1923 
(Milan 1956)
121 Malatesta, op. cit., p. 273
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in the 1913 elections and then in the local elections of
June 1914, and as the struggle of the peasant leagues rose
to a peak in the events at Molinella in 1914. A clue to
the changing mood of agrarians comes in the appointment
of Filippo Naldi as editor of Resto del Carlino. Naldi
arrived after spells as editor of Rinnovamento and La
Patria, both sympathetic to nationalism, and had taken the
platform at the first nationalist congress in 1910 to urge
122war against Austria at a future date. He was also active
in committees of opposition to socialist candidates in the
elections of 1913. With Naldi*s appointment a group of
Genovese industrialists (including Emilio Bruzzone for
the sugar trust) agreed to inject further capital into the
paper in January 1914, and in so doing take a sixty per
cent majority shareholding: convinced by Naldi -in the
opinion of the Direzione della pubblica sicurezza-
dell’importanza che avrebbe avuto per la campagna 
saccarifera in una regione fertile come quella 
del bolognese un giornale messo a disposizione del 
gruppo stesso che sapesse fare unfefficace propa­
ganda conforme agli interessi dell1industria dello 
zucchero.123
Filippo Naldi!s presence signifies the strengthe­
ning of the agrarian-industrial alliance and assures 
Salandra backing for his policy in 1915. On 17 May the 
paper argued that his programme
E il vecchio programma sabaudo allargato dal 
Piemonte all*Italia, esteso dallfEuropa all’Asia 
e all1Africa mediterranea, raccogliendo l1eredita 
ideale dei Dogi e dei Lusignani. Non h solo 1* 
impresa di liberazione territoriale; la spada 
italiana non si china solo a tagliare i vincoli 
dei fratelli emigrati, ma cade con tutto il suo 
peso sul piatto della bilancia europea.124
The Giornale d1Italia1s editor was also a friend of Angelo
Pogliani, director of the Banco di Sconto, and his role
in the entry of French capital into the Fucine e Fonderie
122 G. Castellini (ed.), II Naz. it.... , p. 104
123 Malatesta, op. cit. , p. 292
124 Now in A. Caroncini, Problemi di politica nazionale 
(Bari 1922), p. 278
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Gorpi Cavi company led the pubblica sicurezza to question
125if the funds for Resto del Carlino were entirely Italian. 
Again, Naldi played a central role in the foundation of 
Mussolini!s Popolo d1Italia, meeting Mussolini in October
12 b1914 and assuring him of sufficient funds for the project. 
Finance came from industrialists in favour of intervention 
or at least an expansion of state contracts -among them 
the Perrones, Agnelli and again Bruzzone of the Unione 
zuccheri. It would seem that those groups favouring inter­
vention understood the value of the press in mobilising 
support. In particular, Genovese industry extended its 
influence over national dailies, financing Tribuna and 
Idea Nazionale as well as the papers edited by Naldi and 
Mussolini -this process was capped by the Perrones1 purc- 
nase of 11 Messaggero on 1 May 1915.
The creation of the catholic trust press in 1907 
is another example of the reorganisation of the Italian 
press in alignment with developing economic interests, and 
brings further backing for commercial expansion. In October 
1910 Unita cattolica insisted on the importance of comme­
rcial factors in the Consulta’s development of foreign 
policy:
Problemi gravi e poderosi annichilano la produzione 
e il commercio italiano...Ogni nuovo sbocco commer- 
ciale aumenta la vitalita di un paese per l'import- 
azione e per 11esportazione: e una nuova arteria 
che porta sangue piu vivo e piu generoso alia 
nazione, attivandone gli scambi. Si sapr& approf- 
ittare del momento storico, dell’attimo fuggente 
per rinnovellare le energie del paese, per comba- 
ttere la crisi economica, o si esaurira tutta l1 
energia italiana in sterili dimostrazioni irredent- 
iste accontentandosi di aver reso un grande servizio 
al...Montenegro?127
Two months later the leading paper in the catholic trust,
the Gorriere d*Italia, complained that ’Manca alia nostra
125 Malatesta, pp. 297-8. Malatesta follows the ever closer 
links between agrarians, the metallurgical industry and 
the sugar trust through to 1916 -an alliance involving 
supporters of the nationalists such as Dante Ferraris 
and Max Bondi.
126 R. De Felice, Mussolini il rivoluzionario 1883-1920 
(Turin 1965), pp. 273-7
127 ’L’altra sponda* , 10 Oct. 1910. Cited in Ganapini, 162
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politica estera ogni contenuto economico; noi aggiungiamo
ancora di piu, e ciok che essa manca di contenuto pratico
e di senso di opportunity.1 Chances were being missed
in Albania, where ' le nostre industrie manifatturiere
129troverebbero...un notevole sbocco* , and also in Libya.
The interest of the Banco di Roma in North Africa is
supported faithfully by the trust which it helped to
finance -as one correspondent told Albertini, ’Oggi ho
veduto un numero del Corriere dfItalia: Tripoli, Tripoli, 
130Tripoli!' The paper had a nationalist correspondent in 
Libya even prior to the foundation of Idea Nazionale early 
in 1911. It reacted angrily to Giolitti's speech at Turin 
in the opening weeks of the Libyan war, complaining that 
'Mentre tutta 1'Italia freme di sincero patriottismo, egli 
h arrivato a vantare la sua alleanza con coloro che hanno
dimostrato oggi piu che mai di essere i nemici della pat-
. ,131n a . 1
The permeation of nationalist values in the liberal 
press is signalled most clearly in the employment of their 
supporters by every leading paper. Quite aside from the 
nationalists on the editorial staff of Resto del Carlino, 
the paper also accepted contributions from Enrico Corradini 
and others; Luigi Federzoni, later to be a nationalist 
deputy, was on the editorial staff of Giornale dfItalia; 
while Francesco Coppola wrote for Tribuna before becoming 
editor of Idea Nazionale. The influence of nationalist 
thought on the liberal press can best be followed in the 
Corriere della Sera. Albertini's sympathy for the movement 
as a valuable ally in his campaign to free Italy of his 
bete-noire, Giovanni Giolitti, led him in April 1914 to 
grant Roberto Forges Davanzati several months paid leave 
to prepare for his move from the Corriere to become editor 
of the new daily version of Idea Nazionale. In thanking 
his former editor, Davanzati wrote that 'Sono lieto che 
la cordiale simpatia dimostrata dal Corriere al nostro
128 ibid., p. 169
129 ibid.
130 L. Albertini, op. cit. , p. 10, O.ietti to Alb., 5 Sep. 
1911
131 Ganapini, op. cit., p. 209
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movimento, mi assicuri che 1*opera cui mi accingo, sara
132benevolmente considerata.’ Corradini also had many 
contacts with Albertini, and the convergence of their 
views is suggested in this letter from the nationalist 
leader:
a proposito di quanto dicevamo iersera circa la 
prevalenza che dopo la guerra prenderanno in Italia 
i partiti democratici, causa il cattivo esperimento 
di questo ultimo governo liberale conservatore (e 
vorremmo dire nazionale) in un ora cosl risolutiva 
della nostra storia, veda l'articolo che le accludo, 
del Messaggero. La democrazia gia si da l’atteggia- 
mento di padrona. Cosa che non accadrebbe se il 
governo con altro temperamento e con altra condotta 
avesse raffermato in sh quella parte italiana che 
& veramente nazionale. Poteva, perche mai nessun 
altro governo ha avuto occasione e condizioni si 
f avorevoli.133
Corradini was an assiduous correspondent with the 
Corriere1s editor, a trait he shared with the prime 
minister, who kept in close touch with Albertini to explain 
his policy or thank him for the paper’s support. Albertini 
believed that Salandra was happy with the debate over 
intervention which his paper helped direct, since it enabled 
the government 'stare alia finestra a vedere come si 
metteva il tempo per stabilire se e quando uscire di
I 7  j
casa.’ The prime minister’s only complaint came in late
August 1914, when he passed on reports that 'l’ufficio del
Corriere a Roma diventa un centro di agitazione nazion-
alista. Ora i sentimenti nazionalisti sono generosi e
135nobili, ed io -lo sanno bene- non li reprimo’, but there 
was an over-riding need for public order. This letter 
followed the arrest of one of the office’s employees at 
an early demonstration against Austria. The Rome office 
was run by Andrea Torre, a liberal deputy who believed, 
along with his editor, that the new political force was 
anything but harmful:
132 L. Albertini, op. cit. , p. 237, 4 April 1914
133 ibid., p. 336, 25 Feb. 1915
134 Venti anni..., Part 2, vol. 1, p. 379
135 Epistolario, vol. 1, p. 271, 29 Aug. 1914
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I nazionalisti, poi, credo cne non debbano essere 
attaccati e disprezzati; senza di loro non sarebbero 
awenute certe trasformazioni dell1 opinione pubb- 
lica italiana negli ultimi tempi. E non e bene 
deprimerli. Rappresentano una forza di idealita 
che giova al paese.136
Torre shared the nationalist desire for a more
assertive foreign policy, writing at the time of the Libyan
war that !La politica di espansione non & stata l'effetto
di un capriccio delle nazioni: h nata da un bisogno attuale
137e piu dalla previsione di un bisogno futuro.' Barie 
sees in the extremely hostile tone taken by the Gorriere 
della Sera toward Austrian activity in the Balkans in the 
autumn of 1912 a clear understanding by Albertini that 
the two powers1 differences were irreconcilable, leading
*1 7 0
him to accept the end of the Triple Alliance in 1914.
At the end of July he noted that ' se 1'Inghilterra scende
in campo, noi dobb.iamo marciare o con 1*Austria o contro
139l'Austria. Io vorrei contro...' The speed with which 
Albertini approached the Russian ambassador in the following 
month, informing Krupenski that the Corriere was about to 
begin a campaign for Italy to join the Triple Entente and 
inquiring if Italy would gain hegemony in the Adriatic in 
any agreementV^ suggests that he had little hope of an 
agreement with the Central Powers. Certainly this was the 
opinion of Torre, who had demanded back in 1912 that the 
Consulta work for Italian rather than Austro-German inte­
rests in the Balkans. Once again the Corriere' s
136 ibid., p. 162, 16 Oct. 1912
137 Cited in 0. Barid, 'La "politica nazionale" del Corriere 
della Sera dalla crisi del 1908 alia guerra di Libia',
Il Risorgimento, XX (1968), pp. 73-101 at 93
138 See 0. Barid, rLa "politica nazionale" del Corriere 
della Sera dalla guerra di Libia alia Grande Guerra',
II Risorgimento, XX (1968), pp. 172-99 at 174-6
139 V. Castronovo, op. cit. , p. 242
140 See W.W. Gottlieb, op. cit. , p. 189
141 L. Albertini, op. cit. , p. 162, 16 Oct. 1912. Albertini 
had the same advice from Luigi Barzini -'La nostra 
cultura e la nostra industria sono desiderate ardentem- 
ente (in the Balkans), dovevamo incanalarle con tutti
i mezzi, colle nostre navi e col nostro lavoro, a 
qualunque costo' , ibid., p. 174
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priorities seem little different from those of the nation­
alist journals, as summarised by Paolo Arcari in September 
1914 -’Dai nazionalisti ufficiali dell'"Idea" e del "Dovere", 
a noi dell’"Azione"...a quei ragazzi rumorosi di "Lacerba",
siamo tutti d1accordo...in un solo imperativo evidente e
142appassionato: risolviamo oggi il problema adriatico.’
Albertini’s biographer claims that the Gorriere
della Sera1s owners -the Grespis and other figures in the
textile industry- gave him a large measure of editorial
independence; althougn Einaudi’s freedom to criticise
protection is also linked by Bari£ to the cotton industry’s
143interest in some reduction of tariffs. In fact Mario
Grespi protested to his editor at Einaudi’s persistent
attacks on the sugar trust, while Albertini wrote on another
occasion to Einaudi asking him to moderate his criticisms
of protective tariffs. The economist had resort to La Rif-
orma Sociale for his most scathing remarks, prompting
Avanti! to suggest that Einaudi could only tell the truth
144in this journal. let at the same time the political 
stance of the Gorriere in these years seems to reflect the 
concerns of its editor, above all during the debate over 
Italian intervention in the war. Albertini is at the very 
centre of events in these months, acting as advisor and 
confidant to the prime minister. By September he had under­
stood the full political implications of Italy's position, 
arguing that1^
o vogliamo piegare il capo a questa fatality ed 
agire nelle direttive dei nostri interessi, oppure 
atteniamoci al codice cavalleresco e pur un lealt& 
che non fu mai corrisposta affrontiamo i rischi 
di una rivoluzione interna e di una dimunizione 
morale enorme...Io piu che di espansione -pur 
necessarie per acquistare pace e sicurezza- mi 
preoccupo dell'isolamento in cui la neutralita ci
142 Cited in V. Castronovo, op. cit. , p. 254
143 0. Bari£, Luigi Albertini (Turin 1972), pp. 210-14
144 L. Albertini, op. cit., pp. 194-5, 19 Aug. 1913; 
Avanti.’ , 4 Dec. 1911
W 5  L. Albertini, p. 282, 24 Sep. 1914
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ha gettato.
His fear of a scheming Giolitti who would seize his chance
to return to power and resume his disastrous sway over
political life is clear throughout neutrality -above all
in this letter to Salandra, written in the last few days
before intervention when rumours of a pact between Billow
and Giolitti circulated throughout Rome:
Giolitti vuol forse tornare al potere e fare la 
guerra, allegando la santitb. dei trattati che 
egli non conosceva, profittando, come ha fatto 
sempre, del lavoro preparatogli dai precedenti 
ministeri, ingannando, come ha fatto col suffragio 
universale, tutta la sua maggioranza. Io non 
vedo per l'attuazione di questa ignobile intesa 
gli ostacoli che Lei ieri descriveva. Giolitti, 
per salvare se stesso, passerebbe sul corpo di 
tutti i suoi...non abbandoni il paese, non abban- 
doni noi Suoi amici ai rischi e all’onta di un 
simile inganno. Profitti, se pub, del Suo ascen- 
dente, dei Suoi contatti colla Corona per evitare 
che il gioco riesca.146
Albertini’s reaction on being misinformed by Torre on 11
May that parliament was likely to vote against the prime
minister when it met nine days later -'Siamo diventati
147l1ultimo paese della Terra’- is a further token of his 
fears for a neutral Italy, and for the destruction of 
Salandra*s ministry, ’il migliore che 1*Italia abbia 
avuto da tempo immemorabile e sinceramente amato dal
"I A O
paese.’ Andrea Torre had suffered similar alarms back
in September, when Martini threatened to resign unless
Italy soon intervened -’Sarebbe la fine di Salandra e 1*
awento dei democratici' - and in the following month when
149the prime minister himself spoke of resignation. ^
Thus the opinion of the Corriere della Sera in
150April 1915 that no Austrian concessions could prevent war 
matched the government’s position: both approached the 
question of intervention with a view to winning Italy 
territorial adjustments, but mindful also of internal
146 ibid., p. 361, 15 May
147 Cited in 0. Bari£, ’La ’’politica nazionale”.. .dalla 
guerra...', p. 199
148 Albertini, op. cit., p. 313, 7 Jan. 1915
149 ibid., pp. 279 and 296
150 Edit., 8 April
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political adjustments possible only through war. The
staff of the Milan daily, in the words of Amendola,
'lavorato insieme...per fare prevalere quella politica
che attraverso la dichiarazione di neutrality prima ci
151ha liberato le mani, poi ci dar& la guerra-’ Salandra 
acknowledged the value of Albertini*s help by elevating 
him to the Italian Senate. This naturally aroused much 
opposition amongst the many neutralist senators -as Alber­
tini himself later admitted, citing the remarks of Giornale 
d1 Italia in late March that
La votazione aveva assunto una vera e propria 
fisionomia di tendenza interventista o neutralista 
...II nostro collega pub essere soddisfatto egual- 
mente del risultato della votazione dal momento che 
il suo nome era diventato segnacolo di battaglia ed 
b riuscito vittorioso-152
Salandra had every reason to be grateful for the Gorriere * s
backing, which was a prerequisite for the fruition of his
plans: in the prime minister's own words, 'senza i gior-
nalij l'intervento dell’Italia forse non sarebbe stato 
153possibile.’ It was the immense prestige and authority
of Albertini's paper which above all helped to drum up
support for intervention while the government negotiated
with both sets of powers. As Gaetano Salvemini (himself
active in the campaign for intervention) accepted, ’se il
Gorriere si fosse messo a predicare la neutrality ad ogni
costo, l'intervento italiano non sarebbe stato possibile.
Albertini non fu il solo autore dell’intervento, ma fu uno
154dei principali.' Barib also stressed the paper's impor­
tance in 1914-15:
Proprio nell'influenza esercitata dal Corriere su 
questo ambiente medio e altoborghese milanese e 
lombardo...sta il primo, preciso e insostitubile 
contributo del quotidiano dell'Albertini al movi- 
mento interventista. La un lato sarebbero certo 
stati diversi il volto e l’importanza di Milano 
centro dell’interventismo, dall'altro, su piano 
nazionale, sarebbe mancato al movimento l’anello
151 to Papini, 23 Lee. 1914. Cited in P. Alatri, 'La prima 
guerra mondiale nella storiografia italiana dell'ultimo 
venticinquennio', Belfagor, XXYII (1972), pp. 559-95
at 584
152 L. Albertini, Venti anni, part 2, vol. 1, p. 446
153 A. Salandra, La neutrality..., p. 228
154 0. Barib, op. cit., p. 3HU
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di congiunzione fra le forze della destra liberale 
-quando queste si awiarono in quella direzione 
sotto la spesso incerta guida di Antonio Salandra- 
e le forze democratiche.155
Thus an examination of the press campaign in
general hardly bears out Brunello Vigezzi's claim that no
generalisation on the attitude of the press to intervention
is possible, since 'ogni affermazione e subito contra-
156ddetta e sminuita da un'opposta considerazione.1 Rather, 
a clear commitment to war develops in almost all the 
liberal (and naturally in the entire nationalist) press, 
mobilising support for a decision favoured by the indust­
rial groups which own these titles. The enormous influence 
of nationalism in the Italian press also rules out any 
hearing for Giolitti's policy of a negotiated settlement 
with Austria-Hungary.
Yet it is not only the press which proves amenable
to nationalist ideas, Albertini1s assumption that there is
nothing antithetical between liberalism and nationalism
is shared fully in Salandra1s government. There had been
much cooperation between the liberal destra and the new
movement even before Salandra took office; in the 1913
elections, for example, the Milan nationalist group had
supported all the liberal candidates in the city with
157the exception of one radical. With the entry into the
A.N.I. of Alfredo Rocco and others eager to turn the
movement into a separate party, such local collaboration
seemed threatened, drawing from Gorriere della Sera the
complaint that 'II liberalismo...contava il nazionalismo
come un*avanguardia. Ad un tratto lo ha visto allontan-
158arsi con qualche calcio.' J In fact the nationalists 
continued to look on Salandra1s government with sympathy,
155 ibid.
156 B. Vigezzi, L!Italia di fronte..., p. 274
157 P* Arcari, op. cit. , p. 828
158 22 June 1914
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especially once it seemed "beyond doubt tnat he was working 
for intervention, i'nere is some evidence that tne prime 
minister had even wanted to include in his government 
Romeo Gallenga, ah aristocrat and nationalist deputy who 
was a warm supporter of Salandra (and subsequently entered 
tne government during the war). Certainly Gallenga's 
thanks for 'la sua cortesa lettera che mi conferma la sua 
ambita benevolenza' and accepting 'che, in politica, non 
basta la devozione illimitata e fervidissima a vincere gli
l^u
ostacoli che sorgono sul proprio cammino' ^  suggests 
nothing but sympathy on botn sides. Another of the nation­
alist deputies, Luigi Federzoni, saluted Salandra1s 
administration with the hope 'cne questo supremo tentativo 
di Governo del vecchio glorioso partito sia sorriso dalla 
fortuna e possa riuscire fecondo di bene per la Nazione.'1^0 
Many of those in the government formed by Salandra 
held views which would have been equally serviceable in 
the nationalist party. Vittorio Cottofavi, Under-Secretary 
for Agriculture, had spoken at the 11 Congresso degli 
Italiani all'estero in 1911 of the
necessita di una politica piu energica, in modo 
che l'italiano possa dire come l'inglese: sono 
solo, ma ho dietro di me la bandiera del mio 
paese. Deve venire il giorno in cui il motto 
'sono cittadino italiano', come quello antico di 
'civis romanus sum', bastera perchk il cittadino 
italiano sia rispetto da tutti.161
In such a political perspective, the nationalists were
welcomed as fresh auxiliaries for a flagging liberalism,
reviving national life as a prelude to asserting Italy's
rights in the world. The main link between the Cabinet and
the nationalists was undoubtedly Minister of Colonies
Martini. His diary records regular meetings with Corradini
and other nationalists during neutrality, as well as his
acceptance of many of their arguments. On 1 October he
noted, 'l'articolo che Enrico Corradini pubblica nel primo
159 Cited in B. Vigezzi, 'II suffragio universale...', p.
570
160 A.P. , C.D. , Legis. XXIV, t. del 5 apr. 1914, p. 2283. 
Corradini also welcomed Salandra as a 'uomo di caldo 
cuore patriottico...', II Naz., p. 99
161 Atti del 11 Congresso..., p. 310
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numero dell1Idea Nazionale...contiene tali cosi evidenti
162verita che non & possibile il negarlo.’ His entry of 
26 May -i.e. a few days after Italy announced her interv­
ention in the war- casts much light on the governments 
attitude to the demonstrations for war throughout the 
previous weeks:
Pensare che se io non avessi all*ultima ora fatto 
sapere a D'Annunzio della denunzia del trattato e 
dei nostri nuovi impegni, fatto sapere che Giolitti 
tutto cib conosceva, e avessi serbato il silenzio 
che Sonnino raccomandava, nulla sarebbe avvenuto 
di quanto awenne a Roma ed altrove.163
Salandra had instructed the prefect of Milan not
to trouble any 'manifestazioni patriottiche quando siano
164innocue e non turbino gravamente l*ordine pubblico.1
He had even included democratic interventionists in this
mandate, according to the testimony of Giuseppe Garronne
in December 1914-:
Recentemente l'on Salandra ha mandato a chiamare 
Federzoni, Bissolati, Mosti Trotti, Di Cesaro e 
altri e ha tenuto loro questo discorsetto, o 
pressa poco: "So che voi avete anche intenzione 
di tenere dei comizi per l'intervento immediato, 
dal 20 gennaio in poi, nelle strade e nelle piazze. 
II governo non li pub permettere ma non potendo 
contrastare la volonta populare, li tollerera."
I deputati si sono guardati in viso stupefatti.
Chi mai aveva pensato a quei comizi di cui parlava 
Salandra? Ad ogni modo hanno capito il latino, 
hanno ringraziato e si sono affrettati a indire 
pubblici comizi interventistici.165
Friends of Giolitti wrote to him in May charging that the
police turned a blind eye to much nationalist activity,
and that government employees were encouraged to leave
their offices and demonstrate -the latter claim was also
-j Lit!
repeated later by Nitti. L!Azione of Cremona was
162 F. Martini, op. cit. , p. 160. See entries of 17 Sep.,
1 Dec. and 6 Feb. 1915 for meetings with Corradini
lo3 ibid., p. 433, entry of 26 May 1915
164 A.C.S., Dir. Gen. Pubb. Sicc., Div. AA. GG. RR., 1914- 
18, Conflagrazione europea, cat. A5, pacco 22, no. 1711, 
Panzardi to Min. of Interior
165 G. and E. Garronne, Lettere e diarii di guerra 1914-1918, 
ed. V. and A. Galante Garronne (Milan 1974), p* 100
166 G. Giolitti, Quarant'anni, pp. 204 and 214; F. Nitti, 
Rivelazioni, p. 55
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even unhappy with the official news agency, alleging on 
18 May that
La Stefani nel dar notizia delle odierne dimostr- 
azioni e manifestazioni fatte in Italia & eccezi- 
onalmente tendenziosa e settaria; mentre riferisce 
di ogni plauso guerrafondaio, tace e nasconde le 
dimostrazioni che si fanno contra la guerra.167
Salandra later admitted that he had no wish to suppress
the demonstrations in May as they served 1 a propagare
nel Paese il sentimento dei prossimi eventi e a prepara-
rvelo.|168
The size of many interventionist demonstrations, 
especially of those in Rome, clearly precludes their 
complete orchestration by the government. Yet the image 
of the nationalist party leading a semi-insurrectionary 
movement against a beleaguered government is equally 
unreal. The 'radiant days' of May and Italy's intervention 
in the war in fact demonstrate at work all the domestic 
influences traced in previous chapters. The economic and 
political alliance of agrarians and heavy industry, whose 
disaffection with (xiolitti and his policies leads on to 
support for both the liberal grouping around Salandra 
and the emergence of a strong nationalist movement, comes 
to accept military intervention as the only possible hope 
of transforming a weak and stagnant economy, with war 
offering enormous military contracts, the chance of 
expansion in the Balkans and Asia Minor, and a post-war 
trade and tariff alliance against the overwhelming econ­
omic hegemony of Germany. The alarm of many industrialists 
at their dependence on bank capital, and in particular at 
the power of the Banca Commerciale, led to an attempt 
(headed by Ansaldo) to use the conditions of neutrality 
to press for an alternative and 'Italian' banking 
structure. This demand is favoured by the prime minister,
167 L'Azione, 18 May 1915
168 A. Salandra, L'intervento, pp. 265-6
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anxious to end definitively Giolitti*s influence and
also genuinely alarmed at the oppressive economic and
169political power of Germany, as well as the likely
internal repercussions of continued neutrality. Favoured too
by France, eager to bring Italy into the war and to increase
her economic presence in the peninsula by supplanting
German investments.
Italy's political system enabled Salandra and
Sonnino to carry through a decision for war, presenting
an unhappy parliament and a divided Cabinet with a fait
accompli. Indeed the chamber was in recess for long
periods of neutrality. The first session of 1915 opened
only on 18 February and lasted less than five weeks, while
the opening of the next sitting was postponed from the
twelfth to the twentieth of May. The interventionist
demonstrations, encouraged by the government and given
170more substantial assistance by Camille Barrkre, served
to mobilise opinion for a decision which had already been
taken, and to ostracise Giolitti still further. An editorial
in La Voce on the events of May 1915 had no doubt of the
internal function of Italian diplomacy:
Noi sentiamo vivamente l'ideale della concordia 
nazionale, ma ora che ne abbiamo fatto la prova 
ci sentiamo di poter dire che a pill d'una persona 
la tregua interna ha servito soltanto per curare 
i propri interessi, a piu d'un partito per tentare 
equivoche vie di popolarita...Si vuol lanciare 
l1Italia in una direzione che riteniamo errata, 
si approfitta del movimento patriottico per 
trascinare il paese nell1imperialismo.171
By June 1920 Luigi Albertini could demand 'che Giolitti
172affronti la lotta contro il nazionalismo.' However it 
was the decision taken five years earlier for intervention
169 ibid. , p. 88. Victory with Germany would only make 
Italy first amongst the vassal states.
170 On Barr&re's activities in May 1915, see Nitti, op. 
cit., pp. 51-6. For the prefect's reports, see A.C.S., 
Min. dell Int., Dir. Gen. Pubb. Sicc., 1914-18, b. 1-9; 
and G. Giolitti, Quarant'anni, pp. 170-2
171 La Voce, VII (1915), now in La cultura, vol. V, pp. 
733-37 at 734
172 G.Giolitti, op. oit., vol. 3 ; p. 276, 12 June 1920. 
Intercepted phone call between Albertini and Amendola.
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which had done much to undermine Giolitti's position, and
had indeed been supported "by Albertini and many others
for that very reason. Giolitti made clear his own thoughts
on the events surrounding intervention in an electoral
address of October 1919, when he argued that
Sarebbe una grande garanzia di pace se in tutti i 
paesi fossero le rappresentanze popolari a dirigere 
la politica estera; poiche cosl sarebbe esclusa 
la possibility che minoranze audaci, o governi 
senza coscienza riescano a portare in guerra un 
popolo contro la sua volonty.173
173 G. Giolitti, Discorsi extraparlamentari, p. 313. Disc- 
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